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Heck v. Humphrey/Concurrence Thomas

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Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)
Concurring opinion by Clarence Thomas
4420221Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) — Concurring opinionClarence Thomas

Justice Thomas, concurring.

The Court and Justice Souter correctly begin their analyses with the realization that "[t]his case lies at the intersection of . . . the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Rev. Stat. § 1979, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254." Ante, at 480; post, at 491. One need only read the respective opinions in this case to understand [p491] the difficulty of the task before the Court today. Both the Court and Justice Souter embark on a similar enterprise—harmonizing "[t]he broad language of § 1983," a "general" statute, with "the specific federal habeas corpus statute." Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973).

I write separately to note that it is we who have put § 1983 and the habeas statute on what Justice Souter appropriately terms a "collision course." Post, at 492. It has long been recognized that we have expanded the prerogative writ of habeas corpus and § 1983 far beyond the limited scope either was originally intended to have. Cf., e.g., Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 285–286 (1992) (opinion of Thomas, J.) (habeas); Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 117 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (§ 1983). Expanding the two historic statutes brought them squarely into conflict in the context of suits by state prisoners, as we made clear in Preiser.

Given that the Court created the tension between the two statutes, it is proper for the Court to devise limitations aimed at ameliorating the conflict, provided that it does so in a principled fashion. Cf. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986). Because the Court today limits the scope of § 1983 in a manner consistent both with the federalism concerns undergirding the explicit exhaustion requirement of the habeas statute, ante, at 483, and with the state of the common law at the time § 1983 was enacted, ante, at 484–486, and n. 4, I join the Court's opinion.


This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).

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