Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades/Chapter 4

by John Banks Wilson

CHAPTER 4

 

The Aftermath of World War I

 

I think that the work of this Board was undertaken so soon after the close of hostilities that the members were unduly influenced by the special situation which existed during our participation in the World War.

General John J. Pershing^[1]

 

The abrupt end of World War I and the immediate demand for demobilization threw the Army into disarray, but out of the disorder eventually came a new military establishment. Between the armistice in November 1918 and the summer of 1923 the Army occupied a portion of Germany, demobilized its World War I forces, helped revise the laws regulating its size and structure, and devised a mobilization plan to meet future emergencies. Amid the turmoil Army officers analyzed and debated their war experience, arguing the merits of a large, powerful infantry division designed to penetrate an enemy position with a frontal assault versus a lighter, more mobile unit that could outmaneuver an opponent. The cavalry division received a similar but less extensive examination. After close scrutiny, the Army adopted new infantry and cavalry divisions and reorganized its forces to meet postwar conditions.

 

Occupation and Demobilization

Hostilities ended on 11 November 1918, but the Army still had many tasks to perform, including the occupation of the Coblenz bridgehead on the Rhine River. For that purpose, Maj. Gen. Joseph T. Dickman, at the direction of General Pershing, organized the Third Army on 15 November. Ten U.S. divisions eventually served with it—the 1st through 5th, 32d, 42d, 89th, and 90th in Germany and the 33d in Luxembourg—as well as the French 2d Cavalry Division. Also elements of the 6th Division began moving toward the bridgehead in later April 1919, but that movement was halted in early May. Divisional missions included the administration of civil government, the maintenance of public order, and the prevention of renewed aggression.^[2]

The divisional structure proved unsatisfactory for the military government role. Its organization could not mesh with the civil government of Germany, and the Third Army lacked the time and expertise needed to mature a uniform civil affairs program. Furthermore, assigned areas for the divisional units shift

American occupation troops cross the Rhine at Coblenz, Germany, January 1919.

ed rapidly as divisions departed the bridgehead for the United States. Yet, under the terms of occupation, the entire bridgehead had to remain under American supervision. By the summer of 1919 American divisions had left for home, and the military government functions moved from the tactical units to an area command, the Office of Civil Affairs. With the departure of the divisions, only brigade-size or smaller units remained in Germany, and they too departed by January 1923.^[3]

As the Third Army grappled with occupation duty, officials in Washington confronted the problem of demobilizing the wartime army. On 11 November 1918 a quarter of a million draftees had been under orders to report for military duty. With the signing of the armistice the War Department immediately halted the mobilization process, but it had no plans for the Army's transition to a peacetime role.^[4]

One man, Col. Casper H. Conrad of the War Plans Division, had begun to study demobilization, and he submitted his report eleven days after the armistice. From Conrad's several proposals on disbanding the forces, Chief of Staff March decided to discharge soldiers by units rather than by individuals. Because National Guard and National Army divisions originally had geographical ties, he also ruled that units returning from overseas would be demobilized at the centers nearest to where their men had entered the services.^[5]

Demobilization began in November 1918. March first disbanded the partially organized divisions in the United States, making their camps available as dis

1st Field Artillery Brigade, 1st Division, on occupation duty in Germany, August 1919

charge centers. In January 1919 Pershing sent home the divisions that had been skeletonized or had performed replacement functions. Combat divisions followed, beginning with the 92d, the Army's only black division. A year after the armistice the Army had demobilized fifty-five of its sixty-two divisions, including all the National Guard and National Army units (Table 7). Before the units left service, the War Department gave the American people the opportunity to show their appreciation to the men who had fought in the war. Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington held divisional parades and over five hundred regiments marched through the streets of their hometowns.^[6]

After November 1919 only the 1st through the 7th Divisions and a few smaller units remained active. All were Regular Army units. These divisions retained their wartime configurations, but personnel authorizations for fiscal year 1920 prevented full manning. Divisional regiments had the strengths prescribed in the prewar tables of organization issued on 3 May 1917, and the ammunition, supply, and sanitary trains had only enough men to care for their equipment. Within only a year, the mighty combat force the Army had struggled to build during 1917–18 had vanished without any plans to replace it.^[7] The helter-skelter pace of demobilization and the lack of any sound transitional planning greatly undermined efforts to create an effective peacetime force. A student of demobilization, Frederic L. Paxon, characterized this situation as worse than a "madhouse in which the crazy might be incarcerated. They were at large."^[8]

TABLE 7

Demobilization of Divisions

Division	Returned to U.S.	Demobilized	Camp/Location
1st	September 1919		Zachary Taylor, Ky.
2d	August 1919		Travis, Tex.
3d	August 1919		Pike, Ark.
4th	August 1919		Dodge, Iowa
5th	July 1919		Gordon, Ga.
6th	June 1919		Grant, Ill.
7th	June 1919		Funston, Kans.
8th*	September 1919	September 1919	Dix, N.J.
9th	#	February 1919	Sheridan, Ala.
10th	#	February 1919	Funston, Kans.
11th	#	February 1919	Meade, Md.
12th	#	February 1919	Devens, Mass.
13th	#	March 1919	Lewis, Wash.
14th	#	February 1919	Custer, Mich.
15th	#	February 1919	Logan, Tex.
16th	#	March 1919	Kearny, Calif
17th	#	February 1919	Beauregard, La.
18th	#	February 1919	Travis, Tex.
19th	#	February 1919	Dodge, Iowa
20th	#	February 1919	Sevier, S.C.
26th	April 1919	May 1919	Devens, Mass.
27th	March 1919	April 1919	Upton, N.Y.
28th	April 1919	May 1919	Dix, N.J.
29th	May 1919	May 1919	Dix, N.J.
30th	April 1919	May 1919	Jackson, S.C.
31st	December 1918	January 1919	Gordon, Ga.
32d	May 1919	May 1919	Custer, Mich.
33d	May 1919	June 1919	Grant, Ill.
34th	January 1919	February 1919	Grant, Ill.
35th	April 1919	May 1919	Funston, Kans.
36th	June 1919	June 1919	Bowie, Tex.
37th	April 1919	June 1919	Sherman, Ohio
38th	December 1918	January 1919	Zachary Taylor, Ky.
39th	December 1918	January 1919	Beauregard, La.
40th	March 1919	April 1919	Kearny, Calif.
41st	February 1919	February 1919	Dix, N.J.
42d	May 1919	May 1919	Dix, N.J.
76th	December 1918	January 1919	Devens, Mass.
77th	April 1919	May 1919	Upton, N.Y.
78th	June 1919	June 1919	Dix, N.J.
79th	May 1919	June 1919	Dix, N.J.
80th	May 1919	June 1919	Lee, Va.
81st	June 1919	June 1919	Hoboken, N.J.
82d	May 1919	May 1919	Upton, N.Y.
83d	January 1919	October 1919	Sherman, Ohio
84th	January 1919	July 1919	Zachary Taylor, Ky.
85th	March 1919	April 1919	Ouster, Mich.
86th	January 1919	January 1919	Grant, Ill.
87th	January 1919	February 1919	Dix, N.J.
88th	June 1919	June 1919	Dodge, Iowa
89th	May 1919	July 1919	Funston, Kans
90th	June 1919	June 1919	Bowie, Tex.
91st	April 1919	May 1919	Presidio of San Francisco, Calif.
92d	February 1919	February 1919	Meade, Md.
93d@
95th	#	December 1919	Sherman, Ohio
96th	#	January 1919	Wadsworth, N.Y.
97th	#	December 1918	Cody, N.Mex.
98th	#	November 1918	McClellan, Ala.
99th	#	November 1918	Wheeler, Ga.
100th	#	November 1918	Bowie, Tex.
101st	#	November 1918	Shelby, Miss.
102d	#	November 1918	Dix, N.J.

---

Notes:	*	Only part of the division overseas.
	#	Did not go overseas.
	@	Provisional division, headquarters demobilized in France in May 1918.

 

The AEF Evaluates World War I Divisional Organizations

Although rapid demobilization destroyed the Army's combat effectiveness, military and congressional leaders wanted to avoid what they considered the major mistake made after every earlier war—the loss of well-trained, experienced, combat soldiers. Notwithstanding that World War I was to have been "the war to end all wars," perceived international realities required that the nation be prepared for war. Both Congress and the War Department had been considering changes in the National Defense Act, and Brig. Gen. Lytle Brown, Chief of the War Plans Division, suggested that March obtain the AEF's views on the new Army establishment. He suspected that division, corps, and army organizations used in the "Great War" might not meet future battlefield requirements because they were tied so closely to trench warfare, a type of warfare he thought unlikely to recur.^[9]

Under War Department orders, Pershing set up boards in France to examine the AEF experiences with the arms and services and to draw appropriate lessons for the future. At his staff's suggestion, he also convened the Superior Board to review the other boards' findings. In April Pershing relieved Dickman as the commander of Third Army and appointed him and other senior officers to the review board. All its members had close professional ties to Pershing and had witnessed from various positions the "success" of the heavy infantry division during the war. The board's primary mission was an examination of that infantry division. After a two-month investigation, the Superior Board tendered its recommendation, basically endorsing the World War I square division with modifications. Changes centered on improvements in combat and service support, firepower, and command and control.^[10]

5th Field Artillery troops at the 1st Division parade, September 1919

Changes in command and control touched all divisional echelons. The board recommended headquarters detachments for artillery and infantry brigades along with larger staffs. Because the ammunition train served primarily with the artillery brigade, it proposed making the train an organic element of that unit but serving both artillery and infantry troops. Similarly, the board members believed that the engineer train should be a part of the engineer regiment. Following the principle of placing resources under the control of those who used them, the board wanted to drop the machine gun battalion from the infantry brigade and place a machine gun company in each infantry battalion. The board members believed that only when the infantry commander had his own machine gun company could he learn to handle it properly. For training in mass machine gun fire, the board advised that the companies assemble occasionally under a brigade machine gun officer. It also advocated the retention of a divisional machine gun officer and a divisional machine gun battalion to provide a reserve for barrage or mass fire.

The board regarded the rear area division train headquarters and the accompanying military police as unnecessary. When needed, the division commander could appoint an officer to command the rear elements. The military police could become a separate company. The war had disclosed complex communication problems, particularly in the use of radios, but no uniform signal organization existed. To overcome that defect, the board advised that a closer examination of divisional signal needs be conducted with consideration given to dividing them along functional lines.

Turning to firepower, the Superior Board recommended the elimination of ineffective weapons and the addition or retention of effective ones. Based on wartime experience, the 6-inch mortar battery in the field artillery brigade was deleted and a howitzer company added to the infantry regiment. The infantry was to continue to use 37-mm. guns and 3-inch Stokes mortars temporarily, but eventually howitzers were to replace the mortars. The board found that mortars lacked mobility, accuracy, and range and were difficult to conceal and supply. The board looked upon tractor-drawn artillery pieces as a success in combat and felt that retention of motorized artillery was appropriate if future wars were fought in countries having an extensive road net like that in France. For flexibility, however, the board advised that one 75-mm. gun regiment remain horse-drawn and the other be motor-drawn, along with a motorized 155-mm. howitzer regiment. They decided that the new weapon, the tank, used during the war to break up wire entanglements and to reduce machine gun nests, belonged to the infantry, but instead of assigning tank units to the division, the officers placed them at army level. Tanks could then be parceled out to divisions according to need.

The board also addressed the combat support needs of the division. Since the division routinely employed aircraft for artillery observation, liaison, registration of fire, and reconnaissance, the board suggested the addition of an air squadron, a balloon company, a photographic section, and an intelligence officer to the division. The board endorsed the addition of a litter battalion to the sanitary train to improve medical support and the elimination of all horse-drawn transportation from that unit and from the rest of the division, except for artillery. Because engineers had often been used as infantry in combat, some board members proposed reducing the number of engineer troops. The board concluded, however, that while engineers often had been employed as infantry, this practice stemmed from a failure to understand their role. It advised the retention of the engineer regiment.

Summarizing the requirements for the future infantry division, the Superior Board recommended that it be organized to meet varying combat and terrain conditions encountered in maneuver warfare but have only those elements that it customarily needed. The army corps or army level would supply infrequently used organizations. The board's report endorsed a square division that numbered 29,000 officers and enlisted men—an organization "imbued with the divisional spirit, sense of comradeship and loyalty, that will guarantee service … in critical moments when the supreme effort must be made."^[11]

Although Pershing had not employed a cavalry division in France, the Superior Board also examined its structure in light of Allied experiences, particularly in Italy and Palestine. The board concluded that, except for distant reconnaissance by airplanes, the missions of mounted troops—screening, shock action, and tactical reconnaissance—remained important on the postwar battlefield. To conduct such missions, the cavalry division needed to capitalize on its mobility and firepower. Finding the 1917 unit of 18,000 men too large, the board entertained two proposals for reorganizing it. One called for a division of three cavalry regiments, an artillery regiment, and appropriate combat and service support units; the other comprised two cavalry brigades, each with two cavalry regiments,

Superior Board members. Left to right, Maj. Gens. Joseph T. Dickman, John L. Hines, and William Lassiter, Col. George R. Spalding, Brig. Gen. William Burtt, and Col. Parker Hitt.

and a machine gun squadron, an artillery regiment, and auxiliary units. The board rejected the three-regiment unit because it eliminated a general officer billet, recommending instead a square cavalry division of some 13,500 men.

The Superior Board completed its work on 1 July 1919, but Pershing held the report to consider its findings. He did not forward it to the War Department until almost a year later.^[12]

 

Development of Divisions Under the 1920 National Defense Act

Although Pershing temporarily shelved the Superior Board Report, Congress and the War Department proceeded to explore postwar Army organization. On 3 August 1919, Secretary Baker proposed a standing army of approximately 500,000 men and universal military training for eighteen- and nineteen-year-old males. With that number the department envisaged maintaining one cavalry and twenty infantry divisions. March testified that before 1917, when the Army was stationed at small, scattered posts, officers had no occasion to command brigades or divisions or gain experience in managing large troop concentrations. Under the proposed reorganization, officers would have the opportunity to command large units and to train combined arms units, thus correcting a major weakness of past mobilizations.^[13]

After much debate Congress amended the National Defense Act on 4 June 1920, providing for a new military establishment but scuttling the unpopular universal military training proposal. Instead it authorized a Regular Army of 296,000 officers and enlisted men, a National Guard of 435,000 men, and an Organized Reserve (Officers Reserve Corps and Enlisted Reserve Corps) of unrestricted size. To improve mobilization the law required that the Army, as far as practical, be organized into brigades, divisions, and army corps, with the brigades and divisions perpetuating those that had served in the war. The new law replaced the old territorial departments with corps areas, which assumed the tasks of administering and training the Army. Each corps area was to have at least one National Guard or Organized Reserve division. Corps areas were to be combined into army areas for inspection, mobilization, maneuver, and demobilization. Rather than mandating the structure of regiments as in the past, Congress authorized the number of officers and enlisted men for each arm and service and instructed the president to organize the units. To advise on National Guard and Organized Reserve matters, Congress directed the formation of committees with members from the Regular Army and both reserve components.^[14]

On 1 September 1920, the War Department established the general outline of the postwar Army. It consisted of three army areas divided into nine corps areas (Map 1). Each army area supported one Guard and two Reserve cavalry divisions, and each corps area maintained one Regular, two Guard, and three Reserve infantry divisions, all to be sustained by combat support and combat service support units to be perfected later.^[15]

Six committees of the War Plans Division developed the postwar Army. Only one, however, the Committee on Organization, dealt directly with the structure of the division through the preparation of organizational tables. Until that work was completed, no realistic calculation of future military requirements could be made. The other committees defined the roles of the National Guard and the Organized Reserves, estimated the number of Regular Army personnel required to train and administer them, established manning requirements for foreign garrisons, determined the number of regulars needed for an expeditionary force, and fixed the distribution of the Regular Army in the United States to meet strategic and training considerations.^[16]

The Committee on Organization prescribed a 23,000-man square division patterned after the unit of World War I. Seeking comments from beyond the confines of the General Staff, Col. William Lassiter of the War Plans Division sent the tables to the commandants of the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia; the General Service Schools at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and the General Staff College in Washington, D.C., as well as to General Pershing's AEF headquarters in Washington.^[17]

Faced with the possibility of having a decision made without his views being considered, on 16 June Pershing finally forwarded the Superior Board report along with his comments about the infantry division, which differed substantially Map 1 from the board's findings, to Baker. In comments prepared mostly by Col. Fox Conner, Pershing suggested a 16,875-man division having a single infantry brigade of three infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, a cavalry squadron, and combat support and combat service support units, a design that foreshadowed the triangular division the Army adopted for World War II.^[18]

Pershing felt the Superior Board undertook its work too soon after the close of hostilities and that its report suffered unduly from the special circumstances on the Western Front. After examining all organizational features, he concluded that no one divisional structure was ideal for all battlefield situations. Factors such as the mobility and flexibility of the division to meet a variety of tasks, the probable theater of operations, and the road or rail network available to support the division had to be weighed. The most likely future theater of war for the Army was still considered to be North America, and he believed that the infantry divisions employed in France were too unwieldy and immobile for that region. Therefore, he recommended a small mobile division.^[19]

According to Pershing, specific signposts marked the path to a smaller division, among them putting infrequently used support units at the army corps or army level, organizing the divisional staff to handle needed attached units, making a machine gun company an integral part of the infantry battalion, and providing horse- or mule-drawn vehicles throughout the division because of the poor roads in the United States. Summarizing the requirements for the infantry division, he wrote: "The division should be small enough to permit its being deployed from … a single road in a few hours and, when moving by rail, to permit all of its elements to be assembled on a single railroad line within twenty-four hours; this means that the division must not exceed 20,000 as maximum."^[20]

On 18 June representatives from the General Staff and Pershing's headquarters conferred to iron out the differences between the two positions. The conference failed to reach agreement. Therefore, at Baker's direction, a special committee met to solve this organizational issue.^[21]

Like the Superior Board, the Special Committee, commonly referred to as the Lassiter Committee, drew upon the talents of former AFT officers. From the General Staff, besides Colonel Lassiter, came Lt. Col. Brunt H. Wells, Maj. John W. Gulick, and Capt. Arthur W. Lane. Majs. Stuart Heintzelman and Campbell King represented the General Staff College; Maj. Hugh A. Drum, the General Services Schools; and Col. Charles S. Farnsworth, the Infantry School. Col. Fox Conner and Capt. George C. Marshall spoke for Pershing. Except for Farnsworth, who had commanded the 37th Division during combat, all had held army corps, army, and General Headquarters staff positions where they had gained firsthand knowledge about the operation of divisions and higher commands in France. In addition, Wells had helped draft the initial proposal for the square division adopted during the war; Conner had been a French interpreter for the General Staff in 1917 when the proposal was prepared; and Heintzelman had edited General Pershing's report of operations in France.^[22]

Meeting between 22 June and 8 July 1920, the committee examined three questions: Was the World War I division too large? If so, should the Army adopt a smaller division comprising three infantry regiments? Finally, if a division of four infantry regiments were retained, could it be reduced to fewer than 20,000 men, a figure acceptable to Pershing?^[23]

The committee reviewed all previous divisional studies and recommendations; acquainted itself with views held by officers of the General Staff, departments, and operating services of the Army about divisions; and investigated the views about them developed at the service schools since the end of the war. Approximately seventy officers appeared before the committee, including Col. William (Billy) Mitchell of the Air Service and Brig. Gen. Samuel D. Rochenback, the former chief of the Tank Corps, who testified about two new weapon systems used in the war—the airplane and the tank.^[24]

From the evidence, the committee concluded that the wartime infantry division was too large and unwieldy. In reality it had been an army corps without the proper organization. The division's size made moving the unit by road and railroad or passing through lines an extremely complex and time-consuming process. Furthermore, its size had complicated the problems of command and control of all activities in combat.^[25]

The committee examined various organizational options. The argument for three (versus four) infantry regiments in the division centered on the division's probable area of employment, North America. Experts deemed another war in Europe unlikely, and they doubted that the Army would again fight on a battlefield like that seen in France. They felt technological advances in artillery, machine guns, and aviation made obsolete stabilized and highly organized lines and flanks resting on impassable obstacles, such as those encountered on the Western Front. Future enemies would most likely organize their forces in great depth; therefore, the Army had to be prepared to overcome that challenge.

Nevertheless, the committee believed a division of four infantry regiments, although lacking the flexibility of Pershing's suggested unit, would have the necessary mobility and striking power. Divisional support troops needed to be reduced, but the retention of the square division preserved the organizations for army corps and armies that had been developed during the war. Because most officers were familiar with those units, no change in doctrine was required above the division level. On a more mundane level, the retention of general officers' billets also influenced those who wanted to keep the square division. Its brigades required brigadier generals, which allowed officers to rise from second lieutenants to general officers within their specialties, while a smaller triangular division would terminate that progression at the colonel level. Concluding its examination, the committee decided a field commander could more readily modify the square division to oppose a lesser enemy than strengthen a smaller organization to fight a powerful foe.^[26]

The third question remained: Could the Army reduce the size of the square division to increase mobility? Recommendations to achieve this included a reduction in the number of platoons in the infantry company from four to three and a cut in the number of companies in the battalion by a like amount, a realignment of the ratio between rifles and machine guns, elimination of the 155-mm. howitzers, and the removal of unnecessary support troops. The division could obtain additional troops from pools of combat support and service units located at the army corps or army level. The Lassiter Committee concluded that the square division could be cut in size yet retain much of its firepower.^[27]

After making its report, the Lassiter Committee prepared tentative tables of organization for the division, which March approved on 31 August. When the War Department distributed the draft tables in the fall of 1920 for the division, it totaled 19,385 officers and enlisted men (Chart 5) and covered about thirty miles of road space in march formation. To arrive at that strength and size, each of the four infantry regiments lost 700 men. The regiment consisted of three infantry battalions and supply, howitzer, and headquarters companies. Each battalion included one machine gun company and three rifle companies. The assignment of a machine gun company to each infantry battalion simplified command and control of those weapons, and the realignment of the guns created a substantial saving in personnel. Machine gun units were eliminated from the infantry brigades, and the divisional machine gun battalion was replaced by a tank company, which was to serve as a divisional mobile reserve. The committee endorsed Pershing's suggestion of a divisional tank company but was aware that a single company could not mount an effective attack on a stabilized front; the large numbers of tanks required for that type of operation would have to come from the army level. The committee dropped the 155-mm. howitzer regiment but stipulated its return to the division when these weapons acquired the necessary mobility for use on the North American continent. The engineer regiment and train were combined and reorganized initially as a battalion because the planners thought that the division had little need for large numbers of engineers in mobile warfare, which precluded building extensive fortifications, trenches, and similar works. The chief of engineers and others, however, insisted that the regiment be retained to assure mobility, permit training of lieutenant colonels and colonels, and provide the opportunity for higher grade officers to serve at least one year in five with troops. March thus decided to retain the engineer regiment but reduced its number from 1,831 officers and enlisted men to 867. All these changes husbanded personnel spaces and increased mobility without lessening firepower.^[28]

Substantial reductions also took place in divisional services. The committee cut the size of the ammunition train from 1,333 to 169 officers and enlisted men and changed its mission to serve only the field artillery brigade. Ammunition resupply for all other divisional elements shifted to the tactical units and quartermaster train. That train consisted of half motorized and half animal-drawn transportation, presuming the potential theater of operations to be the rugged North American continent. Ordnance personnel formerly

CHART 5—Infantry Division, 7 October 1920

¹ Division headquarters detachment absorbed 27 April 1921 by the division headquarters company.
² On 20 April 1921 the motorcycle company was moved to the trains and the service company added to special troops.

attached to the various regiments and the mobile repair shop were grouped in an ordnance company, centralizing all ordnance maintenance. A signal company replaced the signal battalion, and it assumed responsibility for message traffic between division and brigade headquarters. Within the infantry and field artillery regiments, men from the combat arms were to handle all communications. The new division abandoned the train headquarters and military police organization, following the recommendation of the Superior Board, but retained a separate military police company. Given the many small separate companies in its structure (division headquarters, signal, tank, service, ordnance, and military police), the division included a new organization, headquarters, special troops, to handle their administration and discipline.

The committee substituted a medical regiment for the sanitary train and revamped health services. Three hospital companies replaced the four used during the war, and the number of ambulance companies in the regiment was similarly reduced. In addition, a sanitary (collecting) battalion comprising three companies corrected the need for litter-bearers, who had previously been taken from combat units. Veterinarians, formerly scattered throughout the division, now formed a veterinary company. A laboratory section, a supply section, and a service company completed the new regiment. Despite the innovations, the regiment fielded about the same number of men as its World War I counterpart.^[29]

Attesting to the greater depth envisaged for the battlefield, an air squadron of thirteen airplanes was to serve as the reconnaissance unit for the division. As under the wartime configuration, units for ground reconnaissance were to be attached as needed.^[30]

Although the committee's infantry division was larger than that contemplated in Pershing's proposal, the planners believed it had only those organic elements necessary for immediate employment under normal conditions. In an emergency, the new division could be quickly adjusted to meet an enemy armed with inferior arms and equipment. The problem the planners tried to address was how to design a division to deal with superior forces without significantly modifying it. The committee's division, nevertheless, had its opponents. Conner and Marshall of Pershing's staff still preferred the smaller triangular division for its mobility and ease of command and control. Years later Marshall recalled that if Heintzelman and King had not been such "kindly characters," the triangular division would have been adopted instead of Drum's large division.^[31]

The question arises why Pershing, after becoming chief of staff on 1 July 1921, failed to replace the infantry division with one more compatible with his concept of battlefield mobility. Marshall pointed out later that the basic recommendation for retaining the square infantry division came from his own officers, the Superior Board. To disavow their advice would have been an embarrassment. Furthermore, by July 1921 the reorganization of the divisions had already begun. To undo so much work would have been unrealistic and would have implied a lack of leadership within the Army. Therefore, the square infantry division stood with the understanding that it might be modified to deal with a particular enemy.^[32]

The Lassiter Committee apparently devoted little attention to the cavalry division and recorded less about its rationale for retaining the unit. Mobility and firepower dominated the new organization. The Cavalry Journal, the official organ for the arm, had repeatedly condemned the 1917 organization as an absurdity. Burdened with more than 18,000 men and 16,000 animals, the division was too large and cumbersome. It required a preposterous amount of road space, roughly thirty miles, and was incapable of maneuver because it lacked an efficient communication system.^[33]

The postwar cavalry division, approximately two-fifths the size of its predecessor, abandoned the three-brigade structure (Chart 6). It included two cavalry brigades (two cavalry regiments and one machine gun squadron each), one horse artillery battalion, and combat and service support units. Each cavalry regiment consisted of two squadrons (of three troops each), a headquarters and headquarters troop and a service troop. Initially the committee desired a third squadron to train men and horses, which represented a major investment in time and money. March denied the request because the Army was to maintain training centers. Unlike the infantry, which incorporated the machine gun into the regiment, cavalry maintained separate machine gun squadrons of three troops each because of the perceived immobility of such weapons compared with other divisional arms. A headquarters for special troops was authorized, under which were placed the division headquarters troop, a signal troop, an ordnance maintenance company, and a veterinary company. All transportation was pack- or animal-drawn, except for 14 cars, 28 trucks, and 65 motorcycles scattered throughout various headquarters elements in the division. Without trains, the division measured approximately 6.5 miles if the men rode in columns of twos. The Army chief of staff approved the new cavalry division on 31 August 1920.^[34]

After approving both types of divisions, March directed the preparation of final tables of organization. When published the following year, the infantry division fell just below Pershing's recommendation of 20,000, numbering 19,997 officers and enlisted men. The cavalry division totaled 7,463.^[35]

As the War Plans Division prepared the new tables, it also developed tables for understrength peacetime units because the Army's leadership did not expect to be able to maintain the number of men authorized under the National Defense Act. These tables were designed so that the units could expand without having to undergo reorganization. The peacetime infantry division was thus cut to 11,000 with all elements retaining their integrity except the division headquarters and military police companies, which were combined. The peacetime cavalry division strength was set at 6,000. But severe cuts in the War Department's budget made it impossible initially even to publish the peacetime tables. Fortunately, the service journals undertook that task.^[36]

CHART 6—Cavalry Division, 4 April 1921

¹ Includes four Medical Department personnel and two Chaplains that were attached.

Reorganization of Divisions

March directed the War Plans Division to implement the tentative tables of organization he had approved. Planning for reorganization of the Army had been under way since 5 June 1920, when the War Plans Division had set up committees to carry out the provisions of the National Defense Act. Officers from the General Staff, the National Guard, and the Organized Reserves helped formulate the plans.^[37]

One committee, originally charged with defining the missions of the National Guard and the Organized Reserves, widened its task to encompass the Regular Army. The committee delineated four missions for the regulars: form an expeditionary force in an emergency; furnish troops for foreign and coastal defense garrisons; provide personnel to develop and train the reserve components; and supply the administrative overhead of the Army. The National Guard's dual missions remained unchanged. It contributed to the federal forces during national emergencies or war and supplied the states with forces to maintain law and order and cope with local disasters. The mission of the Organized Reserves was to expand the Army during war or national emergencies. Because of the strong antiwar sentiment after World War I, the expense of maintaining large numbers of enlisted men, the lack of training facilities, and the possible adverse effect on the recruitment for the Guard, units of the Organized Reserves were to have only officers and enlisted cadres. After a declaration of war or national emergency, the remainder of the enlisted men would come from voluntary enlistments or the draft.^[38]

Another committee looked into the number of divisions that could be organized and supported during peacetime. Given a Regular Army of 296,000 officers and enlisted men, the committee determined that the War Department could maintain nine infantry divisions (one per corps area), three cavalry divisions (one per army area), and one infantry brigade of black troops in the United States. Of these divisions, one cavalry and three infantry divisions were to be ready for war while the others were to be at reduced strength. This arrangement evenly distributed the expeditionary forces throughout the nation and provided an infantry division to serve as a model for the reserves within each corps area.^[39]

In view of the great personnel turbulence caused by the rapid demobilization, the committee recommended that the Regular Army quickly rebuild its seven existing infantry divisions to meet the strength in the new peacetime tables and permit the units to conduct realistic training. The other two planned infantry divisions could be organized after the first seven had reached their reduced strength level, and when all nine attained that level one or more divisions could be increased to full manning for war. How the Regular cavalry divisions were to be formed remained unaddressed. With 486,000 men in the National Guard, the committee envisioned forming eighteen Guard infantry divisions, two for each corps area, and three or more Guard cavalry divisions, at least one for each army area. For the Organized Reserves, twenty-seven infantry divisions were contemplated, three per corps area, and three or more cavalry divisions, at least one for each army area.^[40]

When March approved the structure of infantry and cavalry divisions, he also sanctioned the formation of divisions based on that report. Instead of three Regular Army cavalry divisions, he saw a need for only two. The Army's mobilization base would thus be fifty-four infantry divisions and eight or more cavalry divisions.^[41]

Reorganization of the Regular Army began in late 1920 as the infantry elements of the 1st through 7th Divisions began to adopt the new peacetime tables. In the 2d Division a Regular Army infantry brigade, the 4th, replaced the Marine Corps unit that had been attached to the division in France. As tables for other divisional units became available, they too were put into effect.^[42]

All this work quickly appeared somewhat premature. By the fall of 1921, cuts in Army appropriations indicated that the Regular Army could not support seven infantry divisions in the United States. Secretary of War John W Weeks, therefore, instituted a policy allowing inactive units to remain on the "rolls" of the Army but in an inoperable status—that is, without personnel and equipment. Congressional insistence on maintaining the tactical division frameworks to ensure immediate and complete mobilization made such arrangements necessary. Judging that nothing was wrong with the mobilization plan, but recognizing the shortage of funds for the fiscal year, Weeks directed that some units be taken "out of commission" or inactivated. The policy represented a marked departure from past Army experience. Previously, when a unit could not be maintained or was not needed, it was removed from the rolls of the Army either by disbandment or consolidation with another unit. Acting otherwise threatened to obscure the Army's reduced strength through a facade of paper units.^[43]

Nevertheless, under the new system the Army cut the divisional forces in September and October 1921 by inactivating the 4th through the 7th Divisions, except for the even numbered infantry brigade in each. These brigades—the 8th, 10th, 12th, and 14th—remained active to serve as the nuclei of their parent divisions upon mobilization. To save even more personnel, the 2d Division, programmed at wartime strength, was placed under the reduced strength tables, leaving the Army without a fully manned division in the United States.^[44]

During the summer of 1921 the General Staff turned its attention to Regular Army cavalry divisions. On 20 August the adjutant general constituted the 1st and 2d Cavalry Divisions to meet partial mobilization requirements, and the following month the commander of the Eighth Corps Area organized the 1st Cavalry Division. The headquarters of the division and its 2d Brigade were located at Fort Bliss, Texas, and that of the 1st Cavalry Brigade at Douglas, Arizona. Resources were not available to organize a second cavalry division until World War II.^[45]

The Regular Army divisions underwent postwar reorganization and reduction even before the War Department could determine their permanent stations. A committee established in June 1920 to make recommendations about posting units never submitted a report because of the unsettled size of the Regular Army. When Congress funded a Regular Army of 150,000 enlisted men for 1922, the Acting Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord, directed a new war plans group to prepare an outline for stationing these troops. If possible, he wanted units to have adequate housing and training facilities as well as to be located where the men could assist in the development of the reserve components. The recommendations called for the Second and Ninth Corps Areas each to have an infantry division, the Eighth Corps Area to have both infantry and cavalry divisions, and the remaining corps areas each to have a reinforced brigade.^[46]

As the existing divisions and brigades moved to their permanent stations in 1922, the Army organized the 16th and 18th Infantry Brigades to complete the Regular Army portion of the plan (Table 8). To fulfill mobilization requirements for nine Regular Army infantry divisions, the adjutant general also restored the 8th and 9th Divisions to the rolls in 1923, but they remained inactive except for their 16th and 18th Infantry Brigades. The stationing plan allowed the regulars to support the reserves, but only the 2d Division was concentrated at one post—Fort Sam Houston, Texas.^[47]

The last large unit recommended for the Regular Army in 1920 was a black brigade scheduled for service along the Mexican border. However, only four black regiments, two cavalry and two infantry, remained after the war, and the War Department decided that they should not be brigaded. In 1922 two of them, the 10th Cavalry and the 25th Infantry, served along the border. Of the remainder, the 9th Cavalry was stationed at Fort Riley, Kansas, the home of the Cavalry School, and the 24th Infantry was posted to Fort Benning, Georgia, where the Infantry School had been established.^[48]

The post-World War I Army also maintained forces in the Philippine Islands, China, the Panama Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, Germany, and Hawaii. To assure that these areas were adequately garrisoned, the War Plans Division examined their manning needs. Based upon its findings, March approved the formation of the Panama Canal, Hawaiian, and Philippine Divisions. In 1921 the commanders of those overseas departments organized their units as best they could from available personnel and equipment. The infantry and field artillery brigades and many of the other divisional elements had numerical designations that would be associated with the 10th, 11th, and 12th Divisions. These elements, all table of organization units, could be assigned wherever needed in the force. Because the divisions themselves were not expected to serve outside of their respective territories, they had territorial designations. The division headquarters were at Quarry Heights, Canal Zone; Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; and Fort William McKinley, Philippine Islands. Personnel for the Hawaiian and Panama Canal Divisions came from the Regular Army, but the Philippine Division was filled with both regulars and Philippine Scouts, with the latter in the majority.^[49]

Section V of the National Defense Act prescribed a committee to devise plans for organizing the National Guard divisions. Formed in August 1920, this group consisted of Regular Army and Guard officers who represented their embryonic

TABLE 8

Distribution of Regular Army Divisions and Brigades, 1922

Corps Area	Unit	Station
First	18th Infantry Brigade (9th Division)	Fort Devens, Mass.
Second	1st Division	Fort Hamilton, N.Y.
Third	16th Infantry Brigade (8th Division)	Fort Howard, Md.
Fourth	8th Infantry Brigade (4th Division)	Fort McPherson, Ga.
Fifth	10th Infantry Brigade (5th Division)	Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind.
Sixth	12th Infantry Brigade (6th Division)	Fort Sheridan, Ill.
Seventh	14th Infantry Brigade (7th Division)	Fort Omaha, Neb.
Eighth	2d Division	Fort Sam Houston, Tex.
	1st Cavalry Division	Fort Bliss, Tex.
Ninth	3d Division	Fort Lewis, Wash.

(Units in parentheses are the inactive parent organizations.)

corps areas. Within a short time the committee presented the states with a blueprint for eighteen infantry divisions. Corps area commanders were to resolve any divergent views or disputes among the states over the allotment of the units. The plan offered the states the 26th through the 41st Divisions, organized during World War I, and three new units, the 43d, 44th, and 45th Divisions, as Guard units. The 42d "Rainbow" Division was omitted because it lacked an association with any particular state or geographic area. All corps areas except the Fourth received two divisional designations. The states in the Fourth Corps Area, which had raised the 30th, 31st, and 39th Divisions during World War I, decided to reorganize the 30th and 39th Divisions. By the spring of 1921 the states had agreed on the allotment of most units in the infantry divisions, the War Department had furnished the new divisional tables of organization, and the states had begun to reorganize their forces accordingly. Between 1921 and 1935 the National Guard Bureau granted federal recognition to the headquarters of all eighteen Guard infantry divisions (Table 9). Although a few divisions lacked federally recognized headquarters until the 1930s, most of the divisional elements were granted federal recognition in the 1920s.^[50]

The historical continuity of Guard units rested upon geographic areas that supported the organizations, and during the reorganization most units adopted the designations used during World War I. Some shifting of units to new geographic areas took place, resulting in some designation changes. For example, in World War I Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi had raised the 39th Division, but when the 39th was reorganized in the postwar era Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana supported the unit. Subsequently, a joint board of Regular and Guard officers recommended that the division be renamed the 31st Division, a unit that during the war had raised troops from Florida, Alabama, and Georgia. Secretary Weeks approved the change, and on 1 July 1923 the 39th Division was replaced by the 31st Division.^[51]

The allocation and organization of the Guard cavalry divisions followed the same procedure as the infantry divisions. But in order to use all existing cavalry units, a fourth cavalry division was added to the force. In 1921 the formation of the 21st through 24th Cavalry Divisions began with the First, Second, and Third Army Areas supporting the 21st, 22d, and 24th Cavalry Divisions, respectively. The 23d was the nation's at-large cavalry division, supported by all army areas (Table 10). In a short time the divisions had the prescribed cavalry regiments and machine gun squadrons but not the majority of their support organizations.^[52]

The organization of the third component's units began in 1921 when the War Department published Special Regulations No. 46, General Policies and Regulations for the Organized Reserves. The regulations explained the procedures for administering, training, and mobilizing the Organized Reserves and provided a tentative outline for the corps area commanders to follow in organizing the units. Using the outline and a 6 April 1921 troop allotment for twenty-seven infantry divisions, corps area commanders set up planning boards to establish the units. In locating them, the boards considered the distribution and occupations of the population, attempting to station the units where they would be most likely to receive effective support. For example, a medical unit was not located in an area where there was no civilian medical facility. After determining the location of the units and giving the Guard some time to recruit, thus avoiding competition with it, officers began to organize the 76th through the 91st and the 94th through the 104th Divisions.^[53]

Recruiting the units proved to be slow. Regular Army advisers were armed with lists of potential reservists and little else. There were not enough recruiters, office space and equipment, or funds available to accomplish the work. Furthermore, a marked apathy toward the military prevailed throughout the nation. By March 1922, however, all twenty-seven infantry divisions had skeletal headquarters (see Table 9).^[54]

To complete the divisional forces in the Organized Reserves, the War Department added the 61st through the 66th Cavalry Divisions to the rolls of the Army on 15 October 1921. Corps area commanders followed the same procedures used previously for the infantry divisions in allotting and organizing them. Within a few months they too emerged as skeletal organizations (see Table 10).^[55]

Thus, in early 1923 the Army had 66 divisions in the mobilization force shared among three components—11 in the Regular Army (2 cavalry and 9 infantry), 22 in the National Guard (4 cavalry and 18 infantry), and 33 in Organized Reserves (6 cavalry and 27 infantry). In addition, three understrength

TABLE 9

Allotment of Reserve Component Infantry Divisions, 1921

Corps Area	Division	Component	Location
First	26th	NG	Massachusetts
	43d	NG	Connecticut, Maine, Rhode Island, and Vermont
	76th	OR	Connecticut and Rhode Island
	94th	OR	Massachusetts
	97th	OR	Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont
Second	27th	NG	New York
	44th	NG	New Jersey, New York, and Delaware
	77th	OR	New York
	78th	OR	New Jersey and Delaware
	98th	OR	New York
Third	28th	NG	Pennsylvania
	29th	NG	Maryland, Virginia, and District of Columbia
	79th	OR	Pennsylvania
	80th	OR	Maryland, Virginia, and District of Columbia
	99th	OR	Pennsylvania
Fourth	30th	NG	Georgia, Tennessee, North Carolina, and South Carolina
	39th	NG	Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, and Louisiana
	81st	OR	North Carolina and Tennessee
	82d	OR	South Carolina and Georgia
	87th	OR	Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama
Fifth	37th	NG	Ohio
	38th	NG	Kentucky, Indiana, and West Virginia
	83d	OR	Ohio
	84th	OR	Indiana
	100th	OR	Kentucky and West Virginia
Sixth	32d	NG	Michigan and Wisconsin
	33d	NG	Illinois
	85th	OR	Michigan
	86th	OR	Illinois
	101st	OR	Wisconsin
Seventh	34th	NG	Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, and South Dakota
	35th	NG	Nebraska, Kansas, and Missouri
	88th	OR	Minnesota, Iowa, and North Dakota
	89th	OR	South Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas
	102d	OR	Missouri and Arkansas
Eighth	36th	NG	Texas
	45th	NG	Oklahoma, Colorado, New Mexico, and Arizona
	90th	OR	Texas
	95th	OR	Oklahoma
	103d	OR	New Mexico, Colorado, and Arizona
Ninth	40th	NG	California, Nevada, and Utah
	41st	NG	Washington, Oregon, Wyoming, Montana, and Idaho
	91st	OR	California
	96th	OR	Oregon and Washington
	104th	OR	Nevada, Utah, Wyoming, and Idaho

 

TABLE 10

Allotment of Reserve Component Cavalry Divisions, 1921

Division	Component	Location
21st	NG	New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and New Jersey
22d	NG	Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, West Virginia, and Wisconsin
23d	NG	Alabama, Massachusetts, New Mexico, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin
24th	NG	Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming
61st	OR	New York and New Jersey
62d	OR	Maryland, Virginia, District of Columbia, and Pennsylvania
63d	OR	Tennessee, Louisiana, Georgia, North Carolina, Texas, Oklahoma, and Colorado
64th	OR	Kentucky, Massachusetts, Vermont, and New Hampshire
65th	OR	Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin
66th	OR	Nebraska, Missouri, Utah, and North Dakota

infantry divisions were located overseas. No separate brigades existed. In almost every case, however, these divisions, which varied from inactive units to partially manned organizations, were "paper tigers."

After World War I the Army quickly demobilized its forces, but memories of the unpreparedness of 1917 caused the nation to change the way it maintained its military forces. Infantry and cavalry divisions, rather than regiments or smaller units, became the pillars that would support future mobilization. Officers examined the structure of those pillars and adopted a modified, but powerful, square infantry division designed for frontal attack and a small light cavalry division for reconnaissance. Although the lessons of war influenced the structure of these divisions, more traditional criteria regarding their local geographical employment continued to affect their organization. But with no real enemy in sight and the nation's adoption of a generally isolationist foreign policy, it is not surprising that Congress provided neither the manpower nor the materiel to equip even a caretaker force adequately.

Notes

1. Wrapper Indorsement (Forwarding Report of A.E.F. Superior Board on Organization and Tactics), General Headquarters (GHQ, AEF, to Sec of War, 16 Jun 20, AGO 322 (4–19–19), RG 407, NARA.
2. General Headquarters, Armies, pp. 170–91; Henry T. Allen, The Rhineland Occupation (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1927), p. 13; Huidekoper, The History of the 33rd Division, 1: 257–95.
3. General Headquarters, Armies, pp. 399–404; Irwin L. Hunt, American Military Government of Occupied Germany 1918–1920 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943), pp. 76–84; Robert S. Thomas, "The United States Army 1914–1923," pt. 1, pp. XIX–48–49, Ms in Historical Resources Branch, Center of Military History, hereafter cited as DAMH-HSR.
4. Second Report of the Provost Marshal General to the Secretary of War on the Operations of Selective Service System to December 20, 1918 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1919), p. 239.
5. Rpt of the CofS, ARWD, 1919, pp. 451–52; John W. Sparrow, History of Personnel Demobilization of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1952), pp. 11–19.
6. WD Cir 77, 21 Nov 1918; Thomas, "The United States Army 1914–1923," p. XX–22; Directory of Troops, pp. 1310–16; Peyton C. March, The Nation at War (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Dorn, and Co., 1932), pp. 310–25. The New York Times Index, vol. 7, nos. 1, 2, and 3, provides a quick guide to the divisional parades.
7. Memo, Ch of Operations Branch to TAG, 12 Aug 19, sub: Retention of Divisional Organization, WPD file 8481–131, RG 165, NARA; WD GO 91, 1919.
8. Frederic L. Paxson, The Great Demobilization and Other Essays (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1941), p. 7.
9. March, The Nation at War, pp. 330–33, 336–41; Memo, WPD for Cots, 24 Feb 19, sub: Tactical organization of the division and higher tactical units, WPD 8481–116, RG 165, NARA; John McA. Palmer, "The Military Policy of the United States as Settled by Recent Law and Executive Order," lecture at the AWC, published in WD Bull 19, 1921.
10. Memo, G–5, AEF, to General Nolon, sub: Board of Review, 16 Mar 19, RG 120, NARA; Special Orders (SO) 98, AEF, 8 Apr 19, and Rpt of the Superior Board, AEF, on Organization and Tactics, AGO 320 (6–21–20), Bulky Files, RG 407, NARA. Unless otherwise indicated, the following discussion of the infantry and cavalry divisions is based on the board report. Also see reports of the various postwar AEF boards on the arms and services, which are included in the same file. See John B. Wilson, "Mobility Versus Firepower: The Post-World War I Infantry Division," Parameters 13 (Sep 1983): 48, for biographical data about the board members.
11. Rpt of the Superior Board, p. 85.
12. Wrapper Indorsement (Forwarding Report of the AEF Superior Board), 16 Jun 20. Although Pershing held the report, its recommendations were widely known by the Army Staff.
13. John Dickinson, The Building of an Army (New York: Century Co., 1922), pp. 330–34.
14. WD Bull 25, 1920.
15. WD GO 50, 1920; Memo, WPD for Dir, WPD, 10 Jul 20, sub: Committee No. 2 Report on Army Reorganization, AWC file 52–21, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. hereafter cited as MHI.
16. Memo, WPD, 5 Jun 20, sub: Committees for Working out Army Reorganization, AWC file 52–21.
17. Memo, WPD to General Staff College (hereafter cited as GSC), 14 Jun 20, sub: Army Organization, 14 Jun 20, with enclosures, Memo, WPD to GSC, 15 Jun 20, sub: Army Organization, AWC file 52–10. Pershing maintained an AEF headquarters in Washington between the time fee returned from France and the time he assumed the position of Chief of Staff, Army.
18. Wrapper Indorsement (Forwarding Report of AEF Superior Board), 16 Jun 20; Draft entitled "Notes on Organization" with Fox Conner's initials, undated, AWC file 52-21.
19. Wrapper Indorsement (Forwarding Report of AEF Superior Board), 16 Jun 20.
20. Ibid.
21. Memo WPD to GSC, 15 Jun 20, sub: Army Organization, AWC file 52-10, MH1; Memo, WPD to TAG, 21 Jun 20, sub: Special Committee on Reorganization of the Army, AGO 320 (6-21-20), RG 407, NARA.
22. Arthur W. Lane, "Tables of Organization," Infantry Journal 18 (May 1921): 489–91.
23. Arthur W. Lane, "Tables of Organization," Infantry Journal 18 (May 1921): 489–91.
24. Ibid.; Wilson, "Mobility Versus Firepower," p. 49.
25. Lane, "Tables of Organization," pp. 489–91.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.; App. 2 to Rpt of Special Committee, WPD, 8 Jul 20; Memo, CofS, 31 Aug 20, no subject, WPD file 6935-1, RG 165, Draft T/Os, 7 Oct 1920, WPD file 6935-8, RG 407, NARA; T/O, 15 Oct 1920, DAMH-HSO.
29. Lane, "Tables of Organization," pp. 489–91; App. 2 to Rpt of Special Committee, WPD, 8 Jul 20; T/O 1921, Table 1 War (W), Infantry Division, 4 May 1921.
30. T/O, 1921, Table 1 W, Infantry Division, 4 May 1921; Field Service Regulations, 1923, p. 18.
31. Lane, "Tables of Organization," pp. 489–90; Ltr, George C. Marshall to Fox Conner, 17 Jan 38, and Ltr, Marshall to William M. Spencer, 18 Mar 38, Marshall Papers, George C. Marshall Research Foundation, Lexington, Va.
32. Ltr, George C. Marshall to Walton H. Walker, 21 Dec 37, Marshall Papers.
33. Rpt of Special Committee, WPD, 8 Jul 20; "Cavalry Organization," Cavalry Journal 29 (Jul 20): 116; "Cavalry Reorganization," Cavalry Journal 30 (Jan 21): 62–63.
34. T/O 1921, Table 401 W, Cavalry Division, 4 Apr 21; Memo, GSC for Dir of Operations, 30 Jul 20, sub: Comments on report of Special Committee on Reorganization of the Regular Army, Memo, Ch of Cavalry for CofS, 10 Aug 20, sub: Comments on Recommendations of Special Committee on Reorganization of the Army, 11 Aug 20, CSC file 8481-136, RG 165, NARA; Memo, CofS, 31 Aug 20.
35. T/O, Table 1 W, Infantry Division, 4 May 21; T/O, Table 401 W, Cavalry Division, 4 Apr 21.
36. T/O, Table 1 Peace (P), Infantry Division, 1921; T/O, Table 401 P, Cavalry Division, 21; "Tables of Organization", Cavalry Journal 30 (Oct 1921): 422-15.
37. Memo, CofS, 31 Aug 20; Memo, WPD, 5 Jun 20, sub: Committees for Working out Army Reorganization, AWC file 52-21.
38. Memo, WPD for Dir, WPD, 10 Jul 20, sub: Committee Report on Army Reorganization, AWC file 52-21.
39. Ibid.; Rpt of Committee 5, appointed by Dir, War Plans Division, June 7, 1920, 30 Jul 20, John L. Hines Papers, LC.
40. Rpt of Committee 5, 30 Jul 20.
41. Memo, CofS, 31 Aug 20.
42. WD Cirs 400 and 415, 1920; GO 2, 1st Division, 1921; GO 1, 3d Division, 1921; GO 2, 4th Division, 1921; GO 10, 5th Division, 1921; GO 1, 6th Division, 1921; GO 23, 7th Division, 1921, copies of these and other divisional general orders relating to the reorganization of Regular Army units in Division General file, DAMH-HSO. Circular 400 authorized the 2d Division to be at war strength, which included its 4th Brigade.
43. WD GO 31, 1921.
44. WD GO 33, 1921; GO 19, 2d Division, 1921, Division General file, and 3d Ind, Historical Section, AWC to TAG, 15 Nov 21, 2d Inf Div file, both in DAMH-HSO.
45. Ltr, TAG to CG of all Corps Areas, 20 Aug 21, sub: Organization of the Cavalry, Cavalry Reorganization file, 1921-28, Historical Data Card, 1st Cavalry (Cav) Div, DAMH-HSO. By 30 June 1922 about 10,000 officers and enlisted men were available in the fourteen active cavalry regiments (see Annual Rpt, Sec of War, 1922, p. 305).
46. Memo, WPD, 5 Jun 20, sub: Committees for Working out Army Reorganization; Memo Operations and Training Division, G-3,/1575 for DCofS, 27 Dec 21, sub: Comments on Report of Board of GS officers relative to distribution, shelter, and training areas for the Army (basic report attached), AGO 320 file, 27 Dec 21, RG 407, NARA.
47. Ltr, TAG to CGs, all Corps Areas and Depts; Chief of Infantry; CG, American Forces in Germany; CG, Fort Benning, Ga.; and COs of Exempted Places concerned, sub: Organization and Redistribution of the Infantry, AGO Central file 1917–25, 320.2 (7-15-22) RG 407, NARA; WD GO 10, 1923.
48. Memo, WPD for Dir, WPD, 10 Jul 20, sub: Committee Report on Army Reorganization; "Brief History of the 24th Infantry," 27 Sep 26, Ms, 24th Infantry file, DAMH-HSO; Historical and Pictorial Review Second Cavalry Division, United States Army (Baton Rouge, La.: Army and Navy Publishing Co., 1941), p. 50.
49. Memo, WPD for Dir, WPD, 9 Jul 20, sub: Strength of the Foreign garrisons required and their special organization. Available troops to be considered in the connection (Report of Committee No. 3), 9 Jul 20, AWC 52-21, MHI; WD Cir 149, 1921; WD GO 15, 1921; Ltr, TAG to CG, Philippine Dept., 22 Oct 22, sub: Completion of overseas garrison, 320 (10-7-21), 12th Inf Div file, DAMH-HSO; Returns, Panama Canal, Hawaiian, and Philippine Divisions, divisional files, DAMH-HSO. The National Defense Act continued departments in the Hawaiian Islands, the Philippine Islands, and the Panama Canal Zone.
50. Memo G-3 for CofS, 14 Mar 22, sub: Basic plan for the organization of the National Guard, AGO 320 G/2253 (10-31-22) to (7-28-22), Bulky Files, RG 168, NARA; Ltr, TAG to CGs all Corps Areas, 19 Oct 20, sub: Allotment of National Guard troops, 323 (Misc. Div.); Ltr, Fourth Corps Area to TAG, 17 Nov 20, sub: Allotment of National Guard Troops; and Ltr, TAG to CG of all Corps Areas, 7 Dec 20, sub: Designation and location of units of the National Guard and the Organized Reserve, 325.344 (Misc. Div.), all Reference Files, National Guard, DAMH-HSO. The granting of federal recognition to divisional elements maybe traced through the Official National Guard Register 1931, 1936, and 1939 and state and unit records in DAMH-HSO.

    Regular Army members of the Section V committee were Col. Brunt H. Wells, Lt. Col. John W. Gulick, and Maj. William Bryden; the National Guard officers were Cols. Walter E. Bare of Alabama, Greed G. Hammond of Oregon, Milton A. Reckord of Maryland, George C. Richards of Pennsylvania, Frank M. Rumbold of Missouri, and Franklin W. War of New York; Lt. Cols. Chalmer R. Wilson of Ohio and Guy M. Wilson of Michigan; and Majs. J. Ross Ives of Connecticut and J. Watt Page of Texas.

51. Ltr., TAG to CGs of all Corps Areas, 7 Dec 20, sub: Designation and location of units of the National Guard and the Organized Reserves, Reference Files, National Guard, DAMH-HSO; Report of the Chief of the Militia Bureau, 1923, p. 11.
52. Rpt of the Chief of the Militia Bureau, 1922, pp. 24–26; Memo, WPD to TAG, 15 Feb 22, sub: Normal numerical designations of units of National Guard Cavalry Divisions, WPD 9691, AGO 325.455, and Ltr, TAG to CGs all Corps Areas, 29 Nov 21, sub: Revised Tables of normal numerical designations of units National Guard Cavalry Divisions, 325–455 (11-28-21) (Misc. Div.), Reference Files, National Guard, DAMH-HSO.
53. Special Regulations No. 46, General Policies and Regulations for the Organized Reserves, 1921; Ltr, Maj Gen John L. Hines to John J. Pershing, 26 Dec 21, John L. Hines Papers, LC; Ltr, TAG to CGs all corps areas, 24 Jun 21, sub: Normal numerical designations of infantry divisions, AG 325.455, Reference Files, Army Reserve, DAMH-HSO.

    The numbers 94, 103, and 104 were new designations, and the numbers 92 and 93 were omitted because during the war these divisions had not come from any one state or group of states. Furthermore, the 92d Division and 93d Division (Provisional) in World War I had been organized with Negro soldiers, and the department's policy was not to maintain large Negro units during peacetime.

54. Report of the Secretary of War, 1922, p. 18; Organized Reserves (infantry division notes), Reference Files, Army Reserve, DAMH-HSO. Also see Marken's notes on Organizational Data, ROAD Brigades, Brigade General Files, DAMH-HSO.
55. Ltr, TAG to CGs all Corps Areas, 15 Oct 21, sub: Numerical designations of Army and GHQ Reserve Troops, First, Second, and Third Field Armies, Organized Reserves, AG 320.2 Organized Reserves (10-21-21) (Misc. Div.), AG Reference files, 1921, DAMH-HSO.