Harper's Weekly/The Indian Question

by Harper's Weekly

THE INDIAN QUESTION.

The Report of the Secretary of the Interior is very interesting, and it discusses the Indian question very fully. There was no department in worse odor than that of the Interior at the accession of Mr. Chandler, and Mr. Schurz's integrity, energy, and ability have produced the most excellent results. He is a man not only of statesmanlike views, but of the courage of his convictions, and of implicit trust in principles. His spirit and force have been felt throughout the administration of his department, and nowhere more than in the Indian Bureau. The Secretary denies absolutely that the administration is without an Indian policy. On the contrary, he states in detail what his purposes are, and his measures, in his judgment, all tend to their accomplishment. We published some weeks since a letter from a prominent gentleman in one of the Territories who has devoted great attention to the Indian question. He is singularly qualified to speak upon the subject, and his letter showed that while he heartily approves the purpose of the Interior Department, he differs with it as to methods. The Secretary defines the ultimate object to be the civilization of the Indians, and their incorporation and absorption into the general population of the country. This object is being gradually attained in the Indian Territory, where, however, even under the most favorable conditions, progress is slow, and where the Indians, even the Cherokees, who are the most advanced, are not yet ready for the holding of land in severalty — a measure which would result in exile and pauperism, and the arrest of civilization.

The Indians of the plains are shrewd savages. Like all barbarians, they respect visible power, and the display of force in treating with them is a humane policy. As we write, the White River Utes, who have just massacred Major Thornburgh's command, are conferring with a peace commission of half a dozen of our citizens. The Ute warriors had been confounded by the sudden appearance of General Merritt and his troops after an extraordinarily rapid march, and, as winter is approaching, they retreated. The Secretary concedes that the original offence in this instance did not come from us; but General Merritt, whose arrival arrested the Ute attack, instead of punishing them, was withdrawing from fear of harm to the captives held by the Indians, and the situation now is the commission of half a dozen surrounded by some six or eight hundred Ute warriors, and General Merritt two hundred miles away. What possible conclusion can the Utes draw but that the Government is afraid of them? And how could the presence of General Merritt's troops with the commission have affected the negotiations injuriously? If it should be said that the Utes would not come to treat if troops were present, the reply is that had troops been present at first there would have been nothing to treat about. Great Britain, we are told, manages these things better. But the policy of Great Britain is to show that she has the power to enforce her will. It is because we avoid showing that power that we hear so often of massacres and impending Indian wars. General Crook's recent letter asserts that Indian troubles generally begin on our side. When that is true, they begin either in the rascalities of traders, who are generally outlaws from civilization, and who infest the neighborhood of the agencies, as Secretary Schurz describes them upon the edges of the Ute Reservation, selling arms and ammunition to the Indians; or from the failure of supplies at the agencies, and the consequent suffering of the Indians. Now if near every agency, instead of an agent and half a dozen helpless civilians only, there was a military force, the rascalities would be summarily suppressed, and end, and the supplies would be as sure as they are at the military posts. The crowd of Indian traders and agents are bent upon making money, and the Indians consequently suffer. The army is not bent upon making money. But while the troubles which begin on our side are chiefly due to the present system of management, there are troubles which begin with the Indians. When the grass springs, groups of young men, instinctively restless for excitement, slip away from the reservation, and descend upon a village, or a ranch or farm, one or two hundred miles away, steal horses, burn houses, and kill people, and return to the reservation. Even if the agent knows that they have gone, and knows when they return, what can he do? He can not arrest or punish. But when the irritation produced by the raids bursts into war, the soldiers are summoned to interfere; they are ambushed and massacred, and at great cost of life and money they subdue an outbreak which they could have prevented without any loss whatever.

Those who agree with the Secretary that the great object of the Indian policy must be the ultimate civilization of the savages, differ with him as to methods, and hold that the surest, most humane, and least costly method is first of all to secure just treatment to the Indians, as it is not and can not be secured by the present civilian system, and then to prove to them that we have the power to enforce our will, as we do not prove it to them now. There is no doubt that the present control of the Department of the Interior is vigorous and honest, that many abuses have been corrected, and that the old Indian system is managed as well as it can be. But we can not resist the conviction that the character of the officers of the army offers a much better guarantee of the prompt correction of the abuses of which the Indians justly complain, than the character of Indian traders and agents and dealers of every kind. Granting the strongest allegation that can be made, that the Indian troubles spring from the cheating and outrage and wanton injustice of the whites, official and unofficial, with whom the Indians come in contact, the question is whether officers of the army would be guilty of such cheating, outrage, and injustice. When criminals and scoundrels have provoked an Indian rising, those officers are called to suppress it. Why not authorize them to prevent it? Place the Indians upon reservations, scrupulously observe the conditions that we impose, keep the white settlers off as sternly as the Indians are kept in, punish white and red offenders promptly, and equally, feed and clothe the Indians faithfully, cut off from them gunpowder and whiskey by summary suppression of the traffic in both, and the beginning of civilization will be possible.