Guns for Gold: The Wagner Network Exposed/What next?

by the Foreign Affairs Committee

3 What next?

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What next for Wagner?

74. At the time of writing, the situation is fluid. Recent events in Russia fundamentally altered the relationship between Yevgeny Prigozhin and the Russian Government. The network may be consolidating its operations abroad or it may be fighting for its life. Russian media have shown Wagner flags being lowered, suggesting its operations in Russia are winding down. Although the last month has seen significant debate on the future of the Wagner Network,^[1]no early signs have yet emerged on its future. The network’s heavy reliance on the Russian state for military equipment and logistical support may challenge its combat operations, unless the network can find alternative suppliers of weapons and ammunition.^[2] The Russian government may seek to ‘nationalise’ the network—as we have seen with demands that all fighters sign paperwork to join Russia’s standing forces—but whether it can is another question.^[3] There is reason to believe that the network will evolve rather than cease its operations altogether, as the Russian state has a vested interest in maintaining it for foreign policy and wealth acquisition purposes. Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has already stated Wagner’s operations in Mali and the Central African Republic “will continue”.^[4] Likewise, a Russian envoy recently reassured General Haftar of Wagner operatives’ continued presence in Libya,297^[5] and Russia remains a committed regional actor in Africa.^[6] The network’s ties to the GRU may also support its survival.^[7] The last decade has shown that the Wagner Network is highly effective at reconfiguring itself. We expect its activities to continue in some form, as they are too valuable, especially financially, to the Russian state to be lost. The question is not just what happens to the Wagner Network but what happens to a wider set of PMCs in Russia which continue to have close and intimate relationships with Russian officials300^[8] We recommend that the UK Government takes advantage of the current uncertainty and seeks to disrupt the Wagner Network. In particular, at a moment when its usual supply channels from the Russian Ministry of Defence are in doubt, the Government should do all within its power to restrict the flow of arms and other military equipment to the Wagner Network, to reduce the viability of future combat operations. The UK Government should also share intelligence with host Governments to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the Wagner Network and to demonstrate how it is a tool of enrichment for the Russian state.

What next for ‘PMCs’?

75. Our report focused on the Wagner Network as an obvious example of a ‘PMC’—also often called PMSC301^[9]—that poses a threat to the UK’s interests and values. We acknowledge that many dispute the applicability of this term. It is not the only Russia-aligned PMC,302^[10] even if it is unique.303^[11]Sorcha MacLeod, Chair of the UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, warned of an “extremely concerning” increase in the use of ‘PMCs’ as proxies by Russia and others.304^[12] Some drew attention to the significant growth of China’s private sector industry in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative,305^[13] and warned that countries may consider using proxies in future in a similar way to Russia, as we have seen in Iran.306^[14] As we watch the fallout of the Wagner Network and where it continues to have influence, we should be particularly looking at Syria and whether Iran steps into that fold. We are also aware of the Turkish-headquartered SADAT increasing its presence across the continent of Africa. It has been operating since at least 2013, including in Libya and Sudan.^[15]

76. The UK Government does not wish to disincentivise the use of PMCs in general, as their activity as “not necessarily illegal or harmful”.^[16] Other contributors emphasised the need to recognise that such companies can make a positive contribution to security.^[17] However, the Government recognised that the “malign use of PMCs as proxies of States increasingly forms part of an intensified competition over norms and values”.^[18] The Government appears to think it can manage these risks. We disagree. The Ministry of Defence has a “policy framework to understand where and how the use and activities of PMCs threatens UK interests and values”.^[19] As the Government has not provided this to us, however, we do not know which PMCs it considers a threat or why, nor are we aware of what the Government does with this information. Overall, we perceived the coordination of analysis across Government to be poor.

77. The Government has underlined that the rules of international law governing state relations with PMCs are “well-established”.^[20] If true, this would make it considerably easier to challenge states whose malign use of PMCs falls foul of these rules. However, other evidence disputes the clarity of international rules. There is no widely agreed international legal definition of a Private Military Company,^[21] and there are ambiguities over the status of PMC employees under international humanitarian law.^[22] We were also told that the legal tests to meet the term ‘mercenary’ are “near impossible” to fulfil, due to the six cumulative conditions that must be satisfied.^[23] Proelium Law called for a workable international definition that “adequately differentiates PMSCs used to build capability for corrupt governments and those which are legitimate businesses”.316^[24]

78. Perhaps implicitly recognising these ambiguities, the UK Government expressed a desire to “build consensus around responsible state behaviour and competition” when it comes to states’ use of PMCs.^[25] It promotes international voluntary initiatives to encourage responsible practices among PMSCs themselves.^[26] There is also domestic regulation of companies.^[27] The Government has limited interest in changing the existing national regulation or non-voluntary initiatives, believing that its current approach “provide[s] the necessary safeguards” for PMSC activities. The fact that the Government has no plans to ratify the UN Mercenaries Convention (an international treaty designed to ban the recruitment, use or financing of mercenaries) due to disagreements with its definitions, would suggest that this is not as clear as the Government asserts.^[28]

79. Transparency International called international voluntary initiatives a “step in the right direction”, but warned of their limited support among states.^[29] KCL academic Christopher Kinsey and Col. Christopher Mayer (US Army Retd) have warned that recent changes to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Services may inadvertently provide greater legitimacy to organisations like the Wagner Network, because they appear to have made it more acceptable for PMSCs to carry out offensive activities.^[30]

80. Our predecessor committee carried out a detailed report in 2002 into PMCs, responding to the Government’s Green Paper (June 2002) outlining different legislative options for such companies.^[31] The report recognised the benefits of PMCs and stated that a new regime for regulation should not undermine these.^[32] However, the report concluded that:

a voluntary code is insufficient to regulate the private military industry, because it would not enable the Government to prevent the activities of disreputable companies which were detrimental to the United Kingdom’s interests^[33]

The report recommended that the UK Government (with others) develop a new international convention to regulate PMCs, which might replace the UN Mercenaries Convention. It also made recommendations to balance the benefits and costs of new regulation and proposed a distinction between combat and non-combat activities when regulating PMCs (even if difficult to determine). It is worth noting that a draft UN Convention on Regulating PMSC Activities has been the subject of international debate since 2011.^[34]That no meaningful progress has been made on these issues is disappointing

81. International crimes abroad may be prosecuted before the UK courts when there is a connection between the perpetrator and the UK.^[35] However—as explained above (paragraph 19)—there are many practical obstacles to holding Wagner fighters to account. These obstacles apply to other, if not all, PMCs. In February, the Government told us that it is “spending more time and focus on accountability” than it was a “few months ago”.^[36] The UK has provided significant support to the Ukrainian legal system and to the International Criminal Court, to enable accountability for crimes in the Russia-Ukraine war.^[37] This assistance is likely to support the prosecution of offences committed by Wagner fighters in Ukraine. The UK is “not specifically” pursuing accountability for crimes committed within the context of Wagner’s operations in other countries.^[38] The FCDO told us that: …regarding accountability, a lot of what the Wagner Group is accused of, and is alleged to have done, falls within the standard jurisdiction of a domestic court, or an international court, such as the ICC. We do not create a new work strand for that. We need to reinforce what we have…^[39]

82. For nearly 10 years, the Government has under-played and under-estimated the Wagner Network’s activities, as well as the security implications of its significant expansion. The Government has not told us anything specific that it is doing to challenge the network’s influence and impunity in countries other than Ukraine, beyond sanctions coordination (which itself appears limited). The Government has also failed to adequately structure its response to the Wagner Network. When asked to give evidence to this inquiry, six weeks were spent on internal discussions to try to identify which was the lead Government department, demonstrating a lack of leadership across Government to tackle the Wagner Network. In oral evidence, the Minister was unable to demonstrate joined-up working within the department, lessons-sharing, strategic thinking, or a clear definition of what the Wagner Network is. It is evident that a taskforce should have been established at least by 2016.

83. The Wagner Network is merely the best-known and documented example of a PMC acting deniably on behalf of a state to further its interests and enrich its elites, at the expense of local citizens’ safety and stability in the long term – as well as security and stability in Europe. We are deeply concerned that the Government’s failure to address the network hints at a fundamental lack of knowledge of, and policy on, other malign PMCs.

84. The Government should take a more strategic and coherent approach to addressing the challenges of this network and other proxy ‘PMCs’ by:

a) assigning clear responsibility for the Wagner Network and adjacent ‘PMCs’ to a senior official in the Russia Unit, whose primary job it is to ensure that all levers of government are working together to tackle the challenges of Russia-aligned PMCs;

b) establishing a cross-Government lead on Private Military Companies, operating from the Cabinet Office’s Office for Conflict, Stabilisation and Mediation, focused on analysing this trend, mapping activity globally, and bringing together different geographic desks and teams across the MoD, Treasury, intelligence community and FCDO as appropriate to assess threats to British interests, and to identify British responses as appropriate;

c) establishing a taskforce for addressing the challenges posed by the Wagner Network and other linked PMCs, to enable swift cross-government collaboration.

85. The Government appears remarkably complacent about the growing practice of states using PMCs for malign purposes. Although the expansion of the Wagner Network and the harm it has caused appears to have led to some re-examination of the Government’s approach (paragraph 34), we have no detailed information to understand the Government’s new approach to countering state threats. 86. The Government continues to rely on a largely voluntary model of PMC regulation. Our predecessor committee conducted a detailed report into the subject of PMCs in 2002. Even then, the risks of a voluntary model were clear, in that it does little to prevent the “activities of disreputable companies” that are “detrimental to the United Kingdom’s interests”. The current approach also does little to protect the UK’s domestic PMCs, which may be tarred with the same brush as malign actors. We do not want our successor committee to have to raise these issues again in 20 years’ time.

87. The Government should improve its understanding of other PMCs and Private Security Companies (PSCs) connected in particular to Russia and China, and from all states. This is likely to be a growth industry, with more Governments seeking to create PMCs to secure their geopolitical and economic interests. The Government should provide further information on how its new approach to countering state threats, outlined in the Integrated Review Refresh, will tackle the challenge of states’ malign use of proxy PMCs.

88. In its response, the Government should set out the steps that it will take to strengthen the international legal framework governing PMCs’ activities, drawing on the UK’s deep legal expertise. Its response should address the following aspects:

i) how the UK will take steps to move forward the debates around the definition of ‘mercenaries’ and PMCs;

ii) how the UK will work to improve the accountability of Wagner fighters in more countries;

iii) how the UK will promote greater accountability and responsibility of states where PMCs are headquartered, if PMCs engage in destabilising activities.

To address the first point (i), the Government should revisit its position on the UN Mercenaries Convention and ratify it, or else propose specific revisions that would make ratification acceptable. The Government could also participate actively in ongoing international debates around a draft convention on private military and security companies (PMSCs). The Government may be able to address the second point (ii), by drawing lessons from work to bolster accountability of Wagner fighters in Ukraine.

89. The UK Government should use its significant support to the Office of the Prosecutor General in Ukraine to identify mechanisms to prosecute the Wagner Network. A prosecution in this theatre would serve to help deter the sense of impunity abroad.

90. The Government should provide the evidence base that leads it to believe in the effectiveness of its mostly voluntary model of PMC regulation.

1. Some aspects of Prigozhin’s media operations have already closed; some Wagner personnel left CAR; there has been a pause in recruitment. See Prigozhin media group closes following leader’s exile from Russia, JURIST, 4 July 2023; Wagner troops leave Central African Republic after ‘refusing contracts with Russia’, Sky News, 7 July 2023; Russia’s Wagner Group Suspends Recruitment In Wake Of Mutiny, Radio Free Europe, 3 July 2023.
2. According to a former fighter, “For PMC Wagner the Russian MOD remains its main supply hub for weapons and ammunition. If this artery is blocked, then PMC Wagner, having used up the available ammunition, will simply lose its ability to conduct combat operations. The base camp of PMC Wagner is located on a Russian military training ground i.e. land belonging to the Ministry of Defence.” Anonymous (WGN0026). See also Wagner’s future in Africa in question after Russian mutiny, Financial Times, 28 June 2023.
3. Whether the Russian state could match the salaries of Wagner fighters is a question. Many operatives also feel loyal to Prigozhin personally. ‘It is like a virus that spreads’: business as usual for Wagner group’s extensive Africa network, The Guardian, 6 July 2023; Wagner still recruiting despite mutiny, BBC finds, BBC News, 29 June 2023
4. Wagner and Russia are here to stay in Africa, says Kremlin’s top diplomat, POLITICO, 26 June 2023
5. ‘It is like a virus that spreads’: business as usual for Wagner group’s extensive Africa network, The Guardian, 6 July 2023
6. It is hosting its Russia-Africa summit in late July 2023. Wagner Will Keep Part of Its African Business After Russian Mutiny, Yahoo, 10 July 2023; Wagner mercenaries will not be withdrawn from Africa, says Russia, The Guardian, 26 June 2023
7. Wagner’s future in Africa in question after Russian mutiny, Financial Times, 28 June 2023
8. The Foreign Office listed Russia-linked PMCs as: RSB Group, Redut, Moran Security Group, ENOT Corp, Vegacy Strategic Services and PMC MAR. There is also the PMC ‘Patriot Group’, which the U.S. State Department has said is run by the Russian Defence Minister, Sergei Shoigu. A former Wagner fighter described the other PMC, Redut, in this way: “Redut was created to protect the factories transferred to the management of […] Timchenko (a Russian oligarch and former KGB officer close to Putin)’s structures. The godfather for this project, Timchenko, was proposed by the Russian military. The head of the Redut, K. Merzoyants, has maintained close friendly relations with some high-ranking officers of the Russian General Staff. […] Redut receives weapons, military equipment and ammunition from the stocks of the Russian forces in Syria.” Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (WGN0025); Anonymous (WGN0026); Russia’s private armies, POLITICO, 28 June 2023
9. Private Military and Security Company. This term is not clearly defined in international law. It has been used in a general sense in this report to cover a company that sells military and/or security services for compensation.
10. As mentioned in a previous footnote, other PMCs include: RSB Group, Redut, Moran Security Group, ENOT Corp, Vegacy Strategic Services and PMC MAR. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (WGN0025).
11. FCDO sees it as “highly likely” that “none are as close to the state as Wagner”. There is fluidity between the members of various PMCs. Grozev noted: “We see that these different incarnations of private military companies in Russia are fluid—they flow from one another—simply because they are not companies, they are proxies for the state.” Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (WGN0025; Q64. See also Dossier Center (WGN0009) para 46–52
12. “We are seeing increasing use of them. We are seeing them being used not just by Russia but also by other countries, and it is extremely concerning to the working group that that trend is emerging. We published a report in 2020 that was submitted to the UN General Assembly. We highlighted the new manifestations, the proxy actors and a lot of the points that I made earlier. From our perspective, the biggest concern is the insertion and deployment of these types of actors into armed conflicts where they do not help the situation.” Q18. Similar point in Prof. Mark Galeotti (Managing Director at Mayak Intelligence Ltd) (WGN0005) para 15.
13. Companies mentioned included China Security & Protection, the Shandong Huawei Security Group and Genghis Security Services, HuaXin Zhong, Beijing DeWe Security Services Limited Company, Frontier Services Group and China Overseas Security Group. See Transparency International Defence & Security, Transparency International UK (WGN0021) para 5.3; Prof. Mark Galeotti (Managing Director at Mayak Intelligence Ltd) (WGN0005) para 16; CSIS, ‘A Stealth Industry: The Quiet Expansion of Chinese Private Security Companies’, 12 January 2022 (accessed 16 July 2023)
14. PMCs are currently banned in China. Private Security Companies (PSCs) are permitted, but they are officially banned from carrying weapons abroad: a significant difference to Russia. Prof. Mark Galeotti (Managing Director at Mayak Intelligence Ltd) (WGN0005) para 16
15. Grey Dynamics, ‘SADAT: Turkey’s Paramilitary Wings Take Flight in Africa’, 16 April 2021 (accessed 18 July 2023)
16. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (WGN0025) section 4
17. International Code of Conduct Association (WWGN0015) paras 16, 25; Sean McFate, The Modern Mercenary: Private Armies and what they mean for World Order (OUP, 2014), xv; Mr D White (WGNO0001). Relatedly, data suggests that PMSCs are not on average associated with greater harm to civilians, even if PMSCs headquartered in non-democracies are. Dr Ulrich Petersohn (Senior Lecturer at University of Liverpool) (VWWGNO0004)
18. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (WWGN0025) section 4
19. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (WGN0025) section 4
20. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (WWGN0025) section 6
21. Q4 [Sorcha MacLeod]; Q5 [Sean McFate]; Proelium Law (VWVWGNO0016) para 5.1. There is, however, a draft Convention on Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs}, which defines a Private Military and/or Security Company as a corporate entity which provides on a compensatory basis military and/or security services by physical persons and/or legal entities. There is a similar definition in the Montreux Document, although this goes further in that it defines military and security services as including armed guarding and protection of persons and objects; maintenance and operation of weapons systems: prisoner detection and advice to or training of local forces and security personnel. See Report of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination, A/HRC/15/25, 2 July 2010
22. Their status as civilians or direct participants in hostilities relates to the nature and circumstances of their functions. Some PMC employees have also tried to benefit from combatant status. ICRC, ‘International humanitarian law and private military/security companies - FAQ’, 10 December 2013 (accessed 16 July 2023); Lindsey Cameron, ‘Private military companies: their status under international humanitarian law and its impact on their regulation’ International Review of the Red Cross, vol 88 (2006), pp 573-598
23. Proelium Law (WGN0016) para 5.2. See also Q7 [Sorcha MacLeod]. These six conditions are as follows. According to Article 47 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, a mercenary is any person who:
    • (a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;
    • (b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;
    • (c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party;
    • (d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict;
    • (e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and
    • (f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces
24. Proelium Law (WGN0016)
25. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (WGN0025) section 4
26. For example, the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Services and the ISO management system. The Government has also worked with the Security in Complex Environments Group (SCEG), a “UK-based Special Interests Group for the Private Security Sector, on the transparent regulation of Private Security and Maritime companies”. Among other things, SCEG members are expected to comply with national legislation and documents such as the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Services, and the Montreux Document. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (WGN0025) section 6
27. Domestically, the UK Security Industry Authority (set up in 2001 by Private Security Industry Act) regulates the private security industry “by operating a licensing regime for individual security operatives and a voluntary approvals scheme for security businesses”. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (WGN0025) section 6
28. Correspondence with the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State (Europe) following up on the FAC evidence session on 6 February 2023, dated 28/02/2023 and 09/02/2023
29. Transparency International Defence & Security, Transparency International UK (WGN0021) para 3.4
30. Defence-in-Depth, ‘A step too far: how the ICoCA actions could unintentionally help to privatise war (Part One)’ (accessed 16 July 2023); Defence-in-Depth, ‘A step too far: how the ICoCA actions could unintentionally help to privatise war (Part Two)’ (accessed 16 July 2023)
31. Foreign Affairs Committee, Ninth Report of Session 2001–02, Private Military Companies, HC 922.
32. Foreign Affairs Committee, Ninth Report of Session 2001–02, Private Military Companies, HC 922, para 163
33. Foreign Affairs Committee, Ninth Report of Session 2001–02, Private Military Companies, HC 922, para 137
34. RUSI, ‘Private Military and Security Companies: Views from the UK and Russia on Regulation and Accountability’, 22 April 2020 (accessed 16 July 2023)
35. For the domestic courts to have jurisdiction to prosecute international crimes, there must be a nexus with the domestic jurisdiction. The nature of the nexus depends on the specific offence. For offences covered by the International Criminal Court Act 2001, domestic courts can exercise jurisdiction over any person who is, or was, a UK national or UK resident at the time of the offence, or who became a UK national/resident after the offence was committed but still resides in the UK, or a person subject to UK service jurisdiction (see s54 and s67 ICCA). Other international crimes, such as torture and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, can be prosecuted on the basis of universal jurisdiction (i.e. torture or grave breaches which have been committed on a foreign territory by a perpetrator of any nationality can be prosecuted in the UK courts). International crimes in this context refers to those set out within the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, including genocide and crimes against humanity.
36. Q200 [Ben Fender]
37. For example, the Atrocity Crimes Advisory Group (founded with US and EU) is “the way in which we co-ordinate our support to the Ukrainian domestic system”. The UK has put £2.5 million towards this. Actions include: “funding mobile evidence-gathering teams and providing training in international humanitarian law to the Ukrainian judiciary.” The UK has also supported the ICC by providing extra £1 million to the court. Q194 [Hazel Cameron]
38. Q196 [Hazel Cameron]
39. Q196 [Hazel Cameron]

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