Monsieur Bossu's Treatise of the Epick Poem/Chapter 2

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CHAP. II.
What is the Nature of the Epick Poem.

The most considerable difference my Subject presents me with between the Style of the Ancients, and that of the last Ages, is, That our way of Speaking is plain, proper, and without the Turn: Whereas theirs was full of Mysteries and Allegories. The Truth was mask'd under these ingenious Inventions, which for their Excellence go under the name of Fables, or Sayings; as if there were as much difference between these fabulous Discourses of the Wise, and the ordinary Language of the Vulgar, as there is between the Language that is proper to Men, and the Sounds brute Beasts make use of to express their Passions and Sensations.

At first the Fables were employ'd in speaking of the Divine Nature according to the Notion they then had of it. This sublime Subject made the first Poets to be stil'd Divines, and Poetry the Language of the Gods. They divided the Divine Attributes as it were into so many Persons; because the Infirmity of a Humane Mind cannot sufficiently conceive, or explain so much Power and Action in a Simplicity so great and indivisible as is that of God. And perhaps they were jealous of the Advantages they reap'd from such excellent and refin'd Learning, and which they thought the vulgar part of Mankind was not worthy of.

They could not tell us of the Operations of this Almighty Cause, without speaking at the same time of its Effects: So that to Divinity they added Physiology, and treated thereof, without quitting the Umbrages of their Allegorical Expressions.

But Man being the chief and the most noble of all the Effects which God produc'd, and nothing being so proper, nor more useful to Poets than this Subject, they have added it to the former, and treated of the Doctrine of Morality after the same manner as they did that of Divinity and Philosophy: And from Morality thus discours'd of, has Art form'd that kind of Poem and Fable, which we call the Epick.

What the Divines made their Divinity, that did the Epick Poets make their Morality. But that infinite Variety of the Actions and Operations of the Divine Nature (to which our Understanding bears but little proportion) did as it were force them upon dividing the single Idea of the only one God into several Persons, under the different Names of Jupiter, Juno, Neptune, and the rest. And on the other hand, the Nature of Moral Philosophy being such as never lays down a Rule for any particular thing, the Epick Poets were oblig'd to unite in one single Idea, in one and the same Person, and in an Action that appear'd singular, all that look'd like it in different Persons, and in various Actions, which might be thus contain'd as so many Species under their Genus.

Therefore when Aristotle speaks to this purpose, That Poetry is more serious than History, and that Poets are greater Philosophers than Historians are:[1] He does not only speak this to magnifie the Excellence of this Art, but to inform us also of the Nature of it. [2]Poesie, says he, teaches Morality not by Recital only as an Historian, who barely tells us what Alcibiades for Instance ('tis Aristotle's own Instance) did or suffer'd: But by proposing whatever a Person, let the Poet call him by what name he pleases, ought either necessarily, or in all probability, to have said or done upon that or the like occasion? 'Tis in this Nature that the Poet lays down the bad Consequences of an ill-grounded Design or a wicked Action; or else the Reward of good Actions, and the Satisfaction one receives from a Design form'd by Vertue, and manag'd by Prudence. Thus in the [3]Epopea, according to Aristotle, let the Names be what they will, yet the Persons and the Actions are Feign'd, Allegorical, and Ʋniversal; not Historical and Singular.

Horace is likewise of the same mind, as we shall see hereafter. Only by the way we cannot but observe, that he not only says [4]that Poets teach Men Morality full as well as Philosophers, but in that he even gives Homer the Pre-eminence.

The reason Poets are more excellent herein than the plain downright Philosopher, is this, [5]that every sort of Poem is in general an Imitation. Now Imitation is extremely natural, and pleases every body: By which means this way of proposing things is more charming, and more proper to take with an Audience. Besides Imitation is an Instruction by Examples; and Examples are very proper to perswade, since they prove such or such a thing is feasible. In short, [6]Imitation is so far the Essence of Poetry, that it is Poetry it self, as Aristotle the first Founder of this Art tells us: And [7]Horace recommends it very particularly to the Poet he would create.

But thô Poets play the Moral Philosophers, yet still they are no less Divines. The Morality they deal withal, does indispensibly oblige them to have a Vein of Divinity run thrô all their Works: Because the Knowledge, the Fear, and the Love of God; in a Word, Piety and Religion, are the chief and solidest Foundations of other Vertues, and of all Morality.

The Presence of the Deity, and the Care such an August Cause ought to take about any Action, obliges the Poet to represent this Action as great, important, and manag'd by [8]Kings and Princes. It obliges him likewise to think and speak in an elevated way above the Vulgar, and in a Style that may in some sort keep up the Character of the Divine Persons he introduces. [9]To this end serves the Poetical and Figurative Expression, and the Majesty of the Heroick Verse.

But all this, being divine and surprizing, may quite ruine all Probability: Therefore the Poet should take special care as to that Point, since his chief aim is to instruct, and without Probability any Action is less likely to perswade.

To all this the Poets are oblig'd by the substance of the Things they propose to themselves as the subject Matter of their Poems and Instructions. The manner of teaching them usefully and methodically, has likewise oblig'd them to add several other Rules.

The Epopéa's business is with the Morals and Habitudes more than the Passions. These rise on a sudden, and their Heat is soon over; but the Habitudes are more calm, and come on, and go off more leisurely. Therefore the Epick Action cannot be contain'd in one single day, as the Dramatick can: It must have a longer and more just space allow'd it, than that of Tragedy, which is only allow'd for the Passions.

This Distinction makes the Tragedy and the Epopéa differ very much. The violence of Tragedy requires a great deal more lively and brisk Representation than that of a Recital: besides it is all Action, and the Poet says never a Word, as he does in the Epopéa, where there are no Actors.

But if in this the Epopéa is inferiour to the Drama, yet 'tis superiour to both Philosophy and History: because 'tis a great deal more active than bare Philosophy, and the Recitals of History: And thô it does not present Actors to the Eyes of the Spectators, yet it ought at least more frequently than Historians, to break off the Thread of its Discourse by the Speeches of its Personages. This Aristotle orders, when he says, that the Narration of the Epick ought to be Dramatick, that is to say, very active.

It has likewise its Passions, which give it no small Advantage over Philosophy and History: But in this it is inferiour to Tragedy. For thô it has a mixture of all the Passions, yet Joy and Admiration are the most essential to it. These indeed contribute most towards the making us wise Men: Admiration and Curiosity are the Cause of Sciences; and nothing engages us so forcibly as Pleasure. So that these two Passions must never be wanting to any invented Piece, if we would be inform'd in what we are indispensibly oblig'd to know.

To conclude, because the Precepts had need be [10]concise, that so they may be more easily conceiv'd, and less burden the Memory; and because nothing can be more effectual thereto, than proposing one single Idea, and collecting all things so well together, that so they may be present to our Minds all at once, the Poets have reduc'd all to one [11]single Action, under one and the same Design, and in a Body whose Members and Parts should be homogeneous.


  1. φιλοσοφώτερον κὰι σῶουδαιότερον Ποίησις Ἱστοείας ὀστιν. Poet. c. 9.
  2. (Greek characters) Ibid.
  3. (Greek characters) Ibid.
  4. Quicquid fit pulchrum, quid turpe, quid utile, quid non, Plenius & melius Chrysippo & Crantore dicit. Epist. Lib. i. Ep. 2.
  5. (Greek characters) Arist. Poet. c. i.
  6. (Greek characters) Poet. c. 4.
  7. Respicere exemplar vitæ morumq; jubebo Doctum Imitatorum, & veras hinc ducere Voces. Hor. Art. Poet.
  8. Res gestæ regumque Ducumque. Hor. Art. Poet.
  9. Cui mens divinior atque os Magna sonaturum des Nominis hujus honorem. Horat.
  10. Quicquid praecipecs esto brevis, ut cito dicta Percipiant animi dociles, teneantq; fideles. Hor. Poet.
  11. Denique sit quodvis simplex duntaxat, & unum. Ibid.