Hilton v. Dickinson/Opinion of the Court

by Morrison Waite

United States Supreme Court

108 U.S. 165

Hilton  v.  Dickinson

'The distinction constantly maintained is this: Where the plaintiff sues for an amount exceeding $2,000, and the ad damnum exceeds $2,000, if by reason of any erroneous ruling of the court below, the plaintiff recovers nothing, or less than $2,000, there the sum claimed by the plaintiff is the sum in controversy for which a writ of error will lie. But if a verdict is given against the defendant for a less sum than $2,000, and a judgment passes against him accordingly, there it is obvious that there is, on the part of the defendant, nothing in controversy beyond the sum for which the judgment was given; and consequently he is not entitled to any writ of error. We cannot look beyond the time of the judgment in order to ascertain whether a writ of error lies or not.'

The rule as thus stated by Mr. Justice STORY, was cited in Walker v. U.S. 4 Wall. 163, and in Merrill v. Patty, 16 Wall. 345. But these were cases in which the question was as to the right of a defendant to bring up for review a judgment against himself for less than $2,000.

In Ryan v. Bindley, 1 Wall. 66, the plaintiff below sued for $2,000, and the defendant pleaded set-off to the amount of $4,000. Under such a plea, if the set-off had been sustained, the defendant would have been entitled to a judgment for the difference between the amount of his claim and that established by the plaintiff. The plaintiff recovered a judgment for $575.85, and the defendant brought a writ of error, upon which jurisdiction was sustained because the defendant sought to defeat the judgment against him altogether, and to recover a judgment in his own favor and against the plaintiff for at least two thousand dollars, and possibly four thousand. Thus the matter in dispute in this court exceeded $2,000.

In Pierce v. Wade, 100 U.S. 444, the action was replevin for cattle. A judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs for the most of the cattle taken on the writ, but against them for $1,400, the value of some that were taken which did not belong to them. They brought the case here by writ of error, but the writ was dismissed on the ground that the matter in dispute was only the part of the cattle for which judgment had been rendered against the plaintiffs, the court remarking that 'the plaintiffs recovered everything else which they claimed, and the judgment against them is less than $5,000.'

In Lamar v. Micou, 104 U.S. 465, where the appeal was taken by a defendant from a decree against him for less than $5,000, it was held that if the set-off or counter-claim relied on would only have the effect of reducing the amount of the recovery, without entitling the defendant to a decree in his own favor, there was no jurisdiction. We understand that Wilson v. Daniel is overruled by Gordon v. Ogden, in which Chief Justice MARSHALL states the opinion of the court to be that 'the jurisdiction of the court depends upon the sum in dispute between the parties, as the case stands upon the writ of error,' and that Wilson v. Daniel was not followed because 'a contrary practice had since prevailed.' It is undoubtedly true that until it is in some way shown by the record that the sum demanded is not the matter in dispute, that sum will govern in all questions of jurisdiction, but it is equally true that when it is shown that the sum demanded is not the real matter in dispute, the sum shown, and not the sum demanded, will prevail. Lee v. Watson, 1 Wall. 337; Schacker v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. 93 U.S. 241; Gray v. Blanchard, 97 U.S. 565; Tintsman v. National Bank, 100 U.S. 6; Banking Ass'n v. Insurance Ass'n, 102 U.S. 121. Under this rule it has always been assumed, since Cooke v. Woodrow, supra, that when a defendant brought a case here, the judgment or decree against him governed our jurisdiction, unless he had asked affirmative relief, which was denied; and this because, as to him, jurisdiction depended on the matter in dispute here. As the original demand against him was for more than our jurisdictional limit, and the recovery for less, the record shows that he was successful below as to a part of his defense, and that his object in bringing the case here was not to secure what he had already got, but to get more. As to him, therefore, the established rule is that, unless the additional amount asked for is as much as our jurisdiction requires, we cannot review the case.

We are unable to see any difference in principle between the position of a plaintiff and that of a defendant as to such a case. The plaintiff sues for as much as, or more than, the sum required to give us jurisdiction, and recovers less. He does not, any more than a defendant, bring a case here to secure what he has already got, but to get more. If we take a case for him when the additional amount he asks to recover is less than we can consider, he has 'an advantage over his antagonist,' such as, in the language of Chief Justice ELLSWORTH, supra, 'it is not to be presumed it was the intention of the legislature to give.' Such a result ought to be avoided, and it may be by holding, as we do, that, as to both parties, the matter in dispute, on which our jurisdiction depends, is the matter in dispute 'between the parties as the case stands upon the writ of error' or appeal; that is to say, as it stands in this court. That was the question in Wilson v. Daniel, where it was held that, to avoid giving one party an advantage over another, it was necessary to make jurisdiction depend 'on the matter in dispute when the action was instituted.' When, therefore, that case was overruled in Gordon v. Ogden, and it was held, as to a defendant, that his rights depended on the matter in dispute in this court, we entertain no doubt it was the intention of the court to adopt as an entirety the position of Mr. Justice IREDELL in his dissenting opinion, and to put both sides upon an equal footing. Certainly it could not have been intended to give a plaintiff any advantage over a defendant, when there is nothing in the law to show any such superiority in position.

Under this rule we have jurisdiction of a writ of error or appeal by a plaintiff below when he sues for as much as or more than our jurisdiction requires and recovers nothing, or recovers only a sum which, being deducted from the amount or value sued for, leaves a sum equal to or more than our jurisdictional limit, for which he failed to get a judgment or decree. And we have jurisdiction of a writ of error or appeal by a defendant when the recovery against him is as much in amount or value as is required to bring a case here, and when, having pleaded a set-off or counter-claim for enough to give us jurisdiction, he is defeated upon his plea altogether, or recovers only an amount or value which, being deducted from his claim as pleaded, leaves enough to give us jurisdiction, which has not been allowed. In this connection it is to be remarked that the 'amount as stated in the body of the declaration, and not merely the damages alleged, or the prayer for judgment, at its conclusion, must be considered in determining whether this court can take jurisdiction.' Lee v. Watson, and the other cases cited in connection therewith, supra. The same is true of the counter-claim or set-off. It is the actual matter in dispute as shown by the record, and not the ad damnum alone, which must be looked to.

Applying this rule to the present case, it is apparent we have no jurisdiction. The original matter in dispute was $3,000. On appeals from the supreme court of the District of Columbia we have jurisdiction only when the matter in dispute exceeds $2,500. Hilton recovered below one-half of the $3,000. It follows that as to him the matter in dispute in this court is only $1,500.

The appeal of Hilton is dismissed for want of jurisdiction, and that of Devlin for want of prosecution.

Notes