International Association of Machinists v. Street/Concurrence Whittaker

by Charles Evans Whittaker

United States Supreme Court

367 U.S. 740

International Association of Machinists  v.  Street

 Argued: Jan. 17, 18, 1961. --- Decided: June 19, 1961

Mr. Justice WHITTAKER, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Understanding the Court's opinion to hold-put in my own words that, in enacting § 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act, Congress intended to, and impliedly did, limit the use that railway labor unions may make of dues, fees and assessments, collected from those of its members who were or are required to become or remain its members by force of union shop contracts negotiated as permitted by that section, only to defray the costs of negotiating and administering collective bargaining agreements-including the adjustment and settlement of disputes-and that the Hanson case, rightly construed, upholds no more than that, I join Points I, II and III of the Court's opinion.

But I dissent from Point IV of the Court's opinion. In respect to that point, it seems appropriate to make the following observations. When many members pay the same amount of monh ly dues into the treasury of the union which dispenses the fund for what are, under the Court's opinion, both permitted and proscribed activities, how can it be told whose dues paid for what? Let us suppose a union with two members, each paying monthly dues of three dollars, and that one does not the other does not object to his dues being expended for 'proscribed activity'-whatever that phrase may mean. Of the dues for a given month, the union expends four dollars for admittedly proper activity and two dollars for 'proscribed activity,' answering to the objector that the two dollars spent for 'proscribed activity' were not from his, but from the other's, dues. Would not the result be that the objector was thus required to pay not his one-half but three-fourths of the union's legitimate expenses? Or, has not the objector nevertheless paid a ratable part of the cost of the 'proscribed activity'?

The Court suggests that a proper decree might require 'restitution' to the objector of that part of his dues that is equal to the ratio of dues spent for 'proscribed activity' to total dues collected by the union. But even if the Court could draw a clear line between what is and what is not 'proscribed activity,' the accounting and proof problems involved would make the remedy most onerous and impractical. But when there is added to this a full recognition of the practical impossibility of judicially drawing the clear line mentioned and also of the fact that the local unions which collect the dues promptly pay a part of them to the national union which, in turn, also engages in 'proscribed activity,' it becomes plain that the suggested restitution remedy is impossible of practical performance.

It would seem to follow that the only practical remedy possible is the one formulated by the Georgia court, and I would approve it.

Mr. Justice BLACK, dissenting.

Notes