Ex parte Bradstreet (32 U.S. 634)/Opinion of the Court

by John Marshall

United States Supreme Court

32 U.S. 634

Ex parte Martha Bradstreet

MARSHALL, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court.

After hearing counsel, and considering the cause shown by the honorable the judge for the court of the United States for the northern district of New York, this court is of opinion, that it ought not to exercise any control over the proceedings of the district court in allowing or refusing to allow amendments in the pleadings; but that every party has a right to the judgment of this court, in a suit brought by him in one of the inferior courts of the United States, provided the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of $2000.

In cases where the demand is not for money, and the nature of the action does not require the value of the thing demanded to be stated in the declaration, the practice of this court, and of the courts of the United States, is, to allow the value to be given in evidence. In pursuance of this practice, the demandant in the suits dismissed by order of the judge of the district court, had a right to give the value of the property demanded in evidence, at or before the trial of the cause; and would have a right to give it in evidence in this court. Consequently, he cannot be legally prevented from bringing his case before this tribunal. The court doth, therefore, direct that a mandamus be awarded to the judge of the court of the United States for the northern district of New York, requiring the said judge to reinstate, and proceed to try and adjudge according to the right of the case, the several writs of right, and the mises thereon joined, lately pending in said court, between Martha Bradstreet, demandant, and Apollos Cooper et al., tenants.

The following mandamus was issued by order of the court. United States of America, ss. To the Honorable Alfred CONKLIN, judge of the district court of the United States for the northern district of New York, greeting: Whereas, one Martha Bradstreet hath heretofore commenced and prosecuted, in your court, several certain real actions, or writs of right, in your court lately pending between the said Martha Bradstreet, demandant, and the following named tenants severally and respectively, to wit, Apollos Cooper and others [naming them]. And whereas, heretofore, to wit, at a session of the supreme court of the United States, held at Washington, on the second Monday of January, in the year 1832, it appeared, upon the complaint of the said Martha Bradstreet, among other things, that at a session of your said court, lately before holden by you, according to law, all and singular the said writs of right then and there pending before your said court, upon the several motions of the tenants aforesaid, were dismissed, for the reason that there was no averment of the pecuniary value of the lands demanded by the said demandant in the several counts filed and exhibited by the said demandant against the several tenants aforesaid; which orders of your said court, so dismissing the said actions, were against the will and consent of demandant; whereupon, the said supreme court, at the instance of said demandant, granted a rule requiring you to show cause, if any you had, among other things, why a writ of mandamus from the said supreme court, should not be awarded and issued to you, commanding you to reinstate and proceed to try and adjudge, according to the law and right of the case, the several writs of right aforesaid, and the mises therein joined. And whereas, at the late session of the said supreme court, held at Washington, on the second Monday of January, in the year 1833, you certified and returned to the said supreme court, together with the said rule, that after the mises had been joined in the several causes mentioned in the said rule, motions were made therein, on the part of the tenants, that the same should be dismissed, upon the ground, that the counts respectively contained no allegation of the value of the matter in dispute, and that it did not, therefore, appear by the pleadings, that the causes were within the jurisdiction of the court; that, in conformity with what appeared to have been the uniform language of the national courts upon the question, and your own views of the law, and in accordance especially with several decisions in the circuit court for the third circuit (see 4 W. C. C. 482, 624), you granted their motions; and assuming that the causes were rightly dismissed, it follows, of course, that you ought not to be required to reinstate them, unless leave ought also to be granted to the demandant to amend her counts: And whereas, afterwards, to wit, at the same session of the said supreme court last aforesaid, upon consideration of your said return and of the cause shown by you therein against the said rule's being made absolute, and against the awarding and issuing of the said writ of mandamus, and upon consideration of the arguments of counsel, as well on your behalf, showing cause as aforesaid, as on behalf of the said demandant, in support of the said rule, it was considered by the said supreme court, that you had certified and returned to the said court an insufficient cause for having dismissed the said actions, and against the awarding and issuing of the said writ of mandamus, pursuant to the rule aforesaid; the said supreme court being of opinion, and having determined and adjudged upon the matter aforesaid, that in cases where the demand is not made for money, and the nature of the action does not require the value of the thing demanded to be stated in the declaration, the practice of the said supreme court, and of the courts of the United States, is to allow the value to be given in evidence; that, in pursuance of this practice, the demandant in the suits dismissed by order of the judge of the district court, had a right to give the value of the property demanded in evidence, either at or before the trial of the cause, and would have a right to give it in evidence in the said supreme court; consequently, that she cannot be legally prevented from bringing her cases before the said supreme court; and it was also then and there considered by the said supreme court, that the peremptory writ of the United States issue, requiring and commanding you, the said judge of the said district court, to reinstate and proceed to try and adjudge, according to the law and right of the case, the several writs of right and the mises therein joined, lately pending in your said court between the said Martha Bradstreet, demandant, and Apollos Cooper and others, the tenants aforesaid: Therefore, you are hereby commanded and enjoined, that immediately after the receipt of this writ, and without delay, you reinstate and proceed to try and adjudge according to the law and right of the case, the several writs of right and the mises therein joined, lately pending in your said court between the said Martha Bradstreet, demandant, and the said Apollos Cooper and others, the tenants herein-above named, so that complaint be not again made to the said supreme court; and that you certify perfect obedience and due execution of this writ to the said supreme court, to be held on the first Monday in August next. Hereof fail not, at your peril, and have then there this writ.

Witness the honorable John MARSHALL, chief justice of said supreme court, the second Monday of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirty-three.

W. T. CARROLL, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States.

Notes