Lytle v. Arkansas (63 U.S. 193)/Dissent McLean

by John McLean

United States Supreme Court

63 U.S. 193

Lytle  v.  Arkansas

Mr. Justice McLEAN and Mr. Justice CLIFFORD dissented.

I dissent from the opinion of the court, as now expressed, and shall refer to the former opinion, to show the nature of the case:

'After the refusal of the receiver to receive payment for the land claimed, an act was passed, 14th July, 1832, continuing the act of the 29th May, 1830, and which specially provided that those who had not been enabled to enter the land, the pre-emption right of which they claimed, within the time limited, in consequence of the public surveys not having been made and returned, should have the right to enter such lands, on the same conditions in every respect as prescribed in said act, within one year after the surveys shall be made and returned. And this act was in full force before Governor Pope selected said lands. That the public surveys of the above fractional sections were made and perfected on or about the 1st of December, 1833, and returned to the land office the beginning of the year 1834. On the 5th of March, 1834, the complainant paid into the land office the sum of $135.76 1/4, in full for the above-named quarter section.'

That a certificate was granted for the same, 'on which the receiver endorsed, that the northwest fractional quarter section two was a part of the location made by Governor Pope in selecting 1,000 acres, adjoining the town of Little Rock, granted by Congress to raise a fund for building a court-house and jail for the Territory; and that the endorsement was made by direction of the Commissioner of the General Land Office.' 'That the register of the land office would not permit the said fractional quarter sections to be entered.'

It appeared that 'the patentees in both of said patents, at the time of their application to enter the lands, had both constructive and actual notice of the right of Cloyes, and that the present owners of any part of these lands had also notice of the right of the complainants.'

In his dissenting opinion, Judge Catron says: 'The proof of occupancy and cultivation was made in April, 1831, under the act of 1830, pursuant to an instruction from the Commissioner of the General Land Office having reference to that act. The act itself, the instruction under its authority, and the proofs taken according to the instruction, expired and came to an end on the 29th May, 1831. After that time, the matter stood as if neither had ever existed; nor had Cloyes more claim to enter from May 29, 1831, to July, 1832, than any other villager in Little Rock.'

Now, although it may be true that, until the act of 1832 had passed, the act of 1830 having expired, the pre-emptive right of Cloyes could not be perfected, yet the policy of the law was, where vested rights had accrued, which, by reason of delays in the completion of surveys, could not be carried out, the Government gave relief by extending the law. And the inchoate right was secured by the policy of the Government. It is therefore not strictly accurate to say, the party entering a pre-emption has no right. He has a right, recognised by the Government, by which he is enabled to perfect his right; and, under such circumstances, no new entry could interfere with a prior one, though imperfect.

This court say, the proof of the pre-emption right of Cloyes being entirely satisfactory to the land officers, under the act of 1830, there was no necessity of opening and receiving additional proof under any of the subsequent laws. The act of 1830 having expired, all rights under it were saved by the subsequent acts. No steps which had been taken were required again to be taken.

Did the location of Governor Pope, under the act of Congress, affect the claim of Cloyes? On the 15th of June, 1832, one thousand acres of land were granted, adjoining the town of Little Rock, to the Territory of Arkansas, to be located by the Governor. This selection was not made until the 30th of January, 1833. Before the grant was made by Congress of this tract, the right of Cloyes to a pre-emption had not only accrued, under the provisions of the act of 1830, but he had proved his right, under the law, to the satisfaction of the register and receiver of the land office. He had, in fact, done everything he could do to perfect this right. No fault or negligence can be charged to him.

'By the grant to Arkansas, Congress could not have intended to impair vested rights. The grants of the thousand acres and of the other tracts must be so construed as not to interfere with the pre-emption of Cloyes.'

From the citations above made in the original opinion in this case, the following facts and principles of law are too clear to admit of doubt by any one:

1. That Cloyes's pre-emption to fractional quarter section No. 2 was clearly established, by the judgment of the land officers and of this court.

2. That the location of Governor Pope, being subsequent to the right of Cloyes, could not affect, under the circumstances, that right, and that the conveyance was subject to it. This appears by the certificate of the land office, by the uniform action of the Government in all such cases, and the good faith which has characterized the action of Government, in protecting pre-emption rights, by giving time to protect such right, where the Government officers had failed in doing their duty. And in addition to these considerations, in the solemn declaration of this court, 'that Congress could not have intended to impair vested rights.' And the court say, 'the grants of the thousand acres and of the other tracts must be so construed as not to interfere with the pre-emption of Cloyes.'

This court say, 'The Supreme Court of the State, in sustaining the demurrers and dismissing the bill, decided against the pre-emption right claimed by the representatives of Cloyes; and as we consider that a valid right as to the fractional quarter on which his improvement was made, the judgment of the State court was reversed.'

'Now, the defendants demurred to the original bill, which they had a right to do, and rest the case on the demurrer's appearing on the face of the bill. But this court held Cloyes's right valid, and consequently reversed, on this head, the judgment of the State court. And the cause is transmitted to the State court for further proceeding before it, or as it shall direct on the defence set up in the answers of the defendants, that they are tona fide purchasers of the whole or parts of the fractional section in controversy, without notice, and that that court give leave to amend the pleadings on both sides, if requested, that the ments may be fully presented and proved, as equity shall require.'

Now, it is perfectly clear that nothing was transmitted under the derection of this court to the State court, except the latter part of the sentence beginning, 'and the cause is transmitted to that court,' &c. And that part relates wholly to the inquiry whether the defendants were bona fide purchasers of the whole or parts of the fractional section in controversy. And for this purpose, leave was given to amend the pleadings. If there is anything in this bill which afforded any pretence to the State court to open the pleadings, and examine any matters in the bill, except those specified in its close, it has escaped my rotice.

It is said in the bill, 'the register and receiver were constituted, by the act, a tribunal to determine the right of those who claimed pre-emptions under it. From their decision no appeal was given. If, therefore, they acted within their powers, as sanctioned by the commissioner, and within the law, the decision cannot be impeached on the ground of fraud or unfairness; it must be considered final.'

The court here was speaking of its own powers of jurisdiction and investigation, and not the powers of any other tribunal. It was supposed that no superior court would willingly permit its judicial powers to be subverted, new parties made, new subjects introduced, and the whole proceedings reversed, at the will of an inferior jurisdiction, without the exercise of a controlling power.

This State record of Arkansas seems to have been a prolific source of controversy, as its proportions have grown to about a thousand pages, not including briefs and statements of facts. It certainly must require some skill in legislation, to draw into the State court so large an amount of business under the laws of Congress. And it may become a matter of public concern, when such a mass of judicial action is not only thrown into the State court, but new rules and principles of action are liable to be sanctioned, in disregard of the laws of the United States.

Without any authority, it does appear that the judgment of the Supreme Court has been reversed by the Arkansas court, its proceedings modified in disregard of its own judgments and opinions clearly expressed, and new rules of proceedings instituted and carried out; and this under an authority given to the Arkansas court to ascertain whether certain purchases had been made bona fide.

Cloyes, in his lifetime, by his own affidavit, and the affidavits of others, made proof of his settlement on, and improvement of, the above fractional quarter, according to the provisions of the act, to the satisfaction of the register and receiver of said land district, agreeably to the rules prescribed by the Commissioner of the General Land Office; on the 20th May, 1831, Hartwell Boswell, the register, and John Redman, the receiver, decided that the said Cloyes was entitled to the pre-emption right claimed. 'On the same day, he applied to the register to enter the northwest fractional quarter of section two, containing thirty acres and eighty-eight hundredths of an acre.' But the register very properly decided that Cloyes could only be permitted to enter the fraction on which his improvement was made.

The Commissioner of the General Land Office, and the register and receiver, declare they were satisfied with the proof made in the case; but the Supreme Court of Arkansas decided against the pre-emption right claimed by the representatives of Cloyes; and the Supreme Court of the United States say, 'as we consider that a valid right as to the fractional quarter on which the improvement was made, the judgment of the State court is reversed.'

How does this case now stand? It stands reversed upon our own records by the Supreme Court of Arkansas, and by no other power. A majority of this bench entered the judgment, as it now stands, in 1849. But, through the reforming process, of a record of a thousand pages, not including notes and statements of facts, it has become a formidable pile, enough to fill with despair the first claimant of the pre-emption right.

It is true, the cause was sent down for a special purpose, every word of which I now copy:

'And the cause is transmitted to that court (the Supreme Court of Arkansas) for further proceedings before it, or as it shall direct, on the defence set up in the answers of the defendants, that they are bona fide purchasers of the whole or parts of the fractional sections in controversy, without notice, and that that court give leave to amend the pleadings on bothsides, if requested, that the merits of the case may be fully presented and proved, as equity shall require.'

Several of the defendants alleged they were bona fide purchasers of a part or the whole of the fraction, without notice; and the object in sending the case down was to enable persons to show they were purchasers of this character. This did not necessarily involve fraud. And this embraces the whole subject of inquiry.

It would have been inconsistent for this court to say, we consider the pre-emption claim by the representatives of Cloyes as a valid right, as to the fractional quarter on which his improvement was made, and on that ground to reverse the judgment of the State court, and at the same time send the case down, open to the charge of fraud and every conceivable enormity. The object was to know who were purchasers without notice. That this was the intention of the Supreme Court, is palpable from the language of the entry.

The majority of the Supreme Court had full confidence in the validity of Cloyes's claim, and consequently they reversed the judgment of the State court, leaving the question open, whether the defendants were purchasers without notice. It may be that this entry would have protected all the purchasers.

From the nature of pre-emption rights, it is presumed, a person desirous of such a right is the first applicant. And the proof of such a right, if sustained by the register and receiver and the Commissioner of the Land Office, the proof required, is deemed satisfactory. It is only where a fortunate selection appears to be made, by the prospect of a city, or some great local advantage is anticipated, that a contest arises as to such a claim.

The officers of the land department, whose peculiar duty it was to protect the public rights, seemed to have discharged their duty to the satisfaction of the Government. This was also entirely satisfactory to a majority of the judges of this court, with the single exception, that, from the answers, it was probable that there may have been purchasers of this right without notice. And from the evidence introduced, it would seem to have been considered that any one who at any time desired to purchase, considered himself as having a right to complain, although he had no means to make the purchase, or had no desire to make it.

If I mistake not, evidence was heard from witnesses from twenty to twenty-five years after the pre-emption right was sanctioned by the Government. Such a course tends greatly to embarrass land titles under the general land law. Every one knows that a man who endeavors to obtain a pre-emption, must, in the nature of things, be a man of limited means, and incapable of maintaining an expensive suit at law; and it has always appeared to me the true policy to limit those questions to the land department of the Government. At all events, that they should be limited to the Federal tribunals, where, it may be presumed, the land department will have an uniform administration.

As this case now stands, I think the judgment of the Arkansas Supreme Court must be reversed on two grounds:

1. Because it has reversed the judgment of this court, entered by a majority of the members at December term, 1849, in these words: 'The Supreme Court of the State, in sustaining the demurrers and dismissing the bill, decided against the pre-emption claimed by the representatives of Cloyes; and as we consider that a valid right, as to the fractional quarter on which his improvement was made, the judgment of the State court is reversed.'

This is the judgment of this court as it now stands upon our docket. And

2. The judgment of the State court must be reversed, because it wholly disregarded the directions of this court in trying the issues transmitted to it.