In Korea with Marquis Ito/Chapter 11

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Chapter X.
The Problem: Historical (continued)

In Korea with Marquis Ito (1908)
by George Trumbull Ladd

Chapter XI. The Compact

Chapter XII.
Rulers and People

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1901867In Korea with Marquis Ito — Chapter XI. The Compact1908George Trumbull Ladd

CHAPTER XI

THE COMPACT

It will need no argument for those familiar with the habitual ways of the Korean Government in dealing with foreign affairs to establish the necessity that Japan should make more definite, explicit, and comprehensive, the Protocols of February 23 and August 22, 1904. Foreign affairs have always been with the Emperor and Court of Korea a particularly favorable but mischievous sphere for intrigue and intermeddling. The Foreign Office has never had any real control over the agents of the government, who have been the tools of the Emperor in their dealings with foreign Legations. The Korean Foreign Minister in 1905 was not an efficient and responsible representative of either the intentions or the transactions of his own government; instructions were frequently sent direct from the Palace to Ministers in other countries; foreign Legations had, each one, a separate cipher to be used for such communications; and there were several instances of clandestine communication with agents abroad, even during the Russo-Japanese war. To guard, therefore, against the repetition of occurrences similar to those which had already cost her so dearly, Japan's interests demanded that her control over the management of Korea's foreign affairs should be undivided and unquestioned.

It was not, however, in the interests of Japan alone that the management of Korea's foreign affairs was to pass out of her own hands. It was distinctly, as events are fast proving beyond a reasonable doubt, for the advantage of Korea herself. In any valid meaning of the word, Korea had never been "independent" of foreign influences, dominating over her and corrupting the officials within her own borders. For centuries these influences came chiefly from China; for a decade, chiefly from Russia and other Western nations. The Treaty of 1905 was also, just as distinctly—so, we believe, the events will ultimately prove—for the advantage of these Western nations, and of the entire Far East.

It is, therefore, highly desirable, not only as vindicating the honor of Marquis Ito and of the Japanese Government, but also as establishing the Protectorate of Japan over Korea upon foundations of veracity and justice, that the exact and full truth should be known and placed on record before the world, concerning the Convention of November, 1905. This is the more desirable because of the gross and persistent misrepresentations of the facts which have been repeated over and over again chiefly by the same persons down to the time of the appearance of the so-called Korean Commission at The Hague Conference of 1907.^[1] His Majesty the Emperor (now ex-Emperor) of Korea has, indeed, publicly proclaimed his intention not to keep a treaty "made under duress" and through fears of "personal violence"; he has also made it appear that the signatures and the Imperial seal upon the document were fraudulently obtained. Meantime, he has sedulously (and, we believe, with such sincerity as his nature admits) cultivated and cherished the friendship of the Japanese Resident-General who negotiated, and who has administered affairs under, the Treaty. How he lost his crown, at the hands of his own Ministry, for his last violation of the most solemn provisions of the same treaty, is now a matter of universal history.

Marquis Ito arrived at Seoul, as the Representative of the Japanese Government, to conclude a new Convention with Korea, during the first week of November, 1905. He was the bearer of a letter from his own Emperor to the Emperor of Korea, which frankly explained the object of his mission. What follows is the substance of His Japanese Majesty's letter.

"Japan, in self-defence and for the preservation of the peace and security of the Far East, had been forced to go to war with Russia; but now, after a struggle of twenty months, hostilities were ended. During their continuance the Emperor of Korea and his people, no doubt, shared the anxiety felt by the Emperor and people of Japan. In the mind of His Majesty, the Emperor of Japan, the most absorbing thought and purpose now was to safeguard the future peace and security of the two Empires, and to augment and strengthen the friendly relations existing between them. Unfortunately, however, Korea was not yet in a state of good defence, nor was the basis for a system of effective self-defence yet created. Her weakness in these regards was in itself a menace to the peace of the Far East as well as to her own security. That this was unhappily the case was a matter of as much regret to His Majesty as it could be to the Emperor of Korea; and for this reason the safety of Korea was as much a matter of anxiety to him as was that of his own country. His Majesty had already commanded his Government to conclude the Protocols of February and August, 1904, for the defence of Korea. Now, in order to preserve the peace which had been secured, and to guard against future dangers arising from the defenceless condition of Korea, it was necessary that the bonds which united the two countries should be closer and stronger than ever before. Having this end in view, His Majesty had commanded His Government to study the question and to devise means of attaining this desirable result. The preservation and protection of the dignity, privileges, and tranquillity of the Imperial House of Korea would, as a matter of course, be one of the first considerations kept in view.

"His Majesty felt sure that if the Emperor of Korea would carefully consider the general situation and its bearing upon the interests and welfare of his country and people, he would decide to take the advice now earnestly tendered to him."

It should be noticed that this address from His Imperial Majesty of Japan to the Korean Emperor the sincerity of which cannot be questioned is pervaded with the same spirit as that which has characterized the administration, hitherto, of the Japanese Residency-General. Marquis Ito informed the Korean Emperor that he would ask for another audience in a few days. His Majesty consented, adding that in the meantime he desired carefully to study the letter from the Emperor of Japan.^[2]

On the 15th of November, Marquis Ito had a private audience which lasted about four hours, and in which he frankly explained the object of his mission. . . . The Emperor began the interview by complaining of certain injuries done by the Japanese civil and military authorities during the war. He dwelt at length upon past events, saying, among other things, that he had not wished to go to the Russian Legation in 1895, but had been over-persuaded by those about his person.

↑ The narrative which follows may be trusted to correct most of these misstatements. But among them, some of the more important may here be categorically contradicted. Such are, for example, the statements that armed force was used; that General Hasegawa half drew his sword to intimidate Mr. Han; that Hagiwara seized the latter with the aid of gendarmes and police; that the Minister of Agriculture continued to hold out; that he and Minister Pak, during the conference, withdrew from the Japanese Legation and betook themselves to the Palace, denouncing the compact (something no one acquainted with the geographical relations of the two places would be likely to assert with a sincere belief); that the Emperor ordered the consenting Ministers to be assassinated; that Japanese troops patrolled the streets all night, etc., etc. One curiously characteristic error of Mr. Hulbert is involved in the statement, published in one of the papers of the United States, which makes his commission by the Korean Emperor to lodge an appeal with President Roosevelt the cause of hastening the Japanese Government in their iniquitous coup d'état. The truth is that the Japanese Government had made all the preparations for Marquis Ito's departure, and the plan afterward carried out had been carefully formulated, weeks before it was known that Mr. Hulbert was going to the United States. The Marquis was only waiting the return of Baron Komura to Japan before leaving for Korea. No thought whatever was at any time given to Mr. Hulbert. It is, in general, late now to say that the efforts of those "friends of Korea," who have taken the Korean ex-Emperor's money while holding out to him the hope of foreign intervention, have done him and his country, rather than Japan, an injury impossible to repair.
↑ In order to understand the following negotiations and all similar transactions conducted in characteristic Korean style, it should be remembered that delay, however reasonable it may seem or really be, is in fact utilized for purposes not of reflection and judicious planning for future emergencies, but the rather for arranging intrigues, securing apparent chances of escape from the really inevitable, with the result of an increasing unsettlement of the Imperial mind.

[p253-1] The narrative which follows may be trusted to correct most of these misstatements. But among them, some of the more important may here be categorically contradicted. Such are, for example, the statements that armed force was used; that General Hasegawa half drew his sword to intimidate Mr. Han; that Hagiwara seized the latter with the aid of gendarmes and police; that the Minister of Agriculture continued to hold out; that he and Minister Pak, during the conference, withdrew from the Japanese Legation and betook themselves to the Palace, denouncing the compact (something no one acquainted with the geographical relations of the two places would be likely to assert with a sincere belief); that the Emperor ordered the consenting Ministers to be assassinated; that Japanese troops patrolled the streets all night, etc., etc. One curiously characteristic error of Mr. Hulbert is involved in the statement, published in one of the papers of the United States, which makes his commission by the Korean Emperor to lodge an appeal with President Roosevelt the cause of hastening the Japanese Government in their iniquitous coup d'état. The truth is that the Japanese Government had made all the preparations for Marquis Ito's departure, and the plan afterward carried out had been carefully formulated, weeks before it was known that Mr. Hulbert was going to the United States. The Marquis was only waiting the return of Baron Komura to Japan before leaving for Korea. No thought whatever was at any time given to Mr. Hulbert. It is, in general, late now to say that the efforts of those "friends of Korea," who have taken the Korean ex-Emperor's money while holding out to him the hope of foreign intervention, have done him and his country, rather than Japan, an injury impossible to repair.

[2] In order to understand the following negotiations and all similar transactions conducted in characteristic Korean style, it should be remembered that delay, however reasonable it may seem or really be, is in fact utilized for purposes not of reflection and judicious planning for future emergencies, but the rather for arranging intrigues, securing apparent chances of escape from the really inevitable, with the result of an increasing unsettlement of the Imperial mind.

[1]

[2]

In Korea with Marquis Ito/Chapter 11

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