Historic Highways of America/Volume 5/Chapter 5
CHAPTER V
THE NEW ROAD
THE correspondence included in the chapter preceding affords probably the utmost light that can be thrown today upon the reason of the making of the great Pennsylvanian thoroughfare to the Ohio. It cannot be affirmed, as has often been said, that Forbes was early prejudiced in favor of a Pennsylvania route; he never could have been such a hypocrite as to pen the words to be found on page 94. That his first plans were completely altered at the advice of Sir John St. Clair is very plain from his letters to Governor Denny (March 20) and to Colonel Bouquet (July 6); but up to the very last he leaves the question open, to be decided wholly according to the reports of the guides and explorers. It is difficult, however, to reconcile the words in Forbes's letter to Bouquet of July 23, in which he states that St. Clair, when advising the Raystown route, affirmed "that he nor nobody else knew anything of the road leading from Laurell hill." It is evident from this that Forbes originally expected to fall down to the Braddock road from Raystown, but that when once on the ground, with the distances clear in his mind, he was compelled to find a shorter road westward if there was one to be found. This is the only explanation of his immediate change of plan at St. Clair's advice, knowing that St. Clair had found no route westward by Laurel Hill; it seems that St. Clair thought only of proceeding via Raystown to Fort Cumberland, as he affirmed in his letter of June 9 to Bouquet. St. Clair was undoubtedly right in deciding that the best course to Fort Cumberland from Philadelphia for the army was through populous Pennsylvania, and his understanding that the Braddock Road would be followed from that point would easily explain why he had provided forage at Fort Cumberland, which occasioned Forbes's criticism in his letter of July 14. Indeed from Forbes's letters of June 16, 19, and 27, it does not seem that he had any definite plan for the construction of a new road.
On the other hand Forbes very correctly doubted the advisability of using Braddock's long route when his army was once gathered together along the road from Carlisle to Raystown. Bouquet stated his (Forbes's) position very soundly when he said: "You cannot take the Cumberland until you are in a position to demonstrate the impossibility of finding another road, or at any rate the impossibility of opening one without risking the expedition by too great an expenditure of time." Moreover, Forbes had a comprehensive view of the situation such as probably no one else had.
So far as Bouquet's position was concerned, his correspondence shows that he was assiduous in carrying out Forbes's directions; as to any conspiracy on his part to win Forbes over to the Pennsylvania route, as Washington insinuated, who can believe one existed after reading his letters? Bouquet very properly threw the burden of ultimate decision upon Forbes, as it was his duty to do; he sent him all the information which he could obtain, pro and con, concerning all routes; he sent Colonel Burd out, with his guides, in order to have testimony upon which he was sure he could rely; he urged Forbes to defer his decision of route until he (Forbes) could have a personal interview with Washington; he had Braddock's Road partly cleared and plainly described it as needing "very little in the way of repair;" he never seems to have attempted to minimize the difficulties of making a new route or maximize those of the old; he continually urges the necessity of great caution in the selection of a route.
The motives which directed the movements of Sir John St. Clair during these months of controversy are quite beyond fathoming. It is easy to believe that the "new light," which Forbes said Sir John had received "at Winchester," made it clear that if he did not send the army over the southern route (Fort Frederick–Fort Cumberland) to Cumberland, it was possible that Forbes would never traverse Braddock's Road at all. It is certain that upon Governor Sharpe's and Washington's arrival upon the scene, Sir John began to shower upon Bouquet letters advising the opening of the Fort Frederick–Fort Cumberland road; "and I believe from thence," Forbes wrote of St. Clair's meeting with Governor Sharpe, "proceeded to the opening the road from Fort Frederick to Fort Cumberland." Indeed, it would be interesting to know whether it was not St. Clair's suddenly raised clamor over the length of the Raystown route to Fort Cumberland (hoping to "drive" Forbes over the Fort Frederick route) that determined Forbes to ignore Fort Cumberland and push out on a new, shorter route to the Ohio.
Whatever were St. Clair's reasons for such vacillating plans, it is sure he fell into disgrace in Forbes's eyes. In addition to the upbraiding he received from the general's own lips, Forbes wrote in his letter of July 14 that the wagons were the plague of his life and denied that St. Clair had taken "the smallest pains" or made the "least inquiry" concerning the matters he had been detailed to care for. Again, in Forbes's letter to Bouquet of July 17 he says: "Sir John acknowledges taking some (kettles &c from Pennsylvania troops) and applying them to the use of the Virginians &c which is terrible." In a letter previously quoted Forbes affirms that St. Clair—who was sent in advance of the army to settle the matter of route—"knows nothing of the matter." Forbes's wrath at St. Clair reached a climax before the end of August when he savagely declared that he suspected his "heart as well as the head."[1]
And now as to Washington. His letters are typical of the young man to whom these western forests were not unfamiliar; they are patriotic and loyal. Though he was standing for election to the House of Burgesses in his home county, he had refused to accept a leave of absence to do his electioneering—which in no wise prevented his election. I cannot find any ill-boding prophecy in his letters, concerning the making of a new road westward from Raystown, which after events did not justify. He affirmed that Forbes could not reach Fort Duquesne by a new road before the winter set in; and no prophecy ever seemed more accurately fulfilled. For before Fort Duquesne was reached it was decided not to attempt to continue the campaign further. An unexpected occurrence suddenly turned the tide and Forbes went on—to a splendid conquest. But, nevertheless, Washington's prophecy was, not long after it was made, found to have been that of a wise man. Had Forbes been one iota less fortunate than Braddock was unfortunate, Washington's words would have come true to the letter. So much for his judgment, which Forbes ignored.
But Washington's knowledge was limited, so far as the general situation of the army was concerned. Forbes's expedition was one of three simultaneous campaigns; and the three commanders were somewhat dependent upon each other. At any time Forbes might be called upon to give assistance to Abercrombie or Johnson. Forbes was in constant correspondence with both of his colleagues; after Abercrombie's repulse the prosecution of the Fort Duquesne campaign, it may almost be said, was in question. At any rate it was important to have open the shortest possible route of communication to the northern colonies where the other campaigns were being pushed; in case Fort Duquesne was captured a straight road through populous, grain-growing Pennsylvania would be of utmost importance; especially as Pennsylvania abounded in vehicles, while in Virginia they were scarce.
Washington thought only of a quick campaign completed in the same season as begun. Forbes, however, was not in eager haste and had good reason for moving slowly. As early as August 9 he wrote Bouquet: "Between you and I be it said, as we are now so late, we are yet too soon. This is a parable that I shall soon explain." Three reasons appealed to Forbes for moving slowly, though it is doubtful if he intended moving as slowly as he actually did move: Frederick Post, the missionary, had been sent to the Indians on the Beaver asking them to withdraw from the French; the Indian chiefs were invited to the treaty at Easton, where their alliance with the French would, it was hoped, be undermined; winter was drawing on apace, when the Indians who were with the French would withdraw to their villages and begin to prepare for the inclement season.
One of the direct serious charges brought against Washington was that he did "not know the difference between a party and an army." This is brought by Colonel Bouquet and I do not believe that he was in error or that the accusation can be proved unjust. Washington had had much experience, such as it was, in the Fort Necessity campaign, with Braddock, and on the Virginia frontier. But the Fort Necessity campaign was conspicuous as a political, not a military event. The force he led west did not number two hundred men. This was, surely, a party, not an army. Now, be it remembered, the great difficulty of leading any body of men, small or great, lay in provisioning them and feeding the horses. The larger the army the greater the difficulty—indeed the difficulty trebled as the number of men and horses was doubled. On those mountain roads the second wagon was drawn with much greater difficulty than the first. Again, a small body of men could, in part, be supplied with food from the forests; in the case of an army this source of supply must be ignored. In the case of Washington's Fort Necessity campaign, how did his handful of men fare? They nearly starved—and capitulated because they did not have the food to give them the necessary strength to retreat. This was not Washington's fault, for he, properly, left this matter with those whose business it was; but the experience certainly did not teach him how to handle an army.
I cannot see that he had the opportunity to learn much more in Braddock's campaign in 1755. He was that general's aide, a carrier of messages and orders, and a member of the military family. He had ever before his eyes a thousand examples of carelessness, chicanery, and mismanagement, but those could not teach him how an army was to be cared for properly. His advice was often asked and minded, but he gave it in the capacity of a frontiersman, not as a tactician or officer. The one exception was when he urged that Braddock divide the army into two parties by sending a small flying column rapidly against Fort Duquesne.
It is clear from preceding pages that, on the Virginia frontier, he learned no lessons on the control of large bodies of men.
But now, in 1758, as colonel of an important branch of the army General Forbes was throwing across the Alleghenies, Washington came forward conspicuously as a champion of a certain route to be pursued by an army of five thousand men. Frankly, what did he know of the needs of five thousand men on a march of two hundred miles from their base of supplies? His correspondence on this point is not satisfactory. He had never passed over the Pennsylvania Road, and, though he understood better than anyone what it meant to cut a new road, he does not answer the argument that the Braddock Road failed to offer as much pasturage for horses and cattle as the Pennsylvania route. He confines himself largely to the matter of celerity: and the situation, as we have explained, did not demand haste. Forbes had the best of reasons for moving slowly. From a commissary's standpoint Washington's argument could have had no weight whatever.
Washington was strongly prejudiced in favor of the Virginia route; and no man could have had better reasons for prejudice, as will be shown. He argued conspicuously and vehemently on a subject with which he had no experience. Great and good as he became, and brave and faithful as he was, it is all the easier to confess to a weakness which was due to a lack of experience and to loyal, old-time Virginia pride. It is an exceedingly pleasant duty to emphasize the fact that, after his repeated arguments were cast aside by his superiors and a route was chosen in the face of the strongest opposition he could bring to bear on the subject, the young man swallowed his chagrin and the slights under which his fine spirit must have writhed, and worked manfully and heroically for measures which he had heartily opposed. In all that he had done in the past five years he never played the man better than here and now.
It is very difficult to unravel what General Forbes continually calls the plot of certain Virginians to force him into Braddock's Road. The matter is of additional interest because, in his letter to Bouquet of August 9, Forbes utters a very sharp criticism of Washington: "By a very unguarded letter of Col. Washington's that accidentally fell into my hands, I am now at the bottom of their scheme against this new road, a scheme that I think was a shame for any officer to be concerned in, but more of this at [our] meeting." Again on September 4 he wrote: "Therefore [I] would consult C. Washington, altho perhaps not follow his advice, as his Behaviour about the roads, was in no ways like a soldier." What letter this was of Washington's I do not know. It could not have been the letter written to Halket (page 113); it hardly seems possible that it could have been the following letter which Washington wrote to Governor Fouquier: "The Pennsylvanians, whose present as well as future interest it was to have the expedition conducted through their government, and along that way, because it secures their frontiers at present, and their trade hereafter, a chain of forts being erected, had prejudiced the General absolutely against the old road, and made him believe that we were the partial people, and determined him at all events to pursue that route."[2] The doubt is not whether Forbes would have spoken sharply if he had seen this letter, but whether it could have fallen into his hands. It was undoubtedly sent from Fort Cumberland straight to Winchester and Williamsburg. From one point the letter does Washington no credit, though it shows plainly that there was a bitter factional fight and that he felt strongly the righteousness of the Virginian side of the question, for which he is not to be blamed. As to his accusation against his general, it seems to me unreasonably bitter. Forbes's correspondence with Bouquet is convincing proof of the falseness of Washington's theory that the Pennsylvanians "had prejudiced the General absolutely against the old road . . and determined him at all events to pursue that (new) route." After wrestling with the route question two months Forbes wrote General Abercrombie as late as July 25 that he was unwilling to bring the divisions of his army together "till the Route is finally determined." Forbes had no predilection for Pennsylvanians; when, in September, a spirit of jealousy appeared concerning the province from which the army provisions should be obtained, Forbes wrote Bouquet (September 17): "I believe neither you nor I values one farthing where we get provisions from, provided we are supplyed, or Interest ourselves either with Virginia or Pennsylvania, which last I hope will be damn'd for their treatment of us with the Waggons, and every other thing where they could profit by us from their impositions, altho at the risque of our perdition."
The controversy as to whether Forbes's route should be through Pennsylvania or Virginia serves to bring into clear perspective one of the most interesting and one of the most important phases of our study—the meaning of the building of a road at that time to either one of those colonies. Nothing could emphasize this more than the sharpness of the quarrel and the position of those concerned in it. It meant very much to Pennsylvania to have Forbes cut a road to the Ohio in both of the two ways suggested by Washington to Governor Fouquier—it fortified her frontier and opened a future avenue of trade. The Old Trading Path had been her best course westward and her trade with the Indians had been nothing to what it would now become. But such as it had been, it was most distasteful to the Virginians to the south who called the West their own. This rivalry was intense for more than a quarter of a century and came near ending in bloodshed; the quarrel was only forgotten in the tumultuous days of 1775. General Forbes seems to have understood very well that his new road would be of utmost importance to Pennsylvania as that province would then have a "nigher Communication [than Virginia] to the Ohio;" and that was the very reason he cut it: because it was shorter—not to please Pennsylvania. If Fort Duquesne was to be captured and fortified and manned and supplied, the shortest route thither would be, as the dark days of 1764 and 1775 and 1791 proved, a desperately long road to travel.
On the other hand the building of Forbes's road in Pennsylvania was a boon which that province far less deserved than Virginia. Virginia men and capital were foremost in the field for securing the Indian trade of the Ohio; they had, nearly ten years before, secured a grant of land between the Monongahela and Kanawha, and sent explorers and a number of pioneers to occupy the land; their private means had been given to clear the first white man's road thither and erect storehouses at Wills Creek and Redstone; the activity of these ambitious, worthy men had brought on the war now existing. When open strife became the colonies' only hope of holding the West, Virginia was first and foremost in the field; the same spirit that showed itself in commercial energy was very evident when war broke out, and for four years Virginia had given of her treasure and of her citizens for the cause. During this time Pennsylvania had hardly lifted a finger, steadily pursuing a course which brought down upon her legislators most bitter invectives from every portion of the colonies. And now, in the last year of the war, the conquering army was to pass through Pennsylvania to the Ohio, building a road thither which should for all time give this province an advantage very much greater than that ever enjoyed by any of the others. True, Braddock's Road curled along over the mountains, but after the defeat by the Monongahela it had never been used except by small parties on foot and had become well-nigh impassable otherwise. We do not know what Washington wrote in the letter which Forbes so roundly criticised, but it can easily be conceived, without detriment to his character, that he might have spoken in a way Forbes could not understand concerning lethargic Pennsylvania's undeserved good fortune.[3] But Forbes had the present to deal with, not the past, and the shortest route to the Ohio was all too long.
This became alarmingly plain in a very short time after the day, August 1, on which Bouquet began to cut it. The story of the hewing of this road cannot be told better than by quoting the fragments appertaining to it contained in the letters of those closely concerned in its building. Old St. Clair, who, as we have seen, was sent on by Forbes to Bouquet, was the advance supervisor. As early as August 12 he was writing Bouquet from "Camp on ye Side of Alleganys" that not as much progress had been made as he had hoped, and that the "Work to be done on this Road is immense. Send as many men as you can with digging tools, this is a most diabolical work, and whiskey must be had. I told you that the road wou'd take 500 Men 5 Days in cutting to the Top of the Mountain." On the sixteenth he wrote: "A small retrencht is picked out at Kikeny Pawlings."
". . The Stages will be from Rays Town to the Shanoe Cabins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
11 Miles, | |
to Sr Allan McLeans camp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
9 or 10 Miles | |
to Edmunds Swamp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
9 or 10 Miles." | |
" . . The Pack Horses returning from Kikoney Paulins have taken the other Road, so you may send them back loaded."
Forbes, writing to Bouquet, refers as follows to the new road August 7: "Extremely well satisfied with your accounts of the Road, and very glad to find that you have entered upon the making of it;" (August 9): "I hope your new road advances briskly, and that from the Alleghany Hill to Laurell Hill may be carrying forward by different partys, at the same time, that you are making the pass of the Allegany practicable;" (August 15): "I hope the new road goes on fast and that soon we shall be able to take post at Loyal Haning. I see nothing that can facilitate this more than by still amusing the Enemy by pushing Considerable parties along Mr Braddock's route, which parties might endeavour to try to find communications betwixt the two roads where they approach the nearest, or where most likely such passages can be found. As it will be necessary very soon to make a disposition of our small Army I beg you will give your thoughts a little that way. at present I think the greatest part ought to be assembled at Raestown to make our main push by that road, while Coll Washington, or some other officer might push along the other road and might join us if a Communication can be found when called upon. But this is only an Idea in Embryo. . ." (August 18): "In carrying forward the new road I think there might easily be a small road carried on at the same time, at about 100 yards to the right and left of it, and paralel with it, by which our flanking partys might advance easier along with the line. I dont mean here to cut down any large trees, only to clear away the Brushwood and saplins, so as the men either on foot or on horseback may pass the easier along. . ."
Bouquet forwarded this order to St. Clair on August 23, also writing: "Colonel Burd is to command on the West of Lawrell Hill, and to march without delay and before the Road is cut to Loyal H— [Hannan]." On the same date St. Clair wrote Bouquet from Stoney Creek as follows: "I wrote you yesterday . . that three waggons have got to this place, the Road not so good as I shall make it . . I hope to get to Kikoney Pawlins to morrow night, if not shall do it next day. Tell Mr Sinclair to send me my Down Quilt the weather is cold." That evening he wrote again, in reply to Bouquet's letter, from "Kikoney Paulins:" "It is impossible for me to tell you any more than I have done about the Road to L— H— [Loyal Hannan]. I required 600 Men to make the Road over the Lai Ri—ge in three days on condition I was to see it done my Self, and perhaps I might reach L— H the 3d Day. I expect to get the Road cleared as far as the clear fields a Mile from the foot of L— R on this Side, by the time the A—y [army] comes up, and work afterwards with as many men as the Other Corps will give me." From Edmonds Swamp St. Clair wrote next (no date): "I got the Waggons safe as far as this post yesterday the road is so far good, and if it had not rain'd so hard I was in hopes to report the Road good this Night to Kikoney Pawlings. . . If you think the Road from Rays town to the Shanoe Cabins will be wet in the autumn, it wou'd be well to open the Road over the two Risings, and it wou'd be shorter for our Returned Waggons. I shall send out a Reconoitering party 25 Miles northward that we may know the Paths that lead to sidling Hill."
By the last of August all parties concerned were beginning to realize that the young Washington had been telling some plain truth when he urged Forbes not to try this new route. On the twenty-seventh Bouquet wrote St. Clair: "I am extremely disappointed in my Expectation of the Road being open before this time to the foot of Lawrell Hill . . push that Road with all possible dispatch . . the Chief thing we want is the Communication open for Waggons to Loyal Hannon. Employ all your Strength there, and Colonel Burd has order to cut backwards to you from L. Han. . . Capt Dudgeon and Mr Dapt will oversee some Part of the Road, and every body is to stir and make amend for their unaccountable slowness." Bouquet blamed St. Clair for the delay and Forbes wrote him from Shippensburg August 28: "The slow advance of the new road and the cause of it touch me to the quick, it was a thing I early foresaw and guarded again[st] such an assistant with all the force and Energy of words that I was master off, but being over ruled was resolved to make the most I could of a wrong head . . the Virginians who are able to march . . might advance as far forward upon Braddock's road as to that part of it which is most contiguous to our second deposite, which I think might be about Saltlick Creek . . The using of Braddock's road I have always had in mind was it only a blind—pray lose no time as that does not oblidge us to march, before we see proper."
Forbes alone realized that despatch was not to be, necessarily, the secret of the success of his campaign, though he had urged Bouquet to hasten the roadmaking as fast as possible. He had his eyes fixed elsewhere than on the Allegheny ranges; he knew the Indians at Fort Duquesne were weary of the listless campaign; that Bradstreet had been sent against Fort Frontenac (which, if captured, would shut Fort Duquesne completely off from Quebec); that by the first of September a hundred Indians were already gathered at Easton ready for a treaty; that the brave Post was now among the Delawares bringing the final opportunity for them to abandon the French cause. On September 2 he wrote Bouquet hinting of all these circumstances and urging delay in everything but mere road-building. On the sixth of September Forbes wrote Pitt:
"In my last I had the honour to acquaint you, of my proceedings in the new road across the Alleganey mountains, and over Laurell Hill, (leaving the Rivers Yohieganey and Monongahela to my left hand) strait to the Ohio, by which I have saved a great deal of way, and prevented the misfortunes that the overflowing of those rivers might occasion.
"I acquainted you likewise of the suspicions I had, of the small trust I could repose in the Pennsylvanians in assisting of me with anyone necessary, or any help in furthering the service that they did not think themselves compelled to do by the words of your letter to them. . . My advanced post consisting of 1500 men, are now in possession of a strong post 9 miles on the other side of Laurell Hill, and about 40 from Fort Du Quesne, nor had the Enemy even suspected my attempting such a road till very lately, they having been all along securing the strong passes, and fords of the rivers upon Genl Braddock's route."[4]
Forbes had been in Philadelphia while Bouquet was struggling away at Raystown with his thousand perplexities. Early in July he had proceeded to Carlisle where he remained stricken down "with a cursed flux" until the eleventh of August. Two days later he reached Shippensburg, where he was again prostrated and unable to advance until the middle of September. It is difficult to realize that the campaign had been directed so largely by this prostrate man whose "excruciating pains" often left him "as weak as a new-born infant" and who, when able to be about camp, retired "at eight at night, if able to sit up so late." All of this might well have been stated long ago but it is of particular significance now that Forbes's correspondence of the whole summer has been systematically reviewed. The very trials and perplexities, the crying need for his bravery and resolution, seemed in a measure to keep him alive.
No one can study this campaign without yearning to know more of the impetuous soul which threw its last grain of strength into making it a triumphant success. The Indians called Forbes "The Head of Iron"—and no words can better describe the man. Giving all praise possible to Bouquet for his sturdy and active service throughout the summer, it is still plain that the dying Forbes was the magnetic influence that made others strong. Those were dark days at Raystown when at last the pale general arrived upon the ground; "had not the General come up," wrote an officer on the spot, "the Consequence wou'd have been dangerous."[5] Bouquet was an invaluable man but the "Head of Iron" in command was needed.
The remainder of the campaign has been often told and in detail. Washington and his Virginians came northward over the newly-cut road to Fort Bedford at Raystown and plunged westward to the Loyal-hannan, to which point Armstrong and St. Clair pushed the road-building. Washington himself supervised the cutting of Forbes's road westward from Fort Ligonier toward Fort Duquesne. Much as he had wrangled with Bouquet as to the propriety of making a new road he was as good as his word and worked heroically for its success. Never, even in Braddock's death-trap on the Monongahela, did he come nearer giving his life to his country. Forbes's first check came when Grant's command, sent forward from Fort Ligonier to reconnoitre Fort Duquesne, was cut to pieces on Grant's Hill within sight of the French fort. Eight hundred men went on the expedition; two hundred and seventy-three were killed, wounded, or captured. Bouquet reported the disaster to Forbes on the seventeenth of September, upon which the sad man "deeply touched by this reverse," writes Parkman, "yet expressed himself with a moderation that does him honor." "Your letter of the seventeenth I read with no less surprise than concern, as I could not believe that such an attempt would have been made without my knowledge and concurrence. The breaking in upon our fair and flattering hopes of success touches me most sensibly. There are two wounded highland officers just now arrived, who give so lame an account of the matter that one can draw nothing from them, only that my friend Grant most certainly lost his wits, and by his thirst of fame brought on his own perdition, and ran great risk of ours." The brave generosity of these words is not so significant as the fact that this pain-racked man, far behind on the road, had such a grasp of the minutest detail of the whole campaign that Bouquet, he believed, would not even send out a scouting party in force without his "knowledge and concurrence."
A letter from Forbes to Bouquet dated Reastown, September 23rd, contains some interesting paragraphs: "The description of the roads is so various and disagreeable that I do not know what to think or say. Lieutenant Evans came down here the other day, and described Laurell Hill as, at present, impracticable, but he said he could mend it with the assistance of 500 men, fascines and fagots, in one day's time. Col. Stephens writes Col. Washington that he is told by everybody that the road from Loyal Hannon to the Ohio and the French fort is now impracticable. For what reason, or why, he writes thus I do not know; but I see Col. Washington and my friend, Col. Byrd, would rather be glad this was true than otherways, seeing the other road (their favourite scheme) was not followed out. I told them plainly that, whatever they thought, yet I did aver that, in our prosecuting the present road, we had proceeded from the best intelligence that could be got for the good and convenience of the army, without any views to oblige any one province or another; and added that those two gentlemen were the only people that I had met with who had shewed their weakness in their attachment to the province they belong to, by declaring so publickly in favour of one road without their knowing anything of the other, having never heard from any Pennsylvania person one word about the road; and that, as for myself, I could safely say—and believed I might answer for you—that the good of the service was the only view we had at heart, not valuing the provincial interest, jealousys, or suspicions, one single two-pence; and that, therefore, I could not believe Col. Stephen's descriptions untill I had heard from you, which I hope you will very soon be able to disprove. I fancy what I have said more on this subject will cure them from coming upon this topic again."
Forbes's next check was more ominous than Grant's scrimmage. It was not administered by the French—though they followed up the decisive victory on Grant's Hill with various attacks in force upon Fort Ligonier—but by the clouded heavens. A wet autumn set in early as if to make St. Clair's road doubly "diabolical." Forbes wrote Bouquet on October 15: "Your Description of the roads peirces me to the very soul yet still my hopes are that a few Dry days would make things wear a more favourable aspect as all Clay Countries are either good or bad for Carriages according to the wet or dry season. It is true we cannot surmount impossibilities nor prevent unforseen accidents but it must be a comfort both to you and I still that we proceeded wt Caution in the choice of this road and in the opinion of every Disinterested man, it had every advantage over the other. And I am not sure but it has so still considering the Yachiogeny & Monongehela rivers—so I beg yt you will without taking notice to any body make yourself master of the arguments for and objections against the two roads so that upon comparison one may Judge how far we have been in the right in our Choice. N. B. If any party goes out after the Enemy they ought to have instructions always with regard to the roads forward as likewise ye Communication twixt Loyalhana and the nearest part of Mr Braddocks road which want of all things to be reconnoitred in order to stop foolish mouths if it chances to prove anyways as good or practicable. May not such a communication be found without crossing Laurel hill?"
These are exceedingly interesting words when we know that failure stared Forbes in the face. This might mean official inquiry or court martial; in such a case there would have been, no doubt, question raised as to the "right" of Forbes's and Bouquet's "choice." But the fact that Forbes desired to know the exact condition of Braddock's Road, to get into it if it seemed best, and to prove the soundness of his judgment if it was found to be useless, is especially significant because it shows so plainly that the weary man already scented failure. In a few days he wrote again: "These four days of constant rain have completely ruined the road. The wagons would cut it up more in an hour than we could repair in a week. I have written to General Abercrombie, but have not had one scrap of a pen from him since the beginning of September; so it looks as if we were either forgot or left to our fate."
Early in November the poor man was carried on over the mountains to Fort Ligonier where the whole army, approximately six thousand strong, lay. Hope of continuing the campaign had fled and the desperate prospect of wintering amid the mountains, with no certainty of receiving sufficient stores to keep man and beast alive, stared the whole army in the face. Nevertheless, at a council of officers it was decided to attempt nothing further that season.
In a few hours three prisoners were brought into camp who reported the true condition of affairs at Fort Duquesne. Bradstreet had destroyed the stores destined for the Ohio by the destruction of Fort Frontenac. Ligneris, the commandant, had consequently been compelled to send home his Illinois and Louisiana militia. The brave Post had succeeded in alienating the Ohio Indians. The remainder at Fort Duquesne were glad now to hurry away into their winter quarters in their distant homelands. The gods had favored the brave.
Immediately Forbes determined upon a hurried advance with a picked body of twenty-five hundred men, unencumbered. Washington and Armstrong hastened ahead to cut the pathway. A strong vanguard led the way. Behind them came the hero of the hour and of the campaign, Forbes, borne on his litter. The Highlanders occupied the center of the rear, with the Royal Americans and provincials on their right and left under Bouquet and Washington. On the night of the twenty-fourth the little army lay on its arms in the hills of Turkey Creek, near Braddock's fatal field. At midnight a booming report startled them. Were the French welcoming the long-expected reënforcements from Presque Isle and Niagara—or had a magazine exploded? In the morning some advised a delay to reconnoitre. Forbes scorned the suggestion; "I will sleep," he is said to have exclaimed, "in Fort Duquesne or in hell tonight."
At dusk that November evening the army marched breathlessly down the wide, hard trace over which Beaujeu had led his rabble toward Braddock's army and, without opposition, came at last within sight of the goal upon which the eyes of the world had been directed so long. The barracks and store-house of Fort Duquesne were burned, the fortifications blown up and the French—gone forever.
Two days later a weary man sat within an improvised house and with a feeble hand indited a letter to the British Secretary of State. And all it contained was summed up in its first words: "Pittsbourgh 27th Novemr 1758." It was Pitt's bourgh now. The region about the junction of the Allegheny and Monongahela was known in Kentucky as "the Pitt country."
The generous Bouquet expressed the sentiment of the army when he affirmed: "After God, the success of this expedition is entirely due to the General." When Forbes's physical condition is understood, his last campaign must be considered one of the most heroic in the annals of America. "Its solid value was above price. It opened the Great West to English enterprise, took from France half her savage allies, and relieved the western borders from the scourge of Indian war. From southern New York to North Carolina, the frontier populations had cause to bless the memory of the steadfast and all-enduring soldier."[6]
Forbes soon became unable to write or dictate a letter. On the terrible return journey over his freshly-hewn road he suffered intensely, sometimes losing consciousness. He was carried the entire distance to Philadelphia on his litter, and in March he died. His body, at last free from pain, was laid with befitting honors in the chancel of Christ Church.
The following death notice and appreciation of General Forbes appeared in the Pennsylvania Gazette March 15, 1759:
"On Sunday last, died, of a tedious illness, John Forbes, Esq., in the 49th year of his age, son to ——— Forbes, Esq., of Petmerief, in the Shire of Fife, in Scotland, Brigadier General, Colonel of the 17th Regiment of North America; a gentleman generally known and esteemed, and most sincerely and universally regretted. In his younger days he was bred to the profession of physic, but, early ambitious of the military character, he purchased into the Regiment of Scott's Grey Dragoons, where, by repeated purchases and faithful services, he arrived to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. His superior abilities soon recommended him to the protection of General Campbell, the Earl of Stair, Duke of Bedford, Lord Ligonier, and other distinguished characters in the army; with some of them as an aid; with the rest in the familiarity of a family man. During the last war he had the honor to be employed in the post of Quarter-Master General, in the army under his Royal Highness, the Duke, which duty he discharged with accuracy, dignity and dispatch. His services in America are well known. By a steady pursuit of well-concerted measures, in defiance of disease and numberless obstructions, he brought to a happy issue a most extraordinary campaign, and made a willing sacrifice of his own life to what he valued more—the interests of his king and country. As a man he was just and without prejudices; brave, without ostentation; uncommonly warm in his friendships, and incapable of flattery; acquainted with the world and mankind, he was well-bred, but absolutely impatient of formality and affectation. As an officer, he was quick to discern useful men and useful measures, generally seeing both at first view, according to their real qualities; steady in his measures, and open to information and council; in command he had dignity without superciliousness; and though perfectly master of the forms, never hesitated to drop them, when the spirit and more essential parts of the service required it.
"Yesterday, (14th,) he was interred in the Chancel of Christ's Church, in this city."
A fellow-countryman of Forbes has built beside Forbes's Road (now Forbes Street), in the city of Pittsburg, a magnificent library. What could be more fitting or beautiful than that this brave Scotchman's memory should be honored with a monumental pillar here on his road which "opened the Great West to English enterprise?" And let it bear the sweet human testimony of a British historian: "No general was ever more beloved by the men under his command."[7]
- ↑ Forbes to Bouquet, August 28, 1756.
- ↑ Sparks: Writings of Washington (1834), vol. ii, p. 308, note.
- ↑ Washington's jealousy of Virginia's welfare appeared in 1755 when the question of Braddock's route from Alexandria to Fort Cumberland arose. It would seem to us today that conditions in Virginia must have been pitiable if the marching of an army through the colony could have been considered in any way a boon. Yet such was Washington's attitude in 1755 toward the Governor of Maryland's new road. In a letter to Lord Fairfax dated May 5, 1755, Washington objected to Dunbar's regiment marching to Cumberland by way of Frederick, Maryland; in a letter to Major Carlisle written from Fort Cumberland May 14, 1755, he ridicules the route: "Dunbar had to recross [the Potomac] at Connogagee [Williamsport, Maryland] and come down [into Virginia]—laughable enough."
- ↑ As to the correctness of Forbes's statement see Bougainville au Cremille, Pennsylvania Archives (2d series), vol. vi, p. 425; also Daine au Maréchal de Belleisle, id., pp. 420, 423.
- ↑ Armstrong to Richard Peters. Pennsylvania Archives, vol. iii, p. 552.
- ↑ Parkman: Montcalm and Wolfe, vol. ii, p. 162.
- ↑ Entick: History of the Late War (1763), vol. iii, p. 263, note.