Metaphysics (Ross, 1908)/Book 7

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Metaphysics (Ross, 1908)
(350 B.C.E.)
by Aristotle, translated by W. D. Ross and J. A. Smith

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(1908) Annotations pertaining to Greek translation not included.

Aristotle4170960Metaphysics (Ross, 1908)
— Book 7350 B.C.E.W. D. Ross and J. A. Smith

Layout 2

Chapter 1

There are several senses in which a thing may be said to 'be', as we pointed out previously in our book on the various senses of words;^[1] for in one sense the 'being' meant is 'what a thing is' or the individual thing, and in another sense it means that a thing is of a certain quality or quantity or has some such predicate asserted of it. While 'being' has all these senses, obviously that which 'is' primarily is the 'what', which indicates the substance of the thing. For when we say of what quality a thing is, we say that it is good or beautiful,^[2] but not that it is three cubits long or that it is a man; but when we say what it is, we do not say 'white' or 'hot' or 'three cubits long', but 'man' or 'God'. And all other things are said to be because they are, some of them, quantities of that which is in this primary sense, others qualities of it, others affections of it, and others some other determination of it. And so one might raise the question whether walking and being healthy and sitting are, each of them, existent or non-existent, and similarly in any other case of this sort; for none of them is either self-subsistent or capable of being separated from substance, but rather, if anything, it is that which walks or is seated or is healthy that is an existent thing. Now these are seen to be more real because there is something definite which underlies them; and this is the substance or individual, which is implied in such a predicate; for 'good' or 'sitting' apart from that which sits or is good has no meaning. Clearly then it is in virtue of this category that each of the others is. Therefore that which is primarily and is simply (not 'is something') must be substance.

Now there are several senses in which a thing is said to be first; but substance is first in every sense — (1) in formula, (2) in order of knowledge, (3) in time. For (3) of the other categories none can exist independently, but only substance. And (1) in formula also this is first; for in the formula of each term the formula of its substance must be present. And (2) we think we know each thing most fully, when we know what it is, e.g. what man is or what fire is, rather than when we know its quality, its quantity, or where it is; since we know each of these predicates also, only when we know what the quantity or the quality is.

And indeed the question which was raised of old and is raised now and always, and is always the subject of doubt, viz. what being is, is just the question, what is substance? For it is this that some assert to be one, others more than one, and that some assert to be limited in number, others unlimited. And so we also must consider chiefly and primarily and almost exclusively what that is which is in this sense.

Chapter 2

Substance is thought to belong most obviously to bodies; and so we say that both animals and plants and their parts are substances, and so are natural bodies such as fire and water and earth and everything of the sort, and all things that are parts of these or composed of these (either of parts or of the whole bodies), e.g. the heaven and its parts, stars and moon and sun. But whether these alone are substances, or there are also others, or only some of these, or some of these and some other things^[3] are substances, or none of these but only some other things, must be considered. Some think the limits of body, i.e. surface, line, point, and unit, are substances, and more so than body or the solid.

Further, some do not think there is anything substantial besides sensible things, but others think there are eternal substances which are more in number and more real, e.g. Plato posited two kinds of substance — the Forms and the objects of mathematics — as well as a third kind, viz. the substance of

sensible bodies. And Speusippus made still more kinds of substance, beginning with the One, and making principles for each kind of substance, one for numbers, another for spatial magnitudes, and then another for the soul; and in this way he multiplies the kinds of substance. And some say Forms and numbers have the same nature, and other things come after them, e.g. lines and planes, until we come to the substance of the material universe and to sensible bodies.

Regarding these matters, then, we must inquire which of the common statements are right and which are not right, and what things are substances, and whether there are or are not any besides sensible substances, and how sensible substances exist, and whether there is a separable substance (and if so why and how) or there is no substance separable from sensible substances; and we must first sketch the nature of substance.

CHAPTER III

The word 'substance' is applied, if not in more senses, still at least to four main objects; for both the essence and the universal and the genus are thought to be the substance of each thing, and fourthly the substratum. Now the substratum is that of which the others are predicated, while it is itself not predicated of anything else. And so we must first determine the nature of this; for that which underlies a thing primarily is thought to be in the truest sense its substance. And in one sense matter is said to be of the nature of substratum, in another, shape, and in a third sense, the compound of these. By the matter I mean, for instance, the bronze, by the shape the plan of its form, and by the compound of these (the concrete thing) the statue. Therefore if the form is prior to the matter and more real, the compound of both will be prior also for the same reason.

↑ Cf. Δ. 7.
↑ 1028^a 16 read καλόν
↑ 1028^b14 read ἢ τούτων τινὲς ἢ καὶ ἄλλαι. The possibilities are (a) all of these, (b) all of these and some others, (c) some of these, (d) some of these and some others, (e) some others.

[1] Cf. Δ. 7.

[2] 1028^a 16 read καλόν

[3] 1028^b14 read ἢ τούτων τινὲς ἢ καὶ ἄλλαι. The possibilities are (a) all of these, (b) all of these and some others, (c) some of these, (d) some of these and some others, (e) some others.

[1]

[2]

[3]

Metaphysics (Ross, 1908)/Book 7

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