Mauran v. Insurance Company

by Samuel Nelson

United States Supreme Court

73 U.S. 1

Mauran  v.  Insurance Company

ERROR to the Circuit Court for Massachusetts.

Mauran brought suit in that court against the Alliance Insurance Company on a policy of insurance upon the ship Marshall for one year from the 29th November, 1860, covering the sum of $8000. The insurance, as stipulated in the body of the policy, was 'against the adventures and perils of the seas, fire, enemies, pirates, assailing thieves, restraints, and detainments of all kings, princes, or people of what nation or quality soever.'

In the margin of the policy was the following:

'Warranted by the assured free from loss or expense arising from capture, seizure, or detention, or the consequences of any attempt thereat, any stipulations in this policy to the contrary notwithstanding.'

The vessel was seized on the afternoon of the 17th of May, 1861, two or three miles inside of the bar at the mouth of the Mississippi River, on her way up to New Orleans, by the officers and crew of the steamer Music, belonging to the so-called Confederate States. Some persons on board the steamer at the time of the seizure, hoisted the Confederate flag to the mast-head of the Marshall, and informed the captain and pilot that the ship was 'a prize to the Confederate States.' Verdict and judgment having been given in favor of the insurance company, the question here on error was, whether this taking of the vessel by the naval forces of the so-called Confederate States was a capture within the warranty of the assured in the margin of the policy? If it was, then the loss was not one of the perils insured against, and the judgment below was right.

Mr. Cushing (who submitted with his own, a learned brief of Messrs. R. H. Dana, Jr., and Horace Gray, Jr., in the case of another vessel before the Supreme Court of Maine), for the plaintiff in error:

If this loss was by 'assailing thieves' or 'pirates,' then the insurers are bound to pay; for undoubtedly a taking by assailing thieves or pirates does not operate to make in law a 'capture.' Rovers, thieves and pirates have always been treated as ordinary perils of the sea. Chancellor Kent ^[1] lays down the distinction in explicit terms:

'The enumerated perils of the sea, pirates, rovers, thieves, include the wrongful and violent acts of individuals, whether in the open character of felons, or in the character of a mob, or as a mutinous crew, or as plunderers of shipwrecked goods on shore. . . . But the stipulation of indemnity against takings at sea, arrests, restraints, and detainments of all kings, princes, and people, refers only to the acts of government for government purposes, whether right or wrong.'Other writers make the same classification. ^[2] 'Taking by pirates,' says Mr. Dane, ^[3] 'has none of the effects of legal capture.'

Now, can this court, a court of the United States, treat the persons who made the seizure here otherwise than as pirates or thieves? The political department of the government, it will be conceded, has never acknowledged the rebel confederation as a government de facto, any more than one de jure. On the contrary, it is matter of common knowledge that it has most scrupulously, and in every form, avoided doing so. As to their captures of ships, it has actually treated them as 'pirates.'

The Crimes Act of 1790 ^[4] makes the taking of a vessel of the United States by rebels an act of piracy. It says:

'If any citizen shall commit any piracy or robbery aforesaid, or any act of hostility against the United States, or any citizen thereof, upon the high seas, under color of any commission from any foreign prince or state, or any pretence of authority from any person, such offender shall, notwithstanding the pretence of any such authority, be deemed, adjudged, and taken to be a pirate, felon, and robber; and on being thereof convicted, shall suffer death.'

In United States v. Wiltberger, ^[5] the court, obiter, says that the sole object of this statute was to reach a citizen of the United States who depredates on commerce of the United States under color of a foreign commission. The word 'foreign' here includes, of course, any government other than the United States, and especially a pretended government; and most especially a pretended government in rebellion against our own.

The definition of piracy by the law of nations is this:

'Depredating on the seas, without being authorized by any sovereign state, or with commissions from different sovereigns at war with each other.' ^[6]

Of course, looking to all the conditions of the rebellion, cruising by rebels who are as yet unacknowledged by anybody, even as a de facto government, would be cruising without being authorized by any sovereign, and so would be piracy by the law of nations. ^[7]

The proclamation of the President of the United States of April 19, 1861, ^[8] is explicit, as follows:

'And I hereby proclaim and declare, that if any person, under the pretended authority of said (Confederate) States, or under any other pretence, shall molest a vessel of the United States, or the persons or cargo on board of her, such person will be amenable to the laws of the United States for the prevention and punishment of piracy.'

This proclamation is fully justified by the section of the Crimes Act heretofore cited. It was in force at the time of the taking of the ship Marshall. Its applicability is recognized by successive acts of Congress, ^[9] and it was obligatory on every citizen of the United States; construing every contract made within the United States between citizens of the same.

How then can this court, a depository of the judicial power of the United States, recognize as a government of any kind, a confederation whose representatives the political department proclaims to be pirates, and who, as in the case of Smith, tried before GRIER, J., ^[10] have been tried and convicted as such.

Notes

1. 3 Commentaries, 302, note d, 6th ed.
2. Nesbitt v. Lushington, 4 Term, 783; 2 Arnould on Insurance, §§ 303, 305, 306; 1 Phillips on Insurance, §§ 1106-1108; 2 Parsons' Maritime Law, 236, 246.
3. 7 Abridgment, 92; and see 639 et seq.
4. § 9, 1 Stat. at Large, 114.
5. 5 Wheaton, 76.
6. Lawrence's Wheaton's Int. Law, 246, ed. 1863.
7. United States v. Klintock, 5 Wheaton, 144.
8. 12 Stat. at Large, 12, 58.
9. Act of 24 July, 1861, Id. 273; Act of 6 Aug., 1862, Id. 314.
10. 3 Wallace, Jr., MS.