Ives The Essays of Montaigne/Volume 1/Chapter 5

by Michel de Montaigne

CHAPTER V

WHETHER THE COMMANDANT OF A BESIEGED STRONGHOLD SHOULD GO FORTH TO PARLEY

This is one of the Essays that show Montaigne’s interest in military affairs. They are found only in the first Book, though traces of the essayist’s familiarity with the life of a soldier are to be found throughout. Their subject-matter is now without interest for us. Our sieges and parleyings are of a different character from those of the sixteenth century. But Montaigne’s treatment of these subjects is of importance to the student of his character, from its unconscious self-revelation.

Another point of interest may be found in the sentence in which Montaigne asserts, or at least suggests, that the civilization “among those nations whom we so unhesitatingly call Barbarians” may be in some respects equal to our own. The thought is like a forerunner of the later Essay “‘Of Cannibals.”

In this Essay there is only one openly personal remark — the last sentence, added (as before) in 1588. Montaigne made many additions in 1588 and 1595, doubling the Essay in length.

LUCIUS MARCIUS, the Roman legate during the war against Perseus, King of Macedon, wishing to gain the time required to put the Roman army in condition, scattered suggestions of future agreement,^[1] whereby the king was thrown off his guard and agreed to a truce for several days, thus affording his enemy an opportunity and leisure to prepare himself; as a result the king was utterly overthrown.^[2] But the elders of the Senate, mindful of the customs of their fathers, denounced this device as contrary to their former practice, (c) which was, they said, to fight with valour, not with cunning, nor by surprises and night attacks; nor by counterfeited retreats and unexpected returns; never entering into a war until they had proclaimed it, and often not until they had appointed the time and place of the battle. On this principle they sent back to Pyrrhus his treacherous physician,^[3] and to the Faliscans their disloyal schoolmaster.^[4] Such were the characteristically Roman methods, not those of Greek subtlety and Punic craft, which hold it to be less glorious to conquer by force than by fraud. To deceive may serve for the moment; but he alone considers himself vanquished who knows that he has been so, neither by stratagem nor by chance, but by valour, array against array, in a loyal and just war.^[5] (a) It is plain enough, from this language on the part of those good people, that they had not as yet accepted this fine saying, —

Dolus an virtus quis in hoste requirat?^[6]

(c) The Achaians, says Polybius,^[7] detested all manner of deceit in their wars, deeming that no victory when the courage of the enemy was not cast down. Eam vir sanctus et sapiens sciet veram esse victoriam, que salva fide et integra dignitate, parabitur,^[8] says another.

Vosne velit an me regnare hera, quidve ferat fors,
Virtute experiamur.^[9]

In the kingdom of Ternates, among those nations whom we so unhesitatingly^[10] call Barbarians, it is the custom not to enter into war without having first proclaimed it, adding a full declaration of the means, of all kinds, that they have at their command — how many men, what supplies, what weapons, offensive and defensive. But also, that being done, if their enemies do not yield and come to an agreement, they feel at liberty to do their worst, and do not think that they can be reproached with treason or cunning, whatever means they make use of to conquer.^[11] The ancient Florentines were so far from desiring to obtain advantage over their enemies by surprise, that they gave them warning a month before putting their army in the field, by the constant ringing of the bell they called “‘Martinella.”^[12]

(a) As for our less superstitious selves, who hold the honour of war to be his who has the benefit of it, and who, following Lysander, say that, where the lion’s skin does not suffice, we must add to it a piece of the fox’s,^[13] the most common occasions of surprise are derived from such doing, and there is no time, we say, when a commander should have a more watchful eye than that of parleys and treaties of peace; and for that reason, it is a rule echoed by all the military men of our day, that the commandant of a besieged stronghold must never himself go outside the gates to parley. In the time of our fathers, the lords of Montmord and of Assigni, who were defending Mousson against the Count of Nassau, were blamed for so doing.^[14] But yet, in this matter, he would be excusable who should manage his going out in such a way that safety and advantage would remain with him, as Count Guy de Rangon did in the city of Reggio (if we are to believe du Bellay about it, for Guicciardini says^[15] that it was he himself), when the Lord of l’Escut approached the walls to parley; for he was so far from abandoning his safe ground that, a disturbance having arisen during the negotiation, not only did Monsieur de l’Escut and his soldiers, who had come out with him, find themselves the weaker party, so that Alessandro Trivulzio was killed, but he himself was forced, as the safest course, to follow the count, and, upon faith in his word, to seek shelter in the town.

(b) Eumenes, in the city of Nora, being urged by Antigonus, who was besieging him, to come forth to treat with him, Antigonus alleging, after many other pretences, that it was right that he should come to him since he [Antigonus] was the greater and stronger, — having made this noble response: “I shall never deem any man greater than myself so long as my sword is mine,” — did not consent to come out until Antigonus had given him, at his demand, his own nephew, Ptolomeus, as a hostage.^[16] (a) It is indeed true that there have been others who have found it very advisable to go out on the word of the assailant: witness Henry de Vaux, a knight of Champagne, who being besieged in the Castle of Commercy, and Barthelemy de Bonnes, who commanded the besiegers, having from outside caused the greater part of the castle to be mined, so that nothing was needed, to bury the besieged under the ruins, but to fire the train — he summoned the said Henry to come out to parley with him for his own advantage, which he did, with three others; and his certain destruction being made plain to his own eyes, he perceived himself to be deeply indebted to his enemy, by whose direction, after he and his troop had surrendered, the mine being fired, and the wooden props giving way, the castle was destroyed from roof to cellar.^[17]

(b) I readily trust to the word of another, but I should be slow to do so when it could be thought that I had done it more from despair and lack of courage, than in freedom of spirit and from confidence in his loyalty.

1. Entregets d’accord. See Livy, XLII, 43.
2. The following passage, down to the line from the Æneid, “Dolus an,” etc., was substituted in the edition of 1595 for the following reading of 1580-1588: Si est-ce que le Senat Romain, à qui le seul advantage de la vertu sembloit moyen juste pour acquerir la victoire, trouva cette pratique laide et deshonneste, n’ayant encores ouy sonner à ses oreilles cette belle sentence: —
3. See Plutarch, Life of Pyrrhus.
4. See Idem, Life of Camillus.
5. See Livy, XLII, 43, for the whole story. The addition of the edition of 1595 is almost a literal translation.
6. What matters it whether cunning or courage be used against an enemy? — Virgil, Æneid, II, 390.
7. Montaigne did not take this remark from Polybius, but from the Politiques of Justus Lipsius, V, 17.
8. A conscientious and wise man must know the only true victory to be that which is won without the violation of good faith and honour. — Florus, I, 12,6. This quotation, also, Montaigne took, not from the original, but from the same page of Lipsius.
9. Let us test by valour whether all-powerful Fortune wills that you or that I shall reign, or what she brings us. — Ennius, in Cicero, De Officiis, I, 12.
10. Si à pleine bouche.
11. Goulard, Histoire du Portugal, XIV, 16.
12. See Giovanni Villani, Cronica, VI, 75.
13. See Plutarch, Life of Lysander.
14. See Mémoires du Bellay, I, 22.
15. Guicciardini, IV; du Bellay, I, 29. Guicciardini was governor of Reggio.
16. See Plutarch, Life of Eumenes.
17. See Froissart, I, 209.