Leavenworth Lawrence and Galveston Railroad Company v. United States/Dissent Field

by Stephen Johnson Field

United States Supreme Court

92 U.S. 733

Leavenworth Lawrence and Galveston Railroad Company  v.  United States

MR. JUSTICE FIELD, with whom concurred MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE and MR. JUSTICE STRONG, dissenting.

I do not agree with the majority of the court in this case. In my judgment, the land in controversy passed by the grant of Congress to the State of Kansas, and by the patents of the State to the defendant. In reliance upon the title conferred, a large portion of the money was raised with which the road of the company was built. I cannot think that the legislation of Congress, and the subsequent at ion in conformity to it of the Department of the Interior and of the State of Kansas, deceived both company and creditors.

The act of Congress appears to me to be singularly plain and free from obscurity. 'There be and is hereby granted to the State of Kansas,' are the words used, for the purpose of aiding in the construction of a railroad and telegraph between certain places, alternate odd sections of land along each side of the road and its branches. These words were sufficiently comprehensive to pass whatever interest the United States possessed in the lands. If there were any limitation upon their operation, it lay either in the character of the property granted, as lands in the occupation of Indian tribes, or in the subsequent reservations of the act.

The road with which the present company is concerned was to be constructed through the tract situated in the southern part of the State, known as the Osage reservation. Upon this tract the Osage tribes of Indians resided under the treaty of June 2, 1825, by which the tract was reserved to them so long as they might choose to occupy it. 7 Stat. 240. The fee of the land was in the United States, with the right of occupation, under the treaty, in the Indians. Until this right was relinquished, the occupancy could not be disturbed by any power except that of the United States. The only right of Indian tribes to land anywhere within the United States is that of occupancy. Such has been the uniform ruling of this court; and upon its correctness the government has acted from its commencement. In Fletcher v. Peck, which was here as long ago as 1810, it was suggested by counsel on the argument that the power of the State of Georgia to grant did not extend to lands to which the Indian title had not been extinguished; but Mr. Chief Justice Marshall replied, that the majority of the court were of opinion that the nature of the Indian title, which was certainly to be respected until legitimately extinguished, was not such as to be absolutely repugnant to seisin in fee on the part of the State. 6 Cranch, 121, 142, 143.

In Clark v. Smith, 13 Pet. 200, decided many years afterwards, Mr. Justice Catron, speaking of grants made by North Carolina and Virginia of lands within Indian hunting-grounds, said that these States 'to a great extent paid their officers and soldiers of the Revolutionary war by such grants, and extinguished the arrears due the army by similar means. It was one of the great resources that sustained the war, not only by these States, but others. The ultimate fee encumbered with the Indian right of occupancy was in the crown, previous to the Revolution, and in the States of the Union afterwards, and subject to grant.'

And in the recent case of the United States v. Cook, where replevin was brought for timber cut and sold by Indians on lands reserved to them, the court said that the fee of the land was in the United States, subject only to a right of occupancy in the Indians; that this right of occupancy was as sacred as that of the United States to the fee; but it was 'only a right of occupancy,' and 'that the possession, when abandoned by the Indians, attaches itself to the fee without further grant.' 19 Wall. 593.

It would seem, therefore, clear that there was nothing in the character of the land as an Indian reservation which could prevent the operation of the grant of Congress, subject to the right of occupancy retained by the Indians; so that, when this right should be relinquished, the possession would inure to the grantee.

It is true that the United States, acting in good faith, could only acquire the reliquishment of the Indian right of occupancy by treaty; and so the authors of the bill for the grant understood. The representative of Kansas in the Senate of the United States, by whom the bill was introduced, preceded its presentation with a notice of his intention to introduce at the same time a bill for extinguishing the Indian title in Kansas, and the removal of the Indians beyond her border. The two bills were introduced within a few days of each other; and both became a law on the same day. The one for the extinguishment of the Indian title was incorporated into the appropriation bill, and authorized the President to enter into treaty for that purpose with the several tribes of Indians then residing in the State, and for their own removal beyond its limits. Pursuant to this authority, a treaty was subsequently made with the Osage Indian tribes; and, before the line of the road of the defendant company was definitely fixed, their right of occupancy to the lands in controversy was extinguished.

I proceed to the next inquiry: Was there any thing in the reservations of the act which limited the operation of the general words of grant? There were two reservations in the act,-one general and the other special, the latter being in the proviso. The general reservation only excepted from the operation of the grant lands which, at the time the line of the road and its branches was definitely fixed, were sold or reserved, or to which the right of pre-emption or homestead settlement had then attached.

The sections granted could only be ascertained when the route of the road was established; but, as this might take years, the government did not in the mean time withhold the lands from settlement and sale upon any notion that the route might possibly pass through or near them. It kept the lands generally open to the settler or pre-emptor, and subject at all times to appropriation for public uses; and the object of the general reservation mentioned was to provide for the possible acquisition of interests in this way to lands falling within the limits of the grant. When they did so fall, other lands in their place were to be selected. It was only when the route was definitely fixed that the right of sale or settlement or reservation ended, and the title previously floating attached to the land subject to the grant. This was the construction adopted by the land department, and was the one which most fully fitted in with the general policy of the government in other cases in the disposition of the public lands.

In 1856 the question arose before the Department of the Interior as to the construction of a similar provision in the act of Congress of May 15 of that year, granting lands to the State of Iowa, and was submitted to the then attorney-general, Cushing; and he replied that the act contemplated that the United States should retain power to convey within all the possible limits of the grant, either by ordinary sale or on pre-emption, up to the time when the lines or routes of the road were definitely fixed. 8 Op. Att'y-Gen. 246.

Whilst the operation of the grant may, on the one hand, be thus limited by what occurs subsequent to the act, it may, on the other hand, be enlarged by subsequent removal of existing impediments; such as reservations, contracts of sale, and initiatory steps for acquiring rights of pre-emption and homestead settlement. The question in either case respects the condition of the land at the time the line or route of the road is definitely fixed. If a previous reservation, whether existing before the act of made afterwards, be then relinquished, or a previous contract of sale or right of pre-emption or homestead settlement be then abandoned, the grant will, in my judgment, take the land. Such I understand to be the ruling of the land department; and it is difficult to perceive any reasons of public policy which should prevent the land in such cases from passing under the grant.

The special reservation contained in the proviso to the act in terms applies only to lands reserved to the United States. There have been, from the outset of the government, reservations of lands for public uses of various kinds, through which a right of way for a public highway or railroad might well be granted, subject to the approval of the President, who would see that the property was not injured. To protect lands thus situated, or lands reserved to the government for similar pb lic purposes, the proviso applied. The lands now in controversy, occupied by the Osage Indians, were set apart to them: they were not reserved to the United States in any sense in which those terms can be properly used.

The treaty of 1825, under which the lands were held, distinguishes between reservations to the Indians and reservations to the United States, and speaks of both in the same article (art. 2).

The argument of the majority of the court on this head appears to me to defeat itself. The proviso, it is contended, excluded from the operation of the grant any of the lands occupied by the Indians: it would have been a great breach of faith, it is said, to apply the grant to any of those lands. But at the same time, it is admitted that the act contemplated a right of way through those lands for the road. It is difficult to perceive how taking the lesser quantity of the land for a right of way, if done without treaty, could have been any less a breach of faith; and, if done by treaty, the taking might as well have extended to the whole lands. As the Congress which made the grant also authorized the President to obtain an extinguishment of the right of occupancy from the Indians, it would seem that there ought not to be any greater reproach in providing for the acquisition of the lands, than in providing for the acquisition of the right of way.

But, aside from this consideration, if the conclusion were at all doubtful, which I do not think it is, there is a rule applicable to the construction of provisos in a grant, which should determine the question here; and that is, that they must be strictly construed. In United States v. Dixon, Mr. Justice Story stated, that it was 'the general rule of law, which has always prevailed and become consecrated almost as a maxim in the interpretation of statutes, that where the enacting clause is general in its language and objects, and a proviso is afterwards introduced, that proviso is construed strictly, and takes no case out of the enacting clause which does not fall fairly within its terms. In short, a proviso carves special exceptions only out of the enacting clause; and those who set up any such exception must establish it as being within the words as well as within the reason thereof.' 15 Pet. 165. I submit confidently that the proviso here thus construed would not take the lands in controversy out of the enacting clause of the act.

The proviso itself is a formula used in nearly all land-grants; and is inserted out of abundant caution, even where there are no special reservations on which it can operate. But in this case there was the military reservation at Fort Gibson, which would have passed under the grant but for the proviso.

There is, then, in my judgment, nothing in the reservations contained in the act which should prevent the operation of the granting words upon the lands within the Osage reservation. But, were there any doubt whether the act was intended to cover these Indian lands, that doubt would be removed by the recognition of the grant in the treaty with the Indians and the subsequent legislation of Congress. The treaty was adopted on the 29th of September, 1865. Stat. 687, 692. It provided that, in consideration of the sale of the lands, the United States should pay $300,000, to be placed to the credit of the Indians in the treasury of the United States; and should pay interest thereon in money, clothing, provisions, and such articles of utility as the Secretary of the Interior might from time to time direct. And it declared, as originally drawn, that the lands should be surveyed and sold as public lands are surveyed and sold under existing laws. But, when the treaty was under consideration by the Senate, it was amended in this particular, so as to conform to the act granting the lands to Kansas. That act provided that the alternate sections reserved from the grant, within ten miles of the road or its branches, should be sold at double the minimum price of the public lands. The amendment inserted i the treaty added, immediately after the provision for the survey and sale under existing laws, the words 'including any act granting lands to the State of Kansas in aid of the construction of a railroad through said lands;' so that the provision required that the sale of the lands of the Osage Indians should be made in accordance with existing laws, including among them the one granting lands to Kansas. Here is a clear recognition that that act was intended to cover the Indian lands. This recognition was not limited merely to the senate; for the attention of both houses of Congress was called to the subject by the appropriation which the treaty required and Congress made.

Again: in January, 1871, Congress passed an act authorizing the company, for the purpose of improving its route and accommodating the country, to relocate any portion of its road south of the town of Thayer, within the limits of its grant as prescribed by the act of Congress. The town of Thayer was situated within the boundaries of the Osage lands. The act also declared, that the company should not thereby-that is, by the relocation change, enlarge, or diminish the land-grant; and this declaration is held by the majority of the court to destroy the effect of the act as a recognition of the grant of the Indian lands. How it does so I am unable to see. When it declares that the company may alter its road south of a particular point within the limits of its grant, the act does admit that the company has a grant, and that the grant lies south of that point; and this admission is not affected by the further declaration that the company shall not thereby change, enlarge, or diminish the grant.

But I will not pursue the subject further. The conclusion reached by the court appears to me to work great injustice. The government of the United States, through one set of its officers, after mature deliberation and argument of counsel, has issued its certificates or lists, that the lands in controversy were covered by the grant, and has thus encouraged the expenditure of millions of money in the construction of a public highway, by which the wilderness has been opened to civilization and settlement; and then, on the other hand, after the work has been done and the money expended, has, with another set of officers and all the machinery of the judiciary, attempted to render and has succeeded in rendering utterly worthless the titles it aided to create and put forth upon the world. Such proceedings are not calculated, in my judgment, to enhance our ideas of the wisdom with which the law is administered, or of the justice of the government.

I am of opinion that the decree should be reversed.

Notes