Mathis v. United States/Dissent White

by Byron White

United States Supreme Court

391 U.S. 1

Mathis  v.  United States

 Argued: April 2 and 3, 1968. --- Decided: May 6, 1968

Mr. Justice WHITE, with whom Mr. Justice HARLAN and Mr. Justice STEWART join, dissenting.

I dissented from the Court's decision in Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), because I thought that the Court had accepted an interpretation of the Fifth Amendment having 'no significant support in the history of the privilege or in the language of the Fifth Amendment,' 384 U.S., at 526, 86 S.Ct., at 1655, and because I disagreed with the Court's 'assessment of the (new) rule's consequences measured against community values,' 384 U.S., at 537, 86 S.Ct., at 1660. I continue to believe that the decision in Miranda was an extravagant and unwise interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, and I would prefer that Miranda be abandoned, thus avoiding the reversal of this criminal conviction because of introduction at trial of statements by the petitioner that were unquestionably voluntary by traditional standards but were made without the petitioner's having received the so-called Miranda warnings.

However, even were I to agree that Miranda was correctly decided, I would not join the unexplained extention which the Court gives Miranda in this case. At issue are two questions ^[1] asked of petitioner by an Internal Revenue agent in the course of a civil investigation. The interview was indistinguishable from the thousands of inquiries into tax liability made annually as a necessary adjunct to operation of our tax system. The Court said in Miranda that 'proper safeguards' were needed for 'in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime,' 384 U.S., at 467, 86 S.Ct. at 1624. In this case the majority states that criminal investigation of Mathis began soon after the second of the visits to him of Revenue Agent Lawless. This suggests a view, unsupported by the record before us, that the civil investigation had raised suspicions of criminal conduct by Mathis at the time of this visit. ^[2] However, the majority also says that 'tax investigations frequently lead to criminal prosecutions,' a hint that any in-custody questioning by an employee of the Government must be preceded by warnings if it is within the immensely broad area of investigations which 'frequently lead' to criminal inquiries. For tunately, voluntary compliance with civil regulation is widespread in this country. Nevertheless, compliance must be supplemented and encouraged by constant and widespread investigations, during which questions are asked and data are required by employees of the Government whose goal is only to settle fairly the civil accounts between the United States and its citizens. Sometimes, of course, the possibility of a criminal violation is discovered through such inquiries. I had not thought that Miranda extended its checklist of warnings to these civil investigations. Certainly the explanation of the need for warnings given in the Miranda opinion does not cover civil investigations, and the Court's opinion in this case furnishes no additional support.

The Court is equally cavalier in concluding that petitioner was 'in custody' in the sense in which that phrase was used in Miranda. The State of Florida was confining petitioner at the time he answered Agent Lawless' questions. But Miranda rested not on the mere fact of physical restriction but on a conclusion that coercion-pressure to answer questions-usually flows from a certain type of custody, police station interrogation of someone charged with or suspected of a crime. Although petitioner was confined, he was at the time of interrogation in familiar surroundings. Neither the record nor the Court suggests reasons why petitioner was 'coerced' into answering Lawless' questions any more than is the citizen interviewed at home by a revenue agent or interviewed in a Revenue Service office to which citizens are requested to come for interviews. The rationale of Miranda has no relevance to inquiries conducted outside the allegedly hostile and forbidding atmosphere surrounding police station interrogation of a criminal suspect. The Court's willingness to reverse without explaining why the reasons given for the Miranda decision have any relevance to the facts of this case is deeply troubling.

Notes

1. Petitioner was asked whether tax returns received by the Government bearing his name had in fact been prepared by him and whether he would consent to an extension of the statute of limitations for causes of action arising from those returns.
2. A civil investigator is required, whenever and as soon as he finds 'definite indications of fraud or criminal potential,' to refer a case to the Intelligence Division for investigation by a different agent who works regularly on criminal matters. In the case before us, such a reference was made eight days after the second visit to petitioner by Agent Lawless. The criminal agent visited petitioner, gave him the full set of 'Miranda warnings,' and was told petitioner did not wish to discuss the case with him. No further questions were asked.