History of Mexico (Bancroft)/Volume 5/Chapter 17

by Hubert Howe Bancroft

 

CHAPTER XVII.

 

SCOTT'S MARCH TO PUEBLA.

 

FEBRUARY-JULY, 1847.

Taylor Returns to Monterey — Preparations against Vera Cruz — Landing of United States Forces — Apathy of the Mexican Government — Fortifications of Vera Cruz — Siege and Capitulation — Respective Losses — Operations of the Gulf Fleet — Santa Anna's Preparations — He Takes up a Position at Cerro Gordo — Scott Advances into the Interior — Battle of Cerro Gordo — The Height Carried — Scott Enters Jalapa — The Castle of Perote Evacuated — Worth Proceeds to Puebla — Trist Appointed Commissioner to Mexico — His Disagreement with Scott — Attempts at Negotiation with Santa Anna

With the battle of Buena Vista, Taylor s active operations in the north may be regarded as ended. His work in future was confined to holding possession of the country occupied. The withdrawal of his regular troops for Scott's expedition against the capital, and the approaching expiration of his best volunteers' term of service, rendered offensive manœuvres in the direction of San Luis Potosi inadvisable. At the same time Scott s advance against the capital so occupied the Mexicans that the hostile forces in the northern provinces were almost unmolested. For a brief period the communication between Monterey and the Rio Grande was interrupted by the operations of generals Urrea and Romero, who, in concert with Santa Anna s design of cutting off the retreat of the army which he had hoped to defeat, had advanced with a strong cavalry corps from Tula to the neighbor hood of Cerralvo and Camargo. On the 24th of February Romero attacked a large wagon-train near Marin, escorted by Lieutenant Barbour, 1st Kentucky regiment. The train was destroyed, about 50 wagoners were killed, and the escort captured.^[1] Again, early in March, a train of 150 wagons, escorted by Major Giddings, was attacked near Cerralvo, and a sharp action took place. Many of the wagons were destroyed, and a number of lives were lost. The Mexicans, however, were finally repulsed.^[2] Several other affairs of a like nature took place; but Taylor, having returned to Monterey and established his headquarters at Walnut Springs, marched in person with a strong force against Urrea, who thereupon retired by way of Victoria and Tula to the south.

 

It appears from the official correspondence that Scott first submitted to the government a written exposition of his views relative to a new line of operations on the 27th of October, 1846. In the memoranda which he laid before the secretary of war he expressed the opinion that, in consideration of Mexico's rejection of all overtures of peace, only by the capture of the capital could she be brought to terms, and that the most practicable way of effecting this would be by taking possession of Vera Cruz and San Juan de Ulúa. To accomplish the latter he deemed a force of 10,000 men necessary, though 15,000 would be better if they could be on the spot before the yellow-fever came. Nevertheless, he was willing to attempt the capture of Vera Cruz with a smaller force. To reach the capital an army of more than 20,000 men would probably be needed.^[3] Scott's views were approved, and, as the reader is aware, he was appointed to the command of the forces in Mexico.

As soon as the United States government had decided to change the base of operation, preparations were carried on with all possible vigor. Transports were procured as quickly as possible, large quantities of munitions of war manufactured, and siege trains of heavy artillery shipped as promptly as circumstances would permit. By February the transports began to arrive at Brazos Santiago, and by the end of the month the embarkation of the troops had been effected at that port, as well as of Patterson's and Twiggs' divisions at Tampico. The island of Lobos, about sixty miles to the south of the latter place, was appointed by Scott as a general rendezvous, and there he organized his army, now numbering over 12,000 men.^[4] On March 7th the fleet of transports numbering about eighty vessels anchored at Point Anton Lizardo, and Scott, having reconnoitred the coast, decided to effect a landing at a point about three miles south of Vera Cruz. Sixty-seven surf-boats, each capable of holding from seventy to eighty men, had been provided, and into these 5,500 men were embarked and put ashore about half-past five in the afternoon of the 9th. During the night the debarkation of the whole force was effected without opposition.^[5]

While Vera Cruz, the gateway to the heart of the nation, was yet threatened with this hostile movement, the inhabitants received the unpleasant tidings that a revolution had broken out in the capital, and that the troops destined to move to their aid were there employed. It was more interesting fighting each other for individual supremacy than banding against the invaders. The fortifications of Vera Cruz were not in a satisfactory condition, many important points being out of repair, and the armament by no means in serviceable order.^[6] Gunpowder also would have been almost entirely wanting but for the opportune arrival of the French bark Anax, which succeeded in running the blockade during a norther with a cargo of that article.^[7] Provisions both in the city and in San Juan de Ulúa were scarce at the time of Scott's descent upon the coast, and the government's extraordinary neglect to furnish aid in any form gave rise to bitter reflections and to suspicions of treachery on the part of Santa Anna.^[8]

The fortifications of Vera Cruz at this time consisted of a system of bastions and redans encircling the town on the land side, commencing at Fort Concepcion, situated on the shore at the most northern point, and terminating with Fort Santiago, at the southeastern extremity of the town. The forts were both of considerable strength, but the intermediate bastions, seven in number, were small and provided with curtains of thin masonry only proof against musketry. Owing to the shifting nature of the sand which surrounds the town, no protecting ditches are practicable, as they are quickly filled up during the heavy northers that so frequently prevail. At the end of 1846 there were in the city, according to the report of the minister of war, 144 pieces of artillery of different calibres, of which 89 only were mounted, and in San Juan de Ulúa 135 out of 147 were mounted. Many of the former and most of the latter were heavy guns.^[9] The numerical force of the garrisons in the town and castle was 4,390^[10] of which 3,360 constituted that of the former, a number insufficient even to man effectively the fortifications. Thus it was that Scott was enabled to land his troops in full force without a shot being fired at him within range. In vain appeals were made to the government as the enemy's intentions became more certain and the danger daily more threatening. During the siege no exterior aid was rendered to the beleaguered city except by trivial diversions made by a few troops of cavalry and irregular bands of guerrillas. Nevertheless, though thus abandoned, the commandant, Juan Morales, made every possible preparation to resist, in the vague hope that a relieving army might arrive, or that he might be able to hold out till the vómito compelled the Americans to raise the siege. The ayuntamiento and citizens nobly supported him in his efforts; night and day soldier and civilian worked side by side at the defences; and rich and poor and old and young were alike animated with patriotic ardor.

 

Scott began to take up the line of investment immediately after having disembarked his troops. He encountered some difficulties in his operations, and it was not until the 12th that his line of investment was completed.^[11] The ground about Vera Cruz, out of range of fire from the town and castle, is broken by numerous hills of loose sand, with almost impenetrable thickets of chaparral between, and the progress of the troops was slow. Heavy northers, too, set in, stifling the men with drift sand, interrupting the landing of subsistence and baggage, and delaying the arrival of the siege artillery. On the 18th Scott began his approaches to the city. He ran his trenches with considerable skill, being careful to keep the town as a shield between them and the fire from the castle, and on the 22d had sufficient guns in position to authorize his summoning the city to surrender. Hitherto hostilities had been accompanied with few casualties. A vigorous but ineffective fire at long range was kept up from the town and castle on the line of investment, but the nature of the ground protected the besiegers, and the cannonade was received by them in silence. Paltry skirmishes also took place with insignificant loss to either side, and a few American stragglers, committing depredations on the inhabitants, were killed by the rancheros.

At 2 o'clock in the afternoon Scott sent in a summons to General Morales, who was in command of San Juan de Ulúa as well as Vera Cruz, offering to stipulate that if the city capitulated no fire should be directed against the castle unless the latter fired

Vera Cruz.

upon the United States troops with which the former would be garrisoned. Morales peremptorily refused to comply,^[12] and on return of the flag the bombardment began.

The Americans had at this time seven 10-inch mortars in position, the batteries being planted about 800 yards from the beleaguered city. There were, moreover, six 8-inch mortars^[13] planted at intervals along the parallel. The Mexicans returned the fire of the enemy with great vigor and precision, but the sunken trenches from which the American mortars played rendered their accuracy of little avail, while, after the range was obtained, the bursting shells of the Americans told with visible effect upon the city. Vessels of the blockading fleet, now under Commodore Perry,^[14] drew up near Point Hornos and also opened fire with heavy guns. On the 23d three more mortars were placed in position, and on the following day a naval battery, consisting of three 32-pounders and three 68-pounder Paixhan guns, opened fire. The cannonade on both sides was terrific. Heavy shells crushed through the stone roofs and sides of the houses, scattering ruin around; many portions of the city were set on fire; and no building afforded protection against the deadly missiles, as the round shot tore open its way and the bomb burst open a passage. The Santa Bárbara bastion, against which the naval battery had been directed, was almost rent to pieces, but its fire could not be silenced. Once its flag was shot down and fell outside, but to the admiration of the besiegers, it was recovered by the brave defenders amidst a shower of cannon-balls, and lashed to its place.^[15] The naval battery also suffered; its heavy embrasures and strong platform were torn and battered down and its guns dismounted. But the damage sustained by the Americans was small in proportion to that inflicted upon the Mexicans. The scene in the city was one of desolation. Numbers, both of the garrison and non-combatants, had fallen, and provisions, after twelve days' close investment, began to fail.

Late on the night of the 24th the American commander received a communication from the consuls of Great Britain, France, Spain, and Prussia, praying him to suspend hostilities and grant a truce to enable the subjects of their respective nations, as well as the Mexican women and children, to leave the place on account of the frightful results of the bombardment. Scott had already, on the 13th, sent in safeguards to the foreign consuls, covering their respective subjects, and as they had persisted in remaining in the city, with military severity, but with undeniable justice to his position, supported by his previous action, he would not listen to an application made too late, according to the rules of war.^[16] He informed the foreign representatives that no truce could be granted, except on application of the commander-in-chief of Vera Cruz.

Each day the cannonade and bombardment had become nore destructive, as fresh guns were brought On the 25th another battery of four 24-pounders and two 8-inch Paixhan guns was opened, and a terrible fire sustained during the day. The foreign inhabitants were now convinced of the uselessness of further resistance, and their consuls pressed Morales to take measures, for the sake of humanity, to save the non-combatants. This he could only do by capitulation, and on the night of the 25th he called a council of war at which the advisibility of surrender was generally expressed. To this he was obstinately opposed,^[17] and he resigned the command to General José Juan Landero. On the morning of the 26th that commander, aware that the ammunition was well nigh exhausted, and that the poor were already starving, sent in a communication to Scott, inviting him to appoint three commissioners to treat with an equal number on the Mexican side regarding terms of surrendef. Whereupon Scott ordered a cessation of the fire, and appointed as his commissioners generals Worth and Pillow and Colonel Totten, who during the afternoon held a meeting with colonels Gutierrez de Villanueva and Miguel Herrera and Lientenant-colonel Robles, as the representatives of Landero.

Some time was lost by disagreement as to terms and in discussions. The Mexican commissioners demanded that the garrison should be allowed to march out with the honors of war, retaining all the arms and stores belonging to the different corps, and an allowance of artillery corresponding to its force. Scott's commissioners were instructed to demand the absolute surrender of Vera Cruz and San Juan de Ulúa, the rank and file of the garrisons of which places it was designed to send as prisoners of war to the United States, while the officers would be allowed to retire to their homes on the usual parole.

Nevertheless, on the following day all difficulties were overcome, and a convention was signed late that night, by which Vera Cruz and the castle of San Juan de Ulúa, with their armaments, munitions of war, garrisons, and arms, were surrendered. The Mexican officers were allowed to retain their arms and effects, and the troops were permitted to retire to their homes, their officers giving parole that they should not serve again until duly exchanged. The garrison was permitted to march out with the honors of war, and the civil and religious rights of the inhabitants of the city were solemnly guaranteed.

The surrender took place at ten o'clock in the morning of the 29th, and the American troops immediately afterward took possession of the city and castle, which were placed under the command of Worth.^[18]

In the siege of Vera Cruz the loss on the side of the Americans was insignificant, being only 67 in killed and wounded, eleven of whom were killed.^[19] The Mexicans suffered much more severely, and 1,000 is perhaps not too low an estimate of the killed alone.^[20] The spoils taken, according to the official statements sent to the American government, comprised 5,000 stands of arms, 400 pieces of ordnance, and a large quantity of ordnance stores.^[21]

Scott's bombardment of Vera Cruz and his refusal to yield to the appeal of the consuls produced in the country the deepest indignation; and in the Mexican publications of the day no epithet is spared in qualifying his course of action as barbarous and inhuman. Nor were foreign nations — which under similar circumstances would have acted in precisely the same manner — behindhand in condemning him.^[22] But with the lapse of time the matter has been judged with more calmness and proper justice, and there are not wanting even Mexican writers who exonerate Scott from the charge of inhumanity.^[23]

Scott had now obtained the best base for his advance upon the capital that the country afforded, and he made his preparations for that movement with the utmost expedition. A delay of some days, however, occurred from want of transportation means, during which time he gave his attention to restoring order in Vera Cruz. On the 11th of April he published a proclamation,^[24] in which he informed the public that the Americans were not hostile to the Mexican people, but to their bad rulers; he reiterated his assurance of extending protection to their civil rights and religion; and invited the natives to return to their occupations in which they would be unmolested and meet with just dealing.^[25] Under his provisions for the maintenance of tranquillity, and by the prompt punishment of American offenders,^[26] confidence was greatly restored, and the inhabitants who had fled soon returned to the town and pursued their vocations.

 

At this time the capture of Alvarado was at last achieved. After the surrender of Vera Cruz, Quitman had been sent with a brigade against that port to coöperate with the fleet, but on his arrival found it in possession of Lieutenant Hunter of the Scourge, to whom it had been surrendered by the authorities.^[27] Quitman returned April 4th to Vera Cruz, and Perry placed a detachment of marines in the place to hold possession.

Shortly afterward, April 18th, Tuxpan was captured by the fleet after a feeble resistance, and the guns which belonged to the stranded Truxton were recovered. As the place was of little importance, it was abandoned after the works had been destroyed.

Perry next turned his attention to Tabasco again, and about the middle of June, having proceeded some distance up the river, landed a force of 1,100 men and 10 pieces of artillery, which took the town by assault without difficulty. Destroying the fortifications and transferring the war material to his ships, Perry left the town in possession of 420 men.^[28] Tabasco and the ports in the southern portion of the gulf were held for some time by the naval forces, which experienced no other opposition than annoyances. During the remainder of the war the whole of the eastern coast of Mexico was under the power of the gulf squadron.

When Santa Anna arrived at Matehuala he received news of the revolution promoted in the capital by the political party called the polkos, and decided to proceed thither in person. At San Luis, therefore, where he arrived March 9th, he placed Mora y Villamil in command of the troops which he left behind, and with a portion of his shattered army hastened to the city of Mexico. His presence tended to restore order. He assumed the presidency without opposition, and made a triumphal entry into the city March 23d. Intelligence of Scott's descent upon Vera Cruz had reached the capital as early as the 11th, but had not caused any great alarm, it being confidently expected that the place would be able to hold out for a considerable time. When, however, the news of its fall arrived on the 30th, this illusion gave place to great sensation. A large body of troops^[29] had been despatched from the capital the day before to the aid of Vera Cruz, and the troops that had been left at San Luis Potosí^[30] were also on the march in the same direction. Every exertion was now made by Santa Anna to concentrate forces to oppose the advance of the Americans. A decree was passed April 1st empowering him to take command of the army in person, and providing for the appointment of a substitute as president in his stead.^[31] Having issued one of his usual spirit-stirring proclamations, in which he spoke with confidence of the ultimate triumph of the Mexican arms, and his own determination to die in the cause, he left the capital April 2d, and arrived on the 4th at his hacienda of Encero, about three leagues distant from Jalapa on the road to Vera Cruz. Within a few days the troops from the capital and San Luis Potosí successively arrived, as well as others from different parts. In the movements and concentration of these forces the greatest activity was displayed. The troops stationed at the Puente Nacional having been unwisely withdrawn, and the road to the village of Plan del Rio left open to the enemy, Santa Anna decided to take up a position at the pass of Cerro Gordo.

Santa Anna encountered great difficulties in making his preparations. The government had neglected to provide for the maintenance and equipment of troops. A great portion of his force was composed of raw recruits, undisciplined and unaccustomed to the use of fire-arms. The position at Cerro Gordo was without water; intrenchments had to be thrown up and the army was without the proper implements; the soldiers were hungry and there was little to eat. Nevertheless, this indefatigable leader, without money and most of the ordinary resources for military preparation, collected an army of 9,000 or 10,000 men,^[32] with more than forty pieces of artillery. With laborers and implements taken from his hacienda he cut a ditch from it to Cerro Gordo, three leagues in length, supplying abundance of water, and threw up intrenchments and placed batteries on half a dozen important points. And all this was accomplished within twelve days. It is true the works were incomplete and the surrounding ground was not properly cleared, but he maintained that if he had had fifteen days more time, he would have made his position unassailable.^[33] He established a depôt, making himself responsible to a merchant of Jalapa for the payment of goods delivered at it. He caused the cattle on his estate to be driven into camp, and fed his hungry troops with meat. He did everything, in fact, that man could do to insure success. Yet Santa Anna has been accused of culpably losing the battle of Cerro Gordo, and I do not say he was wholly without blame.

 

A limited amount of pack-animals and other means of transportation having been obtained, Twiggs' division of regulars, the 2d, marched from Vera Cruz for Jalapa April 8th, and was followed the next day by two brigades of Patterson's division of volunteers.^[34] Twiggs arrived at the village of Plan del Rio on the 11th and encamped there. As yet he was entirely ignorant as to the strength of the enemy, and had no more reliable information respecting it than vague reports obtained from Mexicans, who variously estimated it at from 2,000 to 13,000. On the 12th, however, he made a daring reconnoissance, and discovered the general position of the enemy, and the fact that he was in much greater force than had been expected. Nevertheless, he meditated attacking, and on the 13th, having matured his plans, issued his orders to his own division and that of Patterson, which had also arrived in camp, and over which he assumed command. His hasty proceedings were arrested, however, by the receipt of an order from Patterson to suspend all operations until the arrival of the commander-in-chief.

Meantime Scott, who had been somewhat better informed than his generals,^[35] at the first intimation that a serious conflict might be expected, hastened to the front, and arrived at Plan del Rio on the 14th. He was followed by Worth with his comınand, which came up at midnight on the 16th.

The American general employed two days in reconnoitring the formidable position of the enemy. No view of the ground could be obtained from any single point, and the dispositions of Santa Anna were for the most part hidden from sight. The work, too, of reconnoitring was extremely difficult and laborious, owing to the labyrinth of deep ravines and the confusion of massive hills which extended on all sides. Nevertheless, it was successfully accomplished, and on the 17th Scott began his attack.

The highway from Vera Cruz to Jalapa, crossing the Rio del Plan at Plan del Rio, at first winds its way with a north-west trend through a séries of eminences, which, like a Titanic staircase, rise in successive altitudes. Then taking a south-westerly direction, it approaches the northern bank of the river at the base of the highest eminence, called Cerro Gordo, or the Telégrafo.^[36] The Rio del Plan flows at the bottom of a ravine between four and five hundred feet in depth. The sides of this ravine are perpendicular, and present an impassable barrier against approach from the south. On the north of the line of eminences an equally impracticable ravine extends, while beyond it the mountains rise tier upon tier. Santa Anna's dispositions were as follows: On the eminences to the south-east of Cerro Gordo, and flanking the road on the south, four batteries were planted, mounting twenty-two guns in all. At the approach of the road to the ravine, down which the Rio del Plan flows, was a battery of seven guns; on the summit of Cerro Gordo a fort had been erected, defended by four light pieces, afterward increased to six; this position dominated all the other batteries, which consecutively commanded each other in the order of their nearness to Cerro Gordo. The main camp of the Mexican army was situated on level ground at the western base of the Cerro Gordo, and covered by a strong battery on the commanding slope to the north. Some distance in the rear the cavalry under the command of General Canalizo was stationed at Corral Falso.^[37] From Plan del Bio an old road led up to the fortifications on the right of the Mexican position. By consulting the accompanying plan the reader will obtain a correct idea of the battle-field.

Battle-Field of Cerro Gordo.

A. Mexican camp.	E. Twiggs movement on the 18th.
B. Mexican defences and batteries.	F. Pillow s attack.
C. Mexican cavalry.	G. Shields approach on the Mexican camp.
D. Twigg's positions on the 17th and 18th,

Strong as was Santa Anna s position, he made a fatal mistake in neglecting to fortify the Atalaya. To the advice of his engineers and the urgent representations of his generals on this matter he turned a deaf ear, telling the former that not even rabbits could ascend the height, and insulting the latter by remarking that cowards nowhere felt themselves safe.^[38] A picket of twenty-five men was all the force he chose to post on the important point.

 

Scott, recognizing the strength of the enemy's front position, resolved to turn his left, and marked the Atalaya as a point on which to plant a heavy battery. Under the direction of the topographical engineers a path was cut with immense labor, out of sight of the enemy, across the chasms and slopes south of the northern ravine, with the object of gaining the Jalapa highway in the rear of Cerro Gordo. This road was pushed forward until, owing to the nature of the ground, it approached within fire of the Mexican lines and was discovered.

On the morning of the 17th Twiggs was ordered to advance along the new line of approach and turn the enemy's left by occupying all the heights in the neighborhood of Cerro Gordo, which might be of advantage. in an attack on that fortification. Having taken up a position to the north of the Atalaya, Lieutenant. Gardner, of the 7th infantry, was sent with his company to reconnoitre a height immediately below it, and presently became sharply engaged with a strong force hastily pushed forward by Santa Anna. He, however, maintained his ground until relieved by Colonel Harney with the rifle regiment, and Colonel Childs with the 1st artillery, who drove the Mexicans back to the Atalaya. Pursuing their advantage, the Americans pushed forward against the latter height, and after a spirited contest carried it. Santa Anna too late recognized his mistake in not having secured that point, and endeavored to regain it by three times directing a furious assault against it. But the deadly rifle repelled each attack, and the Atalaya summit remained in possession of the enemy. Childs' troops in their impetuosity rushed down the slope and began to ascend the Cerro Gordo, but the recall was sounded and Childs fell back, with a loss of nine killed and twenty-three wounded.^[39] Then from Cerro Gordo a deluge of grape was poured down upon the Atalaya, but the Americans, sheltering themselves on the shelving sides of the crest, sustained little harm. During the night, with incredible labor, a 24-pounder gun and two 24-pounder howitzers were dragged up by hand and placed in position. A 68-pounder howitzer was also, with equal difficulty, transported from Plan del Rio and planted on the south side of the river, bearing upon the batteries on the Mexican right.

On the evening of the 17th Scott issued his order of battle, which from first to last exhibits his confidence in being able to drive the Mexicans from their positions.^[40] Twiggs was directed to move forward and take up a position on the national road in rear of the enemy's position and cut off the retreat. Two regiments of volunteers, under Brigadier-general Shields, were ordered to be sent up as a reënforcement, and Worth's division of regulars was ordered to follow up the movement against the Mexicans left along the route pursued by Twiggs. Pillow, in command of Patterson's division, was to pierce the line of batteries on the heights resting on the ravine and dominating the approach from Plan del Rio. He was directed to begin the assault as soon as he heard firing on his right. Wall's field-battery and the cavalry were to be held in reserve on the national road, out of view and range of the enemy's guns.

At daybreak on the 18th the guns on the Atalaya opened fire on the higher height of Cerro Gordo. Harney, who occupied the summit with the rifle regiment, the 1st artillery, and 7th infantry, immediately organized an attack. Sending the rifles to the left, down the ravine, he drew up the 3d and 7th regiments for a direct assault in front. This force was supported by the artillery regiment. The fortification on Cerro Gordo was surrounded by an abatis of thorny brushwood, extremely embarrassing to a storming party. Harney, observing that a large force was moving on his left to the support of Cerro Gordo, immediately gave the order for the storming column to advance. The first obstacle encountered was a breastwork of stone, at which the Mexicans made so obstinate a stand that bayonets were crossed. Driven from this position, the defenders again attempted to repel the enemy at a line of defences immediately below the main fortification. But their efforts were vain. The plunging fire of the artillery and the heavy volleys of musketry — delivered by inexperienced hands — passed over the heads of the assailants, who, though breathless, with a wild rush upward, burst through the abatis and forced their way into the fort.

Meanwhile Twiggs had been moving forward the other portion of his division under a heavy fire from Cerro Gordo, till Riley's brigade, which consisted of the 2d and 3d infantry, the 4th artillery, and a portion of the 1st artillery,^[41] following the guidance of the engineers, arrived in rear of Cerro Gordo. Orders were now issued to assault that height in reverse, and with similar success the assailants gained the summit simultaneously with Harney's force. The Mexicans in panic fled down to the Jalapa highway, and their guns were immediately turned upon them.

While this was occurring, the Americans, directing an assault against the Mexican left, sustained a serious reverse. Pillow, owing to the difficulties of the ground, though directed to make it as close as possible to the edge of the river, brought his men in front of the 2d battery.^[42] The volunteers pressed forward at first with enthusiasm, but, being enfiladed by the battery resting on the ravine, and being embarrassed by the difficulty of the ground, were soon thrown into confusion, and after sustaining a severe loss, were repulsed, many of the men fleeing to the highway and escaping to camp.

But meanwhile the centre of the enemy had been pierced, and his camp taken. Shields had been sent forward, and with his command approached the camp by the rear through the tangled brushwood. Arriving in front of the battery, his men were severely cut up, and he fell dangerously wounded; but Colonel Baker, who succeeded him, deployed his men in skirmishing order, and the battery was carried.

Santa Anna, seeing that all was lost, had fled; Vasquez had fallen on Cerro Gordo; and Vega, Pinson, and Jarero, in spite of their success, recognized that their position was untenable. The howitzer on the south of the ravine was dropping its shells with deadly accuracy into the batteries, and, cut off from every chance of relief, there was no course left to them but surrender. A white flag was hoisted, and Scott, who was now on the Cerro Gordo, dictated his terms. Vega and his brother generals surrendered themselves as prisoners of war, and 3,000 men laid down their arms. Canalizo with the cavalry, though Santa Anna ordered him to charge the advancing Americans, retired without attempting to cover the retreat.

The victory of the Americans was complete. Santa Anna fled to Orizaba, where he collected about 3,000 of his scattered troops.^[43] Scott, without hinderance, marched to Jalapa, and on the 20th entered the town in advance of Worth's division.

The formidable fortification of Perote, second only to San Juan de Ulúa, next occupied the attention of the United States general, and there he expected to meet with serious opposition. The place, however, was in

Scott's March to Puebla.

no condition to make resistance. Though a large number of guns were in position, there was a want of ammunition and provisions, and Canalizo ordered Gaona, the commander, to abandon it and retire with the garrison.^[44] Worth had been ordered forward without loss of time, and took possession of the castle on the 22d.

Scott's further advance was temporarily embarrassed by learning, a few days later, that the greater portion of the expected new levies had been landed at Brazos Santiago with a view to aid Taylor, unfavorable reports of whose situation had been received at Washington. This placed him in a difficult position, as the term of service of the old volunteers was near its expiration, and the discharge of seven regiments,^[45] numbering 3,000 men in an excellent state of efficiency, was a serious consideration. Nevertheless, as their time expired in five or six weeks, and to advance farther from the coast would expose them to the necessity of returning to Vera Cruz at the most fatal season of the year, Scott, on May 4th, from considerations of humanity, issued his order for them to embark at Vera Cruz for New Orleans, where on their arrival they were honorably mustered out of the service. Patterson, whom this discharge left without a command, also returned to the United States.^[46]

The American congress had passed laws authorizing the raising of fresh troops, and it was the intention of the government to increase Scott's force to about 20,000. Recruits had been quickly obtained, and several detachments were already in motion for Brazos Santiago. At that place General Cadwalader, with about 1,000 troops, disembarked early in April; but Scott, on the 25th, instructed him to embark for Vera Cruz the new regiments as rapidly as they arrived, and in case the line of the Rio Grande was secure, to stop the landing of troops at Brazos Santiago, and directed them to proceed without delay to Vera Cruz.

Although Scott recognized the advantage of moving into the interior during the general panic which prevailed after the battle of Cerro Gordo, the discharge of the volunteers made it doubtful whether he could reach the capital. Nevertheless, he determined to proceed as far as Puebla, which town he knew did not hope to resist his progress. Accordingly, on the 6th of May, Quitman was sent from Jalapa at Perote with two of his regiments to join Worth, who was ordered to advance to Puebla. Worth began his movement on the 8th, and arrived without interruption at Amozoc on the 13th. From this place, which was twelve miles distant from Puebla, he sent in a communication to the ayuntamiento, requesting to meet its members to arrange about his occupation of the city. While waiting for the reply a strong force of cavalry was discovered on the 14th, moving through the hills with the evident intention of turning Amozoc; and as Quitman's corps was in the rear, Worth felt some fear for its safety. He at once sent Colonel Garland, with the 2d artillery regiment and two guns of Duncan's battery, supported by the 6th infantry, in that direction. This detachment presently came within range of the Mexicans, and the American artillery, opening fire, quickly dispersed them. This demonstration had been made by Santa Anna. On his arrival at Orizaba he re-formed the troops which he collected, and having organized a system of guerrilla warfare to harass the enemy and interrupt his communications, proceeded to Puebla. There he endeavored to encourage the inhabitants, and excite in them a spirit of resistance, but his effort was vain; the people felt but little confidence in him, and were inclined to submit to the triumphant invaders.^[47] He therefore turned his attention to securing the retreat of his infantry, and to carrying off the artillery in Fort Loreto near the city. Thinking that he would be able to destroy Quitman's command as Worth advanced on Puebla, he led his cavalry in person against it, but when he discovered that Worth was still at Amozoc, retired from a contest which offered no chance of success. During this operation the Mexican infantry retreated with the artillery along the highway to Mexico, and Santa Anna followed with the cavalry before daybreak next morning.^[48]

Worth moved on in the morning of the 15th, and was met by the ayuntamiento of Puebla three miles outside the city. In obedience to Scott's desire to conciliate the inhabitants, the terms of capitulation were made as liberal as possible, and the column quietly occupied the place.^[49] Worth's reception by the authorities was coldly courteous.

Meanwhile Scott on the 11th of May issued at Jalapa a proclamation to the Mexican people, which elicited the warm approval of the president of the United States, and was well received in those portions of Mexico occupied by the Americans. The document was written in Spanish, at the instigation of Mexicans of high standing and influence, some of them churchmen, and expressed sentiments likely to meet with a friendly response, and promote the cause of peace. The ability with which it was written and the topics suggested influenced the approaching elections in Mexico in favor of the peace party. In one point only was it somewhat inconsistent with the policy of the United States, and that was

in Scott's explanation of the cause of the war, which was attributed to a desire to put a stop to monarchical schemes in Mexico.^[50]

 

When the government at Washington received in quick succession news of the victory at Buena Vista and the capture of Vera Cruz and San Juan de Ulúa, it hoped that Mexico would be disposed to peace; and the president appointed Nicholas B. Trist, chief clerk of the state department, as confidential agent at the headquarters of the American army. Trist's principal recommendation as the man for such a mission was his devotion to the administration. Scott entertained no friendly feelings toward President Polk, and the attempt to appoint a lieutenant-general, although unsuccessful, had galled him deeply. The government, conscious of Scott's sensitiveness, had taken the precaution to direct Trist to communicate confidentially to him the project of a treaty with which he was provided, and which set forth the demands of the United States. Scott was also to be informed of the instructions which had been given to Trist. The commissioner, however, on his arrival at Vera Cruz in the beginning of May, forwarded to Scott a despatch for the Mexican minister of foreign relations, sealed and not accompanied with any explanation regarding his own mission. Trist at the same time addressed a note to Scott, and forwarded one from Marcy directing the general to suspend hostilities in case Trist should make known to him that such contingencies had occurred as would make the president willing that military, operations should cease. This letter mystified Scott, who could only see that the secretary of war intended to degrade him, and on May 7th replied to Trist, stating that he doubted whether he could so far commit the honor of his government as to take any direct agency in forwarding the sealed despatch. The remainder of the letter exhibits an ebullition of characteristic ill temper. This elicited an insolent answer, couched in ironical terms, from Trist, which led to further correspondence that displays the virulent animosity with which these two personages regarded each other. On May 14th Trist arrived at Jalapa, and without deigning to call on Scott, occupied himself with writing his reply. Neither took the least pains to conceal his rancor from the army.^[51] This disgraceful quarrel drew upon both individuals rebukes from the government at Washington.

Scott, having made dispositions for the subsistence of his army, left Jalapa May 21st and entered Puebla on the 28th, Twiggs arrived with his division on the following day, and the army was again concentrated. Meantime Cadwalader arrived at Vera Cruz, and a large train, escorted by Brevet Colonel McIntosh, having been assailed by a strong force of guerrillas under Rebolledo and some loss sustained, Cadwalader, on the 8th of June, marched from Vera Cruz with 500 men and two mountain howitzers, to its assistance. At the Puente Nacional a sharp action took place, in which Rebolledo was driven from his position, and the train was brought to Jalapa, though incessantly harassed by the enemy. Cadwalader pursued his march and entered Perote June 21st, where he was joined by Major-general Pillow with 1,500 men, July 1st. The united commands, numbering 3,500 men, then proceeded to Puebla, and Scott's force, thus augmented, now numbered 10,276, of whom 8,061 only were effectives, there being no less than 2,215 men on the sick-list.^[52]

 

Commissioner Trist had followed the headquarters of the army, waiting for an opportunity to enter upon his mission, and finally sent the despatch for the minister of foreign relations through the British legation, the English minister readily acceding to his request in the matter. The conciliatory tone of the despatch met, however, with no better result than previous offers on the part of the United States to negotiate.^[53] On June 22d, Minister Ibarra again informed the government at Washington that the decision on the affair in question rested with the Mexican congress.

During this time no friendly intercourse had existed between Scott and Trist. To both these officers communications were addressed from Washington, animadverting upon their conduct, representing that the interests of the nation required their coöperation and urging a reconciliation. But before the receipt of these despatches Trist addressed, June 25th, a letter to Scott,^[54] which smoothed the way to more friendly feelings, and henceforth the relations between the two were more cordial.

About the time of this reconciliation, secret agents from Santa Anna arrived at Puebla. This leader, in spite of his disasters, had succeeded in establishing his authority. During the discussions in congress relative to negotiations for peace, that body, to avoid the responsibility, passed a resolution that it was the duty of the executive to make treaties, and that its functions were limited to the approval or disapproval of them. Santa Anna's position was embarrassing, and he referred the matter to a council of general officers, who, equally afraid of consequences, avoided more direct advice than by expressing the opinion that another opportunity should be afforded Mexico of gaining a victory before proposals of peace should be entertained. Santa Anna adopted a course which presented to him a twofold result — success in negotiation, or a delay in the advance of the enemy which would be favorable to his own defensive preparations.^[55] He privately intimated to the American headquarters that if $1,000,000 were placed at his disposal, to be paid at the conclusion of peace, and $10,000 paid down, he would appoint commissioners. In the conferences which were held at Puebla on this proposition Scott advocated its acceptance. The question, however, whether the United States government would consent to have recourse to the payment of the million as a bribe was a difficult one, and long discussed. Pillow was admitted into council, and raised objections, but finally yielded to Scott's arguments. Santa Anna was accordingly apprised in cipher that his proposition was accepted, and the $10,000 were disbursed from the secret-service money at Scott's disposal. When matters had gone thus far Santa Anna intimated that to enable him, in view of the existing feelings at the capital, to appoint the commissioners for Mexico, it would be necessary for the American army to advance, and threaten the city by carrying one of the Mexican outworks. Whether Scott had full confidence in Santa Ana's promises or not, he did not for one moment relax his preparations. Pierce had arrived at Vera Cruz, and Scott, according to his previous plans, was waiting for his division to come up, which would enable him to advance with his full strength. Pierce left Vera Cruz on the 19th of July, and by the end of the month the American general proceeded to put in operation a new movement.^[56]

 

 

1. U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 210-12; Id., H. Ex. 60, p. 1119-20, 1123-4. Urrea reported that 120 wagons and as many pack-mules were captured, and 200 of the enemy killed or taken prisoners. A great number of the wagons were burned for want of animals to take them off. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 116.
2. Urrea states that the train consisted of 300 wagons, 100 of which were burned. Id., 116-17. Giddings' force numbered 260 men. Two of the escort and fifteen teamsters were killed. U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 213-15.
3. At this time Scott stated Taylor's army, including Wool's command, to be 20,500, to be shortly increased to 27,250 by nine additional regiments of volunteers. From them he proposed to withdraw 14,000 for the Vera Cruz. expedition. U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 59, p. 59-60. The correspondence referred to in the text will be found in the same document, Pp. 54-03.
4. Consisting of the 1st and 2d brigades of regulars respectively under Worth and Twiggs. Worth's command was composed of the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 8th infantry, the 2d and 3d artillery, Duncan's field-battery, and two companies of volunteers. Twiggs' brigade included the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 7th infantry, the 1st and 4th artillery, with Taylor's field-battery, and a regiment of mounted riflemen. The division of volunteers under Patterson was organized into three brigades, commanded by Pillow, Quitman, and Shields respectively. The first consisted of the 1st and 2d Tenn. and 1st and 2d Penn., with Steptoe's battery of 12-pounders; the second of the South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama regiments; and the third brigade of one regiment of New York and two of Illinois men. Besides this force of infantry and field-artillery there were the 1st and 21 regiments of dragoons, and one regiment of Tenn. horse. Ripley's War with Mex., ii. 17-18.
5. Scott's Autobiog., 419-21. Scott here states that the whole number was rather less than 12,000 men, but these figures did not include the cavalry which was landed later. U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 223.
6. Cannons of 24-pound calibre were mounted on carriages for 18-pounders, and 18-pounders on those for 12-pounders. p. 18, of Tributo á la Verdad, Vera Cruz, Julio de 1847, 4°, pp. 72. This short work was written by an anonymous citizen of Vera Cruz, who was evidently present at the siege. The first 20 pages are taken up with political matters, and the writer all through the work makes clear his repugnance to Santa Anna and his party. He then portrays the neglect of the government to take proper precautions for the defence of Vera Cruz, and compares Mexico to a vampire that ever sucks her blood, and abandons her in time of danger to her fate. p. 22. Next follows an account of the patriotic exertions of the garrison and inhabitants to oppose the enemy, of the daily operations during the siege, and of the effect of the bombardment. Santa Anna's proceedings down to the entrance of the Americans into Puebla are then severely criticised, and the conclusion reached that while at Habana he made some compact with the U. S. gov., p. 45-6. The different interests of portions of the Mexican republic are touched upon, and the different effects of the war upon them. In a note the copy of an important document is supplied, namely, Gen. Landero's report of the siege to the minister of war.
7. Though she was lost on the following day, more than 1,000 quintales of powder were saved. Id., 23. Captain Desaché, by decree of May 21, 1852, was awarded $22,000 for running the blockade in January 1847. He was probably master of the Anax. Méx., Legisl. Mej., 1832, 122-3.
8. 'Suponiendo. . .que estaba decidido que Vera Cruz corriera la misma suerte que Tampico, y no faltaron estrangeros que decian publicamente, que estos dos puntos y Ulúa estaban ofrecidos en garantia de compromisos hechos en la Habana.' Tributo á la Verdad, 23.
9. On the defences of the city there were eleven 24-pounders and twenty 16-pounders. In San Juan de Ulúa, there were eighty-seven 24-pounder brass and iron cannon, ten 84-pounder mortars, ten 68 pounders, and sixteen 42-pounders. The other pieces varied from 4 to 16 pounders. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 158.
10. Including artillerymen and infantry of the line, active battalions of different states, and the national guards of Orizaba, Vera Cruz, Puebla, and other towns. Id., 158-9; Tributo á la Verdad, 18. Scott says in his despatch of March 17, 1847: 'The garrison of Vera Cruz, independent of that of the castle, is ascertained to be about 5,000 men.' U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 221. Respecting the condition of the garrison and artillery, consult Bustamante, Invasion, MS., 39, 51, 54-5, and Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, iii. 849-37. A tabular statement of the different corps and number of men is supplied in Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 154-5.
11. The line of investment extended in the form of an arc about the city for over six miles. Worth's division occupied the south-eastern portion of the segment; on his left was Patterson's command encamped in the centre of the line; and still farther to the left and north was Twiggs' division extending to the beach at Vergara.
12. Copies of both documents will be found in U. S. Govt Doc., ut sup., p. 226-7. The latter is a translation of the original Spanish.
13. Called coehorns, from the name of their inventor, Baron Coehorn. They were mounted on wooden blocks, made of bronze, and portable for short distances by two men.
14. Perry relieved Connor Mar. 21st. Id., p. 223.
15. 'This gallant act excited the astonishment of our men.' Furber's Volunteer, 527. The name of the courageous young officer who performed this daring feat was Sebastian Holzinger, a lieutenant of the Mexican navy. He was aided by a youth, only 16 years old, of the national guard of Orizaba, now General Francisco A. Velez. Tributo á la Verdad, 27; Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 157; Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 174-5.
16. Communication between neutrals and neutral vessels lying off the island of Sacrificios had been left open till the 23d, to allow neutrals to escape. Consult the correspondence in U. S. Govt Doc., Sen. Ex. 1, p. 218-20, 228-9, 230–1.
17. On the 24th he had already expressed his mind to the consuls: 'The place should be ruined, or he would perish before he would make any demonstration, even indirectly, of yielding.' El Republicano, in El Sonorense, May 7, 1847, p. 2-3.
18. Scott's despatches, in U. S. Govt Doc., ut sup., p. 229-38.
19. Scott's return, in Id., p. 253-5. This number includes the casualties sustained in outside skirmishes. The period extended from the 9th to the 28th of March.
20. Landero states that 350 of the troops and 400 of the inhabitants were killed, but that the numbers in neither case are exact, as many dead — muchos cadáveres — lay buried in the ruins. Tributo á la Verdad, 72. Roa Bárcena states that the number of killed and wounded was estimated at 1,000, and that the value of property destroyed was between $4,000,000 and $5,000,000. Recuerdos, 178. The number of shot and shell thrown into the city was 6,700, weighing 463,600 lbs, while the projectiles fired by the Mexicans amounted to 8,486. Id., 178-9; El Iris Español, May 12, 1847, p. 3; Tributo á la Verdad, 72; Furber's Volunteer, 551. See also the account in El Iris Español, Apr. 7, 1847, p. 2-3. Furber states that the Mexicans did not know their own loss, and that their calculations varied from 1,200 to 1,500. Volunteer, 554.
21. U. S. Govt Doc., ut sup., p. 239. The number of guns is thus made to exceed by more than 100 the figures supplied by the minister of war at the close of the preceding year. Scott also says 5,000 prisoners were taken. Roa Bárcena considers that the American general raised his figures too high. Recuerdos, 188.
22. The London Times of May 1, 1847, denounces his action as opposed to the sentiments of humanity and justice. Many of the English and French residents, who had suffered severely during the siege, with glaring inconsistency complained bitterly against Scott.
23. Roa Bárcena writes: 'Sus deberes de humanidad, ántes que apiadarse del vecindario de Vera Cruz, le obligaban á economizar la sangre y las fatigas de sus propios soldados.' Recuerdos, 178.
24. Copy of which will be found in El Iris Español, 21 Abr., 1847, p. 3, and translation in U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 937.
25. To prevent exactions, however, a tariff of prices of articles of food was decreed by Worth, April 1st, after consultation with the civil authorities. Among these I may mention beef, venison, and pork, each 12½ cents per lb., mutton, 18¾ cents, and a 12-ounce loaf of bread, 12½ cents. Id., p. 934. On the 3d a tariff of duties was decreed, the blockade of the port being raised. Id., 931. Measures for the civil government of the place were also adopted, Worth having been appointed temporary governor by Scott. Id., 930-4.
26. Several culprits were imprisoned or fined for robbery and other delinquencies, and one person was hanged for rape. Id., 935-7; El Iris Español, 21 Abr., 1847, p. 3.
27. Niles' Reg., lxxii. 131-2; El Arco Iris, 9 Nov., 1847, p. 4. Hunter had been stationed to watch the mouth of the river, and discovering that there were no troops in the town, demanded its surrender. His action was disapproved by Perry, who court-martialed him and sent him home. The president did not agree with Perry's proceedings, and complimented Hunter. Sun of Anahuac, July 3, 1847, p. 1; Furber's Volunteer, 565.
28. Official reports, in U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 2, H. Ex. 1. Consult also El Arco Iris, Aug. 9, 1847, pp. 2-3; El Razonador, 18 Junio, 1847, p. 1; Niles' Reg., lxxii. 187-8, 194, 304; Soc. Mex. Geog. Bolet., iv. 244.
29. Consisting of the grenadiers of the guard, the 6th regiment of infantry, the Libertad and Galeana battalions, two squadrons of cavalry, and eight pieces of artillery, all under the command of General Rangel. Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, iii. 877; Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 194.
30. Namely, two brigades of infantry, numbering 4,000 men, respectively under generals Vasquez and Ampudia; one of cavalry, numbering 1,500, under General Julian Juvera; and 150 artillerymen; in all 5,650 men. Ib.; Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 121.
31. The vice-presidency was suppressed; the congress appointed the substitute, the election falling upon Pedro María Anaya. Id., 878; Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex., v. 264-5. Congress on March 28th had authorized Santa Anna to raise $20,000,000 for the prosecution of the war. Id., v. 262-3.
32. It is impossible to arrive at the true number. Scott estimated it 'at 12,000 or more.' U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 204. Santa Anna, in his report from Orizaba after the battle of Cerro Gordo, says that he had little over 6,000 men, adding: 'No es pues cierto que se hubiera reunido allí una fuerza de 12 á 14,000 hombres como se ha divulgado con ligereza ó por malicia.' El Razonador, 29 Junio, 1847, p. 3. A Mexican officer writing anonymously in the same periodical — 15 Junio, 1847, p. 1 — makes the same statement. But no mention is here made of the cavalry which Santa Anna in his Apelacion, 35, puts down at 1,500. Roa Bárcena has investigated this question — Recuerdos, 196 — and taking Santa Anna's figures, makes the number 7,000. By assuming 4,000 as representing the number of the infantry which arrived from San Luis Potosí, he increases these figures to 8,000, and lastly by calculations made from Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 121, 170-83, he swells the number to 9,000. I must add that many of the soldiers who had left Vera Cruz under parole were compelled by Santa Anna to reënter service, and were distributed in the different corps. Id., 169. A writer in El Monitor, 28 Abr., 1847, says: 'No hay hoy quien ignore que el general Santa-Anna tenia en su posicion mas de diez mil hombres.' Gamboa, on page 32 of his Impugnacion al Informe del Señor General Santa-Anna, which was written in refutation of the Apelacion al Buen Criterio de los Nacionales y Estrangeros, copies this remark, and referring to Santa Anna's statements, concludes that at the least he had 8,500 men.
33. 'Quince dias mas habrian bastado para mi intento.' Apelacion, 34.
34. Leaving behind Quitman's brigade and Thomas' Tennessee horse. Brigadier-general Pillow temporarily took command of the volunteer division, owing to the illness of Patterson. The regulars had been organized into two divisions, the 1st of which was under the command of Worth. U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 928-9.
35. He heard on the 9th that Santa Anna was at Jalapa with 6,000 men. He still believed that no serious opposition would be met with before reaching Jalapa, and on receipt of the first reports of Twiggs and Pillow thought 4,000 men an exaggerated estimate of the enemy's force in the pass of Cerro Gordo. Id., 928–9, 939-40.
36. American writers have misapplied the latter name of this hill to a neighboring eminence lying to the east of it, the proper appellation of which is el Atalaya.
37. The above description of Santa Anna s positions is derived from his report of May 7th, in El Razonador, 29 Junio, 1847. It corresponds in every main particular with Scott s account and his plan of the battle-field as given in U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Sen. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 256-7, 261.
38. 'Diciendo, ni los conejos suben por ahí! Algunos generales. . . repitieron igual súplica á Santa Anna' — that is, that he would fortify el Atalaya — 'quien se negó de nuevo enojándose y prefiriendo estas espresiones: los cobardes en ninguna parte se consideran seguros: lo que produjo el disgusto que debia esperarse' Tributo á la Verdad, 35. The neglect to fortify this point was the ground of serious charges against Santa Anna.
39. Santa Anna, in his despatches of the same day, reported this part of the engagement as a complete triumph on his side. Tributo á la Verdal, 35; El Razonador, 29 Junio, 1847, p. 2.
40. He gives positive directions regarding the pursuit; states that the army will not return to the encampment at Plan del Řio; and orders the baggage-trains to follow in the afternoon of the 18th or early the next morning. General Orders No. 111, in U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 258-9.
41. I notice, in the return of killed and wounded, three of this regiment among the casualties of Riley's brigade. Id., p. 265, 270.
42. Consult the plan.
43. The loss of the Mexicans has never been ascertained. That sustained by the Americans during the two days amounted to 431 in killed, wounded, and missing, 63 of whom were killed on the field. About 3,000 prisoners were taken, between 4,000 and 5,000 stands of arms, and 43 pieces of artillery. Owing to the impossibility of keeping guard over such a number of captives, they were released on parole, and the small arıms were destroyed, being of no value to the army. U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 257, 264.
44. Santa Anna sent an order to Canalizo instructing him to defend the place until he could arrive with reënforcements, but Canalizo had already moved forward to Puebla. El Razonador, 29 Junio, 1847, p. 3.
45. They were the Tennessee cavalry, the 3d and 4th Illinois infantry, the 1st and 2d Tennessee infantry, the Georgia infantry, and the Alabama infantry. U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 956.
46. Few of these troops were willing to reënlist, at which Scott expressed his regret. Ib. They were mustered out on the last day of May. Furber's Volunteer, 614.
47. Scott says: 'Puebla. . .stands ready to receive us amicably, or at least courteously.' U. S. Govt Doc., ut sup., p. 954. Vasquez, the bishop of Puebla, is alleged to have favored the occupation of the city by the Americans. Baz, Vida de Juarez, 47. His influence would have great control over the people. Santa Anna says that the populace were enthusiastic in their demonstration in favor of defence, but that the influential men were lukewarm. El Iris Español, 19 Mayo, 1847, 4.
48. Consult Worth's account in U. S. Govt Doc., ut sup., p. 994-5, Santa Anna's despatch in El Iris Español, 19 Mayo, 1847, 4, and El Razonador, 18 Mayo, 1847, 2-3.
49. A copy of the terms granted by Worth will be found in El Iris Español, 5 Junio, 1847, 3-4.
50. On this point Marcy writes: 'As it could not have been your design to enter into a full discussion of the causes which led to the war, it is not to be taken as an authoritative exposition of the views of the executive in this respect.' U. S. Govt Doc., ut sup., p. 975. Copies of the Spanish and English translation of the document, and other particulars, will be found in Id., p. 964-5, 968-74. In the capital the proclamation was denounced as an insult to the nation. El Razonador, 18 Junio, 1847, 1-3.
51. The correspondence on this matter was published by the government, and will be found in U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 813-31, 958-63, 965-6, 975-6. Scott's anger was unbounded, as may be gathered from his note to Trist of May 29th, whose letters he describes as a 'farrago of insolence, conceit, and arrogance,' and adds: If you were but armed with an ambulatory guillotine, you would be the personification of Danton, Marat, and St Just, all in one. Id., p. 996.
52. Scott's letter of July 25th. Id., p. 1013. The arrival of Brigadier-general Pierce from Vera Cruz with about 2,000 more effectives was expected. Scott with this reënforcement hoped to advance with 9,500 men after leaving a competent garrison at Puebla. Ib.
53. The despatch was from James Buchanan, the secretary of state, who informed the Mexican minister of Trist having been sent as a commissioner invested with full powers to conclude a treaty of peace. U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 38-40.
54. The contents are not known, as the despatch conveying the copy was never received at the department of state. U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Н. Ех. 60, р. 830-1.
55. Roa Bárcena considers that Santa Anna's only object in the proceedings to be narrated was simply to gain time. Recuerdos, 286-7.
56. These negotiations with Santa Anna appear to have terminated with the advance of the American army. Ripley enters fully into this curious piece of diplomacy, which fully illustrates Santa Anna's cunning. War with Mex., ii. 148-70.