Innes v. Miller

by Supreme Court of the United States

1786.

INNES verʃus MILLER.

R

EFERREES, having fettled their minds with regard to their report, fent for the Plaintiff, and afked him whether he would agree that a quarter's rent, which accrued after the action brought, fhould be taken into the fettlement, and the Defendant credited for it, which would have made the ballance in favor of the latter. This the Plaintiff refufed to comply with, and withdrew, without being afked another queftion, or faying any thing under further upon the fubject.

A motion was now made to fet afide the report.

by the court. Referrees ought to proceed, not only fo as to do juftice, but to avoid the appearance of injuftice ; left a precedent fhould be eftablifhed, which might afterwards be perverted to a bad ufe. Mifbehaviour is, therefore, a reafon for the Court to interpofe and fet afide a report, no lefs than partiality and corruption. Referrees, however, are allowed greater latitude in their proceedings than juries. They are not equally bound to time and place, nor to the fame ftrictnefs of method in receiving teftimony. A referrence would be of little fervice, if a report were liable to be fet afide, for as irregularity of fmall as that mentioned by the Counfel, in the cafe of Laron's Leʃʃee vs. the Proprietaries, for the South -ftreet lots, that of merely handing in a paper to the Jury by miftake, which was only a copy of an original produced at the trial. Suppofe, in the prefent inftance, the Referrees had adjourned, and in the intermediate time, meeting Innes in the ftreet, fhould make the propofal mentioned to him–furely this would not fet afide the report. It is true, that the manner in which it was done, gave room for fome fufpicion, and the Defendant had a right to prefume, that all was not fairly conducted. But the fact is fatisfactorily explained by the Referrees, and we do not think it fuch mifbehaviour as will invalidate the report. Therefore,

Let Judgment be entered for the Plaintiff.