Hagan v. Tinnin/Opinion of the Court

by Peter Vivian Daniel

United States Supreme Court

43 U.S. 258

Hagan  v.  Tinnin

The principles ruled in the case of Thompson v. Griffin and Ervin as those which define the duties and should govern the conduct of the marshal in levying executions committed to his hands, have been here again considered and approved. They would be decisive also of the case now under consideration, but for two points of difference between this and the case of Thompson v. Griffin et al. These two points arise, 1st, upon the time intervening between the return of the marshal and the plaintiff's motion, as tending to show an acquiescence by the plaintiff; and, secondly, upon the additional evidence in this case amounting to proof of approbation or sanction by the plaintiff, express or implied, of the conduct of the marshal. In Thompson v. Griffin et al., application was made to the court at the earliest practicable period to set aside the marshal's return, and there was throughout no fact or circumstance tending to show a recognition, by the party, or a moment's acquiescence by him in the irregularity complained of. In the present case, the return of the marshal showing the receipt by him of the depreciated bank-notes bears date on the 17th February, 1840; the motion to quash was made in May, 1842. Thus an interval of more than two years was permitted to elapse between the return and the motion; a period during which the party must be presumed to have been cognisant of the return, a public and official proceeding to be found amongst the files and records of the court to which access might at all times have been had. If this fact stood alone, unassociated with and unexplained by any other, it would of itself imply at least, on the part of the plaintiff, laches and negligence in the prosecution of his interests, if not an assent by him to the acts of the officer. This fact of time, however, is by no means solitary or isolated in the evidence in this cause. The language of the return certainly imports no objection by the plaintiff or by any other to the receipt of the $1300, or to the medium in which they were collected: so far from this, then taken altogether, that language strongly implies, if it does not directly declare, that the plaintiff, or whosoever he was that took control of the matter, approved of the proceeding so far as it had gone, and objected only to a collection of the residue of the execution at that time. It should not be lost sight of either, in construing this language, that no exception to any one kind of medium, or preference for any other, is indicated in the inhibition as stated; it is a simple direction to proceed no farther. It cannot be objected to the return in question, that it is the act or declaration of the officer whose conduct in making it is impeached. Although the act of that officer, it is a sworn return, and must stand until falsified. It is introduced by the plaintiff himself in support of his motion; is indeed the only evidence he has adduced to sustain it: he relies on this return, and in so doing must take it entire; he cannot be permitted to garble it. The return must be received as stating the truth. It must be received in all its parts; and if so, it comes (especially when viewed in connection with the interval between the dates of that return and of the motion in this case,) on the part of the plaintiff, an acquiescence if not a direct sanction, which, at this day, this court is unwilling to disturb. Great wrong might, by so late an interference, be visited upon the officer, who may have been reposing upon the conduct of this plaintiff; and the danger of a result like this is enhanced by the total absence of any thing like proof to show that the plaintiff ever refused to receive the amount collected by the marshal, and may not have actually received and applied it to his own use, or at what rate of value if so received. This court is of the opinion upon the case certified to them, that the return of the marshal of the 17th of February, 1840, should not, under the facts disclosed in this case, be quashed.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the southern district of Mississippi, and on the point and question on which the judges of the said Circuit Court were opposed in opinion, and which was certified to this court for its opinion, agreeably to the act of Congress in such case made and provided, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, It is the opinion of this court that the return of the marshal of the 17th of February, 1840, should not, under the facts disclosed in this case, be quashed. Whereupon, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that it be so certified to the said Circuit Court.

Notes