Hannibal Railroad v. Swift/Opinion of the Court

by Stephen Johnson Field

United States Supreme Court

79 U.S. 262

Hannibal Railroad  v.  Swift

Two questions are presented by the record for our determination: 1st, whether upon the facts stated in the agreed case the railroad company was liable as a common carrier for the safe conveyance of the baggage and other property of the plaintiff; and, 2d, whether there was any error in the assessment of damages as allowed by the Circuit Court.

The railroad company was chartered by the legislature of Missouri in 1847, and for many years its railroad between the city of Hannibal, on the Mississippi River, and the city of Saint Joseph, on the Missouri River, has been constructed and in operation. Between those places the company was, in 1861, a common carrier, over its road, of passengers and their baggage, and of goods and merchandise. As such carrier, its duties and liabilities were plain; as a carrier of passengers it was bound, unless there was reasonable ground for refusal, to take all persons who applied for passage, and their baggage, and as a carrier of goods, to take all other property offered for transportation, and was responsible for the safe conveyance of the baggage and other property to the point for which they were destined, or the termination of the road, unless prevented by inevitable accident or the public enemy. Its obligations and liabilities in these respects were not dependent upon the contract of the parties, though they might have been modified and limited by such contract. They were imposed upon it by the law, from the public nature of its employment, independent of any contract.

If at any time reasonable ground existed for refusing to receive and carry passengers applying for transportation, and their baggage and other property, the company was bound to insist upon such ground if desirous of avoiding responsibility. If not thus insisting, it received the passengers and their baggage and other property, its liability was the same as though no ground for refusal had ever existed.

It does not appear from the agreed case that the company refused to transport over its road the troops of the United States, and the plaintiff and his family who accompanied them, when they arrived, in December, 1861, at Saint Joseph, or their baggage. camp equipments, arms, munitions, and other property, but only that it refused to enter into any special contract for the transportation, on account of the danger to the troops from the insurrectionary condition of the country through which the road ran, and the frequent depredations committed by armed bands of rebels upon the railroad, and its track, bridges, depots, and station-houses.

It was usual at the time, and during the entire war, for railroad companies to transport troops of the United States, with their baggage, at a less rate per head, and their equipments, arms, and munitions at a less rate per pound, than the prices paid by ordinary passengers for similar services, and it was undoubtedly the desire of the commanding officer in this case to have a special contract as to the amount of compensation to be paid for the transportation. As we read the agreed statement it was only a contract of this kind, fixing the rate of compensation, which was refused.

Whether the reasons assigned would also have justified a refusal to transport the troops and the plaintiff, with his family, and their baggage and other property, it is unnecessary to determine. It is enough to fasten a liability upon the company that it did not insist upon these reasons and withhold the transportation, but, on the contrary, undertook the carriage of men and property without being subjected to any compulsion or coercion in the matter.

The liability of the company was in no respect affected by the fact that the baggage, camp equipments, arms, and munitions of the troops, and the property of the plaintiff were placed in a separate car, selected by the commanding officer out of several cars standing in the yard of the company, and not in its regular baggage car, or by the fact that the car was loaded by some of the soldiers detailed for that purpose, and not by the servants of the defendant. The car selected belonged to the company, and, after it was loaded and locked by the commanding officer, the agents and employees of the company took charge of it and placed it in the regular train, which transported the troops and the plaintiff and his family, next to the tender of the engine. The liability of the company attached when it thus took possession of the property. No objection was made at the time to the selection of a separate car for the baggage and other property of the troops and the plaintiff, or to the kind of property offered for transportation, or to the manner in which the property was packed, or to the locking up of the car by the commanding officer. If objection existed on any of these grounds, or on any other ground not concealed but open to the observation of the company, it should have been stated before the property was received. The company might then have insisted, as a condition of its undertaking the transportation, upon the selection of a different car, or upon superintending its loading, or upon the possession of its key, or upon all of these things. Not having thus insisted, but having received the property and undertaken its transportation in the car in which it was placed, the company assumed, with respect to it, the ordinary liabilities of a common carrier.

The case of Mallory v. The Tioga Railroad Company, ^[1] is much stronger than this. There the company only agreed with the plaintiff to furnish the motive power to draw his cars laden with his property, he to load and unload the cars and to furnish brakemen, to be under the control of the conductor of the train, to accompany them, yet the company was held liable, as a common carrier, for injuries to the cars and the property of the plaintiff not caused by inevitable accident or the public enemy. The court did not consider the fact that the property was transported in the cars of the plaintiff, and that the cars were loaded and unloaded by him, affected, in any respect, the liability of the company, the entire train in which the cars were moved being, whilst on the route, under the control and management of its servants and employees.

In all such cases the liability of the common carrier attaches when the property passes, with his assent, into his possession, and is not affected by the car in which it is transported, or the manner in which the car is loaded. The common carrier is regarded as an insurer of the property carried, and upon him the duty rests to see that the packing and conveyance are such as to secure its safety. The consequences of his neglect in these particulars cannot be transferred to the owner of the property.

It does not distinctly appear, from the agreed case, whether any troops were detailed to guard the car which contained their property and that of the plaintiff, except while the car was being loaded. But if it were admitted that a special guard was appointed for the car on the route, the admission would not aid the company or relieve it of liability. The control and management of the car, or of the train, by the servants and employees of the company, were not impeded or interfered with; and where no such interference is attempted it can never be a ground for limiting the responsibility of the carrier that the owner of the property accompanies it and keeps a watchful lookout for its safety.

The ruling of the court upon the findings of the referee, appointed to ascertain the damages sustained by the plaintiff, does not appear to us to be open to any valid objection. A considerable portion of the property, it is true, was not personal baggage, which the company was obliged to transport under the contract to carry the person; nor does it appear that it was offered to the company as such. It embraced buffalo robes, hair mattresses, pillows, writing desks, tables, statutory, and pictures, in relation to which there could be no concealment, and it is not pretended that any was attempted. Where a railroad company receives for transportation, in cars which accompany its passenger trains, property of this character, in relation to which no fraud or concealment is practiced or attempted upon its employees, it must be considered to assume, with reference to it, the liability of common carriers of merchandise. It may refuse to receive on the passenger train property other than the baggage of the passenger, for a contract to carry the person only implies an undertaking to transport such a limited quantity of articles as are ordinarily taken by travellers for their personal use and convenience; such quantity depending of course upon the station of the party, the object and length of the journey, and many other considerations. But if property offered with the passenger is not represented to be baggage, and it is not so packed as to assume that appearance, and it is received for transportation on the passenger train, there is no reason why the carrier shall not be held equally responsible for its safe conveyance as if it were placed on the freight train, an undoubtedly he can make the same charge for its carriage.

Here two companies of artillery in the army of the United State sought transportation with their arms, equipments, and ammunition. The plaintiff, as surgeon in the army, was ordered to accompany the troops, and for him and his family and his property transportation was also sought as part of the general transportation for the whole command. On arrival at Hannibal the amount of compensation for the entire transportation, which included carriage of men and property, was agreed upon and was subsequently paid. It is to be presumed when the compensation was fixed that the company took into consideration not merely the peculiar kind of property carried by the troops, which could hardly be treated as simple baggage of travellers, but also the property besides baggage possessed by the plaintiff and his family. The value of the unpublished treatise on veterinary surgery, and of the jewelry, as estimated by the referee, was excluded in the amount allowed. The value of the surgical instruments was properly included. Instruments of that character, in the case of a surgeon in the army travelling with troops, may properly be regarded as part of his baggage. He may be required to use these instruments at any time, and must, accordingly, have them near his person where they can be had upon a moment's notice. Whether the table silverware of the plaintiff, although of a very limited amount, can be regarded in the same manner, admits of much doubt. It does not appear that the plaintiff or his family had any occasion for this ware on the cars, or even that they carried it with any intention of using it on the route. It is not, however, necessary to charge the defendant that it should be treated as baggage. Its value may be properly included in the amount of damages, considering it only as part of the property which the company received as a common carrier of goods, and against the loss of which, from any cause but inevitable accident or the public enemy, it was, as such carrier, an insurer to the plaintiff.

We see no error in the judgment of the Circuit Court, and it is accordingly

AFFIRMED.

Notes

1. 39 Barbour, 488.