Flast v. Cohen/Opinion of the Court

by Earl Warren

United States Supreme Court

392 U.S. 83

Flast  v.  Cohen

 Argued: March 12, 1968. --- Decided: June 10, 1968

In Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923), this Court ruled that a federal taxpayer is without standing to challenge the constitutionality of a federal statute. That ruling has stood for 45 years as an impenetrable barrier to suits against Acts of Congress brought by individuals who can assert only the interest of federal taxpayers. In this case, we must decide whether the Frothingham barrier should be lowered when a taxpayer attacks a federal statute on the ground that it violates the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment.

Appellants filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to enjoin the allegedly unconstitutional expenditure of federal funds under Titles I and II of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 27, 20 U.S.C. §§ 241a et seq., 821 et seq. (1964 ed., Supp. II). The complaint alleged that the seven appellants had as a common attribute that 'each pay(s) income taxes of the United States,' and it is clear from the complaint that the appellants were resting their standing to maintain the action solely on their status as federal taxpayers. ^[1] The appellees, who are charged by Congress with administering the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, were sued in their official capacities.

The gravamen of the appellants' complaint was that federal funds appropriated under the Act were being used to finance instruction in reading, arithmetic, and other subjects in religious schools, and to purchase textbooks and other instructional materials for use in such schools. Such expenditures were alleged to be in contravention of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. Appellants' constitutional attack focused on the statutory criteria which state and local authorities must meet to be eligible for federal grants under the Act. Title I of the Act establishes a program for financial assistance to local educational agencies for the education of low-income families. Federal payments are made to state educational agencies, which pass the payments on in the form of grants to local educational agencies. Under § 205 of the Act, 20 U.S.C. § 241e, a local educational agency wishing to have a plan or program funded by a grant must submit the plan or program to the appropriate state educational agency for approval. The plan or program must be 'consistent with such basic criteria as the (appellee United States Commissioner of Education) may establish.' The specific criterion of that section attacked by the appellants is the requirement

'that, to the extent consistent with the number of educationally deprived children in the school district of the local educational agency who are enrolled in private elementary and secondary schools, such agency has made provision for including special educational services and arrangements (such as dual enrollment, educational radio and television, and mobile educational services and equipment) in which such children can participate * * *.' 20 U.S.C. § 241e(a)(2).

Under § 206 of the Act, 20 U.S.C. § 241f, the Commissioner of Education is given broad powers to supervise a State's participation in Title I programs and grants. Title II of the Act establishes a program of federal grants for the acquisition of school library resources, textbooks, and other printed and published instructional materials 'for the use of children and teachers in public and private elementary and secondary schools.' 20 U.S.C. § 821. A State wishing to participate in the program must submit a plan to the Commissioner for approval, and the plan must

'provide assurance that to the extent consistent with law such library resources, textbooks, and other instructional materials will be provided on an equitable basis for the use of children and teachers in private elementary and secondary schools in the State * * *.' 20 U.S.C. § 823(a)(3)(B). While disclaiming any intent to challenge as unconstitutional all programs under Title I of the Act, the complaint alleges that federal funds have been disbursed under the Act, 'with the consent and approval of the (appellees),' and that such funds have been used and will continue to be used to finance 'instruction in reading, arithmetic and other subjects and for guidance in religious and sectarian schools' and 'the purchase of textbooks and instructional and library materials for use in religious and sectarian schools.' Such expenditures of federal tax funds, appellants alleged, violate the First Amendment because 'they constitute a law respecting an establishment of religion' and because 'they prohibit the free exercise of religion on the part of the (appellants) * * * by reason of the fact that they constitute compulsory taxation for religious purposes.' The complaint asked for a declaration that appellees' actions in approving the expenditure of federal funds for the alleged purposes were not authorized by the Act or, in the alternative, that if appellees' actions are deemed within the authority and intent of the Act, 'the Act is to that extent unconstitutional and void.' The complaint also prayed for an injunction to enjoin appellees from approving any expenditure of federal funds for the allegedly unconstitutional purposes. The complaint further requested that a three-judge court be convened as provided in 28 U.S.C. §§ 282, 2284.

The Government moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that appellants lacked standing to maintain the action. District Judge Frankel, who considered the motion, recognized that Frothingham v. Mellon, supra, provided 'powerful' support for the Government's position, but he ruled that the standing question was of sufficient substance to warrant the convening of a three-judge court to decide the question. 267 F.Supp. 351 (1967). The three-judge court received briefs and heard arguments limited to the standing question, and the court ruled on the authority of Frothingham that appellants lacked standing. Judge Frankel dissented. 271 F.Supp. 1 (1967). From the dismissal of their complaint on that ground, appellants appealed directly to this Court, 28 U.S.C. § 1253, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 389 U.S. 895, 88 S.Ct. 218, 19 L.Ed.2d 212 (1967). For reasons explained at length below, we hold that appellants do have standing as federal taxpayers to maintain this action, and the judgment below must be reversed.

We must deal first with the Government's contention that this Court lacks jurisdiction on direct appeal because a three-judge court was improperly convened below. ^[2] Under 28 U.S.C. § 1253, direct appeal to this Court from a district court lies only 'from an order granting or denying * * * an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges.' Thus, if the Government is correct, we lack jurisdiction over this direct appeal.

The Government's argument on this question is two-pronged. First, noting that appellants have conceded that the case should be deemed one limited to the practices of the New York City Board of Education, the Government contends that appellants wish only to forbid specific local programs which they find objectionable and not to enjoin the operation of the broad range of programs under the statutory scheme. Only if the latter relief is sought, the Government argues, can a three-judge court properly be convened under 28 U.S.C. § 2282. We cannot accept the Government's argument in the context of this case. It is true that the appellants' complaint makes specific reference to the New York City Board of Education's programs which are funded under the challenged statute, and we can assume that appellants' proof at trial would focus on those New York City programs. However, we view these allegations of the complaint as imparting specificity and focus to the issues in the lawsuit and not as limiting the impact of the constitutional challenge made in this case. The injunctive relief sought by appellants is not limited to programs in operation in New York City but extends to any program that would have the unconstitutional features alleged in the complaint. Congress enacted § 2282 'to prevent a single federal judge from being able to paralyze totally the operation of an entire regulatory scheme * * * by issuance of a broad injunctive order.' Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 154, 83 S.Ct. 554, 560, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963). If the District Court in this case were to rule for appellants on the merits of their constitutional attack on New York City's federally funded programs, that decision would cast sufficient doubt on similar programs elsewhere as to cause confusion approaching paralysis to surround the challenged statute. Therefore, even if the injunction which might issue in this case were narrower than that sought by appellants, we are satisfied that the legislative policy underlying § 2282 was served by the convening of a three-judge court, despite appellants' focus on New York City's programs.

Secondly, the Government argues that a three-judge court should not have been convened because appellants question not the constitutionality of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 but its administration. ^[3] The decision in Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 85 S.Ct. 1271, 14 L.Ed.2d 179 (1965), is dispositive on this issue. It is true that appellants' complaint states a nonconstitutional ground for relief, namely, that appellees' actions in approving the expenditure of federal funds for allegedly unconstitutional programs are in excess of their authority under the Act. However, the complaint also requests an alternative and constitutional ground for relief, namely, a declaration that, if appellees' actions 'are within the authority and intent of the Act, the Act is to that extent unconstitutional and void.' The Court noted in Zemel v. Rusk, supra, '(W)e have often held that a litigant need not abandon his nonconstitutional arguments in order to obtain a three-judge court.' 381 U.S., at 5-6, 85 S.Ct. at 1275. See also Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73, 80 S.Ct. 568, 4 L.Ed.2d 568 (1960); Allen v. Grand Central Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535, 74 S.Ct. 745, 98 L.Ed. 933 (1954). The complaint in this case falls within that rule.

Thus, since the three-judge court was properly convened below, ^[4] direct appeal to this Court is proper. We turn now to the standing question presented by this case.

This Court first faced squarely ^[5] the question whether a litigant asserting only his status as a taxpayer has standing to maintain a suit in a federal court in Frothingham v. Mellon, supra, and that decision must be the starting point for analysis in this case. The taxpayer in Frothingham attacked as unconstitutional the Maternity Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 224, which established a federal program of grants to those States which would undertake programs to reduce maternal and infant mortality. The taxpayer alleged that Congress, in enacting the challenged statute, had exceeded the powers delegated to it under Article I of the Constitution and had invaded the legislative province reserved to the several States by the Tenth Amendment. The taxpayer complained that the result of the allegedly unconstitutional enactment would be to increase her future federal tax liability and 'thereby take her property without due process of law.' 262 U.S., at 486, 43 S.Ct. at 600. The Court noted that a federal taxpayer's 'interest in the moneys of the treasury * * * is comparatively minute and indeterminable' and that 'the effect upon future taxation, of any payment out of the (Treasury's) funds, * * * (is) remote, fluctuating and uncertain.' Id., at 487, 43 S.Ct. at 601. As a result, the Court ruled that the taxpayer had failed to allege the type of 'direct injury' necessary to confer standing. Id., at 488, 43 S.Ct. at 601.

Although the barrier Frothingham erected against federal taxpayer suits has never been breached, the decision has been the source of some confusion and the object of considerable criticism. The confusion has developed as commentators have tried to determine whether Frothingham establishes a constitutional bar to taxpayer suits or whether the Court was simply imposing a rule of self-restraint which was not constitutionally compelled. ^[6] The conflicting viewpoints are reflected in the arguments made to this Court by the parties in this case. The Government has pressed upon us the view that Frothingham announced a constitutional rule, compelled by the Article III limitations on federal court jurisdiction and grounded in considerations of the doctrine of separation of powers. Appellants, however, insist that Frothingham expressed no more than a policy of judicial self-restraint which can be disregarded when compelling reasons for assuming jurisdiction over a taxpayer's suit exist. The opinion delivered in Frothingham can be read to support either position. ^[7] The concluding sentence of the opinion states that, to take jurisdiction of the taxpayer's suit, 'would be not to decide a judicial controversy, but to assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of another and co-equal department, an authority which plainly we do not possess.' 262 U.S., at 489, 43 S.Ct. 601. Yet the concrete reasons given for denying standing to a federal taxpayer suggest that the Court's holding rests on something less than a constitutional foundation. For example, the Court conceded that standing had previously been conferred on municipal taxpayers to sue in that capacity. However, the Court viewed the interest of a federal taxpayer in total federal tax revenues as 'comparatively minute and indeterminable' when measured against a municipal taxpayer's interest in a smaller city treasury. Id., at 486-487, 43 S.Ct. at 579-601. This suggests that the petitioner in Frothingham was denied standing not because she was a taxpayer but because her tax bill was not large enough. In addition, the Court spoke of the 'attendant inconveniences' of entertaining that taxpayer's suit because it might open the door of federal courts to countless such suits 'in respect of every other appropriation act and statute whose administration requires the outlay of public money, and whose validity may be questioned.' Id., at 487, 43 S.Ct. at 601. Such a statement suggests pure policy considerations.

To the extent that Frothingham has been viewed as resting on policy considerations, it has been criticized as depending on assumptions not consistent with modern conditions. For example, some commentators have pointed out that a number of corporate taxpayers today have a federal tax liability running into hundreds of millions of dollars, and such taxpayers have a far greater monetary stake in the Federal Treasury than they do in any municipal treasury. ^[8] To some degree, the fear expressed in Frothingham that allowing one taxpayer to sue would inundate the federal courts with countless similar suits has been mitigated by the ready availability of the devices of class actions and joinder under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted subsequent to the decision in Frothingham. ^[9] Whatever the merits of the current debate over Frothingham, its very existence suggests that we should undertake a fresh examination of the limitations upon standing to sue in a federal court and the application of those limitations to taxpayer suits.

The jurisdiction of federal courts is defined and limited by Article III of the Constitution. In terms relevant to the question for decision in this case, the judicial power of federal courts is constitutionally restricted to 'cases' and 'controversies.' As is so often the situation in constitutional adjudication, those two words have an iceberg quality, containing beneath their surface simplicity submerged complexities which go to the very heart of our constitutional form of government. Embodied in the words 'cases' and 'controversies' are two complementary but somewhat different limitations. In part those words limit the business of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process. And in part those words define the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power to assure that the federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government. Justiciability is the term of art employed to give expression to this dual limitation placed upon federal courts by the case-and-controversy doctrine.

Justiciability is itself a concept of uncertain meaning and scope. Its reach is illustrated by the various grounds upon which questions sought to be adjudicated in federal courts have been held not to be justiciable. Thus, no justiciable controversy is presented when the parties seek adjudication of only a political question, ^[10] when the parties are asking for an advisory opinion, ^[11] when the question sought to be adjudicated has been mooted by subsequent developments, ^[12] and when there is no standing to maintain the action. ^[13] Yet it remains true that '(j)usticiability is * * * not a legal concept with a fixed content or susceptible of scientific verification. Its utilization is the resultant of many subtle pressures * * *.' Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 508, 81 S.Ct. 1752, 1759, 6 L.Ed.2d 989 (1961).

Part of the difficulty in giving precise meaning and form to the concept of justiciability stems from the uncertain historical antecedents of the case-and-controversy doctrine. For example, Mr. Justice Frankfurter twice suggested that historical meaning could be imparted to the concepts of justiciability and case and controversy by reference to the practices of the courts of Westminster when the Constitution was adopted. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150, 71 S.Ct. 624, 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951) (concurring opinion); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460, 59 S.Ct. 972, 985, 83 L.Ed. 1385 (1939) (separate opinion). However, the power of English judges to deliver advisory opinions was well established at the time the Constitution was drafted. 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 127-128 (1958). And it is quite clear that 'the oldest and most consistent thread in the federal law of justiciability is that the federal courts will not give advisory opinions.' C. Wright, Federal Courts 34 (1963). ^[14] Thus, the implicit policies embodied in Article III, and not history alone, impose the rule against advisory opinions on federal courts. When the federal judicial power is invoked to pass upon the validity of actions by the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government, the rule against advisory opinions implements the separation of powers prescribed by the Constitution and confines federal courts to the role assigned them by Article III. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 31 S.Ct. 250, 55 L.Ed. 246 (1911); 3 H. Johnston, Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay 486-489 (1891) (correspondence between Secretary of State Jefferson and Chief Justice Jay). However, the rule against advisory opinions also recognizes that such suits often 'are not pressed before the Court with that clear concreteness provided when a question emerges precisely framed and necessary for decision from a clash of adversary argument exploring every aspect of a multifaced situation embracing conflicting and demanding interests.' United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157, 81 S.Ct. 547, 554, 5 L.Ed.2d 476 (1961). Consequently, the Article III prohibition against advisory opinions reflects the complementary constitutional considerations expressed by the justiciability doctrine: Federal judicial power is limited to those disputes which confine federal courts to a rule consistent with a system of separated powers and which are traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process.

Additional uncertainty exists in the doctrine of justiciability because that doctrine has become a blend of constitutional requirements and policy considerations. And a policy limitation is 'not always clearly distinguished from the constitutional limitation.' Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255, 73 S.Ct. 1031, 1034, 97 L.Ed. 1586 (1953). For example, in his concurring opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 345-348, 56 S.Ct. 466, 482-483, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936), Mr. Justice Brandeis listed seven rules developed by this Court 'for its own governance' to avoid passing prematurely on constitutional questions. Because the rules operate in 'cases confessedly within (the Court's) jurisdiction,' id., at 346, 56 S.Ct. at 482, they find their source in policy, rather than purely constitutional, considerations. However, several of the cases cited by Mr. Justice Brandeis in illustrating the rules of self-governance articulated purely constitutional grounds for decision. See, e.g., Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923); Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 42 S.Ct. 274, 66 L.Ed. 499 (1922); Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 12 S.Ct. 400, 36 L.Ed. 176 (1892). The 'many subtle pressures' ^[15] which cause policy considerations to blend into the constitutional limitations of Article III make the justiciability doctrine one of uncertain and shifting contours.

It is in this context that the standing question presented by this case must be viewed and that the Government's argument on that question must be evaluated. As we understand it, the Government's position is that the constitutional scheme of separation of powers, and the deference owed by the federal judiciary to the other two branches of government within that scheme, present an absolute bar to taxpayer suits challenging the validity of federal spending programs. The Government views such suits as involving no more than the mere disagreement by the taxpayer 'with the uses to which tax money is put.' ^[16] According to the Government, the resolution of such disagreements is committed to other branches of the Federal Government and not to the judiciary. Consequently, the Government contends that, under no circumstances, should standing be conferred on federal taxpayers to challenge a federal taxing or spending program. ^[17] An analysis of the function served by standing limitations compels a rejection of the Government's position.

Standing is an aspect of justiciability and, as such, the problem of standing is surrounded by the same complexities and vagaries that inhere in justiciability. Standing has been called one of 'the must amorphous (concepts) in the entire domain of public law.' ^[18] Some of the complexities peculiar to standing problems result because standing 'serves, on occasion, as a shorthand expression for all the various elements of justiciability.' ^[19] In addition, there are at work in the standing doctrine the many subtle pressures which tend to cause policy considerations to blend into constitutional limitations. ^[20]

Despite the complexities and uncertainties, some meaningful form can be given to the jurisdictional limitations placed on federal court power by the concept of standing. The fundamental aspect of standing is that it focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated. The 'gist of the question of standing' is whether the party seeking relief has 'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.' Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). In other words, when standing is placed in issue in a case, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable. ^[21] Thus, a party may have standing in a particular case, but the federal court may nevertheless decline to pass on the merits of the case because, for example, it presents a political question. ^[22] A proper party is demanded so that federal courts will not be asked to decide 'illdefined controversies over constitutional issues,' United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 90, 67 S.Ct. 556, 564, 91 L.Ed. 754 (1947), or a case which is of 'a hypothetical or abstract character.' Aetna Life Insurance Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 27, 240, 57 S.Ct. 461, 463, 81 L.Ed. 617 (1937). So stated, the standing requirement is closely related to, although more general than, the rule that federal courts will not entertain friendly suits, Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, supra, or those which are feigned or collusive in nature, United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 63 S.Ct. 1075, 87 L.Ed. 1413 (1943); Lord v. Veazie, 8 How. 251, 12 L.Ed. 1067 (1850).

When the emphasis in the standing problem is placed on whether the person invoking a federal court's jurisdiction is a proper party to maintain the action, the weakness of the Government's argument in this case becomes apparent. The question whether a particular person is a proper party to maintain the action does not, by its own force, raise separation of powers problems related to improper judicial interference in areas committed to other branches of the Federal Government. Such problems arise, if at all, only from the substantive issues the individual seeks to have adjudicated. Thus, in terms of Article III limitations on federal court jurisdiction, the question of standing is related only to whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution. It is for that reason that the emphasis in standing problems is on whether the party invoking federal court jurisdiction has 'a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy,' Baker v. Carr, supra, 369 U.S. at 204, 82 S.Ct. at 703, and whether the dispute touches upon 'the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.' Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, supra, 300 U.S. at 240-241, 57 S.Ct. at 464. A taxpayer may or may not have the requisite personal stake in the outcome, depending upon the circumstances of the particular case. Therefore, we find no absolute bar in Article III to suits by federal taxpayers challenging allegedly unconstitutional federal taxing and spending programs. There remains, however, the problem of determining the circumstances under which a federal taxpayer will be deemed to have the personal stake and interest that impart the necessary concrete adverseness to such litigation so that standing can be conferred on the taxpayer qua taxpayer consistent with the constitutional limitations of Article III.

The various rules of standing appplied by federal courts have not been developed in the abstract. Rather, they have been fashioned with specific reference to the status asserted by the party whose standing is challenged and to the type of question he wishes to have adjudicated. We have noted that, in deciding the question of standing, it is not relevant that the substantive issues in the litigation might be nonjusticiable. However, our decisions establish that, in ruling on standing, it is both appropriate and necessary to look to the substantive issues for another purpose, namely, to determine whether there is a logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated. For example, standing requirements will vary in First Amendment religion cases depending upon whether the party raises an Establishment Clause claim or a claim under the Free Exercise Clause. See McGowan v. State of Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 429-430, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1106-1107, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961). Such inquiries into the nexus between the status asserted by the litigant and the claim he presents are essential to assure that he is a proper and appropriate party to invoke federal judicial power. Thus, our point of reference in this case is the standing of individuals who assert only the status of federal taxpayers and who challenge the constitutionality of a federal spending program. Whether such individuals have standing to maintain that form of action turns on whether they can demonstrate the necessary stake as taxpayers in the outcome of the litigation to satisfy Article III requirements.

The nexus demanded of federal taxpayers has two aspects to it. First, the taxpayer must establish a logical link between that status and the type of legislative enactment attacked. Thus, a taxpayer will be a proper party to allege the unconstitutionality only of exercises of congressional power under the taxing and spending clause of Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution. It will not be sufficient to allege an incidental expenditure of tax funds in the administration of an essentially regulatory statute. This requirement is consistent with the limitation imposed upon state-taxpayer standing in federal courts in Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429, 72 S.Ct. 394, 96 L.Ed. 475 (1952). Secondly, the taxpayer must establish a nexus between that status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged. Under this requirement, the taxpayer must show that the challenged enactment exceeds specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of the congressional taxing and spending power and not simply that the enactment is generally beyond the powers delegated to Congress by Art. I, § 8. When both nexuses are established, the litigant will have shown a taxpayer's stake in the outcome of the controversy and will be a proper and appropriate party to invoke a federal court's jurisdiction.

The taxpayer-appellants in this case have satisfied both nexuses to support their claim of standing under the test we announce today. Their constitutional challenge is made to an exercise by Congress of its power under Art. I, § 8, to spend for the general welfare, and the challenged program involves a substantial expenditure of federal tax funds. ^[23] In addition, appellants have alleged that the challenged expenditures violate the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. Our history vividly illustrates that one of the specific evils feared by those who drafted the Establishment Clause and fought for its adoption was that the taxing and spending power would be used to favor one religion over another or to support religion in general. James Madison, who is generally recognized as the leading architect of the religion clauses of the First Amendment, observed in his famous Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments that 'the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever.' 2 Writings of James Madison 183, 186 (Hunt ed. 1901). The concern of Madison and his supporters was quite clearly that religious liberty ultimately would be the victim if government could employ its taxing and spending powers to aid one religion over another or to aid religion in general. ^[24] The Establishment Clause was designed as a specific bulwark against such potential abuses of governmental power, and that clause of the First Amendment ^[25] operates as a specific constitutional limitation upon the exercise by Congress of the taxing and spending power conferred by Art. I, § 8.

The allegations of the taxpayer in Frothingham v. Mellon, supra, were quite different from those made in this case, and the result in Frothingham is consistent with the test of taxpayer standing announced today. The taxpayer in Frothingham attacked a federal spending program and she, therefore, established the first nexus required. However, she lacked standing because her constituional attack was not based on an allegation that Congress, in enacting the Maternity Act of 1921, had breached a specific limitation upon its taxing and spending power. The taxpayer in Frothingham alleged essentially that Congress, by enacting the challenged statute, had exceeded the general powers delegated to it by Art. I, § 8, and that Congress had thereby invaded the legislative province reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment. To be sure, Mrs. Frothingham made the additional allegation that her tax liability would be increased as a result of the allegedly unconstitutional enactment, and she framed that allegation in terms of a deprivation of property without due process of law. However, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not protect taxpayers against increases in tax liability, and the taxpayer in Frothingham failed to make any additional claim that the harm she alleged resulted from a breach by Congress of the specific constitutional limitations imposed upon an exercise of the taxing and spending power. In essence, Mrs. Frothingham was attempting to assert the States' interest in their legislative prerogatives and not a federal taxpayer's interest in being free of taxing and spending in contravention of specific constitutional limitations imposed upon Congress' taxing and spending power.

We have noted that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment does specifically limit the taxing and spending power conferred by Art. I, § 8. Whether the Constitution contains other specific limitations can be determined only in the context of future cases. However, whenever such specific limitations are found, we believe a taxpayer will have a clear stake as a taxpayer in assuring that they are not breached by Congress. Consequently, we hold that a taxpayer will have standing consistent with Article III to invoke federal judicial power when he alleges that congressional action under the taxing and spending clause is in derogation of those constitutional provisions which operate to restrict the exercise of the taxing and spending power. The taxpayer's allegation in such cases would be that his tax money is being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against such abuses of legislative power. Such an injury is appropriate for judicial redress, and the taxpayer has established the necessary nexus between his status and the nature of the allegedly unconstitutional action to support his claim of standing to secure judicial review. Under such circumstances, we feel confident that the questions will be framed with the necessary specificity, that the issues will be contested with the necessary adverseness and that the litigation will be pursued with the necessary vigor to assure that the constitutional challenge will be made in a form traditionally thought to be capable of judicial resolution. We lack that confidence in cases such as Frothingham where a taxpayer seeks to employ a federal court as a forum in which to air his generalized grievances about the conduct of government or the allocation of power in the Federal System.

While we express no view at all on the merits of appellants' claims in this case, ^[26] their complaint contains sufficient allegations under the criteria we have outlined to give them standing to invoke a federal court's jurisdiction for an adjudication on the merits.

Reversed.

Notes

1. The complaint alleged that one of the appellants 'has children regularly registered in and attending the elementary or secondary grades in the public schools of New York.' However, the District Court did not view that additional allegation as being relevant to the question of standing, and appellants have made no effort to justify their standing on that additional ground.
2. This issue was not raised in the court below, and the Government argued it for the first time in its brief in this Court. The Government claims the inappropriateness of convening a three-judge court became apparent only as the issues in the case have been clarified by appellants. Because the question now presented goes to our jurisdiction on direct appeal, the lateness of the claim is irrelevant to our consideration of it. United States v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 226, 229, 58 S.Ct. 601, 602, 82 L.Ed. 764 (1938).
3. The Government also seems to argue that, if any administrative action is suspect, it is the action of state officials and not of appellees. For example, the Government describes federal participation in the challenged programs as 'remote.' Brief for the Appellees. The premise for this argument is apparently that, under 20 U.S.C. § 241e, programs of local educational agencies require only the direct approval of state officials to be eligible for grants. However, appellees are given broad powers of supervision over state participation by 20 U.S.C. § 241f, and it is federal funds administered by appellees that finance the local programs. We cannot characterize such federal participation as 'remote.'
4. An additional requirement for the convening of a three-judge court is that the constitutional question presented be substantial. See Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 82 S.Ct. 1294, 8 L.Ed.2d 794 (1962); Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, 54 S.Ct. 3, 78 L.Ed. 152 (1933). The Government does not dispute the substantiality of the constitutional attack made by appellants on the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. See Flast v. Gardner, 267 F.Supp. 351, 352 (1967).
5. In at least three cases prior to Frothingham, the Court accepted jurisdiction in taxpayer suits without passing directly on the standing question. Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U.S. 24, 31, 27 S.Ct. 233, 234, 51 L.Ed. 351 (1907); Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429, 438, 26 S.Ct. 674, 676 (1906); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 295, 20 S.Ct. 121, 122, 44 L.Ed. 168 (1899).
6. The prevailing view of the commentators is that Frothingham announced only a nonconstitutional rule of self-restraint. See, e.g., Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 Harv.L.Rev. 255, 302-303 (1961); Arthur Garfield Hays Civil Liberties Conference: Public Aid to Parochial Schools and Standing to Bring Suit, 12 Buffalo L.Rev. 35, 48-65 (1962); Davis, Standing to Challenge Governmental Action, 39 Minn.L.Rev. 353, 386-391 (1955). But see Hearings on S. 2097 before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 465, 467-468 (1966) (statement of Prof. William D. Valente). The lastcited hearings contain the best collection of recent expression of views on this question.
7. 'Although the Court in the latter part of the opinion used language suggesting that it did not find the elements of a justiciable controversy present in the case, the case in its central aspect turns on application of the judicially formulated (i.e., nonconstitutional) rules respecting standing.' Hearings on S. 2097, supra, n. 6, at 503 (statement of Prof. Paul G. Kauper).
8. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 2097, supra, n. 6, at 493 (statement of Prof. Kenneth C. Davis); Note, 69 Yale L.J. 895, 917, and n. 127 (1960).
9. Judge Frankel's dissent below also noted that federal courts have learned in recent years to cope effectively with 'huge litigations' and 'redundant actions.' 271 F.Supp., at 17.
10. See, e.g., Commercial Trust Co. of New Jersey v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51, 43 S.Ct. 486, 67 L.Ed. 858 (1923); Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 12 L.Ed. 581 (1849).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 81 S.Ct. 547, 5 L.Ed.2d 476 (1961); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 31 S.Ct. 250, 55 L.Ed. 246 (1911).
12. See, e.g., California v. San Pablo & T.R. Co., 149 U.S. 308, 13 S.Ct. 876, 37 L.Ed. 747 (1893).
13. See, e.g., Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 63 S.Ct. 493, 87 L.Ed. 603 (1943); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923).
14. The rule against advisory opinions was established as early as 1793, see 3 H. Johnston, Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay 486-489 (1891), and the rule has been adhered to without deviation. See United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157, 81 S.Ct. 547, 553, 5 L.Ed.2d 476 (1961), and cases cited therein.
15. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 508, 81 S.Ct. 1752, 1759, 6 L.Ed.2d 989 (1961).
16. Brief for Appellees 7.
17. The logic of the Government's argument would compel it to concede that a taxpayer would lack standing even if Congress engaged in such palpably unconstitutional conduct as providing funds for the construction of churches for particular sects. See Flast v. Gardner, D.C., 271 F.Supp. 1, 5 (1967) (dissenting opinion of Frankel, J.). The Government professes not to be bothered by such a result because it contends there might be individuals in society other than taxpayers who could invoke federal judicial power to challenge such unconstitutional appropriations. However, if as we conclude there are circumstances under which a taxpayer will be a proper and appropriate party to seek judicial review of federal statutes, the taxpayer's access to federal courts should not be barred because there might be at large in society a hypothetical plaintiff who might possibly bring such a suit.
18. Hearings on S. 2097, supra, n. 6, at 498 (statement of Prof. Paul A. Freund).
19. Lewis, Constitutional Rights and the Misuse of 'Standing,' 14 Stan.L.Rev. 433, 453 (1962).
20. Thus, a general standing limitation imposed by federal courts is that a litigant will ordinarily not be permitted to assert the rights of absent third parties. See, e.g., Heald v. District of Columbia, 259 U.S. 114, 123, 42 S.Ct. 434, 435, 66 L.Ed. 852 (1922); Yazoo & Miss. Valley R. Co. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S 217, 33 S.Ct. 40, 57 L.Ed. 193 (1912). However, this rule has not been imposed uniformly as a firm constitutional restriction on federal court jurisdiction. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486-487, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 1120-1121, 14 L.Ed.2d 22 (1965); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 73 S.Ct. 1031, 97 L.Ed. 1586 (1953).
21. This distinction has not always appeared with clarity in prior cases. See Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 Harv.L.Rev. 40, 75-76 (1961).
22. One contemporary commentator advanced such an explanation for the holding in Frothingham, suggesting that the standing rationale was simply a device used by the Court to avoid judicial inquiry into questions of social policy and the political wisdom of Congress. See Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 Harv.L.Rev. 338, 359-364 (1924).
23. Almost $1,000,000,000 was appropriated to implement the Elementary and Secondary Education Act in 1965. 79 Stat. 832.
24. The Memorial and Remonstrance was Madison's impassioned reaction to a bill introduced in the Virginia General Assembly in 1785 to provide a tax levy to support teachers of the Christian religion. Madison's eloquent opposition to the levy generated strong support in Virginia and the Assembly postponed consideration of the proposal until its next session. When the bill was revived, it died in committee and the Assembly instead enacted the famous Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty authored by Thomas Jefferson. The Virginia experience is recounted in S.C.obb, Rise of Religious Liberty in America 490-499 (1902).
25. Appellants have also alleged that the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. This Court has recognized that the taxing power can be used to infringe the free exercise of religion. Murdock v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 63 S.Ct. 870, 87 L.Ed. 1292 (1943). Since we hold that appellants' Establishment Clause claim is sufficient to establish the nexus between their status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged, we need not decide whether the Free Exercise claim, standing alone, would be adequate to conver standing in this case. We do note, however, that the challenged tax in Murdock operated upon a particular class of taxpayers. When such exercises of the taxing power are challenged, the proper party emphasis in the federal standing doctrine would require that standing be limited to the taxpayers within the affected class.
26. In fact, it is impossible to make any such judgment in the present posture of this case. The proceedings in the court below thus far have been devoted solely to the threshold question of standing, and nothing in the record bears upon the merits of the substantive questions presented in the complaint.