Mexico in 1827/Volume 1/Chapter 5

by Henry George Ward

 

 

BOOK II.

 

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EFFECTS PRODUCED BY THE EVENTS OF THE YEAR 1808 IN THE PENINSULA.

I have endeavoured to give, in the preceding section, a fair and dispassionate view of the system by which the possessions of Spain in the New World were governed, during a period of three centuries. It was not in the nature of things that such a system should be endured any longer than the power to enforce it was retained. There was little mutual affection, and no reciprocity of advantages; so that the question of right, between the Mother country and the Colonies, became, in fact, a question of might; and resistance, on the part of the Creoles, the almost inevitable consequence of a consciousness of strength. It is uncertain, however, how long a disposition to assert their rights might have been cherished by the more enlightened, without being sufficiently generalized to admit of its being declared, had not the events of the year 1808 favoured its development.

The history of Europe, (and more particularly of the Peninsula,) during this period, is so intimately connected with that of American Independence, that it is impossible to consider them apart, or even to understand the one, without a previous acquaintance with the other. I shall, therefore, not apologize for reminding such of my readers, as may have forgotten the course of Spanish affairs, amidst the endless changes which have since occurred, that, in 1808, the schemes which Napoleon had long cherished for the establishment of his brother on the throne of Spain, were carried into effect. Advantage was taken of the burst of national indignation, by which the ministry of the Prince of Peace was terminated, and of the abdication of Charles IV., which followed the dismissal of his favourite, to entice the whole Royal Family to Bayonne, under pretence of deciding an appeal, preferred by the Ex-king against his son, (the actual monarch,) where, by an act unparalleled in the history of the world, they both renounced the throne, in favour of the family of the Umpire, and consented to live in retirement, upon a stipend assigned to them by his munificence. This act, although supported by a party amongst the Spaniards themselves, (los Afrancesados,) and by the armies of Napoleon, only served to rouse the spirit of the nation, which substituted, in every province, a popular government for that, by which it thought that its youthful monarch had been betrayed. A Central Junta^[1] was entrusted with the management of affairs, which was followed by a Regency^[2], and this, again, by a Second,^[3]; created by the Cortes, which were assembled in the Isla de Leon, in September 1810, as the only legitimate source of power during the captivity of the sovereign. By these unexpected events, the form and spirit of the Spanish government were entirely changed: principles, which had been inculcated for ages, were at once exploded; a Constitution, democratic in the extreme, in its theory, was substituted for the Royal Prerogative; the sovereignty of the people was set against the divine rights of Kings; and even religion was deprived of its influence, as a political engine, by the abolition of the Holy Tribunal. That such things could take place in the Peninsula, without producing corresponding effects in its dependencies, was not to be expected; and these effects it is my present object to trace.

It is generally admitted, that the insurrection of Aranjuez, (1808,) which led to the dismissal of the Prince of Peace, (Godoy,) and to the abdication of Charles IV., gave the first shock to the Royal authority in America. An absolute monarch, compelled to bow before the will of a tumultuous populace, insulted by his subjects, and deserted by his guards, in the very heart of his kingdom, was a sight that could not but tend to diminish those feelings of almost religious awe, with which any thing like opposition to the will of the Sovereign had been previously contemplated.

The subsequent invasion of the Peninsula by Napoleon, the captivity of the Monarch, and the abdication of the Old Dynasty at Bayonne, contributed to destroy whatever remained of the prestige, which had before attached to the name of Spain, and created an impression, only the more strong, because, to the mass of the people in America, she was still the Spain of the sixteenth century, in whose dominions the sun never set, and whose arms were the terror of the world.

This belief had long been the tutelary angel of the Mother country: with it, she lost her moral force, (the only force capable of compelling the obedience of seventeen million of Transatlantic subjects,) and, from that moment, the loss of the Colonies themselves became inevitable.

It was in vain to struggle against nature, or to attempt to subdue that new spirit, which, within two years after the invasion of the Peninsula, began to appear amongst all classes of the Creoles. Its progress was both rapid, and irresistible; and, without any previous concert amongst the parties themselves, without even the possibility of foreign interference, a mighty revolution broke out at once, in almost every part of the New World.

A momentary enthusiasm in favour of the Mother country, was, indeed, excited (in 1808) by the resolution of the Spanish people to vindicate their rights, and not tamely to submit to a yoke, which, force and fraud combined, seemed, at first, to render inevitable; but the rapid progress of the French arms, during the year 1809, the weakness and reverses of the Central Junta, its retreat into Andalusia, and the gradual occupation of the whole of that province by the invading army, with the exception of Cadiz, not only checked this favourable disposition, but completed that change in the feelings and opinions of the Creoles, for which the occurrences of the preceding year had prepared the way. They regarded Spain as lost, and degraded almost to the rank of a province of France; and they saw no plea of right, or justice, by which obedience could be exacted from them to the agents of a government, which was itself decried, and disobeyed with impunity at home. The King was the only tie that connected them with Spain; for it was the fundamental principle of Spanish Jurisprudence, with regard to America, to consider what had been acquired there, as rested in the Crown, and not in the State. In the absence of the Monarch, therefore, the Creoles might, with justice, assert their right to determine what should be considered as a fit substitute for his authority, (as the Spanish people had done in their own case,) instead of admitting the claims of Provincial Delegates, (representing at best but a fraction of the Royal power, and that in virtue of a most irregular popular election,) to exercise the King's Prerogative, in its fullest extent, in the vast possession of Ultramar.^[4]

Yet such were the pretensions of each, and all of the ephemeral Juntas, that started up in the Peninsula. Commissioners from Asturias, and Seville,^[5] (the two first Juntas established in the Mother country,) arrived, almost at the same moment, in the Colonies, equally exclusive in their pretensions, and authoritative in their demands. In the impossibility of reconciling their rival claims, the attention of the Creoles was naturally turned to the source from which they emanated, and to the means by which the vacuum in the frame of the government, occasioned by the captivity of the Sovereign, had been filled up in the Peninsula. They saw every where delegates chosen by the people exercising authority under the denomination of Juntas; and these again, deputing members of their own body to form a Central Junta, which was entrusted with the supreme command. They heard this course not only justified by the sages of the nation, but admired by the world, and pronounced by one whose name they had been taught to respect, (Don Gaspar Jŏvĕllānŏs,) "to be the undeniable and strictly natural right of any nation, placed in circumstances similar to those of Spain."^[6] They applied this doctrine to themselves, and either could not, or would not, understand the soundness of the reasoning, by which a measure, that was allowed to have been productive of the most beneficial results in the Peninsula, could be constructed into absolute treason on the opposite side of the Atlantic.^[7]

Their perception of their own rights was quickened by a deep sense of the grievances under which they laboured, as well as by the injudicious manner in which the justice of their complaints was admitted by the new governments of the Mother country, although not one of those measures was taken, by which the causes of them might have been removed. The State papers of the day furnish abundant proofs of the vacillating policy which prevailed, with regard to American affairs; and, as they have long become the property of the historian, I shall avail myself of them, without scruple, in order to illustrate it.

After proclaiming "a perfect equality of rights, between the American and Spanish subjects of the crown," and declaring the provinces of Ultramar "to be component parts of the Monarchy, and not Colonies or Factories, like those of other nations,"^[8] the Central Junta gave place to the Regency, which, desirous still farther to conciliate the Creoles, by a decree, dated the 17th May, 1810, conceded to them, under certain limitations, free trade, during the suspension of the usual intercourse with the Mother country. This wise decree, the best possible antidote, (as the author of the "Español" very justly terms it,) against a revolutionary spirit in the Colonies, was protested against by the merchants of Cadiz, who found means to induce the Regency, very soon after its publication, to repeal it; and the measure was carried into execution, with a violence as impolitic, as the resolution itself was imprudent. On the 27th of June, a second decree appeared, stating, that "Notwithstanding the lively wish of the Regency to conciliate the welfare of the Americas with that of the Mother country, it had abstained from touching upon a point of such delicacy and importance, that the least innovation with regard to it must be preceded by the repeal of the prohibitory laws of the Indies, which could not but be attended with the most serious consequences to the State: "It therefore declared the decree of the 17th of May^[9] to be spurious, and of no value or effect," and directed "all existing copies of it to be burnt, and its authors to be proceeded against;" but assured the Colonists, at the same time, "that the Regency had not ceased to meditate, and was still meditating upon some mode of relieving the Americas, by other means, from the evils and privations under which they were suffering."^[10] This imprudent disavowal of a measure, by which one great cause of the dissatisfaction of the Creoles would have been removed—known, as it was, to have been forced upon the Government by the very men, whose interests it alone consulted—(the merchants of Cadiz,) naturally tended to convince the Colonies that they had but little practical relief to expect from Spain; and that political freedom alone could emancipate them from those commercial restrictions, by which their natural resources had been so long paralized.^[11] It led them to doubt the sincerity (or the value, at least,) of every other concession; to insist upon perfect equality of representation in the Cortes, by which they hoped to acquire, (and would, undoubtedly, have acquired, ultimately,) an equality upon all other points; and, when this was denied them, to seek, by the direct road of independence, those rights which it was almost impossible to withhold, from the moment that they became sensible of their importance.

Vain were the endeavours of the Regency to soothe or cajole them; vain the admission of errors, and the promises of amendment; although the first were carried so far as to allow, "that, for upwards of twenty years, the door to preferment, in every class of public employment, had been shut against all persons of information, patriotism, and real merit,^[12] while it had been opened, by intrigue and court favour, to persons depraved, vicious, or, at best, totally unfit to command." The Colonists were not to be satisfied with words; they thought, and said, that any thing short of specific reforms would be unavailing; and that "the best laws were useless, as long as a Captain-general could affirm, with impunity, that in his government he recognized no authority superior to his own:^[13] they, therefore, regarded the abolition of offices, inseparably connected, in their minds, with the abuses, the existence of which was admitted, as a first step towards improvement, and this step they determined to take themselves, when they found the Mother country resolved to retain to the last every attribute of her former power.

Such was the state of affairs at the commencement of 1810: I have quoted documents of a later date, in order the better to illustrate it; and they render sufficiently intelligible the unanimity which characterized the first proceedings of the Creole Insurgents. Throughout the whole Continent of America, the same causes were everywhere in operation; and, with little or no difference in point of time, they every where produced the same effects: in Cărācăs, Būēnos Ayres, Bŏgŏtā, Cărthăgēnă, Chīlĕ, Upper Peru, and Mexico, by one simultaneous movement, the people deposed the European Authorities, and transferred the reins of Government to Juntas, composed almost exclusively of Native Americans.^[14]

These Juntas assumed the title of "Guardians and Preservers of the Rights of Ferdinand Vll.^[15] In some, Europeans were at first admitted: in others, the Viceroy himself, (where not personally obnoxious,) was invited to preside.^[16] In all, the most amicable sentiments towards Spain were expressed, and assurances given of a readiness to assist her in her struggle against the forces of her invader.

It is difficult now to ascertain how far these professions of attachment to the Mother country, on the part of the new Governments, were sincere. Many of their members, undoubtedly, aspired to independence from the first; but the majority would have been satisfied with moderate reforms; and it was, perhaps, the necessity of conciliating these, as well as the great mass of the people, (who certainly were not prepared to throw off their allegiance at once,) that forced the bolder spirits to temporize, and to disguise their real designs, under the mask of devoted loyalty. Be this as it may, the good understanding which the Creoles seemed to court, was but of short duration. The jealousy excited amongst the Europeans, by the loss of an authority which they regarded as their patrimony, their irritating language, and the violence of their conduct wherever the presence of European troops gave them even a momentary ascendancy, soon showed the real nature of the conquest. Contempt, and domineering habits, on the one side, begot hatred, and obstinate resistance on the other: rigour led to reprisals, reprisals to habitual cruelty; and thus the war acquired, very soon after its commencement, that sanguinary character, which nothing but private animosity, engrafted on a public quarrel, can explain, and which not even that can excuse. It is a curious fact, that the importance of these great events was not, at first, felt in the Peninsula; or if felt, was, at least, greatly underrated. So little was the character of the Creoles known, and so high the opinion entertained of the superior resources of Spain, that neither the Regency, nor the Cortes, which met, (as I have already stated,) in September, 1810, would ever take the subject into serious consideration.

The First thought to quell the spirit of insurrection in Vĕnĕzuelā, (where the flame first broke out,) by sending there a Royal Commissary, (Don Antonio Ignacio Cŏrtăvărrīă,) armed with extravagant powers,^[17] whom the Junta of Caracas, of course, refused to receive; and the Second^[18] passed days and weeks in discussing the mode in which the Americans were to be represented in the National assembly, and fixed it, at last, upon a basis to which the Colonists refused their assent. The whole coast of Vĕnĕzuelā was subsequently declared to be in a state of blockade,^[19] without a single ship of war being upon the spot to enforce the decree; and by this impolitic mixture of arrogance and weakness, the Colonies were irritated, not intimidated, and the hope of a reconciliation rendered every day more distant.

Of the possibility of such a reconciliation, in the first stages of the Revolution, no reasonable doubt can be entertained; although nothing less than a recognition of the legitimacy of the American Juntas, and the admission of their deputies to the Cortes, on the same terms, and in the same ratio, as the deputies of the Peninsula,^[20] could have effected it. But these were conditions that suited not the temporizing policy of Spain. The equality, which she proffered to her American subjects, was an equality merely of words;—an equality, which was, somehow or another, to subsist in concert with all those abuses, of which the Creoles most complained: the prohibitory system was to be maintained in all its purity; Viceroys, Audiencias, and all the paraphernalia of the Royal Government were to be kept up,^[21] with powers only the more formidable because, under the supposed reign of the law, no legal bounds were prescribed for them: their re-admission into the Colonies was insisted upon, as a preliminary to any accommodation;^[22] and yet, although these onerous conditions were not accompanied by any one practical concession, the Creoles were assured "that they were Spanish citizens, inhabiting one of the component parts of the Monarchy, and equal in rights to their brethren of the Peninsula."^[23]

From such a system as this, nothing good could result. Had the demands of the Creoles been fairly met, some arrangement might have been possible; but dissimulation only gave rise to distrust, and thus, amidst reciprocal assurances of the most amicable intentions, preparations were made for an appeal to arms, by which it was but too soon evident that the question must ultimately be decided.

In this war of words I do not mean to accuse either party of unnecessary hypocrisy; there was perhaps as much of the good faith, which both professed, on the one side, as on the other, (and this is not saying much for the aggregate;) but each was desirous to make out a case, and with this view the Cortes held out hopes, which they never intended to realize,^[24] while the Colonies replied by professions of a fidelity, which they could hardly pretend to feel. In point of fact, from the commencement of 1811, independence on the one side, and the re-establishment of the old system, with as little modification as possible, on the other, were the real objects in view.

The Spaniards urge, that this state of things was the natural consequence of the first steps taken by the Insurgents, which could lead to nothing but the emancipation of the Colonies, and were consequently opposed, from the outset, by the Mother country.

This is perhaps true; but it is not less so, that, until driven to it by actual hostilities on the part of Spain, the war-cry of Independence was not raised by any one of the Colonies;^[25] nor was it done, even then, without reluctance.

The concession of privileges, much inferior to those enjoyed by the former Colonies of Great Britain in the United States, would have satisfied the Creoles, and placed their treasures for years at the disposal of Spain. They would have purchased, at almost any price, the right of Colonial assemblies; which were very justly regarded, by the most enlightened men amongst them, as the greatest blessing that could be conferred upon their country. They might indeed, (and probably would,) have prepared the way for ultimate independence, by initiating the New States in the art of self-government; but their emancipation must have been gradual, and would have been effected, at last, on terms highly favourable to the Mother country: while the Crown, acting as a centre of union in America, would have prevented all those desultory struggles for systems, or for power, which have involved the whole Continent in the calamities of civil war, and rendered its fairest provinces a scene of desolation.

Unfortunately, both for Spain and for the New World, any project of distinct Colonial legislation was incompatible with that exclusive system, with regard to trade, which the Mother country had always conceived it to be its interest to maintain. This was the great bar to accommodation on both sides. Pecuniary advantages might have afforded a compensation for the loss of a portion of that authority, which could hardly have been retained much longer, under any circumstances, in its former extent: but freedom of discussion and commercial monopoly could not exist together. Ignorance was its basis, and the strong arm of power its support. To allow of inquiry or interference on the part of the Colonies, (and who was to check them, if once a Legislative assembly were granted?) was virtually to abrogate the prohibitory laws; and against this, the pride and the prejudices of the Peninsula alike rebelled.

Neither the Constitution of 1812, nor the overthrow of that Constitution in 1814, nor its re-establishment in 1820, created any material difference in the Colonial policy of Spain: the King, on his return from captivity, though he reprobated all the other acts of the Cortes, adopted their system with regard to America, and even pursued it with additional vigour. General Murillo's expedition against Carthagena took place a year after the restoration, (1815,) and a second expedition, upon a still larger scale, was, as is well known, preparing in 1819, and led to the Revolution of 1820.

It is unnecessary to enter into the details of this contest, which possess but little interest for the European reader: it is sufficient, for my present purpose, to state, that in Columbia, Mexico, and Peru, the war has been prosecuted with all the energy that the exhausted state of the finances of the Peninsula would admit of; and that, at the close of a struggle of seventeen years, the result has been every where the same. Throughout the whole continent of America, Spain does not retain one single inch of ground: her troops, after a gallant resistance, have been driven from their last strongholds, both on the Eastern and Western coasts, (St. John of Ulloa, and Callao,) and her flag is proscribed on those shores, where, for three hundred years, it waved without a rival. This mighty change has been slowly, but progressively, accomplished. It is not the work of intrigue or faction, but the natural effect of a change as mighty in the minds of men. To recede is now impossible; not because the Republics of the New World have discovered that standard for regulating political opinions, which has been sought in vain in the Old; but because, whatever differences may prevail as to form, the consciousness of a political existence, and a sense of the advantages of an unrestrained intercourse with foreign nations, when once acquired, can never again be lost. It might rather, indeed, be a matter of surprise, that, with such inducements before them, and so great a superiority of numerical strength, the Colonies should not have brought the contest to an earlier termination, did not their position with regard, both to the Mother country, and to each other, sufficiently explain the causes of the delay.

Scattered over a vast continent, separated by impenetrable wildernesses, or by chains of mountains still more impassable, and kept purposely, under the old system, in a state of ignorance with respect to each other, the New States commenced their contest for freedom without the advantage of any previous combination, or concert.

Even at the present day, the natives of Mexico and Chilé,—of Buenos Ayres and Bogotā,—know as little of each other, as the Neapolitan peasant and the Lapland boor; and, in most cases, England would present the only medium of communication between them.^[26] At the commencement of the Revolution, their estrangement was still greater, and it may be questioned whether the fact of the existence of some of the New States was at all generally known to the rest. With each other's resources, and means of defence, they certainly had no acquaintance. Each therefore, individually, pursued its object, unconnected with the rest; and each was obliged to cope, singly, with whatever force Spain could bring to bear against it.

In addition to this, they had internal as well as external enemies to contend with: the old Spaniards, (known, in the annals of the Revolution, by the names of Găchŭpīnĕs, Gōdŏs, Patriotas, and various other designations,) distributed throughout the possessions of Ultramar,—wealthy, powerful, and connected by intermarriages with the most influential families amongst the Creoles themselves,—were a check to all their operations.

Where they did not openly oppose, they sowed the seeds of discord amongst the leaders of the Independent cause: while, from their intimate acquaintance with the resources of the country, they were enabled, both by their counsels, and the liberality of their donations, to render the most essential services to the Royalist generals.

Nor was this all: the first movements of the Insurgents had indeed been eminently successful; and, (as we have already seen,) with the exception of Mexico, a single year had sufficed to wrest, from the hands of the Europeans, the authority of which they had so long been the sole depositaries. But this was the only point upon which any sort of unanimity prevailed amongst the Creoles. Left to themselves, they knew not how to dispose of the power, which they had so unexpectedly acquired, and it became the apple of discord amongst all who had any pretensions to a share of it. They were totally inexperienced in the science of government, and had no good model to follow:^[27] it is not surprising, therefore, that they should have engrafted upon the stern despotism under which they were brought up, the wildest theories of the French school, nor that their ardour, in the cause of liberty, should have cooled, amidst the many evils which these theories brought upon them.^[28] They soon learnt that tyranny was not, as they had fondly supposed, an heir loom in the family of the Kings of Spain, but might be exercised, just as effectually, in the name of the Sovereign people, by any man, or set of men, to whom that people was supposed to have delegated its authority; and, in their despair at not being able to fix, at once, a balance of power, many would almost have purchased tranquillity, by submitting again to that yoke, to which time had lent its sanction, and given respectability. I shall not, I hope, be accused by the friends of American Independence, of a wish to colour this part of the picture too highly; but if I should be suspected of any such intention, a reference to the first acts of any of the new Juntas, will be sufficient to clear me from the imputation.

It will be found, I believe, that, in almost every instance, they exercised the power with which they were entrusted, in the most wanton and oppressive manner.^[29] Not only opposition to their will, but hesitation in the adoption of their political creeds, (however exaggerated, or absurd,) was visited with the severest penalties. Nor was it to their own territory alone, that this spirit of proselytism was confined; the instant that a Province, or State, had determined upon the principles to be adopted for its own guidance, it endeavoured to force these same principles upon its neighbours, and stamped the least demur in conforming to them, as treason to the common cause.^[30]

Sovereigns by the grace of "Adam and Eve," (as Blanco White somewhere says of the Cortes,) "they ought to have reflected upon the injustice of attempting to dictate to others, who, by the same undeniable title, were free as themselves:" but, far from this, the great object of every Junta throughout America, appears to have been, to extend its own authority, and its own creed as to the abstract rights of man, on the plea of the public good. In it, as in the natural diversity of opinions, which prevailed, where no previous understanding existed, and no fixed principles were known, we find the real cause of that protracted struggle, by which the country was desolated; Buenos Ayres wished to prescribe laws for Montevideo, and Potosi,—Cărācăs for Sānta Fē,—Chile for Pĕrū. Each district, and family, again, sought to extend its jurisdiction, or influence: none would recognize any sort of superiority on the part of the others: the sword was the universal arbitrator in every difference: predatory bands were organized, and lived at large upon the country: the common cause was lost sight of amidst these interminable disputes, while the common enemy, whose object was, at least, clear and well defined, took advantage of them to re-establish an authority, which, under other circumstances, must have sunk at once.

Such are the general features of the contest between Spain and her former Colonies. To throw off the yoke, in the first instance, was a task comparatively easy; but to re-organize society after the dissolution of all earlier ties, to curb passions once let loose, to give to any party, or system, a decided ascendancy, where claims, (or pretensions) were equal, and superior talent rare,—this was an art that nothing but experience could teach; that nothing, at least, but the most bitter experience has ever been known to teach, in the annals of mankind.

Fourteen years of anarchy and bloodshed, have brought the Americans to something more like unity of plan, and will, probably, give stability to the system which they have, with some slight modifications, universally adopted. With regard to their Independence, the question has long been decided; differences of opinion may exist upon other points, but, upon this, unanimity certainly prevails; and I believe that any hostile demonstration on the part of Spain, would, every where, be found a sovereign remedy for domestic feuds. These feuds too, however embarrassing in their effects, ought to be rather matter of regret, than surprise, to those who reflect that no nation has ever yet attained any reasonable portion of civil liberty without them. They are a part of that fearful process, by which it appears that, while human nature remains what it is, abuses, even when past endurance, can alone be corrected. Our own history, as well as that of our neighbours, attests this melancholy truth; and, after the lapse of more than a century, the party distinctions of the day still bespeak the fury of the party-spirit of our ancestors. The same scene, modified only by differences of climate, and rendered less interesting by the want of early education amongst the principal actors, is now representing in the New World. The struggle, like every one in which the passions of the people are engaged, has been accompanied by its usual attendants, bloodshed and desolation; but humanity may console itself with the hope that the storm is now gone by, and that future prosperity, however dearly purchased, will afford a compensation for all past sufferings.

The extent of these sufferings throughout Spanish America, (for, in every part of it the contest has borne the same character,) a précis of the Mexican Revolution will enable us more fully to appreciate.

1. Installed 25th September, 1808.
2. First Regency, 29th January, 1810. Vide Decree of Central Junta of that date. Isla de Leon.
3. Second Regency 18—29th October, 1810. Vide Decree of Cortes of that date.
4. A reference to the history of the year 1808, will show, that the only title by which the first Spanish Juntas held their authority, was the nomination of a mob, which, in each of the great cities, called, by acclamation, those persons, in whom it placed confidence, to assume the management of its affairs.
5. Each assumed the title of "Junta Soberana de España y de las Indias."
6. Vide "Defence of Central Junta, by Jovellanos," in which he assumes, as his second undeniable axiom, "That a people, seeing its existence threatened, and knowing that the ministers of that authority, which ought to direct and defend it, are either intimidated or suborned, is necessarily driven to self-defence, and acquires an extraordinary and legitimate right of insurrection."—7th October, 1808.
7. It is impossible too strongly to insist upon the fact, that all the proceedings of the American Independents were but a transcript of those which had taken place in the Mother country. They applied to the Cortes, at a later period, the very principles which the Cortes applied to Ferdinand VII; and refused to submit to that despotism, in the hands of a popular assembly, which was admitted by that assembly to be intolerable, while in the hands of a monarch.
8. Vide Proclamation, dated Seville, 5th June, 1809; and "Aviso" of 10th January, 1810.
   "Considerando que los vastos y preciosos dominios que lă Espana posee en las Indias, no son, propiamente, Colonias, o' Factorias, como los de otras naciones, sino una parte esencial, é integrante, de la Monarquía Española."
9. "Apocrifa y de ningun valor ni efecto."
10. "Sin que por esto haya dexado de pensar, y piense, el Consejo, en aliviar, por otros medios, a' las Americas, de los males, y privaciones que sufren,
    (Signed)"Castaños,
    "Cadiz, 27th June, 1810.""Pedro Bishop of Oreuse," &c.
11. Things were carried so far, with respect to the Decree of the 17th of May, that the Minister and several clerks of the Colonial department were put under arrest, when it was repealed, in order to induce the public to believe that it had not, in fact, received the sanction of the Regency
12. Lest these terms be thought too strong, I subjoin the passage in the original, as contained in a Circular of the Regency, dated, Isla de Leon, 15th February, 1810. "Convencido el Consejo," &c. "de que el favor, la intriga, y la inmoralidad, al mismo tiempo que han tenido cerrada la puerta, de veinte anos a' esta parte, para toda clase de empleos, a' los sugetos de luces, patriotismo, y verdadero merito, la han franqueado a' una porción de personas, depravadas, inmorales, o'ineptas quando menos."
13. Vide Observations of Junta of Caracas, on the above Circular, dated 20th May, 1810.
14. The revolution of Cărācăs took place on the 19th of April, 1810; that of Buenos Ayres, 25th May; of New Grenada, 3d July; of Bŏgŏtā, 20th July; of Cărthăgēnă, 18th August; of Chīlĕ, 18th September; of Mexico, 16th September.—Vide "Representation of American Deputies to the Cortes," dated 1st August, 1811. Appendix.
15. Junta Conservadora, or Cuerpo Conservador, de los Derechos del Señor Don Fernando 7mo.
16. As at Buenos Ayres, where the Congress was convoked, and a Provisional Government formed, at the suggestion of the Viceroy, Don Baltasar Hidalgo de Cisneros.—Vide his Proclamation of 18th May, 1810.
17. His commission empowered him "to assume the Regal power in its fullest extent:—to remove, suspend, or dismiss the Authorities of every rank and class; to pardon or punish the guilty, at pleasure; to make use of the monies belonging to the Royal Treasury; and to give orders, which were to be obeyed as emanating directly from the King's own person.—Vide Commission, dated 1st August, 1810
18. Vide Sessions of Cortes, of 9th, 10th, 11th, 14th, and 16th January, 1811.
19. Decrees of Regency, of 21st August, 1810.
20. The Castes, or mixed breeds, and more especially those in any way contaminated by a mixture of African blood, were not allowed to vote in the elections; and consequently, the number of deputies to be returned by each Colony, depended upon its White population alone. This regulation ensured to the European deputies a permanent majority in the Cortes.
21. Vide Terms proposed in a Proclamation of Cortavarria's, dated Puerto Rico, 7th Dec. 1810, which may be taken as a criterion for the rest, and which amount to the re-establishment of things in statu quó, and nothing more.
22. Vide Correspondence between the new Viceroy Elio, and the Junta of Buenos Ayres, 15th January, 1811, in which the dissolution of the Junta, and the immediate recognition of Elio, as Viceroy, are required.
23. Vide proclamations of Regency, passim; and particularly those already referred to.
24. I do not wish to animadvert upon the conduct of the Cortes with unnecessary severity. They have fallen themselves "from their high estate," and their misfortunes are their protection. But, in considering the feelings of the Americans towards this assembly, it must not be forgotten that the Cortes were the first to sanction the barbarous principle that, "with rebels, and Insurgents, no engagements were binding." They approved of the violation of the capitulation of Caracas, by Monteverde, in 1812; the first of a long series of similar breaches of the public faith; and, with such facts as this before them, it was hardly to be expected that the Americans should place much confidence in their professions of amity, equality, and brotherly love.
25. The Declaration of Independence of Venezuela (which was the first) did not take place till the 5th July, 1811,—seven months after the blockade.
26. A letter from Buenos Ayres to Mexico, would be sent by the double line of packets now established between London and Rio de la Plata, and London and Veracruz. And, although there may be, once or twice in the year, a direct intercourse between Mexico and Peru, or Chilé, by the Pacific, letters, at all other times, would be forwarded by the English mail.
27. Spain was their only model, and to her most of their errors may be traced. The want of fixed principles, the preference of theory to practice, the dilatory habits of those in power at one time, and their ill-judged strides towards impracticable reforms at another,—all are of the modern Spanish school, as are the bombastical addresses to the people, the turgid style which disfigures most of the public documents of the Revolution, the intolerance, and jealousy of strangers, which are only now beginning to subside.
28. It is melancholy to reflect how soon the Americans were initiated in all the cant of Revolutions, and taught to distrust the bewitching terms of patriotism and public felicity, under the sanction of which they found themselves a prey to private ambition, anarchy, and distress.
29. See, as an instance, an order of the day published at Buenos Ayres on the 6th December, 1810, by which a citizen who had, when drunk, given a toast, at a dinner, offensive to the President, was banished for life.
30. Vide a "Declaration of the Rights of the People," sanctioned by the Congress of Venezuela, 1st of July, 1811, followed by a law for regulating the liberty of the press; by the nineteenth article of which, any one who should publish any political writing contrary to the system then established in Venezuela, was condemned to death: 25th July, 1811.