Great Russia/Chapter 8
CHAPTER VIII
RUSSIA AS THE LIBERATOR OF OPPRESSED NATIONALITIES
I
THE Russian people have not only wished freedom for themselves. Long before they succeeded in conquering a measure of political liberty for themselves, they had conquered it for their brethren in the Balkan States. Whereas Austria has always stood for the oppression and suppression of small nationalities, whereas Prussia has only expanded by suppressing the Danes in Schleswig-Holstein, the Poles in Posen, the French in Alsace-Lorraine, the Russian Empire has again and again stood for the emancipation of small nationalities. Most of the wars of Russia have been holy crusades, wars for the liberation of other countries. The Battle of Navarino gave freedom to Greece. The Turkish-Russian War of 1878 gave freedom to Roumania, Serbia, and Bulgaria. If we study closely the historical record of the Russian Empire, we come to the conclusion that Russia, almost as much as France, has been the great crusading nation of history. The glorious title of "Tsar Osvoboditel," or "liberator Tsar," which is inscribed on the statue of Alexander II in the Government Square at Sofia, has been earned in like measure by Alexander I and by Alexander II.
II. The Tragedy of Poland
In at least one case Russia has been guilty of an odious crime against a weaker nationality. The suppression and oppression of Poland is the dark spot in the political history of the Russian Empire, even as the oppression of Ireland is the dark spot in the history of the British Empire. In both cases the oppression has been largely a case of religious intolerance, and has been partly a tragic inheritance of the past. But in the case of Poland it is not Russia, but Prussia, who is the main culprit. It was Frederick the Great who took the initiative of the partition of Poland, and who secured and compelled the complicity both of Russia and Austria.
Maria Theresa, after the partition of Poland, prophesied only too accurately all the evil consequences which would result from the crime. But Maria Theresa, however penitent, never surrendered the spoils. Russia, on the contrary, again and again offered to restore the independence of Poland. It was the dream of Alexander I to re-establish an autonomous Polish kingdom. All his efforts proved of no avail, partly owing to Prussian influence, partly owing to the uncompromising attitude of the Polish patriots. After the Revolution of 1830 the opportunity passed away, and the Russian Government entered an era of reaction, and from 1815 to the present day the history of the relations between Russia and Poland has been a succession of lamentable misunderstandings and political blunders.
But, however severely we may condemn Russian misgovernment in Poland, Russian policy has been enlightened compared to Prussian misgovernment in Posen. Whilst Alexander II did for the Polish peasantry what Great Britain was to do forty years after for the Irish peasantry, whilst he transferred, with the assistance of Nicolas Miloutine, the Polish land from the Polish nobles to the Polish peasants, and tried to create a class of Polish peasant proprietors, Prussia systematically attempted to expropriate the Polish peasantry, and transfer the Polish land to German settlers. And whilst Prussian Poland has been sacrificed to Prussian interests, Russian Poland has become the richest and most thriving province of the Russian Empire.
It is true that even that prosperity has not reconciled the Poles to the rule of an alien Government and to the loss of their national traditions, of their political and religious freedom. The Russian Government have understood in the end, under the pressure of national danger, that a great Slav nation with the glorious past of Poland cannot be reconciled, and will not be satisfied until it has recovered complete autonomy. That autonomy is coming at last. One of the first pronouncements of the Russian Government at the beginning of the war was the new charter of Polish freedom. Like the war of 1812 liberating Europe, like the war of 1825 liberating Greece, like the war of 1878 liberating Bulgaria, the war of 1915 will ultimately be a war of emancipation. The Treaty of Peace which will destroy German militarism will also culminate in the reconciliation of the two great representatives of the Slavonic stock, who both in the past have been the victims of Teutonic militarism.
III. The Quixotic Foreign Policy of Russia
Russia has not only defended the rights of small nationalities, she has also consistently followed a disinterested foreign policy. According to his lights, the Russian statesman has been a good European; he has waged war not in pursuance of national ends, but of general ends. There is even a great deal to be said in favour of the theories which the Slavophil Danilewski expounded in his famous book "Russia and Europe." For the Russian policy has been frequently Quixotic and regardless of Russian interests. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the one end of Russian policy was to liberate the world from the tyranny of Napoleon. The Tsar might have divided the spoils with his ally of Tilsit. Russia resisted the arch-tempter and persistently saved an ungrateful Prussia from annihilation. But even more wonderful than the disinterestedness of Russia has been her restraint and moderation in victory. After the invasion of France, Blücher insisted on continuing the war to the bitter end. What Russia considered as a war of liberation Prussia considered as a war of revenge. He even proposed a punitive expedition against Paris and to blow up the Tena Bridge in mere wanton vindictiveness. Alexander I insisted that not a stone of the French capital should be touched, although the French armies only two years before had destroyed Moscow, the heart and sanctuary of Holy Russia. Prussia also demanded that a despotic Government should be imposed upon the French people, even as in 1873 Bismarck demanded that a revolutionary Government should be imposed on the French people. Alexander I insisted that the Bourbons should grant a constitutional Government.
Unfortunately the disinterested foreign policy of Russia was generally placed at the service of Prussia and Austria. On the assumption that a political understanding of the three Conservative Empires was a necessary condition of the preservation of law and order, Russia made common cause with her neighbours. As M. de Wesselitsky recently abundantly proved in his illuminating book, the Triple Alliance has been the most sinister influence of Russian and European politics in the nineteenth century, and the only Power to profit by the Alliance of the Emperors was the Kingdom of Prussia. No wonder that the expression travailler pour le Roi de Prusse should have become as proverbial in Russia as in France.
The huge area of the Russian Empire has naturally encouraged the belief that Russian policy is determined by lust of territory, that Russia must be systematically aggressive, and must have ever encroached on her neighbours. We forget that Russia is only obeying the irresistible expansion of the race, that Russia already in the seventeenth century had reached the far eastern plains of Asia. We forget that the growth of Russia is but the natural growth of a prolific race which increases at present at the rate of more than three millions a year, notwithstanding an enormous infant mortality. Even if Russia did not add one square mile to her territory, her population in twenty-five years would still have increased by one hundred millions. But notwithstanding that enormous accretion of population, Russia for the last hundred years has not expanded in Europe, and her expansion outside of Europe is small compared with the expansion of the British Empire. The huge Siberian plain was a terra nullius and the hinterland of the European plain.
We have seen that the chief national aim of Russian foreign policy from the times of Peter the Great has been the acquisition of a harbour on the open sea. That aim is perfectly justified. The wonder is not that Russia should have pursued that policy undiscouraged by persistent obstacles, but that she should have had to wait for two centuries before achieving her ends. The present war has proved once more how her national security, her trade and industry, are at the mercy of her enemies for want of an outlet on the sea. For want of an outlet on the sea Russia throughout the war has been at the mercy of Germany and Turkey, and has been unable to equip her heroic armies. Great Britain in the past has thwarted legitimate Russian aspirations, she has sacrificed the Balkan nationalities to the unspeakable Turk; Great Britain is now paying the penalty, and is now discovering that she also through her anti-Russian policy in the past has only played the game of the King of Prussia.