History of Mexico (Bancroft)/Volume 5/Chapter 28

by Hubert Howe Bancroft

 

CHAPTER XXVIII.

 

DOWNFALL OF LIBERAL INSTITUTIONS.

 

1857-1858.

Conservative Intrigues — Talk of a Coup d'État — Spanish Complications — Comonfort's Vacillating Course — Hostility of the Clergy Continues — Congress Installed — Comonfort Avows Liberalism — His Election as Constitutional President — Promises Made and Violated — Plan of Tacubaya — Comonfort Becomes its Chief — Action of Congress Arrest of Juarez and Others — Reactionists Victorious — Comonfort's Overthrow — Civil War in Full Blast — Zuloaga, Reactionary President — Juarez, Constitutional President — His Narrow Escape from Capture — He Establishes his Government in Vera Cruz.

The conservative party, awake to seize every opportunity afforded it by the disturbed condition of the country, boldly came to the front, now that the men of well-known political views had been superseded by others, who were new in government affairs, or who favored a policy of inaction or compromise. The president was urged by the conservatives to solve pending issues by a coup d'état. While pretending to recognize the sovereignty of the people, they claimed that a majority of the nation was displeased with the new constitution, and wanted him to ignore it, and continue the dictatorship. The bickerings of the liberal press widened the gap in the liberal ranks. The president asked the official journals not to say any thing on behalf of his candidacy, but that did not prevent the triumph of the moderate party.^[1] Le Trait d'Union, a French journal of Mexico, advocated the dictatorship, and its remarks were copied into the official journal without disapprobation. And yet it is hardly credible that the president could have fostered such a scheme, knowing that he could rely only on the limited number of men that live by politics to support it. He was a man who calculated well his chances before taking any important step. The majority of the liberals, therefore, treated the coup d'état scheme as newspaper clap-trap. Comonfort over his own signature disclaimed such an intention. Then the progresistas made him their standard-bearer. The political outlook was gloomy, however. Seditions broke out in quick succession everywhere on the promulgation of the new constitution.^[2] It must be said, nevertheless, that the enemies of the government were not permitted to have their own way altogether. The seditious bands, and some parties of highwaymen, were pursued and defeated; many conspirators were severely dealt with. Governor Juarez in Oajaca expelled all priests who refused christian sepulture to the supporters of the constitution and the reform laws. In Aguascalientes the governor, Lopez de Nava, deprived of political rights every man who failed to take the required oath. In Puebla, Governor Alatriste ordered public prayers to God to vouchsafe wisdom and success to the constitutional authorities.^[3]

Just at this time the country's troubles were complicated by the unfriendly state of the relations with Spain, whose government had refused to receive Lafragua, the accredited Mexican plenipotentiary, and exhibited a disposition to intervene with other European powers in the affairs of Mexico. Hence the idea that a war was imminent, and the general alacrity to be enrolled in the national guard.^[4] The conservatives did not fail to make political capital out of this state of affairs, tendering their services, in the event of war, as citizens and soldiers.

The treasury was exhausted, and pecuniary means being required to keep troops in the field, the president resolved to take them where he could find them. This declaration appeared in the semi-official organ El Estandarte Nacional, causing great sensation, as it was construed to mean the seizure of mortmain property, or the adoption of some other extraordinary scheme. The military, and a part of the press, assumed then a threatening attitude, which angered Comonfort, and drew from him severe measures.^[5] In August he transferred his residence to Tacubaya, and rumors began at once to circulate of his intention to proclaim the bases orgánicas, or something of the kind, with himself at the head of affairs. The names of men well known for their dislike of the late reforms were mentioned as already chosen for the highest places in the forthcoming régime. The conservative press kept up the agitation of a coup d'état, and a portion of the liberal journals counselled illegal and revolutionary acts, and that the first constitutional congress should assume the role of reformer and amend the code of 1857. Meanwhile, the dictatorial powers of the executive should continue, and the state governments be restricted in theirs. The reaccionarios, encouraged at the aspect of affairs, left their hiding-places and appeared at armed meetings. Many liberals then adduced this as the strongest evidence that a dictatorship was indispensable, inasmuch as Comonfort could not possibly save the government and overcome its many foes, with a constitution trammelling his every action, when he should be all-powerful to crush opposition. Riots continued in various parts, and were daily becoming more difficult to quell. In several cases there had been much bloodshed.^[6]

A bad feature in the political struggle was the open declaration of the government organs that the new constitution could not go into operation till reglamentary laws were issued. This increased the ill-feeling between the civil and religious authorities.

With the expectation of a forthcoming coup d'état, the conservatives became more audacious; the churches were closed in some towns, and the state governors played the despot in many instances. The prelates, firm in their purpose to resist the government, refused the sacraments to those who would not take back their oath to support the constitution,^[7] while the government, equally firm, demanded the oath from every functionary or official, from the highest to the lowest, without mental reservation, under the penalty of dismissal and forfeiture of political rights. From the time that the question of a coup d'état was brought out upon the arena, some advocated that it should prevent the meeting of congress by contriving to declare null two thirds of the credentials of members elect, on the ground that they were not in accordance with the convocation decree. It is a very remarkable circumstance that the government had looked with indifference upon the elections of members to the congress, and the result was that a majority of them proved to be men opposed to Comonfort's policy; hence, on arriving at the capital and being consulted on the coup d'état, they indignantly rejected the idea. The cabinet on the 15th of September resigned in a body, and the president being unable to replace them at once with men of his own choice, had to leave matters for a time in charge of the oficiales mayores, or chief clerks, there being no under-secretaries.^[8] Congress not having been installed before the 16th of September, and Comonfort's dictatorship being at an end on that date,^[9] the country was left in an alarming condition, rendered still more so by the absence of a responsible ministry at a time when insurrection prevailed everywhere. The excitement in the capital was so great that the business houses were closed, and troops patrolled the streets.^[10]

At last congress was installed on the 8th of October,^[11] when the customary ceremonials took place. In his speech at the installation Comonfort, in speaking of what he had done to secure the triumph of the laws and liberal institutions over antiquated errors and bastard interests, and of his determination to crush the revolution, hinted at the necessity of the government being clothed with ample powers.^[12] At subsequent conferences held at the palace the need of such powers, in matters of war and treasury, was discussed, and Comonfort was advised to appoint ministers before formally bringing the subject before congress. He did not heed the advice. José M. Cortés y Esparza, as acting minister of gobernacion, applied for unlimited authority, and encountered the greatest opposition, many of the deputies not deeming that the situation actually required it. Comonfort then resolved to assume it, and indeed he needed full powers, for the reaction, though constantly receiving heavy blows, was not crushed. It kept consciences troubled, recruited proselytes, and without scruples as to means, maintained alive the fire of sedition. Congress refused to allow the president to move outside the law, and yet granted the governors extraordinary powers. Comonfort still acted prudently, appointing a cabinet,^[13] who had some conferences with committees of the congress, and the difficulties were done away with, though charges had been already preferred against the president. The report on ample powers was much discussed, however, and greatly opposed as unnecessary; but certain acts of the reactionists made their necessity clear enough. Congress, however, refused to grant all that was asked for, and on the 3d of November suspended only certain clauses of the constitution till the 30th of April, 1858.^[14] While the government was engaged in fighting the rebels, congress counted the votes for president, respectively, of the republic and of the supreme court. Comonfort had an absolute majority of 8,000. Juarez and Lacunza being the two candidates with the highest number of votes for the other position, though neither of them had a constitutional majority, it devolved on congress to choose between them, and Juarez was elected.

Peace was not restored, and the army had to be kept on a war footing.^[15] As late as the 11th of November a conspiracy was detected in Puebla, said to have been concocted in the sagrario of the cathedral. The legislature had a sitting at eleven o'clock at night, and the next day a number of reactionists were shot. The report having circulated that Miramon was in the town, Governor Alatriste's alarm was still further increased. The governor published a manifesto stating that documents had been scized establishing the fact that the conspirators intended to assassinate the rulers. The reactionists of course declared the executions to have been political murders.^[16]

In the midst of the turmoil Comonfort assumed the position of constitutional president for four years, from and after December 1, 1857.^[17] In his inaugural address he assured the representatives of the people that he accepted the responsible position only because the nation was laboring under great difficulties.^[18] He asked them to amend the constitution, evidence of his good intentions being the loyalty with which he had fulfilled the pledges made at Ayutla. He bound himself by oath to faithfully discharge the duties of president in accordance with the constitution, and to advance the welfare of the union. Thereupon he received the congratulations of the diplomatic corps and of the authorities. Soon after he asked congress to allow Juarez, La Fuente, and Cortés Esparza, members of the supreme court, to continue at the head of their respective departments in the cabinet.^[19]

Certain conferences held by Comonfort with commissioners from several states had a threatening aspect, and fears were entertained that the clergy would get the upper hand, which were all the more excited by a religious feast in the oratory of the president's palace at Tacubaya on the 13th of December. Congress became alarmed and held secret meetings.^[20] The chief officers of the brigade under Zuloaga had been for some time urging Comonfort to strike a blow. The state governors had been confidentially asked by persons from the capital to effect a political change on the ruins of the present system; that is to say, the federal congress and the state legislatures were to be suppressed, and Comonfort's dictatorship restored. Anastasio Parrodi, governor of Jalisco, declaring that the president wanted no change, urged the other governors to uphold the constitutional system. Minister Payno^[21] and General Zuloaga were accused of plotting against the constitution, which caused much displeasure in congress, and at first there was thought of arresting all parties concerned; but finally the president was requested to have Zuloaga indicted. As Comonfort's name was mixed with everything rumored relating to a change of system, the minister of government, Benito Juarez, declared in the president's name that all such reports were groundless. And really it was unreasonable even to suppose that Comonfort, falsifying his past record, should take part in any scheme to upset the order of things he had worked so hard to establish; that a man of his ability, and having at his side men like Juarez, Ruiz, and others, who were a guarantee to the constitutional party, should exhibit such turpitude, was inconceivable. Moreover, congress had given him proofs of benevolence, and it was not credible that he would respond to them with ingratitude. But incontrovertible facts came to establish once more that there is nothing impossible in politics. The principle advanced some time before by the Clamor Progresista was now given a practical illustration.

The conspirators having perfected their plans with soime governors, particularly with him of Vera Cruz, a political movement was effected in the early morning of December 17th, at Tacubaya, to set aside the national constitution, which was declared to be not in accord with the customs and usages of the Mexican people; the supreme control of the government with ample powers was vested in Ignacio Comonfort, who was to convoke, within three months, an extraordinary congress for framing another constitution to conform with the national will, guaranteeing the true interests of the people; which constitution, before being promulgated as the supreme law, was to be submitted to the voters for their approval; and in the event of its non-acceptance, was to be returned to the congress for amendment. The president was to rule, with a consultive council, composed of one representative from each state. All authorities confusing to second the plan de Tacubaya, as the new arrangement was styled, were to be superseded by others disposed to support it.^[22] Juarez, on hearing the news, forthwith advised Comonfort not to accept the role thus tendered him. He had on the 15th assured congress that the government was on the alert.^[23] Deputy Baz, on the 16th, had made known to the national legislature that it was to be dismissed the next morning, as he had seen the plan at Zuloaga's quarters the previous evening.^[24] On the 17th congress made a solemn protest against the act of that date at Tacubaya,^[25] and decreed Comonfort's authority as president at an end, and all his acts, in his new role of revolutionary leader, as null and void.^[26]

The day following the pronunciamiento Zuloaga's brigade occupied the capital, where the governor, Agustin Alcérreca, and the small garrison accepted the situation without a murmur. The presidents of the supreme court, Juarez, and of the congress, Isidoro Olvera, and several deputies, were arrested, and congress dissolved. The ayuntamiento of Mexico was also deposed. Even now, under circumstances so plainly showing his complicity in the outrages just committed, Comonfort appeared to hesitate, and it was not till the 19th that he officially announced his acceptance of the plan of Tacubaya, believing that the city of Vera Cruz would sustain him, and after setting free the political prisoners, excepting Juarez, he published a manifesto setting forth the causes that had prompted his course. After mature reflection, he became convinced that, under the circumstances, only judicious reforms and a conciliatory policy would meet with acceptance from the people. His reasons are given in a note below.^[27] Any other course, he feared, would give the retrograde element the control of affairs in the new situation; anarchy showed her head everywhere; despotism, with its accessaries, revenge and persecution, would be sure to follow, and render it impossible for liberty ever to reign in the country. His excuses could not, however, wash away the blot he threw upon his name and fame by the violation of his solemn oath. His conduct at first aroused public hatred, which later turned into contempt for his character.

Comonfort labored under the erroneous idea that he could bring about the amalgamation of parties bitterly hating each other, and constitute a government strong enough to overrule all parties, and be at the same time independent of them all. It is not even impossible that he believed the reaccionarios would eventually get the upper hand, and consign him to the fate that General Guerrero's eminent services — compared with which his own were as nothing — did not save that patriot from. Be it as it may, he soon saw his error, and the entanglements he had got himself into. Seventy deputies assembled in Querétaro and reiterated their protest. Anarchy, now that there was no recognized supreme law, reigned in Mexico, and a three years' terrible struggle began. The plan of Tacubaya was accepted in several towns, and rejected with indignation in others.^[28] Comonfort, hard pressed on one side by constitutionalist forces, on the other by conservatives, and at the same time by the coalition of states in the interior^[29], without having a party of his own, was really in a quandary. It has been both asserted and denied that he was at one time on the point of joining the reaccionarios, and becoming a tool of the clergy. Judging by his conduct, the conclusion must be that he never abandoned the plan laid out in his manifesto. As soon as the so-called council of state was installed, the 25th of December, he discovered that the color of the situation was not quite so fully defined as the reaccionarios wanted it.^[30] Comonfort expected a great deal from what he called the assiduity and efficacy of the council; but as it was an illegal body, utterly devoid of prestige, and none of the parties would accede to his pretensions, it could accomplish nothing. His phrases had no significance. The states protested against his acts, and continued their preparations for a solution of the difficulties by the resort to arms.

Comonfort realized how dangerous his position was when Vera Cruz, on which he had confidently relied, but which had never been in favor of the reaction, forsook him. This was on the 30th of December;^[31] he then tried to save himself by sending emissaries

to make known to the troops in the interior his repentance, and willingness to surrender the executive office to the president of the supreme court. No man ever found himself in exactly such a plight. at one time of going into the interior to fight in person against the reaction; but was deterred by the fact, which he was well aware of, that he could not by force of arms combat ideas. He did not succeed in forming a ministry, because no combination was then possible. The question of releasing Juarez being broached, Comonfort assented, but still he was kept confined in a room of the palace, it being known that the coalition of states had resolved his recognition as president of the republic the moment he should present himself at any place within the territory under their control.

The hatred of the liberal party to Comonfort, great as it was for what he had done, was much increased when it became known that the archbishop and the bishop of Michoacan, approving the plan of Tacubaya, removed the bar of excommunication from all who should turn to its support. Comonfort could find no way to extricate himself, and the council acknowledged their inability to better the situation. Some advised him to make a frank retraction, and to attempt a complete change of policy. He still hoped for relief from General Zuloaga's friendship, which seems to have been sincere, but it availed nothing. García Conde, minister of war, was the only member of his last cabinet that continued despatching government affairs; his proposals were rejected from the interior. In one of them he had asked for a meeting of governors to bring about a general reconciliation. The alarm was very great. The constitutionalists lost no time. At a meeting of officers presided over by Comonfort they expressed regret at his not adopting any of the extremes; but then, as at all times, he firmly clung to his neutrality, refusing to take any course for or against He thought any party.^[32] Finally, on the morning of Monday, January 11, 1858, when Comonfort was on the point of departing for the interior, the troops quartered in Santo Domingo and La Ciudladela revolted, going over to the reaccionarios, who had ere this set aside the plan of Tacubaya. Comonfort's spirit was now aroused. Declining the proffers of protection to his person made by the diplomatic corps, he concentrated nearly 5,000 men that he still had in the lower part of the palace and other accessible points, showing much coolness, and resolved to hold the San Francisco, the headquarters of the constitutionalists, with whom he had come to an understanding. He thought then it would be a lesser evil to go back to the point of departure, and surrender the executive authority to the person designated by the constitution, as appears in the manifesto he published in July 1858, in New York.^[33] He accordingly released Juarez^[34], who forthwith repaired to Guanajuato, and the 19th of January established there his government, which was at once recognized by a majority of the states, and became a centre of union for the liberals.

But to return to affairs in the city of Mexico. The position of La Santísima was intrusted by Comonfort to General Trias. The reactionists, on their part, were not idle. They were constantly receiving accessions from Comonfort's army, so that on the night of the 20th his 5,000 men had diminished to scarcely 500, with which insignificant number it would be folly to attempt defence. Comonfort kept up his courage; but by the advice of his friends Rangel and Pardo, he resolved to leave the capital. In his sad predicament he uttered not a word against the men who had brought him into it. The reactionary general, Parra, allowed him to depart, which he did about eight in the morning of January 21, 1858, with his aids and some troops, most of whom deserted him a little way out.^[35] He embarked on the steamer Tennessee on the 7th of February, leaving a manifesto expressing the vain hope that the well-intentioned of all parties, disregarding past animosities, might succeed in restoring peace to the country.

Comonfort expiated his errors. He went into banishment as a last recourse. It was really the best thing he could do, even at the time when the best But services of every liberal were greatly needed. though in exile, he did not remain quiet. He always manifested the desire to serve his country, and made attempts to return and defend liberal principles. At last a foreign war afforded Comonfort the opportunity for an honorable vindication.

 

The reactionary leaders, who for the moment could hardly realize their victory, immediately after Comonfort abandoned the capital, took possession of the national palace and archives, amidst the ringing of bells and the plaudits of their partisans. Zuloaga, whom Comonfort had arrested, and soon after released because no complicity in the revolt of January 11th appeared against him, now found himself placed by circumstances at the head of affairs; and pursuant to the reformed plan of Tacubaya, summoned a body of representatives, among whom were some bishops and other ecclesiastics, to meet on the 22d and choose the president of the republic. They met accordingly, made José Ignacio Pavon their chairman, and after some unnecessary discussion for forım's sake, inasmuch as two or three military chiefs and the clergy had the whole control, Félix Zuloaga was chosen president by twenty-six votes, against one cast for Echeagaray and another for Santa Anna. The oath of office prescribed by the committee, containing the obligation to support religion and national independence, and to promote union among the Mexicans, and the general welfare, was administered to Zuloaga a little after midnight on the 23d.

Zuloaga was born in Álamos, Chihuahua, in 1814, and in 1834 became a lieutenant of national guards. In 1836 he was transferred to the engineer corps, in which branch he served several years in various parts of the country. In 1843 he was a brevet lieutenant-colonel. During the American war he prepared defences in Monterey, Saltillo, between Vera Cruz and Mexico, and lastly, in the southern part of the capital.^[36] The next two years he served in the southern campaign as a brevet general of brigade, and in 1855 was promoted. That year he was taken prisoner, and Comonfort not only saved him from being shot, but had him at his side until the triumph of the revolution of Ayutla. Later he intrusted to him the military operations in the sierra de Querétaro, and afterward employed him in the two campaigns of Puebla, and appointed him a councillor of state. Finally, we have seen that, as a mark of confidence, he gave him command of the brigade stationed in Tacubaya.^[37]

At the time of taking possession of the presidential chair, Zuloaga spoke in general terms of his intention to secure the just rights of citizens, but did not lay down any policy.^[38] He at once appointed his cabinet, made up of men whose antecedents and political opinions clearly indicated that the civil war would be pushed energetically till the influence of the army and clergy should predominate.^[39]

The foreign legations rather hastily recognized his government as one de facto. It would have been difficult for them to say on what they grounded its probable stability.

Among the first acts of Zuloaga's cabinet was the organization of a government council with one representative from each state and territory, regulating its functions and duties. The next steps were to restore the fueros, and generally to annul the reform laws passed during Comonfort's administration.^[40] Their retrogressive acts did their cause more harm than the liberal forces ever could; inasmuch as the reform laws had already developed interests that could not be destroyed, particularly such as emanated from the ley Lerdo. However, so great a change was operated in one month, with the power and pecuniary assistance of the clergy, that the government found itself enabled to meet the liberal forces, among whose leaders was lacking the bond of union so necessary to insure success. The conservative chiefs, on the contrary, were now acting in accord.

The possession of the port of Vera Cruz being of the highest import, Zuloaga tried to win over to his side Gutierrez Zamora, governor of that state, who never returned answers to his official letters, but in a private letter^[41] apprised him of his resolve to sustain Juarez' constitutional authority. The reactionists still hoped to gain possession of the port, believing that their opponents, by using the moneys appropriated under conventions from the customs revenue to the payment of the foreign debt, would provoke a foreign war. Zuloaga placed much reliance on the recognition of his government by the diplomatic corps, as well as on the support of the pope's legate, Monsignore Clementi.^[42]

All eyes were turned to the campaign in the interior, which was to decide the destiny of the country. Everything else, even the dispute with Spain, fraught though it was with danger in view of the concentration of a large Spanish fleet in the waters of Cuba, went for the present unnoticed. Zuloaga endeavored to win popularity by an order suppressing levies for the army, and to ingratiate himself with the clergy and the pious, frequently attended church, visited the shrine of the vírgen de Guadalupe, took the communion in public, and even went so far as to ap point himself a chaplain. He also pardoned deserters from the army, and liberated some prisoners, but at the same time filled the jails with liberals accused of plotting. The eastern states, on the other hand, formed a league, and Vidaurri was organizing forces to oppose the reaction. Manuel Doblado headed

Salamanca Campaign

another coalition in the interior for the same purpose. It was he who declared that retractions in articulo mortis counted for nothing. This last-named league presented a resolute aspect, Parrodi decreeing on the 15th of January that anti-constitutionalists should be dealt with as conspirators. Zuloaga and his supporters paid no heed to that threat other than to organize forces with the money supplied by the clergy.^[43] believing themselves under God's special protection, and relying on the dissensions said to exist among the liberals, the reactionary chiefs felt certain of success. The liberal army of the interior, upwards of 10,000 men, had its headquarters in Celaya. The troops had been in constant hard service and needed rest. San Luis Potosí, Tampico, and other principal towns were surrounded by liberal forces, and had it not been for the defection of many, the reaction might have been easily crushed. The battle of Salamanca in Guanajuato, fought on the 9th and 10th of March, was the most memorable one, and resulted disastrously for the constitutionalists,^[44] opening the gates of the_interior to their foes, and was soon followed by Doblado's capitulation at Silao. The successes rewarding the reactionists in less than two months were extraordinary, and if they had been able to get Vera Cruz, their rule might have been a long one. They were now further strengthened by a revolt in Mazatlan, with the approval of General Yañez, and of the troops in Guanajuato and other towns. But the constitutionalists were determined not to yield;^[45] they kept up an active guerrilla warfare, striking the enemy or crippling his resources, as opportunity favored them. It was easy to see that after its victory at Salamanca the reactionary government would leave no stone unturned to secure possession of the port of Vera Cruz. With this object in view, intrigues were carried on with some residents of the place, all of which were frustrated by the vigilance of the authorities. Echeagaray marched with troops into the state, where he had friends, through whom money was used to breed discord between the regular forces and the national guard; but, thanks to Governor Gutierrez Zamora's good management, harmony was restored.

Zuloaga decreed the dismissal from the army of the generals and other officers serving with the liberals, and believed his triumph secured, when a portion of the garrison in Guadalajara mutinied, with Lieutenant-colonel Landa at its head, and seized Juarez, whom the circumstances of the war had obliged to remove there from Guanajuato, together with his ministers and other officials.^[46] The mutineers confined their prisoners in one room, threatening them with death, particularly Juarez, as the only obstacle to the triumph of the reactionists. They were extricated, however, from their perilous position, or with Juarez' death there would have been an entire change in the country's political affairs, for some years, at least.

This was a thrilling episode. Nuñez, the commander of the garrison, hastened to the mutineers' barracks, where he was fired upon and then placed in confinement. However, a portion of the cavalry and national guard started to rescue the prisoners, and as they were about entering the palace, the mutineers thought themselves lost. Peraza, who commanded the guard over the prisoners, ordered his men to point their muskets at the prisoners. Guillermo Prieto dissuaded the soldiers from firing, and they left the room. Landa and one Morett tried to obtain from Juarez an order for the faithful troops not to fire against the mutineers, but he impassively replied that, being a prisoner, he could give no orders. Landa finally agreed to an arrangement that Juarez and the others should be set free and allowed to leave Guadalajara, exempt from recapture within the radius of ten leagues from it. The party had a narrow escape from falling into the enemy's hands again on their journey to Colima, when Juarez not only showed the utmost coolness, but great abnegation.^[47]

Juarez arrived at Sayula on the 23d of March, and found there General Rocha with his force. Before reaching Colima, news came that Parrodi had on that day surrendered in Guadalajara without resistance,^[48] and thus failed the coalition of the states in the interior.

Santos Degollado, who had hitherto had only the portfolio of government, was now also intrusted with that of war, and with the chief command — incompetent as he had shown himself for high commands — of the constitutionalist army yet to be organized. He was also clothed with ample powers in financial affairs connected with that army.^[49]

Juarez now resolved to establish his government in Vera Cruz, where he could make his action better felt. Accordingly, on the 14th of April, he embarked at Manzanillo with the other members of his cabinet, namely, Melchor Ocampo, of relations; Manuel Ruiz, of justice; Guillermo Prieto, of the treasury; and Leon Guzman, of fomento,^[50] on the American steamship John L. Stephens, and in seven days reached Panamá, whence, via Colon, Habana, and New Orleans, he went to Vera Cruz landing on the 4th of May, 1858, and forthwith installed his government.^[51]

 

 

1. Accomplished by soldiers with their officers at their head capturing the polls. Rivera, Gob. de Méx., ii. 521.
2. The Spaniard Cobos invited good catholics to defend their tenets by force of arms. Most unfriendly relations existed between the bishops and governors, as evidenced in their correspondence. Mejía, hard pressed by Rosas Landa, submitted; but his capitulation was really a victory, for Landa, deeming it the best course to pursue, recognized military rank in the rebels. The president having disapproved the arrangement, Mejía went back to his lair. Rosas Landa, Manif., 1-64; El Estandarte Nac., June 17, 1857; Buenrostro, Hist. Prim. Cong. Const., 103-4.
3. Details of occurrences may be found in the following authorities: Rivera, Gob. de Méx., ii. 521-3; Méx., Mem. Guerra, 1857, 36-8; Buenrostro, Hist. Prim. Cong. Const., 105, 109; El Estandarte Nac., May 14 to July 5, 1857, passim; El Eco Nac., May 1 to July 9, 1857, passim; Diario de Avisos, May 9 to July 13, 1857; La Nacion, May 12-30, 1857, passim.
4. Archivo Mex., Col. Ley., iii. 693-6.
5. The military were bluntly reminded of an army circular of 1851, prohibiting their strictures on the government, and several newspapers were suppressed. Archivo Mex., Col. Ley., iii. 698-702; Rivera, Gob. de Méx., ii. 523.
6. Among the worst cases was that of Colima, Aug. 26th, when the comandante general was killed, and his remains, as El Pais of Guadalajara recorded it, treated most brutally by the parish priest. Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, iv. 805. In Puebla, Tlascala, Tamaulipas, San Luis Potosí, Zacatecas, and even at the capital itself, there were several disturbances. In Yucatan the reactionary element gained strength in Campeche. Not even Chiapas escaped the general conflagration. The tiger of Alica, Lozada of Tepic, routed all government forces sent after him and committed horrible cruelties. Hydra-headed revolution showed itself everywhere, and though in most encounters the government forces won victories, yet they were not decisive enough to insure permanent peace. El Estandarte Nac., July 17 to Sept. 22, 1857; El Eco Nac., Aug. 8 to Oct. 31, 1857; Diario de Avisos, July 8 to Oct. 29, 1857; El Tiempo, Aug. 3 to Nov. 2, 1857; La Cruz, v. 622; El Progreso, July 18, 1857; Buenrostro, Hist. Prim. Cong. Const., 97, 101-2, 109-10; Suarez, Informe, 26-8.
7. Bishop Verea and the canons of Nuevo Leon were arrested, and the former was banished from his diocese. El Estandarte Nac., Sept. 26, 1857; Diario de Avisos, Sept. 25, 1857.
8. Archivo Mex., Col. Ley., iii. 955-6.
9. The constitution should have gone into operation that day; but Comonfort issued decrees on that date under his powers from the plan de Ayutla. From the day congress opened, he acted under this fundamental law. Archivo Mex., Col. Ley., iii. 954-5; Buenrostro, Hist. Seg. Cong. Const., i. 56.
10. Some deputies were maturing a plan to overthrow Comonfort, and put Juarez in his place. Rivera, Gob. de Méx., ii. 525.
11. Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex., viii. 637.
12. No duda vencerla, como hasta ahora, si conserva su accion tan espedita y enérgica, segun la importancia de los casos lo requiera.' Archivo Mex., Col. Ley., iii. 958-69, 970-1.
13. Minister of relations and chief of the cabinet, Juan A. de la Fuente; of justice, ecclesiastical affairs, and public instruction, Manuel Ruiz; of the treasury and public credit, Manuel Payno; of war, José García Conde; of fomento, Bernardo Flores; and of gobernacion, Benito Juarez. The last named took possession on the 3d of Nov.; the others had done so on the 20th of Oct. Méx., Мem. Насіenda, 1870, 1053-4.
14. The constitutional articles suspended were nine: namely, freedom of speech, of the press, of assembling, and of bearing arms; respect of domicile; the term of detentions; guarantees in criminal proceedings; application of penalties by civil authority, and use of property, etc. The government was also empowered to borrow six million dollars on as easy terns as possible. Archivo Mex., Col. Ley., iii. 1008-13; Buenrostro, Hist. Prim. Cong. Const., 160, 163-70, 175-87; Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex., viii. 644-9. Minister Juarez in a circular stated that it was not the governinent's intention to suspend these guarantees in all the states at once; and that it would use the extraoråinary powers only when indispensable. In fact, we are assured that at the public discussion in congress it had been said that they were allowed 'por solo la confianza que inspiraba la presencia de Juarez en el gabinete.' Juarez, Biog. del Ciud., 20.
15. Eight thousand infantry and 800 cavalry, costing two and a half million dollars. There were, besides, drawing pay 17 generals of division, 58 of brigade, and many field-officers. This involved an expenditure of $350,000. From Oct. 4, 1855, to Aug. 21, 1857, had been commissioned five generals of division, 38 of brigade, 110 colonels, 116 lieut-colonels and majors, making together 1,741 commissions, exclusive of auxiliary forces. To meet this expense, and to aid unhappy Yucatan and the frontier states, forced loans at ruinous rates had to be resorted to.
16. Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, iv. 817-18; Diario de Avisos, Nov. 12, 14, 20, 1857.
17. Buenrostro, Hist. Prim. Cong. Const., 211; Archivo Mex., Col. Ley., iii. 998-1002, 1022.
18. 'He creido que aun debia hacer nuevos sacrificios en su obsequio, y apurar todos los medios posibles para su salvacion.' Archivo Mex., Col. Ley., iii. 998-9.
19. The British minister protested against the election of justices of the supreme court, saying that they should all be of the legal profession; the government intimated in reply that he had better mind his own business. Rivera, Gob. de Méx., ii. 526.
20. On the 14th the ordinary session was by special decree prorogued for thirty working days. Archivo Mex., Col. Ley., iii. 1029.
21. Baz, Vida de Juarez, 118, says that Payno afterward confessed it. But I find that Payno makes a general denial in these words: 'ni ántes, ni entónces, ni ahora,' 1860, 'he tenido relaciones políticas con ninguna persona del partido opuesto al gobierno, de que yo formaba parte.' He did confess to the postscript in a letter to Gen. Huerta, denying that he entered into any conspiracy against the established political orders. Mem., Revol. Dic., 75; Payno, Defensa que hace, 4.
22. Arrangoiz, Méj., ii. 353-4; El Eco Nac., Dec, 19, 1857; Diario de Avisos, Dec. 18, 1837; Rivera, Gob. de Méx., ii. 528.
23. 'Velaba por el órden y la constitucion.'
24. It seems that no heed was paid that day to Baz' announcement. Baz, Vida de Juarez, 118-19.
25. It said that the 'segundo caudillo de Ayutla,' who had had so much tust put into his hands, and only a few days before had sworn to be the faithful guardian of the country's institutions, had suddenly turned into a 'fuccioso vulgar.' Archivo Mec., Col. Ley., iii. 1030-4.
26. That decree was officially published, May 13, 1861. Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex., ix. 217-18.
27. Till the 17th he could not, he said, break his pledge to follow the constitution in every act; but after Zuloaga and his brigade set aside the code, which he was powerless to prevent, his position changed. In upsetting the code they effected a revolution, which seemed to have been prompted by the force of circumstances; and in tendering him the chief place they showed that their movement was not hostile to liberty, for they well knew him to be no compromiser with retrogression. He accepted the office under the solemn promise and condition, sine qua non, that 'ningun partido dominaría en la situacion nueva, y que el gobierno no habia de abandonar el camino de una prudente reforma, ni el pensamiento conciliador que le habia gaiado hasta entónces.' Baz, Vida de Juarez, 128; Portila, Méj. en 1356-7, 288-300.
28. The states of Mexico, Tlascala, Vera Cruz, Tamaulipas, and parts of Querétaro and San Luis Potosí were the only ones to second it. Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, iv. 833, 835; Diario de Avisos, Dec. 30, 1857, Jan. 1, 2, 7, 1858; El Eco Nac., Dec. 23, 29, 1857; Voz. de Son., Feb. 10, 1858; La Razon, Jan. 6, 1858; La Paz, Jan. 5, 1858.
29. Jalisco, Guanajuato, Querétaro, Aguascalientes, Zacatecas, Michoacan, and Colima. They organized numerous forces to uphold the constitution, and General Anastasio Parrodi, their commander-in-chief, issued a proclamation sotting forth the general plan. Portilla, Méj. en 1856-7, 305-6; La Razon, Jan. 1, 1858.
30. In his speech at the opening of that council, he reiterated, though in another form, the statements of his last manifesto, laying stress on the oft-repeated though absurd and impracticable theory of making of a whole people one family in aspirations. There were, besides, some progresistas in the council who exposed the absurdity of his plan to amalgamate the parties. Baz, Vida de Juarez, 126-7; Rivera, Gob. de Méx., ii. 528; La Paz, Jan. 1, 1858; Diario de Avisos, Dec. 25, 1857; La Razon, Dec. 25, 1857; El Eco Nac., Dec. 22, 1837.
31. 'Estamos perdidos,' said he, when he saw an official report that Vera Cruz had returned to her allegiance. It was indeed a coup de grace. Payno, Mem. Revol. Dic., 99; Diario de Avisos, Jan. 6, 1858.
32. Being assured of every facility if he would give his preference to the conservative party, he refused; he would not become, he said, the destroyer of his former friends; could not banish Juarez or Olvera, ner fight against Doblado and Parrodi. He would modify all; 'yo no perseguiré ya, porque el brazo me duele de castigar; pero yo no puedo convertirme en reaccionario.' He was told to throw himself into the arms of the puros, as the out-and-out liberals were called, and they would forget and forgive; to nationalize the property of the clergy, to confine the nuns to fewer houses, do away with the friars, banish a few dozen men from the country, and perhaps shoot a number of others; to follow a straight progressive policy, call an assembly to make another constitution, and stop all temporizing with the clergy, high and low. No: he would not send away the archbishop, who might die on the journey, and the death would be laid at his door. How leave the towns without their curas? How expect the soldiers to fight with alacrity, knowing that dying they would not be absolved, and at death would not be buried in holy ground? He wanted time to think, and to introduce reforms slowly, without doing violence to the consciences of the peaceful and timid. Such was the dilly-dallying at a time when there was not a moment to spare. 'Revolucion que no marcha, muere'.' Payno, Mem. Revol. Dic., 95-7.
33. 'Menos malo era volver al punto de partida;' the plan of Tacubaya havbeen destroyed by its own authors, and the reactionary tendencies of the pronanciamiento being clcar. Comonfort, Política, in Portilla, Méj. en 1856– -7, 391; Comonfort's Policy, 19; Méx., Rev. Filosóf. Hist. Polít., in Doc. Hist. Mex., 1832-7, nos 10, 55.
34. Juarez is said to have been under the personal custody of Manuel Payno, to protect him from possible assassination. Payno, Mem. Revol. Dic., 95, 104-5.
35. Col Valero cried out 'Viva la religion!' and with the 5th cavalry and Oajaca lancers returned to the city. Portilla, Méj. en 1856-7, 332-3.
36. In July 1847 he returned to private life in his native state, where he held, for a time, municipal offices till 1853, when he rejoined the military service, being made a colonel and president of the military court for trying robbers and highwaymen, which office he filled several months.
37. Rivera says that though Zuloaga's revolt led to Comonfort's downfall, it is but justice to state that he did not mean to be ungrateful to the late president. Gob. de Méx., ii. 533. Lefêvre speaks contemptuously of his character and abilities: 'Antiguo baratero en una casa de juego, que solo su nulidad le habia designado al clero para que este hiciese de él su hombre de paja.' Doc. Ofic. Mахіmiliano, i. 26.
38. However, the development of a policy in consonance with the reformed plan de Tacubaya was soon after initiated. La Cruz, vi. 558; Méx., El Gob. Sup., 1-9; Córtes, Diario Cong., i. ap. 5, note 4, 20; Diario de Avisos, Jan. 23, 25, 1858.
39. The appointments were on the 24th, namely: Luis G. Cuevas, minister of relations; Manuel Larrainzar, of justice, public instruction, and ecclesiastical affairs, who resigned the office April 22d, being succeeded ad interim by Hilario Elgnero from April 24th, and later by Francisco Javier Miranda from July 10th; Hilario Elguero, of government; Juan Hierro Maldonado, of fomento; and José de la Parra, of war. Hierro was for a time charged with the portfolio of the treasury, which, on the 25th of April, went into the hands of Manuel Piña y Cuevas. Méx., Mem. Hacienda, 1870, 1058.
40. The Lerdo law and that on parochial emoluments were repealed on the 28th of Jan. Méx., Col. Ley., Mex., 1861, ii. 1-18; Diario de Avisos, Jan. 28, 1858; El Eco Nacional, Jan. 29, 1858. On the other hand, President Juarez, by his decree of Jan. 19, 1858, reiterated August 30 and January 4, 1859, declared all acts of the revolutionists from Dec. 17, 1837, null and void. Archivo Mex., Col. Ley., iv. 3, 7, 13-17; Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex., viii. 654; Buenrostro, Hist. Seg. Cong. Const., i. 60.
41. Dated Feb. 13th. Diario de Avisos, Feb. 23, 1858.
42. The legate had been officially advised of the repeal of the reform laws. Zuloaga had on the 31st of Jan. addressed the pope a letter expressive of his government's allegiance to the holy see, which was forwarded through Clementi, there being no Mexican legation then in Rome. The answer, dated March 18th, came in the same manner; the pope manifesting the highest satisfaction at the suppression of those laws which had kept the church of Mexico, he said, in great affliction, and rejoicing at the promised harmony between the state and the church in the future. Diario de Avisos, February 27, 1858; La Cruz, vii. 94-6, 415-16; Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, v. 37; Wappäus, Hex., 124-5.
43. The libro de actas of the cathedral chapter of Mexico, with the signatures of El Obispo de Teuagra, arcediano, and Ignacio Martinez y Rojas, secretary, giving them authenticity, Jan. 27 and 28, 1858, shows that even before the end of the reactionary revolution its chiefs had asked for money of the archbishop; that afterward he was asked to contribute one and a half million dollars. It was first intended to let the government have the least valuable portion of the silver plate in the churches and convents; and finally, as its necessities were very pressing, it was concluded that the chapter should forthwith advance $150,000, and afterward arrange about the million and a half. The archbislhop had in general terms promised that the church would aid the government to the best of its ability, but 'ni habrán de hipotecarse sus bienes, ni tampoco emitirse pagarés, ni aceptarse libranzas.' Other ecclesiastical documents exhibit the enormous sums furnished by the clergy for carrying on the war.
44. They retreated from Celaya in the face of the enemy, commanded by Osollo, who attacked them on the 9th. Many of the liberal battalions threw down their arms and deserted, which became known to Osollo that night. Sure of victory, he vigorously followed up his advantage the next morning; but Parrodi made Calderon's cavalry charge upon his ranks, causing much havoc. However, Osollo had excellent artillery, which was efficiently used. Calderon was slain, and most of the liberal battalions became dispersed. A few of them stood their ground, repulsed the enemy, and saved some pieces of artillery. The ammunition was despatched to Irapuato, and the chiefs with 3,000 men moved on to Guadalajara. Diario de Avisos, March 9, 1858; El Eco Nac., March 11, 1858; Buenrostro, Hist. Seg. Cong. Const., i. 61; Rivera, Gob. de Méx., ii. 536; Id., Hist. Jalapa, v. 38-9, 43-5.
45. President Juarez' government, in a circular to the governors detailing the last occurrences, made known his firm resolve to face all difficulties, and to incur all sacrifices in order to save the laws and citizens' rights.
46. After the defeat at Salamanca, the garrison of Guadalajara became shaky. Landa, with a portion of his regiment, the 5th infantry, which was on guard at the government palace, revolted in favor of the reaction. Juarez, Biog. del Cind., 23; Diario de Avisos, March 22, 26, 1858; El Eco Nac., March 21, 24, 1858.
47. Full details of the affair at the inn of Santa Anna, Acatlan, appear in Juarez, Biog. del Ciud., 24-6, 47-8; Juarez, Cartas, in Circulares Leg. Mex., 432-3.
48. Parrodi capitulated to Osollo and Miramon. Tepic accepted the reformed plan of Tacubaya March 27th. El Eco Nac., March 28, Apr. 10, 1858; Diario de Avisos, March 29-31, Apr. 5, 9, 10, 1858.
49. Decrees of Apr. 5th at Colima. Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex., viii. 654-5.
50. Мех., Мem. Насіеnda, 1870, 1054-7.
51. Officially announced to governor and others by Minister Ocampo on the 8th of May. Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex., viii. 655-6; Diario de Avisos, Dec. 21, 1858.