Glacier Northwest v. Teamsters/Opinion of Justice Alito
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 21–1449
GLACIER NORTHWEST, INC., DBA CALPORTLAND, PETITIONER v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 174
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON
[June 1, 2023]
Justice Alito, with whom Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch join, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that the Washington Supreme Court erred in holding that Glacier Northwest’s complaint is preempted under San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 (1959). The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) protects the right to strike, but that right is subject to certain limitations and qualifications, see 29 U. S. C. §163, and this Court’s decisions make clear that the Act does not protect striking employees who engage in the type of conduct alleged here.
This Court has long recognized that the Act does not “invest those who go on strike with an immunity from discharge for acts of trespass or violence against the employer’s property.” NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U. S. 240, 255 (1939). To justify “despoiling [an employer’s] property” or “the seizure and conversion of its goods,” we have reasoned, “would be to put a premium on resort to force instead of legal remedies.” Id., at 253. It follows that Garmon preemption does not prevent States from imposing liability on employees who intentionally destroy their employer’s property. See, e.g., Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm’n, 427 U. S. 132, 136 (1976) (“Policing … destruction of property has been held most clearly a matter for the States”); Construction Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U. S. 656, 669 (1954) (The NLRA does not allow employees to “destroy property without liability for the damage done”); Electrical Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U. S. 740, 748 (1942) (The NLRA “was not designed to preclude a State” from regulating threats of property damage); see also Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U. S. 53, 61–62 (1966) (“ ‘[T]here is no ground for concluding that existing criminal penalties or liabilities for tortious conduct have been eliminated’ ” by the NLRA); Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U. S. 731, 741–742 (1983) (“It has … repeatedly been held that an employer has the right to seek local judicial protection from tortious conduct during a labor dispute”).
Nothing more is needed to resolve this case. Glacier’s complaint alleges that the Union and its members acted “with the improper purpose to harm Glacier by causing [its] batched concrete to be destroyed.” App. 10; accord, id., at 14, 19–20. As the Court recognizes, they succeeded by “prompt[ing] the creation of the perishable product” and then ceasing work when the concrete was in a vulnerable state. Ante, at 10 (emphasis deleted); see App. 10–13. Because this Court has long rejected the Union’s claim that this kind of conduct is protected, Garmon preemption does not apply. See Longshoremen v. Davis, 476 U. S. 380, 395 (1986).[1]
- ↑ The Court wisely declines to address the argument on which Justice Jackson relies regarding the effect of the complaint before the NLRB on this litigation. See post, at 7–8. That argument represents a striking extension of Garmon preemption, which, as the Court notes, is already an “unusual” doctrine. See ante, at 3–4. If the state courts on remand dismiss this case on that ground, the decision, in my judgment, would be a good candidate for a quick return trip here.