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Lindsey v. Normet/Dissent Brennan

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4419768Lindsey v. Normet — Dissent BrennanWilliam J. Brennan
Court Documents
Case Syllabus
Opinion of the Court
Dissenting Opinions
Douglas
Brennan

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting in part.


In my view the District Court erred in declining to apply the doctrine of abstention with respect to the availability of defenses in FED actions.[1] The issue [p91] is whether Oregon would violate the Fourteenth Amendment if its substantive view in some circumstances recognized a tenant's rights to withhold rent and retain possession based on the landlord's breach of duty to maintain the premises, but its procedural law would not permit assertion of those rights in defense of an FED action. This constitutional issue is ripe for decision if, and only if, Oregon law (1) recognizes substantive rights of the tenant based on the landlord's brach of duty; (2) recognizes, because of such breach, that a tenant may remain in possession while withholding rent during the term or may hold over after expiration of the term, and (3) excludes the assertion of these rights to continued possession as a defense to an FED action.

The Court's opinion exposes the fallacy of the District Court's conclusion that Oregon law is "clear" and that "[i]t is unlikely that an application of state law would change the posture of the federal constitutional issues." App. 73. For the Court cites Oregon decisions that have recognized certain equitable defenses in FED actions, ante, at 66 n. 11, and can only conjecture that the defenses appellants sought to raise are "apparently" not in this category. We cannot confidently say, therefore, how the Oregon courts would treat appellants' defenses, if available at all, when asserted in an FED suit, or how, if those defenses are available in FED suits, the Oregon courts would apply the requirement of a trial no later than six days after service of process. Clearly, therefore, the Oregon law is susceptible of a "construction by the state courts that would avoid or modify the constitutional question." Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 249 (1967); Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970). In these circumstances the District Court should have remitted appellants to the Oregon courts for an authoritative interpretation of Oregon law in [p92] these respects before adjudicating appellants' plainly nonfrivolous constitutional attacks upon the FED Statute.

I would vacate the judgment of dismissal and remand with direction to the District Court (1) to enter judgment declaring that the double-bond requirement of Ore. Rev. Stat. § 105.160 violates the Equal Protection Clause, and (2) to retain jurisdiction and reinstate the temporary restraining order conditioned on the payment of rent into the escrow account, provided appellants, within a time fixed by the District Court, institute appropriate proceedings in the Oregon courts to obtain an authoritative interpretation of the FED Statute with respect to defenses available in actions thereunder.


  1. Abstention on the double-bond provision is not required in light of the Oregon Supreme Court's decision in Scales v. Spencer, 246 Ore. 111, 424 P. 2d 242 (1967). I agree with the court that this provision violates the Equal Protection Clause.