Monsieur Bossu's Treatise of the Epick Poem/Chapter 22
CHAP. IV.
The Word Episode passing from the Theatre to the Epopéa, did not change its Nature: all the Difference [1]Aristotle makes between them is, that the Episodes of Tragedy are shortest, and the Episodes in these great Poems are by much the longest. So slight a Difference should be no hinderance to our speaking of both after the same manner.
This Word, according to Aristotle, is capable of three distinct Meanings. The first arises from that Enumeration of all the parts of Tragedy, which we mention'd. For if there are only four parts, viz. The Prologue, the Chorus, the Episode, and the Epilogue; it follows, that the Episode in Tragedy is whatever does not make up the other three; and that if you substract those three, the Episode necessarily comprehends all that remains. And since in our times they make Tragedies without either Chorus, Prologue, or Epilogue; this Term Episode signifies all the Tragedy which is made now-a-days. So likewise the Epick Episode will be the whole Poem. There is nothing to be substracted thence, but the Proposition and the Invocation, which are instead of the Prologue. In this sense the Epopéa and Tragedy have each of them but one single Episode, or rather, are nothing else but an Episode: and if the Parts and Incidents of which the Poet composes his Work have an ill Connexion together, then the Poem will be Episodical and defective, as we hinted before.
But as all that was sung in Tragedy was, according to Aristotle's Expression, call'd the Chorus in the Singular Number; and yet its being in the Singular was no reason why each part (when it was divided into several) should not be call'd the Chorus too; and so several Chorus's be introduc'd: just so in the Episode, each Incident, and each part of the Fable and the Action, is not only stil'd a part of the Episode, but even an Entire Episode. 'Tis in this sense that [2] Aristotle said, the Madness of Orestes, and his Cure by Expiatory Sacrifices, were two Episodes. This Term taken in this sense signifies each part of the Action exprest in the Model, and first Constitution of the Fable; such as the Absence and Travels of Ulysses the Disturbance of his Family, and his Presence which re-adjusted all things.
Aristotle tells us of a third sort of Episodes, when he says, that whatever is comprehended and exprest in the first Platform of the Fable is Proper, and the other Things are Episodes. [3] This is what he says just after he had propos'd the Model of the Odysseïs. We must then in the Odysseïs it self examine what this third sort of Episode is, the better to know wherein it differs from the second. We shall see how the Incidents he calls proper, are absolutely necessary: and how those, which he distinguishes by the Name of Episodes, are in one sense necessary and probable; and in another sense not at all necessary, but such as the Poet had liberty to make use of, or not.
After Homer had laid the first Ground-work of the Fable, and prepar'd the Model, such as we have observ'd it to be, it was not then at his Choice to make or not make Ulysses absent from his Country. This Absence was Essential: [4] Aristotle stiles and places it among those things that are proper to the Fable. But the Adventure of Antiphates, that of Circe, of the Sirens, of Scylla, of Charybdis, &c. he does not call such. The Poet was left at his full liberty to have made choice of any other, as well as these things. So that, they are only probable, and such Episodes as are distinct from the main Action, to which in this sense they are neither proper nor necessary.
But now let us see in what sense they are necessary thereto. Since the Absence of Ulysses was necessary, it follows, that not being at home, he must be somewhere else. Though then the Poet had his liberty to make use of none of these particular Adventures we mention'd, and he made choice of; yet had he not an absolute liberty of making use of none at all: but if he had omitted these, he had been necessarily oblig'd to substitute others in their room; otherwise he would have left out part of the Matter contain'd in his Model, and his Poem would have been defective.
This last sense of the Word Episode is not so different from the second as it seems at first sight, since it still informs us that an Episode is a necessary part of the Action. The difference between them lies in this, that an Episode in the second sense is the Foundation and Ground-work of the Episode in the third Sense: and that this third Sense adds to the second the probable Circumstances of Places, Princes, and People, where and among whom he was cast by Neptune, and abode during his Absence from Ithaca.
We must likewise take notice, that in this third Sense, the Incident which serves as a Foundation to an Episode, ought to be of some Extent and Compass, and that without this an Essential part of the Action and Fable is not an Episode. As in the Example of Oedipus which we propos'd; the Cure of the Thebans is a part proper and essential to the Fable, and would be an Episode in the second Sense. But because the Poet has not amplified this Incident by any Circumstance, therefore 'tis not an Episode in the third Sense: 'tis only the Foundation of such an Episode, which the Poet made no use of. This Observation makes it clear, that in reality the first Platform of the Action contains only what is proper and necessary to the Fable, and has not any Episode; as Aristotle says of the Model he has given us of the Odysseïs.
'Tis therefore in this third Sense we are to understand the Precept of Aristotle, which orders us not to form the Episodes till after we have made Choice of the Names we would give our Personages. Homer could not have spoken of a Fleet and Navy, as he has, if instead of the Names of Achilles, Agamemnon, and the Iliad, he had made choice of those of Capaneus, Adrastus, and the Thebaid, as he might have done without spoiling the Essence of the Fable.
If one should form an Episode, whereof not only the Names and Circumstances were not necessary, but whose very Ground-work and Foundation was not a part of the Action, that serves for the Subject-Matter of a Poem: then this Episode would have a sorry Connexion, and would render the Fable Episodical. This Irregularity is discernable, when one can so take away a whole Episode, without substituting any thing in its room, that this Substraction shall make no Vacuum, nor Defect in the Poem. The Story of Hypsipyle inserted in the Thebaid, is an Instance of these defective Episodes. If the whole Narration of this famous Matron were taken away, the Sequel of the main Action would be but so much the better; one should not perceive that the Poet had forgot any thing, or wanted the least Member of the Body of his Action.
But suppose any one should say, "That if these particular Incidents were natural and necessary Members, it would thence follow, that they would not be foreign, extraneous, additional, and inserted Pieces." To this I answer, that all this is true; but withall, that the Thing has retain'd its original and native Name, though it has quite lost its Nature. Aristotle, who as well as others has retain'd this dubious Term, prescribes the Rules of Tragedy under the Name of Episode. Therefore in this Treatise, wherein I only follow his Precepts, I am oblig'd to take every thing in his sense, and not spoil the Nature of the Things, which he explains, by a superstitious adhering to a Word that has chang'd its Nature ever since its first Rise.
I will maintain then that the Word Episode in the Epick Poem does not signifie in extraneous foreign Peice, even in Aristotle's opinion: but that it signifies the whole Narration of the Poet, or a necessary and essential part of the Action and the proper Subject, extended and amplified by probable Circumstances.
This Conclusion deserves a more particular Examination.