Infantry, Part I: Regular Army /ROAD and Flexible Response

by John K. Mahon and Romana Danysh

• ROAD and Flexible Response

• The Pentomic battle group had a rather brief existence as the basic unit of the infantry. From its inception, the Pentomic system had been considered an interim measure by the Army Staff. It was intended as the first step, not the last, in the Army's adaptation to the nuclear battlefield and to the increasingly complicated military situations that might be expected to arise in the future. Planning for a new combat structure began even before all infantry units had been reorganized under the D-series TOE's. In December 1960, CONARC was directed to re-evaluate the current organization and to make recommendations for necessary changes. The result of this re-evaluation was not another modification of the existing Pentomic system but a major Army-wide reorganization under an entirely new concept called ROAD (Reorganization Objective Army Divisions). ROAD was approved by the Secretary of the Army in April 1961 and was publicly announced by President John F. Kennedy before a joint session of Congress on 25 May 1961. The first ROAD units were organized in February 1962 under draft TOE's. The final tables were published on 15 July and 15 August 1963, and by the end of June 1964 the reorganization was completed both in the Regular Army and in the reserve components.

• The fundamental assumption behind the Pentomic organization had been that atomic war was the most likely form of future warfare and that tactical nuclear weapons would definitely be used. The new Kennedy administration questioned this assumption and was seriously concerned about limited conflicts and the ability to handle situations short of nuclear war. General Maxwell D. Taylor, long-time champion of what he called "flexible response," was appointed Military Representative of the President in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and later Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Pentomic, a product of the era of massive retaliation, did not fit into the strategy of flexible response, which now became official national policy. ROAD, on the other hand, was specifically designed to carry out such a policy.

• The single most important characteristic of the new system was its flexibility. Under ROAD each division had a fixed base, common 'to all divisions, but the number and type of its infantry and armor elements varied according to its mission, geographic location, and strategic as well as tactical requirements. By different combinations of organic maneuver elements, divisions could be tailored to fit any environment or situation. Without reducing the Pentomic division's tactical nuclear weapons, ROAD increased conventional firepower and personnel strength. As a result, ROAD units had a genuine dual capability and greater staying power on the non-atomic battlefield. The new system had the additional advantage of introducing an organization that was more compatible with that of major NATO allies.

• ROAD, like Pentomic, was primarily a divisional reorganization. It did, however, affect the infantry as a whole by changing the structure of infantry units of all sizes down to and including the squad. Among the most serious shortcomings of the Pentomic organization was the fact that the battle group, which had been planned as a lean, highly mobile, scaled-down regiment, was too small and not powerful enough to be an adequate substitute for the regiment; it was much more like an oversized and reinforced battalion. Nor was the combat capability of all five Pentomic battle groups equivalent to that of the three regiments of the triangular division. ROAD, therefore, dropped the battle group from the infantry structure, but it did not bring back the regiment. Instead, it made the battalion the basic tactical and administrative unit of the infantry.

• Command and control also posed major problems in the Pentomic system. With the elimination of infantry regiments and battalions and the introduction of the pentagonal, as opposed to the triangular organization, only one echelon of command remained between the division commander (a major general) and the company commander (a captain). As a result, the commanding general was burdened by having five major independent combat elements under his immediate control. Experience showed that even with modern communications this span of control was too wide for efficient operations. Furthermore, infantry majors and lieutenant colonels had extremely limited command opportunities, since only about 5 percent of them could expect to acquire command experience in peacetime under the Pentomic system. ROAD improved both the command and control structure and infantry officer career opportunities by dropping the pentagonal organization and by establishing three brigades in each division to serve as intermediary headquarters between the division commander and the combat battalions. Contrary to the fixed structure of the five Pentomic battle groups and of the old infantry regiments with three identical battalions, the new brigades could control a variable number and type of units. The brigades, which were made organic to all divisions, were similar to the combat commands that the armored division had since World War II, but they provided greater flexibility.

• Battalions were attached to brigades according to what was appropriately described as the "building-block" concept. In order to facilitate interchangeability of maneuver elements between and within divisions and to simplify training, a certain degree of standardization of structure was introduced. Thus not only did different types of infantry battalions resemble each other more than ever before, but even tank battalions were organized along similar lines. This similarity was accompanied by a renewed emphasis on the employment of combined arms teams, and new techniques were developed for task force formation of infantry and armor elements on brigade, battalion, and company levels. Under ROAD, divisional brigades with their infantry and armor elements were capable of operating independently when reinforced by support and service units from the division base. In such cases, the brigades were comparable to the infantry RCT's that had been employed with great success during World War II and the Korean War.

• The ROAD infantry battalion differed considerably from the Pentomic battle group, but it had several things in common with the infantry battalion of the preROCID period. Like the earlier battalion, it was organized with three organic rifle companies. In both units each rifle company had three rifle platoons and a weapons platoon; the rifle platoon consisted of three rifle squads and a weapons squad, and. the weapons platoon had a mortar and an antitank section. Unlike the pre-Pentomic battalion, the ROAD unit had no separate heavy weapons company; all the organic support elements were included in the headquarters company. This company also contained a mess section, which for the first time consolidated company mess teams on the battalion level. Furthermore, the ROAD infantry battalion was tactically self-sufficient and thus had a greater degree of independence than the battalions which had been organic to the infantry regiment.

• The new rifle squad contained ten men. It was larger by one man than the squad of the post-World War II and Korean War period but smaller than the 11-man Pentomic squad. It consisted of a squad leader, two 4-man fire teams (team leader, automatic rifleman, rifleman, and grenadier) , and an extra rifleman, who could be used to reinforce either fire team or assist the squad leader. Organizationally, the squad reflected ROAD's characteristic flexibility down to the very last man.

• The M 14 rifle, introduced in the D-series TOE's, remained the infantryman's basic weapon; with a selector and bipod it also served as an automatic rifle. The ROAD tables provided a new knife-type bayonet for the M14 instead of the former carbine bayonet, which had been temporarily issued with the M 14. The M79 grenade launcher was also authorized as a new individual weapon. Designed to close the gap between the maximum range of a hand grenade and the minimum range of a mortar, the lightweight M79 fired a 40-mm. highexplosive fragmentation projectile to a range of approximately 400 meters. With. two launchers per rifle squad and a total of eighty-five in the battalion, the M79 helped to improve the capabilities of small infantry units.

• Several new antitank weapons, both close-in and long-range, were introduced by the ROAD TOE's. The 90-mm. recoilless rifle, M67, replaced the 3.5-inch rocket launcher in the weapons squad of the rifle platoon, and the ENTAC (ENgin-Teleguide Anti-Char) became the new weapon for the battalion's three antitank squads. A French-manufactured wire-guided missile with a range of 2,000 meters, the ENTAC was a considerable improvement over the SS10 antitank missile which was being phased out. Some 3.5-inch rocket launchers were still found in the ROAD infantry battalion, but the TOE clearly stated that they were to be issued only until the new fib-mm. high explosive antitank rocket, M72, became available. Commonly known as the LAW (Light Antitank Weapon), this weapon was designed to be carried and operated by one man. Although the rocket together with its launcher weighed only about 4.75 pounds and was only 25 inches long and 3 inches in diameter, the LAW had an effective range of 200 meters and was capable of penetrating armor of the heaviest known tank.

• For the first time under ROAD, the portable flame thrower was made organic to the infantry battalion. Flame throwers had been used by infantry units before, but they had been considered special purpose weapons and as such had to be requested in advance from ammunition points. Nine of them were included in the ROAD battalion's TOE equipment. With three in each rifle company headquarters, flame throwers were immediately available whenever needed. The ROAD TOE's also returned the .50-caliber heavy machine gun to the infantry battalion. The number of these guns, used primarily as antiaircraft weapons, had been drastically reduced under ROCID, and they were completely eliminated from the battle group , by the D-series tables. Under ROAD, thirteen .50-caliber machine guns were again authorized for each infantry battalion. All of the guns were located in the headquarters company, although they were not grouped in any one section within the company. Meanwhile, the new Redeye air defense missile was being developed and tested and its availability for distribution to infantry units was being projected for the near future.

• All of these weapons gave ROAD units much more conventional firepower, and thus helped to correct one of the major weaknesses of the Pentomic organization. Although ROAD emphasized conventional capabilities, it did not neglect atomic power. On the contrary, even the infantry-had its own nuclear weapons system, the Davy Crockett, which could be employed in either a direct or indirect fire support role against a wide variety of targets-primarily massed enemy personnel. While the weapon was being developed, CONARC had proposed and tested several different organizations for its employment, including separate TOE platoons and sections organic to the heavy mortar platoon in the battle group's combat support company. Selected personnel began special training at the Infantry School in October 1961. In the final ROAD TOE, there was a 12-man Davy Crockett section augmentation in the headquarters company of the infantry battalion. It could be organized only by special authorization from the Department of the Army, but should that authority be given, the battalion commander would have four low-yield nuclear weapons under his direct control and the capability of initiating a nuclear fire mission within minutes.

• The ROAD infantry battalion was not only more powerful than the ROCID battle group; its firepower was also much greater than that of the pre-Pentomic infantry battalion. The battalion that had fought in Korea ten years earlier had no M14 rifles, M60 machine guns, M79 grenade launchers, 90-mm. or 106-mm. recoilless rifles, ENTAC's, or Davy Crocketts. Although it could depend on close support from the regimental heavy mortar company, the Korean War unit did not have organic 4.2inch mortars, whereas the ROAD battalion had heavy mortars in its own headquarters company. The 3.5-inch rocket launcher, .50-caliber machine gun, and 81-mm. mortar used by the earlier infantry battalion were still authorized for the ROAD unit. However, the LAW was being tested as a substitute for the bazooka, the Redeye was being designed to replace the machine gun in the antiaircraft role, while the 81-mm. mortar being issued was a new and improved model.

• Only the .45-caliber automatic pistol was the same in both the older and newer battalions. All other weapons organic to the Korean War unit had either been replaced or were scheduled to be replaced in the near future by more sophisticated and powerful weapons. As a result, the ROAD battalion's total firepower was significantly greater than that of its Korean War predecessor, in spite of the fact that its personnel strength was less by fifty-seven men. The communication and transportation equipment of the ROAD infantry battalion was also considerably better. The number of radios and telephones had increased from 66 and 29 to 176 and 149, respectively; trucks had more than doubled from 49 to 115. Neither helicopters nor fixed-wing airplanes were authorized for the infantry battalion, but there was an aviation battalion in the division base of each ROAD division with enough organic aircraft to airlift an entire infantry company at one time.

• In keeping with the new trend toward standardization, the ROAD airborne infantry battalion was almost identical in structure to the regular infantry battalion. There was only one significant difference: the airborne unit had six instead of three antitank squads armed with ENTAC's in its headquarters company. ENTAC's were also authorized for the antitank squads of airborne infantry companies, while the standard infantry used the 106-mm. recoilless rifle at company level. More ENTAC's were authorized because the airborne ROAD division usually had only one tank battalion assigned to it and consequently needed a greater antitank capability in its infantry units. The airborne battalion TOE also provided for thirteen infantry light weapons carriers or mechanical mules, which were not included in the standard battalion's equipment. The regular infantry unit, on the other hand, had more heavy trucks and trailers. In general, the airborne battalion was a little lighter than the standard infantry battalion and was 100 percent transportable by medium aircraft. The capabilities of the ROAD airborne battalion were the same as those of the regular infantry battalion, with one important exception: the airborne unit was organized and trained for frequent airborne assault by parachute or assault aircraft.

• The third type of infantry battalion under ROAD was called "mechanized infantry." It replaced the former armored infantry battalion (AIB) and armored rifle battalion. Mechanized infantry units were characterized by their high cross-country mobility with light armor protection and multiple communications. In addition to sharing the capabilities of the regular infantry, the mechanized infantry battalion could provide a highly mobile exploitation force when suitably reinforced, exploit the effects of mass destruction weapons, and complement and enhance the inherent capabilities of tank elements when employed in tank-infantry task forces. AIB's and armored rifle battalions had been organic only to armored divisions; mechanized battalions were assigned to armored divisions as well as infantry and mechanized infantry divisions.

• The mechanized division was a new organization created under ROAD which, although not as heavy in armor as the armored division, was particularly suitable for employment in such terrain as the plains of Europe or against an enemy with highly mechanized forces. All three types of ROAD infantry battalions were also assigned to separate brigades, which became more numerous during the 1960's.

• The organization of the mechanized infantry battalion was very similar to that of standard and airborne infantry units. Having a strength of 901, compared to 880 for the regular and 828 for the airborne battalion, the mechanized battalion was the largest unit. Additional drivers and maintenance personnel were required for the extra organic vehicles that made the mechanized unit 100 percent mobile. Signal equipment was also more numerous and, because of the mobility factor, wireless communication was more essential. Although there were fewer telephones in the mechanized battalion, the number of radios was twice that of a regular infantry battalion. Each rifle squad, for example, was authorized a vehicular radio set in addition to its portable radio. In the draft TOE the mechanized infantry rifle squad had only ten men, like the standard and airborne squads; one of the riflemen was expected to double as the driver of the squad's M 113 armored personnel carrier (APC). In the final table another rifleman was added, thus permitting the driver to remain with the APC at all times.

• In the process of adopting an organization similar to that of the regular infantry, the mechanized infantry battalion lost the fourth rifle company that had been organic to the AIB and to the armored rifle battalion ever since the post-World War II reorganization. However, the battalion did gain an improved antitank capability. The only antitank weapon in the AIB and armored rifle battalion had been the 3.5inch rocket launcher, while the ROAD mechanized battalion was also authorized 90mm. and 106-mm. recoilless rifles, the ENTAC guided missile, and finally the LAW. The number of machine guns was reduced by the ROAD TOE's, but in spite of this reduction there were still more 7.62-mm. and .50 caliber machine guns in mechanized infantry units than in other infantry organizations.

• With the adoption of ROAD, the designations of different types of infantry units became standardized. The official designation for all infantry battalions consisted of the battalion and the parent regiment, and descriptive terms such as mechanized or airborne were now put in parentheses after the battalion. Also placed in parentheses, following the parent unit, was the traditional or distinctive designation of the regiment, shared by all of its elements. For example, the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 506th Infantry (Currahee), organic to the 101st Airborne Division, and the 3rd Battalion (Mechanized), 118th Infantry (Palmetto Regiment), a unit of the South Carolina Army National Guard, were officially designated as the 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry, and the 3rd Battalion, 118th Infantry. Thus while official designations were standardized and simplified for efficiency's sake, provisions were made for retention of descriptive terms and historical nicknames.

• Although the number and types of infantry battalions assigned to any given division depended on its mission and geographic location, the particular units were selected on the basis of their historical association with the division. The parent regiments of most of the infantry battalions organic to a ROAD division had fought with that division in World War I or II or in the Korean War. Whereas under the Pentomic system each of the organic infantry elements came from a different parent unit, under ROAD two or more battalions from the same parent regiment were usually assigned to each division. This change involved some reassignments and reshuffling of units and was made concurrently with reorganization under the new TOE's.

• CARS adapted very well to ROAD, proving its ability to provide a stable historical and traditional background for combat units in spite of major tactical reorganizations. Except for the addition of five more infantry parent regiments-(the 61st, 188th, 508th, 509th, and 511th)-no changes were made in the system. Separate parent units were not created for the new mechanized infantry battalions. Those that were organized from former armored rifle battalions had parent regiments with armored infantry backgrounds, but since there were far more mechanized units, many of them shared parent regiments with the standard infantry. The airborne parent regiments had only airborne elements. The only exception was the 509th Infantry, whose 1st and 2nd Battalions were organized as airborne /mechanized, that is, as mechanized units with parachutequalified personnel. Two airborne regiments, the 188th and 511th, were added to CARS in order to furnish organic elements for the 11th Air Assault Division, newly organized at Fort Benning, Georgia, with the special purpose of testing the airmobile concept.

• The greater emphasis on limited war capabilities and flexible response, which had set the stage for the ROAD reorganization, also helped to bring about an increase in Army and infantry strength in the early 1960's. The number of infantrymen had been gradually reduced since the Korean armistice and kept on declining after the adoption of the Pentomic organization. Reaching its lowest point in August and September 1958, infantry strength had dropped to less than 100,000 and to approximately 11 percent of the overall Army strength, which also continued to decrease. At that time there were ninety-three infantry units of battle group or battalion size in the active Army. Three-fourths of them were organic elements of divisions and about half were stationed overseas. After this low point, infantry personnel strength began to grow gradually, but it was the Berlin crisis of mid-1961 that brought about a significant gain in both infantry personnel and units.

• The increase was at first mainly the result of federalizing two Army National Guard divisions. The 32nd Infantry Division from Wisconsin with five organic infantry battle groups and the 49th Armored Division from Texas with its four armored rifle battalions were federalized on 15 October 1961. An Army Reserve training division, the 100th, was also ordered into active military service. Thus, the reserve components played an important role during the Berlin crisis. However, in order to be prepared for such crises in the future, a buildup in Regular Army strength was necessary. To satisfy this need, existing units were made more combat ready and two additional divisions were authorized. In February 1962 the 1st Armored Division and the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) were activated. These divisions and their organic elements became the first units to be organized under the new ROAD concept.
• By the time the ROAD reorganization was officially completed in June 1964, active infantry strength had grown to 130,131, even though infantry units from the reserve components had reverted to reserve status. The Regular Army now had sixteen combat divisions: 5 infantry, 2 airborne, 4 armored, 4 mechanized infantry, and I cavalry (organized as infantry), with 107 organic infantry battalions among them. Sixteen infantry battalions were assigned to seven separate brigades: 3 infantry, 1 airborne, 1 armored, and 2 mechanized infantry. There were also three battalions assigned to the 11th Air Assault Division (Test) , four separate battalions, and five separate companies. One unit was still designated a battle group; it was the 1st Battle Group, 1st Infantry, active at zero strength at West Point. From this total of 136 infantry units, 67 were stationed in the continental United States and 69 were overseas with 31 in West Germany, 19 in Korea, and the remainder in Okinawa, Hawaii, Alaska, Berlin, and the Canal Zone.

• Infantry readiness in the Army Reserve and Army National Guard was also considerably improved during the 1960's, but it was accompanied by a reduction in the total number of organized units. Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, was instrumental in bringing about several realignments of the reserve components. He recommended drastic cuts in the number of reserve units, which in turn would enable the remaining organizations to be more fully manned and equipped. One of McNamara's original suggestions was to eliminate all infantry and other combat units from the Army Reserve, leaving only service units, and to make the Army National Guard the combat reserve. Congress rejected this proposal and modified many of his other recommendations. Nevertheless, after the reorganization of 1967-68 both the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard were significantly different from the reserve components of a decade earlier.

• The twenty-seven Army National Guard divisions of the late 1950's, with sixty-three organic infantry regiments (of three battalions each) and twenty-four organic armored infantry battalions, had been reduced by 1968 to only eight divisions and eighteen separate brigades, having a total of 111 organic ROAD infantry battalions. There were also four separate infantry companies and twelve separate infantry battalions, including two scout battalions organized in Alaska with Eskimo personnel. All of the Army National Guard infantry units were elements of seventysix CARS parent regiments.

• In the 1968 Army Reserve there were no divisional combat infantry units left, since four of the ten combat divisions had been inactivated in 1963 and the other six by the end of 1965. Only three separate brigades, each having three organic, infantry battalions, remained active together with one separate infantry battalion. In the course of these realignments twelve of the eighteen CARS infantry parent regiments with Army Reserve backgrounds had been eliminated. The 313th, 314th, 315th, 409th, 410th, and 442nd Infantry were retained with one battalion each, while the other four active infantry battalions were elements of Regular Army parent units. The Army Reserve continued to have thirteen training divisions, but these too had undergone a major reorganization. The five training regiments previously organic to each division were replaced by thirteen battalions, with eight for Basic Combat Training (BCT), three for Advanced Individual Training (AIT), and two for Combat Support Training (CST), all of which were attached to four brigades within the division. Although a battalion and brigade structure was introduced, the training divisions were not organized under ROAD and the new battalions did not become elements of designated CARS parent regiments. The former training regiments, however, were reorganized under a modified CARS concept with a variable number of BCT, AIT, or CST battalions and with the regimental headquarters inactive.

• One other type of infantry organization, the Special Forces, remained active in the Army Reserve and also had elements in the Regular Army and in the Army National Guard. Although part of CARS, the Special Forces were not like any other CARS units, but had a unique structure. Their basic operational unit was the 12-man "A" detachment, commanded by a captain. Forty-eight of these detachments were organic to a full strength Special Forces group. The parent regiment for all Special Forces units from all three components, designated the 1st Special Forces, was created on 15 April 1960 by consolidation of the six ranger infantry battalions and the 1st Special Service Force of World War II. Since the ranger companies of the Korean War period traced their lineages back to elements of the World War II ranger battalions, their histories were also perpetuated by the new parent unit.

• The mission of the Special Forces was to fight both as guerrillas and against guerrillas and to organize, train, advise, direct, and assist indigenous forces anywhere in the world in the conduct of guerrilla warfare as well as in counterinsurgency and counterguerrilla operations. Special Forces personnel were therefore among the first Americans to be sent to Vietnam as advisors to the South Vietnamese in their struggle against Communist aggression. As the conflict in Vietnam developed into a major war, the U.S. involvement deepened. Regular infantry and other combat troops were committed, and the war in Vietnam became the first actual battle test of the strategy of flexible response and the ROAD organization.