Kesler v. Department of Public Safety of Utah/Dissent Black

by Hugo Black

United States Supreme Court

369 U.S. 153

Kesler  v.  Department of Public Safety of Utah

 Argued: Oct. 10, 1961. --- Decided: March 26, 1962

Mr. Justice BLACK, with whom Mr. Justice DOUGLAS concurs, dissenting.

I agree that this case was properly heard by a three-judge District Court but dissent from the Court's holding that Utah may, through its Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, enforce the payment of a judgment already discharged under the Federal Bankruptcy Act. Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act provides that 'discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts,' ^[1] and this Court has held that a tort judgment, such as that against appellant, arising out of an automobile accident, is a provable debt within the meaning of that section. ^[2] Despite this provision, however, the Court upholds a Utah law which expressly provides that 'A discharge in bankruptcy following the rendering of any * * * judgment (arising out of an automobile accident) shall not relieve the judgment debtor' of his obligation to pay that judgment as a condition of avoiding permanent cancellation of his driving license. ^[3] The effect of enforcement of the Utah law against this appellant is to deny him the federal immunity given by § 17 of the Bankruptcy Act an effect which makes the law of Utah rather than the law of Congress 'The supreme Law of the Land.' This is true because the plain and inevitable effect of the Utah statutory scheme is to create a powerful weapon for collection of a debt from which this bankrupt has been released by federal law. And particularly where, as here, the bankrupt's very livelihood depends upon his retaining a driver's license, he has no real choice under this Utah statute but to make arrangements to pay his judgment creditor to avoid permanent loss of his license. That, of course, means that he must agree to pay the very debt from which he was discharged by the bankruptcy proceeding, and that he must forego the very benefits for which Congress passed the Bankruptcy Act. It also means that a Utah automobile-accident judgment creditor will be given a decided advantage over all other creditors suffering loss from the bankruptcy in that only he can prove his claim, share in the distribution of the bankrupt's estate and still, at the same time, retain the power to force the bankrupt to pay the rest of his claim.

This action of the State, which takes away the benefits conferred on the bankrupt by Congress in § 17 of the Bankruptcy Act and gives special privileges to one class of creditors, cannot, in my judgment, be justified by reference to any 'complicated demands of our federalism.' There are plenty of ways for the States to protect their highways from reckless and irresponsible drivers without running roughshod over immunities that the United States, acting through a specifically granted, exclusive federal power, has chosen to give its citizens. But even if there were not such ways, I see no reason why the Court is not required to settle this conflict between Utah law and federal law in the way that the Constitution requires all such conflicts to be decided-that is, by a simple application of the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution. The Court chooses instead to uphold the law of Utah on the basis of its previous decision in Reitz v. Mealey, ^[4] a decision which I thought then and still think now to be wrong even on the much narrower statute which was sustained on much narrower grounds in that case. If this case involved the same kind of limited statute upheld in Reitz I could acquiesce on the ground that the settled construction of a federal statute should not ordinarily be disturbed. ^[5] I can see no justification, however, for expanding the holding in that case so as to uphold this statute which makes a far more serious state encroachment upon immunities granted by discharge in federal bankruptcy proceedings. ^[6]

The Bankruptcy Act serves a highly important purpose in American life. Without the privileges it bestows on helplessly insolvent debtors to make a new start in life, many individuals would find themselves permanently crushed by the weight of obligations from which they could never hope to remove themselves and the country might, therefore, be deprived of the value of the endeavors of many otherwise useful citizens who simply would have lost their incentive for constructive work. I cannot agree with a decision which leaves the States free-subject only to this Court's veto power-to impair such an important and historic policy of this Nation as is embodied in its bankruptcy laws. I therefore respectfully dissent.

Notes

1. 11 U.S.C. § 35, 11 U.S.C.A. § 35.
2. Lewis v. Roberts, 267 U.S. 467, 45 S.Ct. 357, 69 L.Ed. 739.
3. Section 41-12-15 of the Utah Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, Utah Code Ann., 1953.
4. 314 U.S. 33, 62 S.Ct. 24, 86 L.Ed. 21.
5. Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 74 S.Ct. 78, 98 L.Ed. 64. See also James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 230-235, 81 S.Ct. 1052, 1061-1063, 6 L.Ed.2d 246 (separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part).
6. Cf. United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236, 75 S.Ct. 259, 99 L.Ed. 290; Still v. Norfolk & Western R. Co., 368 U.S. 35, 82 S.Ct. 148, 7 L.Ed.2d 103.