Lynch v. Household Finance Corporation/Dissent White
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, dissenting.
I agree with the Court that federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 is not limited to the adjudication of personal rights and if the disposition of this case turned solely on that issue I would without reservation join in the majority opinion. But I cannot agree either with the approach that the majority takes to the [p557] anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, or its conclusion that the statute does not bar this suit. I do not mean to suggest that appellants' due process attack on the Connecticut garnishment statute is not substantial. It obviously is. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). Nevertheless, in my view, appellants should be required to press their constitutional attack in the state courts.
In Connecticut, garnishment or attachment is one method of beginning a lawsuit. Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 52-329; 1 E. Stephenson, Connecticut Civil Procedure 156-157, 232-237 (2d ed. 1970). Of course, the requisite personal service upon a defendant is necessary to obtain in personam jurisdiction, Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 52-54, as well as to secure an effective garnishment, Stephenson, supra, at 244, but as a matter of right in certain kinds of civil actions a plaintiff may simultaneously garnish a defendant's bank account and serve a summons upon the defendant, together with a complaint stating the nature of the underlying action. Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 52-329. A state court obtains jurisdiction of the action and of questions concerning the garnishment when return of process is made to that court. Stephenson, supra, at 67. Garnishment is "ancillary to the main action for damages and cannot exist without such action." Id., at 143. Its purpose, as the majority notes, is to secure property that will thus be made available for the satisfaction of a judgment. Ibid. A writ of garnishment may be issued by a judge of the court of jurisdiction, Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 52-89 (Supp. 1969), but because garnishment in Connecticut, unlike most other States, is a matter of right and requires no prior judicial determination, the writ may also be issued by a court clerk or licensed attorney. Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 51-85. In either [p558] case, the matter is accomplished simply by completing a form.
Appellant Lynch brought this federal action to enjoin the garnishment more than seven months after the writ had been executed, the summons and complaint served, process returned, and the case docketed in Connecticut court. At the earliest moment that a federal injunction could have issued the state court proceeding was well under way. Despite this, the majority purports to sever the garnishment from the action that underlies it. The Court reasons that Connecticut garnishment is not a proceeding in state court because it is carried out by private parties not acting pursuant to a court order. Ante, at 554-555.
If the majority means that garnishment is a severable matter, independent of the main suit and for that reason outside of § 2283, then I would suppose it permissible for a federal court to enjoin any garnishment or attachment, whether obtained at the inception of a lawsuit, while it is in progress, or after judgment and for the purpose of execution. This approach to the anti-injunction statute, articulated in Simon v. Southern R. Co., 236 U.S. 115, 124-125 (1915) was, I thought, laid to rest in Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393, 403, (1935), where the Court construed "proceedings in any court of a State" comprehensively and as embracing
"all steps taken or which may be taken in the state court or by its officers from the institution to the close of the final process. It applies to appellate as well as to original proceedings; and is independent of the doctrine of res judicata. It applies alike to action by the court and by its ministerial officers; applies not only to an execution issued on a judgment, but to any proceeding supplemental or [p559] ancillary taken with a view to making the suit or judgment effective." (Footnotes omitted.)
The Court today embarks on quite a different course and rejects not only Hill v. Martin but also a substantial body of federal court of appeals law to the effect that § 2283 bars federal court interference with execution on state court judgments. E.g., Manufacturers Record Publishing Co. v. Lauer, 268 F. 2d 187 (CA5), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 913 (1959); Furnish v. Board of Medical Examiners of California, 257 F. 2d 520 (CA9), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 882 (1958); Norwood v. Parenteau, 228 F. 2d 148 (CA8 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 955 (1956).[1]
The Court also suggests that § 2283 is inapplicable here because no Connecticut court authorized the garnishment. Its view apparently is that a federal injunction would therefore not interfere with state court processes. Until now, however, it has been reasonably clear that § 2283 cannot be avoided by the simple expedient of enjoining parties instead of judges. Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 309 U.S. 4, 9 (1940). Moreover, the Court's rationale proves too much. Contrary to the views expressed in Hill v. Martin, supra, state court ministerial officers could be enjoined at any time and for any purpose in the course of a litigation and without regard to § 2283. In addition, parties to state court litigation could be enjoined from performing any one or all of the tasks essential to the orderly progress of litigation so long as the acts in question are not carried out pursuant to court order. Depositions of parties and witnesses, interrogatories to parties, and subpoenas for witnesses are commonly [p560] pursued without resort to a judge. Are these and other functions not performed under court order now subject to attack in federal court at the option of the offended state court litigant?
Today's decision will, I fear create confusion by making the applicability of § 2283 turn on rules that are difficult to apply. The potential for conflict between state and federal courts will increase and the price for judicial errors will be paid by litigants and courts alike. The common sense of the matter, it seems to me, is that the garnishment at issue here is part and parcel of a state court proceeding now under way. Garnishment in Connecticut may be characterized as separate from the underlying action, but it is nonetheless a proceeding and derives its legitimacy from the suit it accompanies. At the time this federal action was brought, return of process had long since been completed and the state court had acquired jurisdiction of a straightforward cause of action, including questions of the legitimacy and constitutionality of the garnishment.
It also seems to me that, quite apart from § 2283, today's holding departs from such casts as Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951), and Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971), which counsel against atomizing state litigation by enjoining, for example, the introduction of illegally obtained evidence, as well as from the more general admonitions of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); and Perez v. Ledesma, supra, against improvident exercise of a federal court's equitable powers to frustrate or interfere with the operations of state courts by adjudicating federal questions that are involved in state court litigation and which can be adjudicated there. As the Court said in Stefanelli, if such interventions were to be permitted, "[e]very question of procedural due process [p561] of law—with its far-flung and undefined range—would invite a flanking movement against the system of State courts by resort to the federal forum, with review if need be to the Court, to determine the issue." 342 U.S., at 123. Such resort, if permitted, "would provide ready opportunities, which conscientious counsel might be bound to employ, to subvert the orderly, effective prosecution of local crime in local courts." Id., at 123-124.
Appellee Barrett invokes Younger and companion cases as a ground for affirming the judgment of the District Court. Of course, those cases involved federal injunctions against state criminal proceedings, but the relevant considerations, in my view, are equally applicable where state civil litigation is in progress, as is here the case.[2]
I would affirm the judgment of the court below.
Notes
[edit]- ↑ Some confusion persists whether a federal court may, consistently with § 2283, enjoin the operation of a state court judgment procured by fraud. See C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts 179-181 (2d ed. 1970). That question is not presented here.
- ↑ I thus would affirm whether or not 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is an exception to the bar of § 2283. That question is at issue in Mitchum v. Foster, No. 70-27, now sub judice.