Messages and Letters of William Henry Harrison/Tippecanoe account taken from McAfee

by William Henry Harrison and Robert McAfee

The Battle of Tippecanoe^[1] [Nov 7, 1811]

Dawson, Harrison, 204-208

McAfee, The Late War, 22 seq

On the evening of the 5th November, the army encamped at the distance of nine or ten miles from the prophet's tovn. It was ascertained that the approach of the army had been discovered before it reached Pine creek. The traces of reconnoitring parties were very often seen, but no Indians were discovered until the troops arrived within five or six miles of the town on the 6th of November. The interpreters were then placed with the advanced guard, to endeavor to open a communication with them. The Indians would, however, return no answer to the invitations that were made to them for that purpose, but continued to insult our people by their gestures. Within about three miles of the town, the ground became broken by ravines and covered with timber. The utmost precaution became necessary, and every difficult pass was examined by the mounted riflemen before the army was permitted to enter it. The ground being unfit for the operation of the squadron of dragoons, they were thrown in the rear. Through the whole march, the precaution had been used of changing the disposition of the different corps, that each might have the ground best suited to its' operations. Within about two miles of the town the path descended a steep hill, at the bottom of which was a small creek running through a narrow wet prairie, and beyond this a level plain partially covered with oak timber, and without under-brush. Before the crossing of the creek, the woods were very thick and intersected by deep ravines. No place could be better calculated for the savages to attack with a prospect of success, and the Governor apprehended that the moment the troops descended into the hollow, they would be attacked. A disposition was therefore made of the infantry, to receive the enemy on the left and rear. A company of mounted riflemen was advanced a considerable distance from the left flank to check the approach of the enemy; and the other two companies were directed to turn the enemy's flanks, should he attack from that direction. The dragoons were ordered to move rapidly from the rear and occupy the plain in advance of the creek, to cover the crossing of the army from an attack in front. In this order the troops were passed over; the dragoons were made to advance to give room to the infantry, and the latter having crossed the creek, were formed to receive the enemy in front in one line, with a reserve of three companies—the dragoons flanked by mounted riflemen forming the first line. During all this time, Indians were frequently seen in front and on the flanks. The interpreters endeavored in vain to bring them to a parley. Though sufiiciently near to hear what was said to them, they would return no answer, but continued by gestures to menace and insult those who addressed them. Being now arrived within a mile and a half of the town and the situation being favorable for an encampment, the Governor determined to remain there and fortify his camp, until he could hear from the friendly chiefs, whom he had dispatched from fort Harrison, on the day he had left it, for the purpose of making another attempt to prevent the recurrence to hostilities. These chiefs were to have met him on the way, but no intelligence was yet received from them. Whilst he was engaged in tracing out the lines of the encampment, major Daveiss and several other field officers approached him, and urged the propriety of immediately marching upon the town. The Governor answered that his instructions would not justify his attacking the Indians, as long as there was a probability of their complying with the demands of the government, and that he still hoped to hear something in the course of the evening from the friendly Indians, whom he had dispatched from fort Harrison.

To this it was observed, that as the Indians seen hovering about the army, had been frequently invited to a parley by the interpreters, who had proceeded some distance from the lines for the purpose; and as these overtures had universally been answered by menace and insult, it was very evident that it was their intention to fight; that the troops were in high spirits and full of confidence; and that advantage ought to be taken of their ardour to lead them immediately to the enemy. To this the Governor answered, that he was fully sensible of the eagerness of the troops; and admitting the determined hostility of the Indians, and that their insolence was full evidence of their intention to fight, yet he knew them too well to believe, that they would ever do this, but by surprise, or on ground which was entirely favorable to their mode of fighting. He was therefore determined not to advance with the troops, until he knew precisely the situation of the town, and the ground adjacent to it, particularly that which intervened between it and the place where the army then was—that it was their duty to fight when they came in contact with the enemy—it was his to take care that they should not engage in a situation where their valor would be useless, and where a corps upon which he placed great reliance would be unable to act—that the experience of the last two hours ought to convince every officer, that no reliance ought to be placed upon the guides, as to the topography of the country—that relying on their information, the troops had been led into a situation so unfavorable, that but for the celerity with which they changed their position, a few Indians might have destroyed them; he was therefore determined not to advance to the town, until he had previously reconnoitred, either in person, or by some one, on whose judgment he could rely. Major Daveiss immediately replied, that from the right of the position of the dragoons, which was still in front the openings made by the low grounds of the Wabash could be seen; that with his adjutant Davis Floyd, he had advanced to the bank, which descends to the low grounds, and had a fair view of the cultivated fields and the houses of the town; and that the open woods, in which the troops then were, continued without interruption to the town. Upon this information, the Governor said he would advance, provided he could get any proper person to go to the town with a flag. Captain T. Dubois of Vincennes having offered his services, he was dispatched with an interpreter to the prophet, desiring to know whether he would now comply with the terms, that had been so often proposed to him. The army was moved slowly after in order of battle. In a few moments a messenger came from captain Dubois informing the Governor that the Indians were near him in considerable numbers, but that they would return no answer to the interpreter, although they were sufficiently near to hear what was said to them and that upon his advancing, they constantly endeavored to cut him off from the army. Governor Harrison during this last effort to open a negotiation, which was suflicient to show his wish for an accommodation, resolved no longer to hesitate in treating the Indians as enemies. He therefore recalled captain Dubois, and moved on with a determination to attack them. He had not proceeded far, however, before he was met by three Indians, one of them a principal cousellor to the prophet. They were sent, they said, to know why the army was advancing upon them—that the prophet wished if possible to avoid hostilities; that he had sent a pacific message by the Miami and Potawatamie chiefs, who had come to him on the part of the Governor—and that those chiefs had unfortunately gone down on the south side of the Wabash. A suspension of hostilities was accordingly agreed upon; and a meeting was to take place the next day between Harrison and the chiefs, to agree upon the terms of peace. The Governor further informed them, that he would go on to the Wabash, and encamp there for the night. Upon marching a short distance further he came in view of the town, which was seen at some distance up the river upon a commanding eminence. Major Daveiss and adjutant Floyd had mistaken some scattering houses in the field below, for the town itself. The ground below the town being unfavorable for an encampment, the army marched on in the direction of the town, with a view to obtain a better situation beyond it. The troops were in an order of march, calculated by a single conversion of companies, to form the order of battle, which it had last assumed, the dragoons being in front. This corps, however, soon became entangled in ground, covered with brush and tops of fallen trees. A halt was ordered, and major Daveiss directed to change position with [Spier] Spencer's rifle corps, which occupied the open fields adjacent to the river. The Indians seeing this manoeuvre, at the approach of the troops towards the town, supposed that they intended to attack it, and immediately prepared for defence. Some of them sallied out, and called to the advanced corps to halt. The Governor upon this rode forward, and requested some of the Indians to come to him, assured them, that nothing was farther from his thoughts than to attack them—that the ground below the town on the river, was not calculated for an encampment and that it was his intention to search for a better one above. He asked if there was any other water convenient besides that which the river afforded; and an Indian with whom he was well acquainted, answered, that the creek, which had been crossed two miles back, ran through the prairie to the north of the village. A halt was then ordered, and some officers sent back to examine the creek, as well as the river above the town. In half an hour, brigade major Marston Clarke^[2]and major Waller Taylor returned, and reported that they had found on the creek, everything that could be desirable in an encampment—an elevated spot, nearly surrounded by an open prairie, with water convenient, and a sufficiency of wood for fuel. An idea was propagated by the enemies of Governor Harrison after the battle of Tippecanoe, that the Indians had forced him to encamp on a place, chosen by them as suitable for the attack they intended. The place, however, was chosen by majors Taylor and Clarke, after examining all the environs of the town; and when the army of general [Samuel] Hopkins^[3] was there in the following year, they all united in the opinion, that a better spot to resist Indians, was not to be found in the whole country.

The army now marched to the place selected, and encamped late in the evening, on a dry piece of ground, which rose about ten feet above the level of a marshy prairie in front, towards the town, and about twice as high above a similar prairie in the rear; through which, near the bank, ran a small stream clothed with willows and brush wood. On the left of the encampment, this bench of land became wider; on the right it gradually narrowed, and terminated in an abrupt point, about one hundred and fifty yards from the right flank. The two columns of infantry occupied the front and rear. The right flank being about eighty yards wide, was filled with captain Spencer's company of eighty men. The left flank, about one hundred and fifty yards in extent, was composed of three companies of mounted riflemen, under major general [Samuel] Wells,^[4] commanding as a major. The front line was composed of one battalion of United States' infantry, under the command of major Floyd, flanked on the right by two companies of militia infantry, under captain [W. C.] Baen, commanding as a major; and four companies of militia infantry, under lieutenant colonel [Luke] Decker;^[5] the regulars being stationed next the riflemen under Wells, and the militia on the other end of the line adjoining Spencer's company. The cavalry under Daveiss were encamped in the rear of the front line and the left flank. The encampment was not more than three fourths of a mile from the town.

The order given to the army, in the event of a night attack, was for each corps to maintain its ground at all hazards till relieved. The dragoons were directed in such a case, to parade dismounted, with their swords on and their pistols in their belts, and to wait for orders. The guard for the night consisted of two captain's commands of twenty four men and four non-commissioned officers; and two subalterns' guards of twenty men and non-commissioned officers—the whole under the command of a field officer of the day.

1. This description of the battle is taken from Robert McAfee, History of the Late War, and may be considered as the work of General Harrison. He not only furnished the substance to the author but in 1824 when Moses Dawson wrote his narrative this was quoted with the approval of General Harrison. The same facts are found in the National Intelligencer, Mar. 4, 1817. Following this there will be a number of descriptions of the battle, without the usual regard for chronological sequence.
2. Marston Clark was born in Va. 1774. About 1800 he settled near Louisville. From there he moved into Ind. and finally located at Salem. His father was perhaps a brother of Geo. R. Clark. He was well known as a militia officer and served in the legislature as well as U. S. Indian agent. He was grand master of the Indiana masons in 1825. He died at Salem in 1842. McDonald, Freemasonry in Indiana, 336.
3. Samuel Hopkins was a native of Albemarle Co. Va.; a soldier of the Rev. surrendered with Lincoln at Charleston. May 20, 1780. Came to Ky. 1797. Located at Red Banks, now Henderson. Served in congress 1813-15 and died Oct. 1819. Collins, Kentucky, 350. Lossing, War of 1812, 335-8.
4. Samuel Wells was a well known Kentucky Indian fighter. He advanced with Harrison to the relief of Fort Wayne in 1812, led the detachment which destroyed the village of Five Medals on Elkhart river, and marched with Winchester to the Raisin, but had returned for reinforcements.
5. Luke Decker came from Va. to Knox Co. Ind. before 1783. He was a slave holder and brought his slaves with him. Decker was in office or connected with the public service throughout his life. In politics he supported Harrison. History of Knox County (1886).