Harper's Weekly/Any Thing to Beat Grant

by Harper's Weekly

ANY THING TO BEAT GRANT.

The arguments against a Democratic adoption of Mr. Greeley at Baltimore, so far as they relate to principle, are, of course, conclusive. There is really no man in the country who is so curiously antagonistic in every political principle to the Democratic party as Mr. Greeley. He was the Whiggest of Whigs and the most radical of Republicans. Every thing which the Democrats did he opposed; every thing which he favored they declared to be not only unconstitutional, but unsound in political philosophy. The adoption of Mr. Greeley by the Democrats, therefore, is as if the French Bourbons should seat Cluseret upon the throne of St. Louis.

But it is not a matter of principle with either party to the coalition. Its battle-cry is, Any thing to beat Grant. And has the meaning of that cry been well pondered by any body but the wily Democratic leaders? The situation to them is as plain as it ought to be to every body. If General Grant should be re-elected, the Democratic party would inevitably dissolve; and once out of the way, new parties and departures would be possible, as they are not and can not be now. And the supposition that they are or could be has been the vital error of Mr. Schurz's view during the whole year.

Now the Democratic leaders do not wish their party to be dissolved, for in new combinations what might become of them? To save the organization, therefore, at all hazards, is at present their sole care. They must tighten the ship, now on its beam ends, even if the whole cargo goes overboard, and as the cargo is of no value, it will be no sacrifice. Even if these leaders should nominate Democrat, their platform would be only abuse of the radicals and denunciation of the Administration, and that is even more agreeable to the Cincinnati “crowd” than to the Democrats themselves. Nothing, therefore, would be gained by a “straight” nomination; but there is a chance of some Republican votes should Mr. Greeley be nominated. To appease the party feeling the leaders argue truly that Mr. Greeley is in no proper sense a Republican candidate. The only Cincinnati ratification meeting of any importance, that in New York, was a meeting of Democrats. Mr. Benjamin Wood headed the list of vice-presidents, and the whole meeting had a flavor of Mr. Benjamin Wood. And admitting, urge the leaders, that Mr. Greeley has been always a Republican, yet if he is willing to run against the Republican party, with the support of the most conspicuous and unreconstructed of the late rebels, why should Northern Democrats plead a queasy stomach?

But above all rises the argument of party preservation. If Grant succeeds, the party is surely gone. Any thing, therefore, which promises most to defeat Grant is best for the Democratic party. A regular Democratic nomination would receive the regular Democratic vote, but no more; and that is merely decent burial, with a forlorn hic jacet. With Mr. Greeley, however, there is a chance of some republican votes. At this point, of course, the doctors disagree, for it is impossible to make it appear that there will be a Republican gain enough to balance the Democratic loss. The party drill, indeed, will do much. A regular Democratic nomination must be held to be binding upon the party. But, whatever is said, every body knows that there are hosts of Democrats who would not vote for the sage, whether as a regular or an irregular candidate.

Nevertheless, as Mr. Greeley is the hopeful horn of the Democratic dilemma, be will probably be taken. Any thing to beat Grant. Without the sage, destruction is sure. With him is the sole chance. The Democratic conviction is that if the chance should win, the Democratic organization would be saved; the Republican organization would be destroyed; and as the great mass of voters and the machinery which accomplished the result would be Democratic, and as Mr. Greeley represents nothing in the canvass but the Democratic purpose of any-thing-to-beat-Grant, the result must necessarily be a Democratic triumph, which would enable the party to intrench itself impregnably for the election of '76.

If these views are correct, it is a great error to suppose that the nomination and election of Mr. Greeley by the Democratic party would be a dissolution of all parties. It would be only a Republican defeat probably resulting in an indefinite Democratic dominance. In the campaign which we suppose, Mr. Greeley would represent nothing but the Democracy, while a candidate of the real Cincinnati men, even if defeated, would have stood for a new party with definite principles, the nucleus, possibly, of a new organization in 1876, after the dispersion and dissolution of the Democracy. Thus, if Mr. Greeley should be nominated, as now seems very probable, at Baltimore, according to the regular usages and traditions of the party; he would be as much the Democratic candidate as Mr. Seymour was in 1868. The question for the country would be now, as it was then, whether liberty, intelligence, and justice — the national stability, peace, and prosperity — would be more firmly secured by a Republican or a Democratic victory.