Hague v. CIO/Separate Stone
Mr. Justice STONE.
I do not doubt that the decree below, modified as has been proposed, is rightly affirmed, but I am unable to follow the path by which some of my brethren have attained that end, and I think the matter is of sufficient importance to merit discussion in some detail.
It has been explicitly and repeatedly affirmed by this Court, without a dissenting voice, that freedom of speech and of assembly for any lawful purpose are rights of personal liberty secured to all persons, without regard to citizenship, by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S.C.A. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S.Ct. 625, 69 L.Ed. 1138; Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 47 S.Ct. 641, 71 L.Ed. 1095; Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 47 S.Ct. 655, 71 L.Ed. 1108; Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed.2d 117, 73 A.L.R. 1484; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 56 S.Ct. 444, 80 L.Ed. 660; De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 57 S.Ct. 255, 81 L.Ed. 278; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 57 S.Ct. 732, 81 L.ed. 1066; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949. It has never been held that either is a privilege or immunity peculiar to citizenship of the United States, to which alone the priveleges and immunitites clause refers, Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L.Ed. 394; Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377, 382, 14 S.Ct. 570, 571, 38 L.Ed. 485; Twining b. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97, 29 S.Ct. 14, 18, 53 L.Ed. 97; Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525, 538 40 S.Ct. 2,5, 63 L.Ed. 1124; Hamilton bv. Regents of University of California, 293 US. 245, 261, 55 S.Ct. 197, 203, 79 L.Ed. 343, and neither can be brought within the protection of that clause without enlarging the category of privileges and immunities of United States citizenship as it has hitherto been defined.
As will presently ppear, the right to maintain a suit in equity to restrain state officers, acting under a state law, from infringing the rights of freedom of speech and of assembly guaranteed by the due process clause, is given by Act of Congress to every person within the jurisdiction of the United States whether a citizen or not, and such a suit may be maintained in the district court without allegation or proof that the jurisdictional amount required by § 24(1) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. § 41(1), is involved. Hence there is no occasion, for jurisdictional purposes or any other, to consider whether freedom of speech and of assembly are immunities secured by the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to citizens of the United States, or to revive the contention, rejected by this Court in the Slaughter-House Cases, supra, that the privileges and immunities of United States citizenship, protected by that clause, extend beyond those which arise or grow out of the relationship of United States citizens to the national government. [1]
That such is the limited application of the privileges and immunities clause seems now to be conceded by my brethren. But it is said that the freedom of respondents with which the petitioners have interfered is the 'freedom to disseminate information concerning the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., to assemble peaceably for discussion of the Act, and of the opportunities and advantages offered by it', and that these are privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States secured against state abridgment by the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It has been said that the right of citizens to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for the redress of grievances is a privilege of United States citizenship protected by the privileges and immunities clause. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552, 553, 23 L.Ed. 588. We may assume for present purposes, although the step is a long and by no means certain one, see Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 20 S.Ct. 448, 494, 44 L.Ed. 597; Twining v. New Jersey, supra, that the right to assemble to discuss the advantages of the National Labor Relations Act is likewise a privilege secured by the privileges and immunities clause to citizens of the United States, but not to others, while freedom to assemble for the purpose of discussing a similar state statute would not be within the privileges and immunities clause. But the difficulty with this assumption is, as the record and briefs show, that it is an afterthought first emerging in this case after it was submitted to us for decision, and like most afterthoughts in litigated matters it is without adequate support in the record.
The respondents in their bill of complaint specifically named and quoted Article IV, § 2, now conceded to be inapplicable, and the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment as the provisions of the Constitution which secure to them the rights of free speech and assembly. They omitted the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from their quotation. They made no specific allegation that any of those whose freedom had been interfered with by petitioners was a citizen of the United States. The general allegation that the acts of petitioners complained of violate the rights of 'citizens of the United States, including the individual plaintiffs here', and other allegations of like tenor, were denied by petitioners' answer. There is no finding by either court below that any of respondents or any of those whose freedom of speech and assembly has been infringed are citizens of the United States, and we are referred to no part of the evidence in which their citizenship is mentioned or from which it can be inferred.
Both courts below found, and the evidence supports the findings, that the purpose of respondents, other than the Civil Liberties Union, in holding meetings in Jersey City, was to organize labor unions in various industries in order to secure to workers the benefits of collective bargaining with respect to betterment of wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment. Whether the proposed unions were to be organized in industries which might be subject to the National Labor Relations Act or to the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board does not appear. Neither court below has made any finding that the meetings were called to discuss, or that they ever did in fact discuss, the National Labor Relations Act. The findings do not support the conclusion that the proposed meetings involved any such relationship between the national government and respondents or any of them, assuming they are citizens of the United States, as to show that the asserted right or privilege was that of a citizen of the United States, and I cannot say that an adequate basis has been laid for supporting a theory-which respondents themselves evidently did not entertain-that any of their privileges as citizens of the United States, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, were abridged, as distinguished from the privileges guaranteed to all persons by the due process clause. True, the findings refer to the suppression by petitioners of exhibits, one of which turns out to be a handbill advising workers they have the legal right, under the Wagner Act, to choose their own labor union to represent them in collective bargaining. But the injunction, which the Court now rightly sustains, is not restricted to the protection of the right, said to pertain to United States citizenship, to disseminate information about the Wagner Act. On the contrary it extends and applies in the broadest terms to interferences with respondents in holding any lawful meeting and disseminating any lawful information by circular, leaflet, handbill and placard. If, as my brethren think, respondents are entitled to maintain in this suit only the rights secured to them by the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment-here the right to disseminate information about the National Labor Relations Act-it is plain that the decree is too broad. Instead of enjoining, as it does, interferences with all meetings ¢for all purposes and the lawful dissemination of all information, it should have confined its restraint to interferences with the dissemination of information about the National Labor Relations Act, through meetings or otherwise. The court below rightly omitted any such limitation from the decree, evidently because, as it declared, petitioners' acts infringed the due process clause, which guarantees to all persons freedom of speech and of assembly for any lawful purpose.
No more grave and important issue can be brought to this Court than that of freedom of speech and assembly, which the due process clause guarantees to all persons regardless of their citizenship, but which the privileges and immunities clause secures only to citizens, and then only to the limited extent that their relationship to the national government is affected. I am unable to rest decision here on the assertion, which I think the record fails to support, that respondents must depend upon their limited privileges as citizens of the United States in order to sustain their cause, or upon so palpable an avoidance of the real issue in the case, which respondents have raised by their pleadings and sustained by their proof. That issue is whether the present proceeding can be maintained under § 24(14) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. § 41(14), as a suit for the protection of rights and privileges guaranteed by the due process clause. I think respondents' right to maintain it does not depend on their citizenship and cannot rightly be made to turn on the existence or non-existence of a purpose to disseminate information about the National Labor Relations Act. It is enough that petitioners have prevented respondents from holding meetings and disseminating information whether for the organization of labor unions or for any other lawful purpose.
If it be the part of wisdom to avoid unnecessary decision of constitutional questions, it would seem to be equally so to avoid the unnecessary creation of novel constitutional doctrine, inadequately supported by the record, in order to attain an and easily and certainly reached by following the beaten paths of constitutional decision.
The right to maintain the present suit is conferred upon the individual respondents by the due process clause and Acts of Congress, regardless of their citizenship and of the amount in controversy. Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13, provided that 'any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance * * * of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States, shall * * * be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress'. And it directed that such proceedings should be prosecuted in the several district or circuit courts of the United States. The right of action given by this section was later specifically limited to 'any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof', and was extended to include rights, privileges and immunities secured by the laws of the United States as well as by the Constitution. As thus modified the provision was continued as § 1979 of the Revised Statutes and now constitutes § 43 of Title 8 of the United States Code, 8 U.S.C.A. § 43. It will be observed that the cause of action, given by the section in its original as well as its final form, extends broadly to deprivation by state action of the rights, privileges and immunities secured to persons by the Constitution. It thus includes the Fourteenth Amendment and such privileges and immunities as are secured by the due process and equal protection clauses, as well as by the privileges and immunities clause of that Amendment. It will also be observed that they are those rights secured to persons, whether citizens of the United States or not, to whom the Amendment in terms extends the benefit of the due process and equal protection clauses.
Following the decision of the Slaughter-House Cases and before the later expansion by judicial decision of the content of the due process and equal protection clauses, there was little scope for the operation of this statute under the Fourteenth Amendment. The observation of the Court in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551, 23 L.Ed. 588, that the right of assembly was not secured against state action by the Constitution, must be attributed to the decision in the Slaughter-House Cases that only privileges and immunities peculiar to United States citizenship were secured by the privileges and immunities clause, and to the further fact that at that time it had not been decided that the right was one protected by the due process clause. The argument that the phrase in the statute 'secured by the Constitution' refers to rights 'created', rather than 'protected' by it, is not persuasive. The preamble of the Constitution, proclaiming the establishment of the Constitution in order to 'secure the Blessings of Liberty', uses the word 'secure' in the sense of 'protect' or 'make certain'. That the phrase was used in this sense in the statute now under consideration was recognized in Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317, 322, 5 S.Ct. 928, 930, 931, 962, 29 L.Ed. 202, where it was held as a matter of pleading that the particular cause of action set up in the plaintiff's pleading was in contract and was not to redress deprivation of the 'right secured to him by that clause of the constitution' (the contract clause), to which he had 'chosen not to resort'. See, as to other rights protected by the Constitution and hence secured by it, brought within the provisions of R.S. § 5508, 18 U.S.C.A. § 51; Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 12 S.Ct. 617, 36 L.Ed. 429; In re Quarles and Butler, 158 U.S. 532, 15 S.Ct. 959, 39 L.Ed. 1080; United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 35 S.Ct. 904, 59 L.Ed. 1355.
Since freedom of speech and freedom of assembly are rights secured to persons by the due process clause, all of the individual respondents are plainly authorized by § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 to maintain the present suit in equity to restrain infringement of their rights. As to the American Civil Liberties Union, which is a corporation, it cannot be said to be deprived of the civil rights of freedom of speech and of assembly, for the liberty guaranteed by the due process clause is the liberty of natural, not artificial, persons. Northwestern Nat. Life Insurance Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255, 27 S.Ct. 126, 129, 51 L.Ed. 168, 7 Ann.Cas. 1104; Western Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 363, 27 S.Ct. 384, 385, 51 L.Ed. 520.
The question remains whether there was jurisdiction in the district court to entertain the suit although the matter in controversy cannot be shown to exceed $3,000 in value because the asserted rights, freedom of speech and freedom of assembly, are of such a nature as not to be susceptible of valuation in money. The question is the same whether the right or privilege asserted is secured by the privileges and immunities clause or any other. When the Civil Rights Act of 1871 directed that suits for violation of § 1 of that Act should be prosecuted in the district and circuit courts, the only requirement of a jurisdictional amount in suits brought in the federal courts was that imposed by § 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 78, which conferred jurisdiction on the circuit courts of suits where 'the matter in dispute' exceeded $500 and the United States was a plaintiff, or an alien was a party, or the suit was between citizens¢of different states; and it was then plain that the requirement of a jurisdictional amount did not extend to the causes of action authorized by the Civil Rights Act of 1871. By the Act of March 3, 1875, c. 137, 18 Stat. 470, the jurisdiction of the circuit courts was extended to suits at common law or in equity 'arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States' in which the matter in dispute exceeded $500. By the Act of March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1087, the circuit courts were abolished and their jurisdiction was transferred to the district courts, and by successive enactments the jurisdictional amount applicable to certain classes of suits was raised to $3,000. The provisions applicable to such suits, thus modified, appear as § 24(1) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 41(1), 28 U.S.C.A. § 41(1).
Meanwhile, the provisions conferring jurisdiction on district and circuit courts over suits brought under § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 were continued as R.S. §§ 563 and 629, and now appear as § 24(14) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 41(14), 28 U.S.C.A. § 41(14). The Act of March 3, 1911, 36 Stat. 1087, 1091, amended § 24(1) of the Judicial Code so as to direct that 'The foregoing provision as to the sum or value of the matter in controversy shall not be construed to apply to any of the cases mentioned in the succeeding paragraphs of this section'. [2] Thus, since 1875, the jurisdictional acts have contained two parallel provisions, one conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts, district or circuit, to entertain suits 'arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States' in which the amount in controversy exceeds a specified value; the other, now § 24(14) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. § 41(14), conferring jurisdiction on those courts of suits authorized by the Civil Rights Act of 1871, regardless of the amount in controversy.
Since all of the suits thus authorized are suits arising under a statute of the United States to redress deprivation of rights, privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution, all are literally suits 'arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States'. But it does not follow that in every such suit the plaintiff is required by § 24(1) of the Judicial Code to allege and prove that the constitutional immunity which he seeks to vindicate has a value in excess of $3,000. There are many rights and immunities secured by the Constitution, of which freedom of speech and assembly are conspicuous examples, which are not capable of money valuation, and in many instances, like the present, no suit in equity could be maintained for their protection if proof of the jurisdictional amount were prerequisite. We can hardly suppose that Congress, having in the broad terms of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 vested in all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States a right of action in equity for the deprivation of constitutional immunities, cognizable only in the federal courts, intended by the Act of 1875 to destroy those rights of action by withholding from the courts of the United States jurisdiction to entertain them.
That such was not the purpose of the Act of 1875 in extending the jurisdiction of federal courts to causes of action arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States involving a specified jurisdictional amount, is evident from the continuance upon the statute books of s 24(14) side by side with § 24(1) of the Judicial Code, as amended by the Act of 1875. Since the two provisions stand and must be read together, it is obvious that neither is to be interpreted as abolishing the other, especially when it is remembered that the 1911 amendment of § 24(1) provided that the requirement of a jurisdictional amount should not be construed to apply to cases mentioned in § 24(14). This must be taken as legislative recognition that there are suits authorized by § 1 of the Act of 1871 which could be brought under § 24(14) after, as well as before, the amendment of 1875 without compliance with any requirement of jurisdictional amount, and that these at least must be deemed to include suits in which the subject matter is one incapable of valuation. Otherwise we should be forced to reach the absurd conclusion that § 24(14) is meaningless and that a large proportion of the suits authorized by the Civil Rights Act cannot be maintained in any court, although jurisdiction of them, with no requirement of jurisdictional amount, was carefully preserved by § 24(14) of the Judicial Code and by the 1911 amendment of § 24(1). By treating § 24(14) as conferring federal jurisdiction of suits brought under the Act of 1871 in which the right asserted is inherently incapable of pecuniary valuation, we harmonize the two parallel provisions of the Judicial Code, construe neither as superfluous, and give to each a scope in conformity with its history and manifest purpose.
The practical construction which has been given by this Court to the two jurisdictional provisions establishes that the jurisdiction conferred by § 24(14) has been preserved to the extent indicated. In Holt v. Indiana Mfg. Co., 176 U.S. 68, 20 S.Ct. 272, 44 L.Ed. 374, suit was brought to restrain alleged unconstitutional taxation of patent rights. The Court held that the suit was one arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States within the meaning of § 24(1) of the Judicial Code and that the United States Circuit Court in which the suit had been begun was without jurisdiction because the challenged tax was less than the jurisdictional amount. The Court remarked that the present § 24(14) applied only to suits alleging deprivation of 'civil rights'. On the other hand, in Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 36 S.Ct. 7, 60 L.Ed. 131, L.R.A.1916D, 545, Ann.Cas.1917B, 283, affirming, D.C., 219 F. 273, this Court sustained the jurisdiction of a district court to entertain the suit of an alien to restrain enforcement of a state statute alleged to be an infringement of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it discriminated against aliens in their right to seek and retain employment. The jurisdiction of a district court was similarly sustained in Crane v. Johnson, 242 U.S. 339, 37 S.Ct. 176, 61 L.Ed. 348, Ann.Cas.1917B, 796, on the authority of Truax v. Raich, supra. The suit was brought in a district court to restrain enforcement of a state statute alleged to deny equal protection in suppressing the freedom to pursue a particular trade or calling. For the purposes of the present case it is important to note that the constitutional right or immunity alleged in these two cases was one of personal freedom, invoked in the Raich case by one not a citizen of the United States. In both cases the right asserted arose under the equal protection, not the privileges and immunities clause; in both the gist of the cause of action was not damage or injury to property, but unconstitutional infringement of a right of personal liberty not susceptible of valuation in money. The jurisdiction was sustained despite the omission of any allegation or proof of jurisdictional amount, pointedly brought to the attention of this Court.
The conclusion seems inescapable that the right conferred by the Act of 1871 to maintain a suit in equity in the federal courts to protect the suitor against a deprivation of rights or immunities secured by the Constitution, has been preserved, and that whenever the right or immunity is one of personal liberty, not dependent for its existence upon the infringement of property rights, there is jurisdiction in the district court under § 24(14) of the Judicial Code to entertain it without proof that the amount in controversy exceeds $3,000. As the right is secured to 'any person' by the due process clause, and as the statute permits the suit to be brought by 'any person' as well as by a citizen, it is certain that resort to the privileges and immunities clause would not support the decree which we now sustain and would involve constitutional experimentation as gratuitous as it is unwarranted. We cannot be sure that its consequences would not be unfortunate.
1 The privilege or immunity asserted in the Slaughter-House Cases was the freedom to pursue a common business or calling, alleged to have been infringed by a state monopoly statute. It should not be forgotten that the Court, in deciding the case, did not deny the contention of the dissenting justices that the asserted freedom was in fact infringed by the state law. It rested its decision rather on the ground that the immunity claimed was not one belonging to persons by virtue of their citizenship. 'It is quite clear', the Court declared (16 Wall. page 74, 21 L.Ed. 394), 'that there is a citizenship of the United States, and a citizenship of a State, which are distinct from each other, and which depend upon different characteristics * * * in the individual.' And it held that the protection of the privileges and immunities clause did not extend to those 'fundamental' rights attached to state citizenship which are peculiarly the creation and concern of state governments and which Mr. Justice Washington, in Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash.C.C. 371, 6 Fed.Cas. page 546, No. 3230, mistakenly thought to be guaranteed by Article IV, § 2 of the Constitution. The privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, it was pointed out, are confined to that limited class of interests growing out of the relationship between the citizen and the national government created by the Constitution and federal laws. Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 79, 21 L.Ed. 394; see Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97, 98, 29 S.Ct. 14, 18, 53 L.Ed. 97.
That limitation upon the operation of the privileges and immunities clause has not been relaxed by any later decisions of this Court. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 448, 10 S.Ct. 930, 934, 34 L.Ed. 519; McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 38, 13 S.Ct. 3, 11, 36 L.Ed. 869; Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U.S. 657, 661, 13 S.Ct. 721, 723, 37 L.Ed. 599; Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377, 382, 14 S.Ct. 570, 571, 38 L.Ed. 485. Upon that ground appeals to this Court to extend the clause beyond the limitation have uniformly been rejected, and even those basic privileges and immunities secured against federal infringement by the first eight amendments have uniformly been held not to be protected from state action by the privileges and immunities clause. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 23 L.Ed. 678; Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 4 S.Ct. 111, 292, 28 L.Ed. 232; Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 6 S.Ct. 580, 29 L.Ed. 615; O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 12 S.Ct. 693, 36 L.Ed. 450; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 20 S.Ct. 448, 494, 44 L.Ed. 597; West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258, 24 S.Ct. 650, 48 L.Ed. 965; Twining v. New Jersey, supra; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S.Ct. 149, 82 L.Ed. 288.
The reason for this narrow construction of the clause and the consistently exhibited reluctance of this Court to enlarge its scope has been well understood since the decision of the Slaughter-House Cases. If its restraint upon state action were to be extended more than is needful to protect relationships between the citizen and the national government, and if it were to be deemed to extend to those fundamental rights of person and property attached to citizenship by the common law and enactments of the states when the Amendment was adopted, such as were described in Corfield v. Coryell, supra, it would enlarge Congressional and judicial control of state action and multiply restrictions upon it whose nature, though difficult to anticipate with precision, would be of sufficient gravity to cause serious apprehension for the rightful independence of local government. That was the issue fought out in the Slaughter-House Cases, with the decision against enlargement.
Of the fifty or more cases which have been brought to this Court since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in which state statutes have been assailed as violating the privileges and immunities clause, in only a single case was a statute held to infringe a privilege or immunity peculiar to citizenship of the United States. In that one, Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 56 S.Ct. 252, 80 L.Ed. 299, 102 A.L.R. 54, it was thought necessary to support the decision by pointing to the specific reference in the Slaughter-House Cases, supra, 16 Wall. page 79, 21 L.Ed. 394, to the right to pass freely from state to state, sustained as a right of national citizenship in Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 18 L.Ed. 745, before the adoption of the Amendment.
The cases will be found collected in Footnote 2 of the dissenting opinion in Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 445, 56 S.Ct. 252, 266, 80 L.Ed. 299, 102 A.L.R. 54. To these should be added Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 18 S.Ct. 383, 42 L.Ed. 780; Ferry v. Spokane, P. & S.R. Co., 258 U.S. 314, 42 S.Ct. 358, 66 L.Ed. 635, 20 A.L.R. 1326; People of New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 49 S.Ct. 61, 73 L.Ed. 184, 62 A.L.R. 785; Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U.S. 431, 56 S.Ct. 532, 80 L.Ed. 778; Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 58 S.Ct. 205, 82 L.Ed. 252; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S.Ct. 149, 82 L.Ed. 288.
2 This provision made no change in existing law but was inserted for the purpose of removing all doubt upon the point. See H.R. Rep. No. 783, Part 1, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 15; Sen. Rep. No. 388, Part 1, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 11. Cf. Miller-Magee Co. v. Carpenter, C.C., 34 F. 433; Ames v. Hager, C.C., 36 F. 129, 1 L.R.A. 377.