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History of Aurangzib, Vol. I
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4573436History of Aurangzib, Vol. IJadunath Sarkar

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CHAPTER VII.

First Siege of Qandahar, 1649.

The province of Qandahar occupies the southern part of Afghanistan. It is a The district of Qandahar: its physical aspects,comparatively level country, of which the heart is formed by the river Helmand and its tributaries. On the east it is separated from India by the extensive net-work of hills centring round Thal-Chotiali. On the south impassable deserts lie between it and Baluchistan. On the north stretch the hill ranges of Ghazni and Kabul. Westwards, from a little beyond the city of Qandahar up to Isfahan, the country is fairly level, but so very hot and barren that for days and days together not a green herb or blade of grass refreshes the traveller's eye, while the dry sandy soil affords only a scanty supply of brackish water at long intervals. A few forts have been built on the rivers, mainly for military purposes, to guard the fords, to protect caravans, ​ and to afford resting places to troops on the march. Patches of cultivation and walled hamlets dot the river banks in an otherwise desolate wilderness.[1]

its crops and canals. Qandahar proper is an open and well-watered district penned within hills and deserts. The Arghandab and the Tarnak, two tributaries of the Helmand, give fertility to its north-eastern corner beyond Kalat-i-Ghilzai, on the road to Ghazni. Numberless canals have drawn away water from the Helmand, and turned the environs of Qandahar into one long expanse of orchards and cornfields, vineyards and melon-beds. The Afghans of this part have used every contrivance that human ingenuity sharpened by want can suggest, to utilise the precious water of their few streams in irrigating their fields. Rightly do the people name their river Hirmand or "abounding in blesssings," because they owe their all to it.[2] But the country is so bare of trees that firewood is very dear, and for lack of timber the people build their houses of sun​ dried clay, with earthen domes for roofs. Burnt bricks are seldom used, even in building the walls of forts.[3] Away from the river, agriculture cannot flourish, and sheep form the chief wealth of the people.

Strategic importance of Qandahar. The great Hindu Kush range running through the heart of Asia, strikes westwards into Persia, and thus completely separates Central Asia from Afghanistan, Baluchistan and India. But north of Herat its formidable heights sink to insignificant levels, with comparatively gentle gradients, which offer an easy passage to an invading host from Central Asia marching to take Kabul from the rear and strike India on her western flank.[4] Herein lies the strategic importance of Qandahar: only 360 miles of level country separate it from Herat,—a ten days' dash for cavalry. Through Qandahar must pass, and there must be turned back, if ever at all, any considerable land force, with artillery and other modern impedimenta, coming to invade India from Persia or Central Asia.[5] The master of Kabul must hold Qandahar and ​ Herat, or his dominion is unsafe. In an age when Kabul was a part of the Delhi Empire, Qandahar was our indispensable first line of defence.

In the seventeenth century Qandahar was evenQandahar, a gate-way of commerce between India and Persia. more important as a gateway of commerce than as an outpost of the empire. The Portuguese navy then dominated the Indian Ocean, and their quarrels with Persia often stopped the sea-borne trade by way of the Persian Gulf. All merchandise from India and even the Spice Islands had to follow the land route through Multan, Chotiali, Pishin and Qandahar. In spite of the length and hardships of the road, in spite of the toll levied by every petty chieftain and local officer whose jurisdiction had to be crossed, in spite of the total cost of transport being as high as Rs. 125 for every camel's load,-the traders had practically a monopoly of the Persian market, and their profits were large enough to attract numbers to the traffic. In 1615, the English traveller Richard Steel noted that fourteen thousand laden camels annually passed into Persia by this route. Many merchants of India, Persia and Turkey met at Qandahar and often concluded their exchange of commodities there, and so great was the con​ course of trade that provisions grew very dear in the city in spite of the natural abundance of the district, and the houses were extended till the suburbs became larger than the city itself.[6]

From its position Qandahar was naturally a bone of contention between Past history of Qandahar: India and Persia. Early in the sixteenth century two powerful monarchies strang up side by side, when Babar conquered Delhi and Shah Ismail founded the glorious "Sophy" dynasty in Persia. In 1522 Babar finally wrested the province of Qandahar from the Arghun family who had held it under nominal submission to the ruler of Herat. On his death, it passed as an appanage to his younger son Kamran. In 1545, Humayun, then a fugitive from India, captured the fort from his brother Askari, but broke his promise of ceding it to the son of the Persian king, who had given him shelter and whose forces had aided the conquest. But this breach of faith availed him little. In the troubles following Humayun's

death and Akbar's minority, the Persian king conquered Qandahar (1558) and bestowed it on his nephew Sultan Husain Mirza. Akbar's turn came in 1594, when Sultan Husain's successor, ​Mirza Muzaffar Husain, surrendered his principality to the Mughal EmperorFrequently changes hands between India and Persia. and entered his service as a high grandee. So also did Muzaffar's brother Rustam, the lord of Dawar. For the next twenty-nine years Qandahar remained united to Delhi, though a fruitless attack was made on it in 1606, just after Akbar's death. But the Persians were not to be denied. After negotiating in vain with Jahangir for a friendly cession of the fort, Shah Abbas the Great in 1623 besieged it for 45 days, and took it from Abdul Aziz Khan Naqshbandi, who was holding it for the Emperor. Fifteen years afterwards, Ali Mardan Khan, the Persian Governor of Qandahar, alarmed at the hostile intentions of the Shah, saved himself and his family by betraying the fort into Mughal hands (Feb., 1638) and entering the Imperial service, where he gained the highest rank and office, and the personal friendship of his new master. Shah Jahan, on getting possession spent immense sums in strengthening the defences and replenishing the stores and arsenals of Qandahar and its dependencies, Bist and Zamin Dawar.[7]

​It now became a point of honour with theShah Abbas II. prepares to recover it. Persian sovereign to recover Qandahar. Shah Abbas II, who had ascended the throne of Isfahan in 1642 as a boy of ten only, wanted to signalise his coming of age by a great exploit. In August, 1648, he began to assemble matchlockmen and pioneers in Khurasan, lay in stores of grain at convenient centres, and mobilise a large force at Herat. At the same time the traffic from Persia to Qandahar by this route was stopped, in order to withhold news from the doomed city. But preparations on such a vast scale cannot be kept secret. At the end of September Shah Jahan learnt of the project; he was even informed that the Persians would make the attack in winter, when the heavy snowfall of Afghanistan would prevent the arrival of relief from India. Shah Jahan, then at Delhi, took counsel with his ministers. Shah Jahan delays sending relief. It was at first decided to move the Court to Kabul, and to warn the nobles to join the expedition with their quotas of troops. But a ​ winter march to Afghanistan was unpleasant; several provincial commanders delayed joining the Emperor. Courtiers were not wanting to suggest that there was no need for hurry, as a Persian campaign in the depth of winter was most unlikely. In a weak moment Shah Jahan listened to the carpet knights of his Court; the march of the grand army was put off till the next spring. Only the Mughal Governor of Kabul threw 5,000 men and five lakhs of treasure into Qandahar to add to its defensive power.[8]

Empire is not for the ease-loving; victory is not for the indolent. The Persians besiege Qandahar. natural consequence of neglecting an enemy followed. The Persian king belied his tender age and character of a drunkard. He triumphed over the depth of winter, his lack of provisions, and other difficulties on which the courtiers of Shah Jahan ​ had built their hopes, and laid siege to Qandahar on 16th December, 1648.

Daulat Khan, surnamed Khawas Khan, the Mughal commandant, adopted a foolish scheme of defence. He threw his picked troops into the citadel, named Daulatabad, as if matters had already come to the worst. Three quarters of a mile from the citadel, on the north face of the hill, stood two projecting guard-towers above a flight of forty steps carved in the solid lime-stone rock. Daulat Khan durst not hold this isolated position. But it was a fatal omission. The Persians at once seized this eminence,[9] which dominated the citadel and the market place of Qandahar. On 5th January, 1649, three big guns, each carrying 74 ft shot, reached their camp. Platforms had been already raised for them, and the bombardment of the city began. The parapets and screens above the fort-walls were demolished, and the Persian trenches were safely run to the edge of the ditch. Thence they crossed the moat Progress of the siege. wooden bridges and secured a lodgement under the walls of the outwork named Shir Haji and began to lay ​ mines. Here the fiercest fighting took place at close quarters, the outwork being repeatedly lost and recovered. The presence of their king spurred the Persians on to heroic exertions.

Treachery among the defenders. Early in February, the garrison began to lose heart. their They had held own for a month and a half against superior odds, and no relief was in sight. Nor were traitors wanting to fan their discontent and alarm. Two Tartar chiefs, Shadi Uzbak and Qipchaq Khan, with their retainers, had entered the Mughal pay at the end of the war in Balkh, and were now in Qandahar. These foreign mercenaries thought only of saving their families and property, without caring for their master's honour. They intrigued with the timid and the slothful among the garrison and created a spirit of despair by dwelling on the impossibility of reinforcements arriving before spring, and painting the horrors of an assault by the Persians. Their arts succeeded. A portion of the garrison mutinied, deserted their trenches and opened negotiations with the enemy. Daulat Khan was not the leader for such a crisis: he lost control over his men; instead of making an example of the ring leaders, asserting his own authority by a stern suppression of the mutiny, and animating the ​ loyal by constant visits to the different points, he vainly reasoned with the mutineers, and then left them absolute masters of their quarters. On 5th February, the traitors admitted a Persian envoy within the lines against orders, and soon a crowd of Mughal officers gathered round him to hear the Shah's letters read. An Imperial officer from Bist was also brought in to convince the garrison of the surrender of that fort to the Persians. This took away what little courage the defenders had still left in them. The commandant begged for a five days' truce, which was granted.Capitulation of Qandahar. On 11th February, the garrison surrendered on a promise of safety from the Persian king, marched out of the fort and set out for India. Thus Qandahar with all its stores and armament was lost to India.[10] The siege had lasted 57 days, and the relieving force succeeded in coming in sight of the fort only three months after its fall!

No greater blow was ever struck at Mughal prestige than the loss of Qandahar. And the shame of it was equalled only when three grand and costly expeditions, led by the Emperor's sons, failed to wrest it from the Persians. The success ​ of Shah Abbas II served only to deepen the disgrace of the subsequent failures of Aurangzib and Dara Shukoh at the same place.

For the fall of Qandahar Shah Jahan and his advisers alone must be held responsible. They had underrated the enemy's powers; they had delayed their own preparations; and above all they had left Daulat Khan in charge. Before the Persians arrived, men and money had been thrown into the fort, but not the man needed for the occasion; and in war it is not men but the man that counts.

Daulat Khan[11] Character of its Mughal commandant. had risen to be a commander of five thousand. By birth a Bhati of the Panjab, his extreme beauty in youth had gained him Jahangir's favour and the easy office of Captain of the Imperial Body-guard. Under Shah Jahan he had distinguished himself by personal bravery and enterprise in the wars of the Deccan and the arrest of a powerful rebel. But he was now verging on sixty and had evidently lost his old energy and leadership of men. He had neither resourcefulness nor power of initiative, nor the iron will that nerves heroes to hold a fortress till the last moment in scorn of ​famine and impending massacre. Above all, he utterly failed to keep in hand the diverse races,―Rajputs and Hindustani Musalmans, Afghans and Turks, who formed the garrison of Qandahar. With an impregnable fort, a garrison of 7,000 men, and provisions and munitions for two years,[12] his task was easy in comparison with that of many an English subaltern known to fame, an Eldred Pottinger or a Grant (of Thobal); and he failed in it. If he had held out a month longer, the Persians would have raised the siege through lack of provisions. The garrison had lost only 400 men out of 7,000 effectives when he opened the gates to the enemy.[13]

Shah Jahan Army sent to Qandahar, had received news of the Persian preparations for the siege of Qandahar as early as 30th September, 1648, but he suffered his courtiers to persuade him to delay his own march to Kabul till the next spring. On 16th January, 1649 at Lahore he received a despatch ​from Qandahar stating that the Shah had arrived and begun the siege exactly a month before. Orders were immediately sent to Aurangzib and the prime minister Sadullah Khan, to hasten to Qandahar with 50,000 men. A bounty of Rs. 100 was paid for every trooper who joined the expedition, while the commanders and ahadis got three months' pay in advance.[14]

The troops moved in two divisions,—underunder Sadullah and Aurangzib. Sadullah Khan from Lahore and under Aurangzib from Multan,—and met together at Bhera. Thence the Prince himself advanced by way of Bangash, Kohat, Jamrud and Jalalabad, arriving at Kabul on 25th March, while the progress of the army was delayed by the snow on the roads and the lack of fodder for the beasts of transport. Meantime Qandahar had fallen, and Aurangzib's new orders were to push on and besiege the fort before the Persians could consolidate their conquest. The Emperor himself proceeded to Kabul to support and direct the siege from the rear.

Leaving Kabul (on 5th April) after a halt of eleven days, Aurangzib reached Ghazni on the 18th, where the absolute want of grain and fodder ​ rendered his further advance impossible. But the Emperor was inexorable. The Prince gathered what provisions he could during a fortnight's stay at Ghazni, and then resumed his march. From Qalat-i-Ghilzai Sadullah pushed on with five divisions of the army, and encamped before Qandahar on 14th May. Aurangzib brought up the rear two days later.[15]

Two miles outside the modern city of Qandahar, a traveller proceeding towards Herat comes upon the ruins of Old Qandahar described. old Qandahar,[16] which Alexander the Great is said to have built and which Nadir Shah destroyed in 1738. It stood on an exceedingly strong position, along the base and eastern slope of a high ridge of bare rock that rises abruptly from the plain. The site of the city is marked by the crumbling walls of houses and confused heaps of bricks and debris, which cover several acres of surface. The lines of defence are still traceable by portions of walls that extend with broken intervals along the crest of the ridge. The city consisted of three distinct ​ parts, each on a separate eminence, and capable The city and the ridge. of mutual defence. On the serrated crest of the hill stood many towers united by curtains. The highest of these, called Lakah, was almost impregnable. It contained rock-cut tanks of water for the city and commanded the citadel (named Daulatabad), which stood lower down on the second eminence, while the town and market-place (Mandavi), both walled round, were situated further below on the first tableland above the eastern plain. Beyond the city stretched gardens, pleasure-houses and fields for miles and miles, to the north, east, and south-east. Three walls surrounded the city at such a distance from it as to enclose a large open space for the encampment of a garrison in time of war.

The ramparts[17] of the old town were built of dried clay,The walls. strengthened by the mixture of chopped straw and stones. The material, thoroughly wetted and stamped out, was laid in layers of eighteen inches high at a time and allowed to dry before the next layer was put on. Their thickness at places was ten yards. An English officer in 1878 wrote of these walls as about the stiffest ​ things of the kind he had seen. On firing a revolver at 10 yards, the bullet was merely lodged in the face of the wall and could be picked out with the nail. Such walls, according to him, might have stood modern battering guns for a length of time, and in fact some of the British artillerymen doubted if any impression to speak of could have been made on them.[18] Beyond the triple walls, on the side of the plain was a wide and deep ditch, supplied with water from the canals of the Arghandab river.

On the north face of the ridge against which the fort nestled, there are forty steps cut in the rock and leading up to a cave half way up the hill. On the two sides of the entrance, are two couchant leopards, and the cave itself contains a bow-shaped chamber with a domed roof.[19] Two guard-towers had been built during the Mughal occupation on adjacent projections of the rock to oppose an enemy's assault by this path, because from the top of the Forty Steps guns could command both the citadel and the city.The gates. The fort of Lakah crowned a peak in the middle of the ridge and defended Qandahar on its western flank, where the hill descended to the plain in a steep ​ scarp. It had a gate named Ali Qábi.[20] Proceeding along the city wall from the north-eastern corner of the ridge where the wall first leaves the hill, we come in succession to the gates of Baba Wali, Waisqaran, Khwajah Khizir, and Mashuri, till at last the wall strikes the ridge again at the south-western corner of the fort, where stood an earth-work bastion and a redoubt (hissar).[21]

The outposts of the province in the direction of Persia were Kushk-i-Nakhud, situated about 40 miles west of Qandahar on the right bank of a tributary of the Helmand which drains the Maiwand valley, the fort of Bist, 50 miles further west on the margin of the Helmand, and Zamin Dawar, north-west of Bist. The Persian frontier station was Girishk, some thirty miles up the Helmand from Bist.[22]

Aurangzib arrived before Qandahar and began the siege on 16th May, 1649.Siege begun. The Mughals completed their ​ investment by throwing up entrenchments opposite the gates and behind the ridge, and began to run covered lanes towards the ditch of the fort. A body of scouts watched the ferry at Kushk-i-Nakhud, to get early news of the coming of any relieving force from Persia.

Next day a coup de main was attempted. Rajahs Man Singh of Gwalior and Bhao Singh of the Kangra Hills, led their Rajputs up the Forty Steps and reached the platform on the top, but the Persian musketeers from within the guard-towers plied their matchlocks with deadly effect at point-blank range, and the Rajputs were driven with heavy loss half way down the hill, where they constructed a stockade and held it for some time.[23]

Despite a heavy fire from the fort guns, threeEntrenching and sapping. covered lanes were carried to the edge of the ditch by 4th July. From one of these a transverse was dug along the bank to the front of the Khwajah Khizir gate. Windows were opened in this and through them earth and tree loppings were flung into the ditch to form a bridge, (2nd August). An underground channel was dug which partly drained the ditch and lowered the water-level by one yard. Another ​ mine was carried under the ditch till it reached the base of the outermost wall.[24]

Hitherto the Imperial troops had worked under cover and carried out their Aurangzib's lack of siege guns. tasks. Now they had to come out into the open and storm the fort. This could have been effected only after overpowering the batteries of the defenders or breaching the walls. But Aurangzib's expedition had been planned for throwing reinforcements into the fort and was therefore not at all equipped for the unexpected task of conducting a siege. He had not a single piece of large cannon, while the fort in the hands of the Persians contained many. An assault in the face of superior artillery could have been carried out only by troops of desperate courage and markedly higher skill and discipline, and after a heavy sacrifice of lives. But in this case the superiority lay with the defenders. The Delhi historian frankly admits, "The Persians had grown expert in the capture and defence of forts, by their long wars with the Turks since thePersian superiority in artillery. days of Shah Abbas. They were masters of fire-arms and artillery. They held such a strong and well-provisioned fort, with big guns and skilful ​ gunners, who in one day fired 25 times on the covered lane which had arrived half way across the ditch and destroyed it. Qasim Khan's mine was also discovered and demolished by the fire from the fort guns...The Imperialists had no gun big enough to overthrow the parapet under shelter of which the fort-gunners fired their pieces, not to speak of silencing their fire."[25]

Failure: Siege raised. "So the Imperialists failed with all their efforts." The capture of the fort was hopeless, and on 5th September, Aurangzib, obeying the Emperor's command, began his retreat from Qandahar. He had sat down 3 months and 20 days before the fort, but all in vain. The retreat was hastened by the approach of the terrible Afghan winter which Indians cannot bear, and the news that a large Persian force, estimated at 20,000 strong, was coming to relieve Qandahar.

An Imperial force under Qalich Khan had been posted for two months near the fort of Bist with Mughal advanced detachment orders to corrupt its Persian garrison, ravage the district of Dawar, and send supplies of grain to Qandahar. But in August reinforcements from Persia began to ​ advance towards Qandahar, and make Qalich Khan's position untenable. Khanjar Khan whom he had detached with 4,000 Indian troops to cross the Helmand and loot the district of Kuraishi, was defeated by Najaf Quli, the Persian Master of the Horse, and driven back across the river with a loss of 700 slain besides many others who perished in swimming the stream (during the second half of July). Qalich Khan rapidly fell back before the enemy's superior numbers till he reached Sang Hissar on the Arghandab, some 24 miles south-west of Qandahar. Here strong reinforcements sent by Aurangzib under Rustam Khan Deccani reached him, after driving away a band of Persian cattle-raiders who had penetrated to within a few miles of the Prince's camp.[26]

fights the Persian relieving force, The two generals joined their forces and on 25th August at Shah Mir fought a great battle with the enemy. The Indian army under Rustam Khan stood in battle order on the bank of the Arghandab, barring the road to Qandahar. The Persians, reported to be 30,000 strong, stretched in a vast line for four miles from the hill of Kushk-i-Nakhud to the river bank. Large reinforcements had reached them that ​ very morning under Murtaza Quli Khan, the Fauji Bashi. The new arrivals, eager to share in the battle, issued from Kushk-i-Nakhud, without stopping to water and refresh their horses. Their general vowed that he would not break his fast before defeating the Indians!

It was an hour past noon when the rival hosts clashed together. The small Indian army was beset in frontwhich retires. and the two flanks, and for three hours waged a fierce struggle. At first the vigour of the Persian charges shook and pressed back the Indian Right Wing, but the troops were picked men and did not lose order; strengthened by the Reserve under Rustam Khan himself, they made a counter-charge and repelled the attack. A dust-storm put an end to the battle. The Persians, on unrefreshed horses, suffered much from the hot wind and retired, leaving the Indians masters of the field. In the hurry of their flight they abandoned some of their artillery, carts, horses, and arms, which the Imperialists captured. Next day the victors advanced, but found that the Persians had evacuated Kushk-i-Nakhud at night and could not be caught up even after a pursuit of 20 miles.[27]

​

This victory cast a dying gleam on the MughalCasualties during the siege. arms, and Shah Jahan celebrated it with great pomp and pride: the Imperial band played for three days, the Court went into rejoicing, and honours and promotions were bestowed on the generals. But the siege of Qandahar was already hopeless, and ten days after this victory it was abandoned. Aurangzib had lost two to three thousand men and double that number of horses, camels and oxen in the siege, and his army had been severely tried by scarcity of grain and fodder.[28] Mihrab Khan, the Persian commandant of Qandahar, died on the day the Imperialists began their retreat; but he had held his trust inviolate.

  1. ↑ Journey of Richard Steel and John Crowther, in Purchas, I. 519—528 (quoted in Kerr's Voyages and Travels, ix. 212 and 213).
  2. ↑ Imperial Gazetteer, i. 12. Ain-i-Akbari (Jarrett), ii. 394. Masson's Journeys, ii. 186, 189. Forster's Journey (1798), ii. 102—104 and 106.
  3. ↑ Masson's Journeys, i. 280.
  4. ↑ Holdich's Gates of India, 528.
  5. ↑ Kandahar (a pamphlet), with an Introduction by Ashmead Bartlett, (1881).
  6. ↑ Purchas, 1.519—528, as quoted in Kerr, ix. 209, 212, 213. Tavernier, i. 90.
  7. ↑ For the history of Qandahar see Erskine's History of India, i. 215, 220, 355; ii. 311-319, Blochmann's Ain-i-Akhari, i. 313—314, 409, 504; Elliot, vi. 130; Rugat-i-Shah Abbas Sani, 77—79, Alam Arai Abbasi (Mulla Firuz MS.), ii. 119; Khafi Khan, i. 115—122, 326; Abdul Hamid, ii. 24—40; Masir-ul-Umara, ii. 795—798 (Life of Ali Mardan Khan), iii. 296 et seq; Encyclopaedia of Islam, i. 167 and 168.
  8. ↑ Waris, 20b-21a, 23a; Khafi Khan, i. 684—686; Muhammad Afzal Husain's Zubdat-ut-Tawarikh, (Khuda Bakhsh MS.) 42a, (very brief). Rugat-i-Shah Abbas Sani, the Shah's letters to Shah Jahan before and after the siege, 52—64, his letter calling upon Daulat Khan to surrender the fort, 120—126, and some other epistles in which he exults over his victory, 105—120 (including the failures of Shah Jahan's sons). One of the letters to Shah Jahan contains the curious request, "Won't you make a free gift of Qandahar to me, who stand in the relation of a son to you?" (59) Tarikh-i-Shah-Abbas Sani by Mirza Tahir Wahid (Mulla Firuz Library) has a brief account of the Persian capture and the failure of the Mughal sieges.
  9. ↑ Manucci mentions a story that they surpised the Mug-hal sentry on the hilltop by following a goat-track up the hill at night under the guidance of a goat-herd. (Storia, i. 186.)
  10. ↑ (For the siege by the Persians) Waris, 23a—27a; Khafi Khan, i. 686—690 and 693.
  11. ↑ Life in Masir-ul-Umara, ii. 24—30.
  12. ↑ When the Persians captured the fort, it had a garrison of 4,000 men armed with the sword or the bow, 3000 men armed with matchlocks, a number of large guns, vast quantities of powder and shot, many thousand stands of arms, besides money, grain, oil and other provisions sufficient for two years. (Waris, 26a and b.)
  13. ↑ Waris, 26a and b.
  14. ↑ Waris, 23a and b, 27a.
  15. ↑ Waris, 27a-28b (for the details of the march).
  16. ↑ This description is based upon Ferrier's Caravan Journeys (ed. 1856), 317; Bellew's Journal of a Political Mission to Afghanistan, 232 & 233; Masson's Journeys, i. 279; Waris, 26a.
  17. ↑ This description is based on Ferrier, 317; Le Messurier's Kandahar in 1879, pp. 70 and 71.
  18. ↑ Le Messurier, 130 and 131.
  19. ↑ Bellew, 232 and 233.
  20. ↑ So far as we can judge from the Persian accounts, Qaitul was the name of the whole ridge. At places it looks as if it were a peak identical with or adjacent to Lakah, but the Adab-i-Alamgiri, 12b, distinctly calls the whole ridge the hill of Qaitul.
  21. ↑ For the gates, Waris, 24b, 28b, 65a; Adab-i-Alamgiri, 12b, 14a.
  22. ↑ Holdich's Gates of Indi'a, 204, Purchas, i. 519—528 (quoted in Kerr's Voyages and Travels, ix). Ain-i-Akbari (Jarrett), ii. 393—398.
  23. ↑ Waris, 28b and 29a.
  24. ↑ Waris, 34a and 34b.
  25. ↑ Waris, 33b, 34b.
  26. ↑ Waris, 29a, 34b—36a.
  27. ↑ Waris, 36a-37b. The Persian version is in Zubdat-ut-Tawarikh, 42b and 43a, where it is stated that as the wind was very hot and their horses not yet watered and baited, the Persians retired and found next day that "the Indian troops in awe of the Persians had retreated and joined Aurangzib!"
  28. ↑ Khafi Khan, i. 695—700.
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