Mexico, Aztec, Spanish and Republican/Volume 1/Book 3/Chapter 12
CHAPTER XII.
1847.
The extraordinary genius of Santa Anna, and the influence he possessed over his countrymen were perhaps never more powerfully manifested than in the manner in which, amid all these disasters, he maintained his reputation and popularity, and gathered a new army to defend the eastern frontier of Mexico. But whilst he was engaged preparing in the interior, we must return to the scene of General Scott's operations on the coast. The small island of Lobos, about a hundred and twenty-five miles from Vera Cruz, had been selected for the rendezvous of the several corps which were to compose the American invading army; and the magnitude of the enterprize may be estimated from the fact, that one hundred and sixty-three vessels were employed as transports. On the seventh of March, Scott embarked his troops in the squadron under Commodore Connor, and on the ninth, landed the army upon the coast below the island of Sacrificios without the loss of a man, and without opposition from the neighboring city of Vera Cruz, which he summoned in vain to surrender. Having planted his batteries, and placed them under the command of Colonel Bankhead, as Chief of Artillery, he commenced a vigorous bombardment of the city on the eighteenth, aided, afloat and on shore, by the guns of the fleet which had been transferred from Commodore Connor to the command of Commodore Perry. The town was thus invested by land and water, and although the Mexican castle, city walls and forts, were but poorly garrisoned and provided, they held out bravely during the terrible siege, which nearly converted Vera Cruz into a slaughter-house. On the morning of the twenty-sixth, when no hope remained for the Mexicans, General Landero, the commander, made overtures for a capitulation, which being satisfactorily arranged, the principal commercial port, and the most renowned fortress in Mexico were surrendered, together with four hundred guns, five thousand stand of arms and as many prisoners who were released on parole.
General Scott had endeavored to mitigate the dangers of this terrific attack upon Vera Cruz by the employment of such a force as would honorably satisfy the inefficient garrison of the town and castle that it was in truth unable to cope with the American forces. He delayed opening his batteries to allow the escape of non-combatants; he refrained, moreover, from storming the town, a mode of assault in which multitudes would have fallen on both sides in the indiscriminate slaughter which always occurs when an enemy's town is invaded in hot blood and with a reckless spirit of conquest and carnage. Yet, weak and badly provided as was the garrison of both strongholds, the walls of the city, its batteries and its guardian castle held out for sixteen days, during which time it is estimated that our army and navy, threw into the town about six thousand shot and shells, weighing upwards of 463,000 pounds. On the side of the Mexicans the slaughter was exceedingly great. Nearly a thousand fell victims during the siege; and, among the slain, numerous unfortunate citizens, women and children, were found to have perished by the bombs or paixhan shot which destroyed the public and private edifices, and ruined many important portions of the city.
When this new disaster was reported in the capital and among the highlands of Mexico, it spread consternation among the more secluded masses who now began to believe that the heart of the country was seriously menaced. They had doubtless trusted to the traditionary, proverbial strength of San Juan de Ulua, and believed that the danger of disease and storm on the coast would serve to protect Vera Cruz from the attack of unacclimated strangers, during a season of hurricanes. Indeed, it was fortunate that our troops were landed from the transports and men-of-war as early as they were in March, for almost immediately afterwards, and during the siege, one of the most violent northers that ever ravaged these shores raged incessantly, destroying many of the vessels whose warlike freight of men and munitions had been so recently disembarked.
But if the people were ignorant of the true condition and strength of Vera Cruz or its castle, such was not the case with the military men and national authorities. They had made but little effort to guard it against Scott, of whose designed attack they had been long apprised, and they were probably prevented from doing so chiefly by the plans of Santa Anna, who supposed that Taylor would fall an easy prey to the large Mexican forces in the field at Buena Vista, especially as the American army had been weakened by the abstraction of its regulars for the operations at Vera Cruz. Victorious at Buena Vista, he could have hastened, by forced marches, to attack the invaders on the eastern coast, and under the dismay of his anticipated victory in the north, he unquestionably imagined that they too would have fallen at once into his grasp. Besides these military miscalculations, Mexico was so embarrassed in its pecuniary affairs, and disorganized in its Central Civil Government, that the proper directing power in the capital,—warned as it was,—had neither men nor means at hand to dispose along the coast of the Gulf, or to station at points in its neighborhood whence they might quickly be thrown into positions which were menaced.
It was at this juncture that Santa Anna's voice was again heard in the council and the field. At the conclusion of the last chapter we left him hastening to the new scene of action; and when he announced the capitulation of the vaunted castle and sea port of the Republic, he declared in his proclamation, that although "chance might decree the fall of the capital of the Aztec empire under the power of the proud American host, yet the Nation shall not perish." "I swear," continues he, "that if my wishes are seconded by a sincere and unanimous effort, Mexico shall triumph! A thousand times fortunate for the nation will the fall of Vera Cruz prove, if the disaster shall awaken in Mexican bosoms, the dignified enthusiasm, and generous ardor of true patriotism!" This was the tone of appeal and encouragement in which he rallied the credulous and vain masses, the disheartened country, the dispersed troops of the north, and reanimated the broken fragments of the army which still continued in the field.
Meanwhile, General Scott placed Vera Cruz under the command of General Worth; opened the port to the long abandoned commerce which had languished during the blockade; established a moderate tariff, and together with the forces of the navy took possession of the ports of Alvarado and Tlacotlalpam on the south, and directed the future capture of Tuspan on the north of Vera Cruz. All his arrangements being completed, and these captures made and projected, he marched a large portion of his twelve thousand victorious troops towards the capital.
When the road to the interior leaves Vera Cruz, it runs for a mile or two along the low, sandy, sea-beaten shore, and then strikes off, 
VERA CRUZ.
nearly at a right angle, in a gap among the sand-hills towards the west. For many miles it winds slowly and heavily through the deep and shifting soil, until, as the traveller approaches the river Antigua, the country begins to rise and fall by gentle elevations like the first heavy swells of the ocean. Passing this river at Puente Nacional over the noble and renowned bridge of that name, the aspect of the territory becomes suddenly changed. The nearer elevations are steeper and more frequent, the road firmer and more rocky, while, in the western distance, the tall slopes of the Sierras rise rapidly in bold and wooded masses. All the features of nature are still strictly tropical, and wherever a scant and thriftless cultivation has displaced the thick vines, the rich flowers, and the dense foliage of the forest, indolent natives may be seen idling about their cane built huts, or lazily performing only the most necessary duties of life. Further on, at Plan del Rio the geological features of the coast assume another aspect. Here the road again crosses a small streamlet, and then suddenly strikes boldly into the side of the mountain which is to be ascended. About seven leagues from Jalapa the edge of one of the table lands of the Cordillera sweeps down from the west abruptly into this pass of the river Plan. On both sides of this precipitous elevation the mountains tower majestically. The road winds slowly and roughly along the scant sides which have been notched to receive it. When the summit of the pass is attained' one side of the road is found to be overlooked by the Hill of the Telegraph, while on the other side the streamlet runs in an immensely deep and rugged ravine, several hundred feet below the level of the table land. Between the road and the river many ridges of the neighboring hills unite and plunge downwards into the impassable abyss. At the foot of the Hill of the Telegraph, rises another eminence known as that of Atalaya, which is hemmed in by other wooded heights rising from below, and forming, in front of the position a boundary of rocks and forests beyond which the sight cannot penetrate.
When Don Manuel Robles left Vera Cruz, after its fall, he was desired by General Canalizo to examine the site of Cerro Gordo. After a full reconnoissance it was his opinion that it afforded a favorable spot in which the invaders might be at least injured or checked, but that was not the proper point to dispute their passage to the capital by a decisive victory. The most favorable position for resistance he believed to be at Corral Falso.
These views, however, did not accord with the opinions of the commander-in-chief, who when the ground was explored under his own eye, resolved to fortify it for the reception of the Americans. The brigades of General Pinzon and Ranjel; the companies of Jalapa and Coatepec, commanded by Mata; and the veterans of the division of Angostura arrived also about this period, and their last sections reached the ground on the 12th. Meanwhile all was activity in the work of hasty fortification. Robles constructed a parapet at the edge of the three hills, but failing to obtain all requisite materials for such a work, his erection merely served to mark the line of the Mexican operations, and to form a breast-work whence the artillery and infantry might command the ground over which, as the defenders supposed, the Americans would be obliged to advance. Colonel Cano had already cut off the access by the road at the point where it turned on the right slope of the Telegraph, by placing a heavy battery. He also formed a covered way leading to the positions on the right, while General Alcorta constructed a circular work on the summit of the eminence and established within it a battery of four guns. In the centre of this the national flag was hoisted, and off to the left nothing was seen but thick, thorny dells and barrancas, which were regarded by Santa Anna as impassable.
Such was the Mexican line of defences extending on the brink of these precipices for nearly a mile, and, throughout it, the commander-in-chief hastened to distribute his forces. The extreme right was placed under the command of General Pinzon, the next position under the naval captain, Buenaventura Aranjo, the next under Colonel Badillo, the next under General Jarero, the next post, at the road, under General La Vega, and finally the extreme left, at the Telegraph, under Generals Vazquez, Uraga and Colonel Palacios. The forces thus in position, according to the Mexican account, amounted to three thousand three hundred and seventy men with fifty-two pieces of ordnance of various calibre. The remainder of the army, with the exception of the cavalry, which remained at Corral Falso until the 15th, was encamped on the sides of the road at the rancheria of Cerro Gordo, situated in the rear of the position. In this neighborhood was placed the reserve, composed of the 1st, 2nd 3rd and 4th light infantry, comprising 1,700 men; and the 1st and 11th regiments of the line, with 780 men, together with their artillery. It is said that the army was badly provided with food and suffered greatly from the climate and the innumerable insects which infest the region.
As Scott advanced against this position the dangers of his enterprize became manifest, and he caused a series of bold reconnoissances to be made by Lieutenant Beaurgard and Captain Lee, of the engineers. He found that the deep rocky ravine of the river protected the right flank of the Mexican position, while abrupt and seemingly impassable mountains and ridges covered the left. Between these points, for nearly two miles, a succession of fortified summits bristled with every kind of available defence, while the top of Cerro Gordo commanded the road on a gentle slope, like a glacis, for nearly a mile. An attack in front, therefore, would have been fatal to the American army, and Scott resolved, accordingly, to cut a road to the right of his position so as to turn the left flank of the Mexicans. To cover his flank movements, on the 17th of April, he ordered General Twiggs to advance against the fort on the steep ascent, in front, and slightly to the left of the Cerro. Colonel Harney, with the rifles and some detachments of infantry and artillery, carried this position under a heavy fire, and, having secured it, elevated a large gun to the summit of the eminence, and made a demonstration against a strong fort in the rear. Early on the 18th, the columns moved to the general attack. General Pillow's brigade assaulted the right of the Mexican entrenchments, and although compelled to retire, produced a powerful impression on that part of the enemy's line. General Twigg's division stormed the vital part of Cerro Gordo, pierced the centre, gained command of the fortifications and cut them off from support; while Colonel Riley's brigade of infantry rushed on against the main body of the foe, turned the guns of their own fort against them, and compelled the panic stricken crowd to fly in utter confusion. Shields' brigade, meanwhile, assaulted the left, and carrying the rear battery, aided materially in completing the rout of the enemy. The whole American force, in action and reserve, was 8,500. Three thousand prisoners, four or five thousand stand of arms, and forty-three pieces of artillery, fell into Scott's hands. In the two days of conflict our loss amounted to 33 officers and 398 men, of whom 63 were killed. The enemy's loss was computed at 1,000 at least, while among the prisoners no less than two hundred and eighty officers and five generals were included. Santa Anna, and General Ampudia who was in the action, escaped with difficulty; and the commander-in-chief, accompanied by a few friends and a small escort, finally reached Orizaba in safety, after encountering numerous dangers amid the mountains and lonely paths through which he was obliged to pass.
This very decisive victory opened the path for the American army to the highlands of the upper plateau of Mexico, and, accordingly, our forces immediately pushed on to Jalapa and Peroté, both of which places were abandoned by the Mexicans without firing a gun. General Worth took possession of Peroté on the 22d of April, and received from Colonel Velasquez, who had been left in charge of the fortress or castle of San Carlos de Peroté by his retreating country-men, 54 guns and mortars of iron and bronze, 11,065 cannon balls, 14,300 bombs and hand grenades, and 500 muskets. On capturing the post he learned that the rout at Cerro Gordo had been complete. Three thousand cavalry passed the strong hold of Peroté in deplorable plight, while not more than two thousand disarmed and famishing infantry had returned towards their homes in the central regions of Mexico. From Peroté Worth advanced towards Puebla on the direct road to the capital.
Thus was Mexico again reduced to extreme distress by the loss of two important battles, the destruction of her third army raised for this war, and the capture of her most valuable artillery and munitions. But the national spirit of resistance was not subdued. If the government could no longer restrain the invaders by organized armies, it resolved to imitate the example of the mother country during Napoleon's invasion, and to rouse the people to the formation of guerilla bands under daring and reckless officers. Bold as was this effort of patriotic despair, and cruelly successful as it subsequently proved against individuals or detached parties of the Americans, it could effect nothing material against the great body of the consolidated army. Meanwhile the master spirit of the nation—Santa Anna—had not been idle in the midst of his disheartening reverses. In little more than two weeks, he gathered nearly three thousand men from the fragments of his broken army, and marched to Puebla, where he received notice of Worth's advance from Peroté. Sallying forth immediately with his force, he attacked the American general at Amozoque, but, finding himself unable to check his career, returned with a loss of nearly ninety killed and wounded. On the 22d of May, Puebla yielded submissively to General Worth, and Santa Anna retreated in the direction of the national capital, halting at San Martin Tesmalucan, and again at Ayotla, about twenty miles from Mexico. Here he learned that the city was in double fear of the immediate assault of the victorious Americans and of his supposed intention to defend it within its own walls, a project which the people believed would only result, in the present disastrous condition of affairs, in the slaughter of its citizens and ruin of their property. The commander-in-chief halted therefore at Ayotla, and playing dexterously on the hopes and fears of the people in a long despatch addressed to the minister of war, he at length received the Presidential and popular sanction of his return to Mexico.
In truth, the nation at large had no one but Santa Anna, at that moment of utter despair, in whose prestige and talents—in spite of all his misfortunes and defeats—it could rely for even the hope of escape from destruction, if not of ultimate victory.
Whilst the Mexican nation had been thus sorely vexed by intestinal commotions and foreign invasion an Extraordinary Constituent Congress—Congreso Extraordinario Constituyente—had been summoned and met in the capital, chiefly to revise the Constitution, or the "Bases of Political Organization," of 1843, which had been superseded by the temporary adoption of the Federal Constitution of 1824, according to the edict issued by Salas, under the direction of Santa Anna soon after that personage's return from exile. This Extraordinary Congress re-adopted the old Federal Constitution of 1824 without altering its terms, principles, or phraseology, and made such slight changes as were deemed needful by an Acta Constitutiva y de Reformas, containing thirty articles, which was sanctioned on the 18th, and proclaimed on the 21st of May by Santa Anna, who had reassumed the Presidency. By this approval of the Federal System the Executive entirely abandoned the Central policy for which he had so long contended, but which, as we have seen in the 11th chapter, he no longer believed, or feigned to believe, suitable for the nation.
Notwithstanding this submission to popular will, and apparent desire to deprive the Central Government of its most despotic prerogatives, the conduct of Santa Anna did not save him entirely from the machinations of his rivals or of intriguers. Much discontent was expressed publicly and privately, and the President, accordingly tendered his resignation to Congress, intimating a desire to hasten into private life! This stratagetic resignation was followed by the retiracy of General Rincon and General Bravo, who commanded the troops in the city. Acts of such vital significance upon the part of the ablest men in the Republic, in an hour of exceeding danger, at once recalled Congress and the people to their senses; and if they were designed, as they probably were, merely to throw the anarchists on their own resources and to show them their inefficiency at such an epoch, they seem to have produced the desired effect, for they placed Santa Anna and his partizans more firmly in power. Congress refused to accept his resignation. Unfortunate as he had been, it perhaps saw in him the only commander who was capable in the exigency of controlling the Mexican elements of resistance to the invaders, and he was thus enabled to form his plans, to collect men, means and munitions, and to commence the system of fortifications around the capital. "War to the knife," was still the rallying cry of the nation. The Congressional resolutions which had been passed on the 20th of April, immediately after the battle of Cerro Gordo, proclaimed "every individual a traitor, let him be private person or public functionary, who should enter into treaties with the United States!" Parties in the capital were, nevertheless, not unanimous upon this subject. There were wise men and patriots who foresaw the issue, and counselled the leaders to come to honorable terms before the capital was assaulted. Others craved the continuance of the war with the hope that its disasters would destroy the individuals who conducted it to an unfortunate issue; and, among these, they saw that Santa Anna was finally pledged to abide that issue for weal or woe. Nor were politicians wanting in the Republic who honestly looked to the prolongation of the conflict as a blessing to Mexico, believing that it would result in the complete subjugation of the whole country by American arms and its final annexation to our Union.
In June a coalition was formed at Lagos by deputies from Jalisco, San Luis Potosi, Zacatecas, Mexico and Queretaro, in which these States combined for mutual defence; but, while they opposed peace, they resolved to act independently of the General Government. Many other parts of the republic looked on the scene with apathy. There was no longer a revenue from foreign commerce. The products of the mines were smuggled from the west coast in British vessels. Disorder and uncertainty prevailed every where in regard to the collection of the national income from internal resources. Individuals, and not States, corporations or municipalities, were now to be relied on for support; and, as the most important parts of the nation on the north and east were virtually in the enemy's hands, the whole effort of the frail authorities was confined to the protection of the capital. In the midst of all this complication of confusion Santa Anna found that the election for President, which was held by the States on the 15th of May, had resulted unfavorably to his pretensions, and, by an adroit movement, he prevailed on Congress to postpone the counting of the votes from the 15th of June until January of the following year! All who opposed his schemes of defence or resistance, were disposed of by banishment, persecution or imprisonment, nor did he fail to establish so severe a censorship of the press, that, in July, it is believed, but one paper was allowed to be issued in the capital, and that one, of course, entirely under his control. Throwing himself, like a true military demagogue, publicly, if not at heart, at the head of popular feeling in regard to the war with the United States, he adopted every measure and availed himself of every resource in his power to place the city in a state of defence, and to fan the flame of resistance. In the meanwhile the guerilla forces, organized on the eastern coast, chiefly under a recreant clergyman named Jarauta, harassed every American train and detachment on their way to the interior, and rendered the country insecure, until a fearful war of extermination was adopted by our garrisons on the line.
The government of the United States had, during the whole of this unfortunate contest, availed itself of every supposed suitable occasion to sound Mexico in relation to peace. In July, 1846, and in January 1847, overtures were made to the national authorities and rejected; and again, early in the spring of 1847, as soon as the news of the defeat at Cerro Gordo reached Washington, Mr. Nicholas P. Trist was despatched by the President upon a mission which it was hoped would result in the restoration of international amity. The commissioner reached Vera Cruz while the American army was advancing towards the interior, but it was not until the forces reached Puebla, and General Scott had established his head quarters in that capital, that he was enabled, through the intervention of the British Minister, to communicate with the Mexican government. The stringent terms of the decree to which we have already alluded, of course, prevented Santa Anna, powerful as he was, from entertaining the proposals in the existing state of the public mind, and, accordingly, he referred the subject to Congress, a quorum of whose members was, with difficulty, organized. On the 13th of July, seventy-four assembled, and voted to strip themselves of the responsibility by a resolution that it was the Executive's duty to receive ministers, and to make treaties of peace and alliance, and that their functions were confined to the approval or disapproval of those treaties or alliances when submitted in due form under the constitution. But Santa Anna, still adhering to the letter of the mandatory decree passed after the battle of Cerro Gordo in April, alleged his legal incapacity to treat, and recommended the repeal of the order, inasmuch as the American commissioner's letter was courteous, and the dignity of Mexico required the return of a suitable reply. Before the appeal could reach Congress, its members had dispersed, foreseeing probably, the delicacy, if not danger, of the dilemma in which they were about to be placed. Without a constitutional tribunal to relieve him from his position, the President finally referred the matter to a council of general officers of the army. This body, however, was quite as timorous as Congress, and dismissed the project by declaring that "it was inexpedient to enter into negotiations for peace, until another opportunity had been afforded Mexico to retrieve her fortunes in the field."
These were the negotiations that met the public eye, and are reported in the military and diplomatic despatches of the day; but there was a secret correspondence, also, which denotes either the duplicity or strategy of Santa Anna, and must be faithfully recorded. It seems that the Mexican President, about the time that the public answer was proclaimed, sent private communications to the American head quarters at Puebla, intimating that if a million of dollars were placed at his disposal, to be paid upon the conclusion of a treaty of peace, and ten thousand dollars were paid forthwith, he would appoint commissioners to negotiate! The proposal was received and discussed by General Scott, Mr. Trist, and the leading officers, and being agreed to, though not unanimously, the ten thousand dollars were disbursed from the secret service money which Scott had at his disposal, and communications were opened in cypher, the key of which had been sent from Mexico. Intimations soon reached Puebla, from Santa Anna, that it would be also necessary for the American army to advance and threaten the Capital;—and, finally, another message was received, urging Scott to penetrate the valley and carry one of the outworks of the Mexican line of defences, in order to enable him to negotiate![1]
The sincerity of these proposals from the Mexican President, is very questionable, and we are still in doubt whether he designed merely to procrastinate and feel the temper of the Americans, or whether he was in reality angling for the splendid bribe of a million which he might appropriate privately, in the event of playing successfully upon the feelings or fears of the masses. The attempt, however, proved abortive; and although both General Scott and Mr. Trist deemed it proper to entertain the proposal, the commander-in-chief never for a moment delayed his military preparations for an advance with all the force he could gather. Thus were the last efforts of the American authorities in Mexico and Washington repulsed in the same demagogue spirit that hastened the rupture between the nations in the spring of 1846, and nothing remained but to try again whether the sword was mightier than the pen.
MAP OF THE VALLEY OF MEXICO.
- ↑ See Major Ripley's History of the War with Mexico, p. 148. et seq.