Eudemian Ethics/Book 1

by Aristotle

ETHICA EUDEMIA

BOOK I

I

The man who stated his judgement in the god's precinct in Delos made an inscription on the propylaeum to the temple of Leto, in which he separated from one another the good, the beautiful, and the pleasant as not all properties of the same thing; he wrote, 'Most beautiful is what is most just, but best is health, and pleasantest the obtaining of what one desires.' But let us disagree with him; for happiness is at once the most beautiful and best of all things and also the pleasantest.

Now about each thing and kind there are many views that are disputed and need investigation; of these some concern knowledge only, some the acquisition of things and the performance of acts as well. About those which involve speculative philosophy only we must at a suitable opportunity say what is relevant to that study. But first we must consider in what the happy life consists and how it is to be acquired, whether all who receive the epithet 'happy' become so by nature (as we become tall, short, or of different complexions), or by teaching (happiness being a sort of science), or by some sort of discipline—for men acquire many qualities neither by nature nor by teaching but by habituation, bad qualities if they are habituated to the bad, good if to the good. Or do men become happy in none of these ways, but either—like those possessed by nymphs or deities—through a sort of divine influence, being as it were inspired, or through chance? For many declare happiness to be identical with good luck.

That men, then, possess happiness through all or some or one of these causes is evident; for practically all new creations come under these principles—for all acts arising from intelligence may be included among acts that arise from knowledge. Now to be happy, to live blissfully and beautifully, must consist mainly in three things, which seem most desirable; for some say prudence^[1] is the greatest good, some virtue, and some pleasure. Some also dispute about the magnitude of the contribution made by each of these elements to happiness, some declaring the contribution of one to be greater, some that of another,—these regarding prudence as a greater good than virtue, those the opposite, while others regard pleasure as a greater good than either: and some consider the happy life to be compounded of all or of two of these, while others hold it to consist in one of them alone.

2

First then about these things we must enjoin every one 3 that has the power to live according to his own choice to set up for himself some object for the beautiful life to aim at, (whether honour or reputation or wealth or culture), with reference to which he will then do all his acts, since not to have one's life organized in view of some end is a mark of much folly. Then above all we must first define to ourselves without hurry or carelessness in which of our belongings the happy life is lodged, and what are the indispensable conditions of its attainment—for health is not the same as the indispensable conditions of health; and so it is with many other things, e.g. the beautiful life and its indispensable conditions are not identical. Of such things some are not peculiar to health or even to life, but common—to speak broadly—to all dispositions and actions, e.g. without breathing or being awake or having the power of movement we could enjoy neither good nor evil; but some are indispensable conditions in a more special sense and peculiar to each kind of thing, and these it is specially important to observe; e.g. the eating of meat and walking after meals are more peculiarly the indispensable conditions of a good physical state than the more general conditions mentioned above. For herein is the cause of the disputes about happy living, its nature and causes; for some take to be elements in happiness what are merely its indispensable conditions.

3

To examine then all the views held about happiness is superfluous, for children, sick people, and the insane all have views, but no sane person would dispute over them; for such persons need not argument but years in which they may change, or else medical or political correction—for medicine, no less than stripes, is a correction. Similarly we have not to consider the views of the multitude (for they talk without consideration about almost everything, and most about happiness); for it is absurd to apply argument

to those who need not argument but suffering. But since every study has its special problems, evidently there are such relating to the best life and best existence; the opinions then that put these difficulties it is well to examine, for a disputant's refutation of what is opposed to his argument is a demonstration of the argument itself.

Further, it is proper not to neglect these considerations, especially with a view to that at which all inquiry should be directed, viz. the causes that enable us to share in the good and beautiful life—if any one finds it invidious to call it the blessed life—and with a view to the hope we may have of attaining each good. For if the beautiful life consists in what is due to fortune or nature, it would be something that many cannot hope for, since its acquisition is not in their power, nor attainable by their care or activity; but if it depends on the individual and his personal acts being of a certain character, then the supreme good would be both more general and more divine, more general because more would be able to possess it, more divine because happiness would then be the prize offered to those who make themselves and their acts of a certain character.

4

Most of the doubts and difficulties raised will become clear, if we define well what we ought to think happiness to be, whether that it consists merely in having the soul of a certain character—as some of the sages and older writers thought — or whether the man must indeed be of a certain character, but it is even more necessary that his acts should be of a certain character.

Now if we make a division of the kinds of life, some do not even pretend to this sort of well-being, being only pursued for the sake of what is necessary, e. g. those concerned with vulgar arts, or with commercial or servile occupations — by vulgar I mean arts pursued only with a view to reputa- tion, by servile those which are sedentary and wage-earning, by commercial those connected with buying in markets^[2] and huckstering in shops. But there are also three goods directed to a happy employment of life, those which we have above^[3] called the three greatest of human goods, virtue, prudence, and pleasure. We thus see that there are

three lives which all those choose who have power, viz. the lives of 'the political man', the philosopher, the voluptuary; for of these the philosopher intends to occupy himself with prudence and contemplation of truth, the ' political man ' with noble acts (i. e. those springing from virtue), the volup- tuary with bodily pleasures. Therefore the latter calls a^[4] different person happy, as was indeed said before.^[5] Anaxagoras of Clazomenae being asked, 'Who was the happiest of men?' answered, 'None of those you sup- pose, but one who would appear a strange being to you,' because he saw that the questioner thought it impos- sible for one not great and beautiful or rich to deserve the epithet 'happy', while he himself perhaps thought that the man who lived painlessly and pure of injustice or else engaged in some divine contemplation was really, as far as a man may be, blessed.

5

About many other things it is difficult to judge well, but most difficult about that on which judgement seems to all easiest and the knowledge of it in the power of any man — viz. what of all that is found in living is desirable, and what, if

26-121 s^J ij^ = E.N. 1095^ 14-1096* 10. attained, would satisfy our desire. For there are many consequences of life that make men fling away life, as disease, excessive pain, storms, so that it is clear that, if one were given the power of choice, not to be born at all would, as far at least as these reasons go, have been desirable. Further, the life we lead as children is not desirable,^[6] for no one in his senses would consent to return again to this. Further, many incidents involving neither pleasure nor pain or involv- ing pleasure but not of a noble kind are such that, as far as they are concerned, non-existence is preferable to life. And generally, if one were to bring together all that all men do and experience but not willingly because not for its own sake, and were to add to this an existence of infinite duration, one would none the more on account of these experiences choose existence rather than non-existence. But further, neither for the pleasure of eating alone or that of sex, if all the other pleasures were removed that knowing or seeing or any other sense provides men with, would a single man value existence, unless he were utterly servile, for it is clear that to the man making this choice there would be no differ- ence between being born a brute and a man ; at any rate the ox in Egypt, which they reverence as Apis, in most of such matters has more power than many monarchs. We may say the same of the pleasure of sleeping. For what is the difference between sleeping an unbroken sleep from one's first day to one's last, say for a thousand or any number of years, and living the life of a plant ? Plants at any rate seem to possess this sort of existence, and similarly children ; for children, too, continue having their nature from their first coming into being in their mother's womb, but sleep the entire time. It is clear then from these considerations that men, though they look, fail to see what is well-being, what is the good in life.

And so they tell us that Anaxagoras answered a man who was raising problems of this sort and asking why one should choose rather to be born than not — 'for the sake of

34: cf. E. N. 1095^b 19 sq. viewing the heavens and the whole order of the universe'. He, then, thought the choice of life for the sake of some sort of knowledge to be precious; but those who felicitate Sardanapallus or Smindyrides the Sybarite or any other of those who live the voluptuary's life, these seem all to place happiness in the feeling of pleasure. But others would rather choose virtuous deeds than either any sort of wisdom or sensual pleasures; at any rate some choose these not only for the sake of reputation, but even when they are not going to win credit by them; but most 'political' men are not truly so called; they are not in truth 'political', for the 'political' man is one who chooses noble acts for their own sake, while most take up the 'political' life for the sake of money and greed.

From what has been said, then, it is clear that all connect happiness with one or other of three lives, the 'political', the philosophic, and the voluptuary's. Now among these the nature and quality and sources of the pleasure of the body and sensual enjoyment are clear, so that we have not to inquire what such pleasures are, but whether they tend to happiness or not and how they tend, and whether—supposing it right to attach to the noble life certain pleasures—it is right to attach these, or whether some other sort of participation in these is a necessity, but the pleasures through which men rightly think the happy man to live pleasantly and not merely painlessly are different.

But about these let us inquire later.^[7] First let us consider about virtue and prudence, the nature of each, and whether they are parts of the good life either in themselves or through the actions that arise from them, since all—or at least all important thinkers—connect happiness with these.

Socrates, then, the elder,^[8] thought the knowledge of virtue to be the end, and used to inquire what is justice, what bravery and each of the parts of virtue; and his conduct

15: cf. E.N. 1095^b 21 sq.

21-23: cf. E.N. 1095^b 22 sq.

28, 29: cf. E. N. 1095^b 14-1096^a 5.

3-25: cf. M. M. 1182^a 1-7, and 1183^b 8-18. was reasonable, for he thought all the virtues to be kinds of knowledge, so that to know justice and to be just came simultaneously ; for the moment that we have learned geometry or architecture we are architects and geometers. Therefore he inquired what virtue is, not how or from what it arises. This is correct with regard to theoretical know- ledge, for there is no other part of astronomy or physics or geometry except knowing and contemplating the nature of the things which are the subjects of those sciences ; though nothing prevents them from being in an incidental way use- ful to us for much that we cannot do without. But the end of the productive sciences is different from science and knowledge, e. g. health from medical science, law and order (or something of the sort) from political science. Now to know anything that is noble is itself noble ; but regarding virtue, at least, not to know what it is, but to know out of what it arises is most precious. For we do not wish to know what bravery is but to be brave, nor what justice is but to be just, just as we wish to be in health rather than to know what being in health is, and to have our body in good condition rather than to know what good condition is.

6

About all these matters we must try to get conviction by argument, using perceived facts as evidence and illustration. It would be best that all men should clearly concur with what we are going to say, but if that is unattainable, then that all should in some way at least concur. And this if converted they will do, for every man has some contribution to make to the truth, and with this as a starting-point we must give some sort of proof about these matters. For by advancing from true but obscure judgements he will arrive at clear ones, exchanging ever the usual confused statement for more real knowledge. Now in every inquiry there is a difference between philosophic and unphilosophic argument; therefore we should not think even in political philosophy that the sort of consideration which not only makes the nature of the thing evident but also its cause is superfluous;

20-25 = E, N. 1103^b 26-29 : cf. M.M. I. I.

26 sq. = E. N. 1098^b 8 sq.

35-1217* 17 : cf. E. N. 1094^b 11-27, 1095¹ 30-^b13. for such consideration is in every inquiry the truly philo- sophic method. But this needs much caution. For there are some who, through thinking it to be the mark of philosopher to make no arbitrary statement but always to give a reason, often unawares give reasons foreign to the subject and idle — this they do sometimes from ignorance, sometimes because they are charlatans — by which reasons even men experienced and able to act are trapped by those who neither have nor are capable of having practical and constructive intelligence. And this happens to them from want of culture ; for inability in regard to each matter to distinguish reasonings appropriate to the subject from those foreign to it is want of culture. And it is well to criticize separately the reason that gives the cause and the conclusion both because of what has just been said,^[9] viz. that one should attend not merely to what is inferred by argument, but often attend more to perceived facts — whereas now when men are unable to see a flaw in the argument they are compelled to believe what has been said — and because often that which seems to have been shown by argument is true indeed, but not for the cause which the argument assigns ; for one may prove truth by means of falsehood, as is clear from the Analytics.^[10]

7

After these further preliminary remarks let us start on 7 our discourse from what we have called^[11] the first confused judgements, and then^[12] seek to discover a clear judgement about the nature of happiness. Now this is admitted to be the greatest and best of human goods — we say human, for there might perhaps be a happiness peculiar to some superior being, e.g. a god ; for of the other animals, which are inferior in their nature to men, none have a right to the epithet 'happy'; for no horse, bird, or fish is happy, nor anything the name of which does not imply some share of a

21 sq. = E. N. 1095^a 16–20. 22–24 = E. N. 1102^a 13: cf. M. M. 1182^b 2–5. 24–29 = E.N. 1099^b 32–1100^a I. divine element in its nature ; but in virtue of some other sort of participation in good things some have a better existence, some a worse.

But we must see later that this is so.^[13] At present we say that of goods some are within the range of human action, some not ; and this we say because some things—and therefore also some good things— are incapable of change, yet these are perhaps as to their nature the best. Some things, again, are within the range of action, but only to beings superior to us. But since 'within the range of action' is an ambiguous phrase — for both that for the sake of which we act and the things we do for its sake have to do with practice and thus we put among things within the range of action both health and wealth and the acts done for the sake of these ends, i.e. wholesome conduct and money-bringing conduct — it is clear that we must regard happiness as the best of what is within the range of action for man.

8

We must then examine what is the best, and in how many senses we use the word. The answer is principally contained in three views.^[14] For men say that the good per se is the best of all things, the good per se being that whose property is to be the original good and the cause by its presence in other things of their being good ; both of which attributes belong to the Idea of good (I mean by 'both' that of being the original good and also the cause of other things being good by its presence in them) ; for good is predicated of this Idea most truly (other things being good by participation in and likeness to this) ; and this is the original good, for the destruction of that which is partici- pated in involves also the destruction of that which partici- pates in the Idea, and is named from its participation in it.

33-35 : cf. E.N. 1141^ 34 sqq., 1178^ 7 sqq. 39 sq. : cf. E. N.

1095^^ 13-20, 2-1218* 38 = E. N. loge** ii-lo97a 13 : cf. M. M.

1182I' 10-1183^ 8, 1205a 8-1 1. Page:Works of Aristotle v9 (ed. Ross).djvu/434 Page:Works of Aristotle v9 (ed. Ross).djvu/435 Page:Works of Aristotle v9 (ed. Ross).djvu/436 Page:Works of Aristotle v9 (ed. Ross).djvu/437

1. 'Prudence,' the traditional rendering of ϕρόνησις.
2. (Greek characters) (Fr. and P_b).
3. Cf. 1214^a 30-3.
4. Sus.'s <(Greek characters)) not wanted.
5. Cf. 1214^a 30-^b5.
6. Omitting τίς and the note of interrogation.
7. No such discussion is to be found in the treatise, but cf. E. N. 1153^b7–25.
8. Distinguished from the younger Socrates, a pupil of Plato.
9. Cf. 1216^b 26–35.
10. Cf. Anal. Pr. ii. cc. 2–4; An. Post. i 75^a 3 and 88^a 20.
11. Cf. 1216^b 32 sq.
12. ἕπειτα for έπί τό
13. No such discussion is to be found in the existing treatise.
14. The three views seem to be those referred to in 1218^b 7–11, that this good we are seeking is (1) the Idea of Good, (2) the common good, (3) the good as end.