Farni v. Tesson/Opinion of the Court

by Robert Cooper Grier

United States Supreme Court

66 U.S. 309

Farni  v.  Tesson

The amendments made to the declaration after demurrer have not removed the original mistake, as to the parties who should have been joined as plaintiffs. In an action of debt on bond, the demand is for the penalty. The condition of the bond is no part of the obligation. It is true, the judgment for the penalty will be released, on performance of the condition annexed to it. The plaintiff may declare on it as single, and defendant would then have to pray oyer of the deed, and have the condition put on the record, so that he could plead a performance of it, or any other defence founded on it. The bond being set forth at length in the declaration, precluded the necessity of oyer, but did not relieve the pleader from the mistake patent in his plea. He sues on a several covenant to pay a sum of money to A, and shows a covenant to pay A B and C jointly. If one of the joint covenantees be dead, a suggestion of that fact is sufficient to show a right to sue in the names of the survivors. If, by the condition, the money to be recovered be not for the joint benefit of all, the suggestion of that fact cannot alter the obligation; but will show only that, though all the parties to it should join in the suit, and show a legal title to recover, the judgment will be for the use of the party named in the condition, and equitably entitled to the money. The true reason for the course pursued by the pleader in this case, though not alleged in the pleading, was, perhaps, to give jurisdiction to the Circuit Court of the United States, by omitting the names of obligees who are citizens of Illinois. But it is admitted that such a reason, even if alleged in the pleading, would not have cured the omission.

It is an elemental principle of the common law, that where a contract is joint and not several, all the joint obligees who are alive must be joined as plaintiffs, and that the defendant can object to a non-joinder of plaintiffs, not only by demurrer but in arrest of judgment, under the plea of the general issue.

When there are several covenants by the obligors, as, for instance, to 'pay $300 to A and B, viz: to A $100, and B $200,' no doubt each may sue alone on his several covenant. The true rule, as stated by Baron Parke, is, that 'a covenant may be construed to be joint or several, according to the interests of the parties appearing upon the face of the obligation, if the words are capable of such a construction; but it will not be construed to be several, by reason of several interests, if it be expressly joint.' In this case, the covenant is joint, and will admit of no construction. The condition annexed cannot affect the plain words of the obligation.

It has not been denied on the argument that such is the established rule of the law, and such the plain construction of the bond; but it is insisted, that the court should disregard it as merely a technical rule, which does not affect the merits of the controversy. The same reason would require the court to reject all rules of pleading. These rules are founded on sound reason, and long experience of their benefits.

It is no wrong or hardship to suitors who come to the courts for a remedy, to be required to do it in the mode established by the law. State legislatures may substitute, by codes, the whims of sciolists and inventors for the experience and wisdom of ages; but the success of these experiments is not such as to allure the court to follow their example. If any one should be curious on this subject, the cases of Randon vs. Toby, (11 How., 517;) of Bennet vs. Butterworth, (ib., 667;) of McFaul vs. Ramsey, (20 How., 523;) and Green vs. Custard, (23 How., 484,) may be consulted.

The judgment of the Circuit Court is therefore reversed, with costs.

Notes