More v. Steinbach/Opinion of the Court

by Stephen Johnson Field

United States Supreme Court

127 U.S. 70

More  v.  Steinbach

The question presented for determination in this case relates to the effect of proceedings taken under the act of March 3, 1851, to ascertain and settle private land claims in California, upon the claims of parties holding concessions of lands in that state under the Spanish or the Mexican government. By the session of California to the United States, the rights of the inhabitants to their property were not affected. They remained as before. Political jurisdiction and sovereignty over the territory and public property alone passed to the United States. U.S. v. Percheman, 7 Pet. 51, 87. Previous to the cession numerous grants of land in California had been made by the Spanish and Mexican governments to private parties. Some of these were of tracts with defined boundaries; some were for specific quantities of land to be selected from areas containing a much larger quantity; and others were of lands known only by particular names, without any designated boundaries. To ascertain what rights had thus passed, and to* carry out the obligation which the government of the United States had assumed to protect all rights of property of those who remained citizens of the country, congress passed the act of March 3, 1851. By it a board of commissioners was created, to which all persons claiming land by virtue of any right or title derived from the Mexican or Spanish governments could present their claims, and have them examined and their validity determined; and the claimants could appear by counsel and produce documentary evidence and witnesses in support of their claims. The act required all persons thus claiming lands in California to present their claims to the board within two years from its date, and declared in substance that if, upon examination, they were found by the board, and by the courts of the United States to which an appeal was allowed, to be valid, the claims should be confirmed and surveyed, and patents issued therefor to the claim ants. But the act also declared that all lands, the claims to which were not presented to the board within that period, should be considered as part of the public domain of the United States. In Beard v. Federy, 3 Wall. 490, this court, while stating that it was unnecessary to express any opinion as to the validity of the legislation in respect to perfect titles acquired under the former government, held that it was not subject to any constitutional objection, so far as it applied to grants of an imperfect character, which required further action of the political department to render them perfect. The grant to Manuel Jimeno, under which the defendants claim, was one of an imperfect character. Upon the cession of the country there remained a further proceeding to be had with respect to that grant before an indefeasible title could vest in the grantee. A formal transfer of the property to the grantee by officers of the government was necessary. The proceeding was termed a judicial delivery of possession. Until it was had the grant was an imperfect one. As preliminary to or as part of the official delivery, the boundaries of the land were to be established, after summoning the neighboring proprietors as witnesses to the proceeding. Malarin v. U.S., 1 Wall. 282, 289. No such official delivery of possession was had under the former government to the grantee, Jimeno, though the grant to him contains these conditions: 'He shall petition the proper judge to be put in judicial possession by him in virtue of this document, by whom the boundaries shall be marked out, on the limits of which he shall place the proper landmarks. The land now granted is of the extent of four square leagues, more or less, as shown by the map which accompanies the espediente. The judge who shall give him possession shall have it measured in confr mity with the evidence, the surplus that results remaining in the nation for its proper use.'

The authority and jurisdiction of Mexican officials terminated on the 7th of July, 1846. On that day the forces of the United States took possession of Monterey, the capital of California, and soon afterwards occupied the principal portions of the country, and the military occupation continued until after the treaty of peace. The political department of the government designated that day as the period when the conquest of California was complete and the authority of the officials of Mexico ceased. In this matter the judiciary follows the political department. U.S. v. Yorba, 1 Wall. 412, 423; U.S. v. Pico, 23 How. 321, 326; Hornsby v. U.S., 10 Wall. 224, 239. After that date no alcaldes elected by the citizens had any jurisdiction to deliver judicial possession. This was distinctly held in the case of Fremont v. U.S., 17 How. 542, 563. In answer to the objection there taken that there was no survey or judicial possession of the land granted to Alvarado, under whom Fremont claimed, the court said: 'The alcalde had no right to survey the land or deliver judicial possession, except by the permission of the American authorities. He could do nothing that would in any degree affect the rights of the United States to the public property; and the United States could not justly claim the forfeiture of the land for a breach of these conditions, without showing that there were officers in California, under the military government, who were authorized by a law of congress to make this survey, and deliver judicial possession to the grantee. It is certain that no such authority existed after the overthrow of the Mexican government.' The doctrine invoked by the defendants, that the laws of a conquered or ceded country, except so far as they may affect the political institutions of the new sovereign, remain in force after the conquest or cession until changed by him, does not aid their defense. That doctrine has no application to laws authorizing the alienation of any portions of the public domain, or to officers charged under the former government with that power. No proceedings affecting the rights of the new sovereign over public property can be taken except in pursuance of his authority on the subject. The cases in the supreme court of California and in this court which recognize as valid grants of lots in the peublo or city of San Francisco by alcaldes appointed or elected after the occupation of the country by the forces of the United States, do not militate against this view. Those officers were agents of the pueblo or city, and acted under its authority in the distribution of its municipal lands. They did not assume to alienate or affect the title to lands which was in the United States. Welch v. Sullivan, 8 Cal. 147; White v. Moses, 21 Cal. 34; Merryman v. Bourne, 9 Wall. 592. It follows from what is thus said that it would be a sufficient answer to the contention of the defendants that the grant under which they claim to have acquired a perfect title conferred none. The grantees were not invested with such title, and could not be without an official delivery of possession under the Mexican government, and such delivery was not had, and could not be had, after the cession of the country, except by American authorities acting under a law of congress. But independently of this consideration, and assuming that the title under the grant was perfect, the obligation of the grantee was none the less to present his claim to the board of land commissioners for examination. The ascertainment of existing claims was a matter of vital importance to the government in the execution of its policy respecting the public lands; and congress might well declare that a failure to present a claim should be deemed an abandonment of it, and that the lands covered by it should be considered a part of the public domain. Certain it is that a claimant presenting his claim to the board for examination and confirmation, in order that he might subsequently acquire a patent from the government, is bound by the adjudication of the board. After submitting his claim to its examination and judgment, he cannot afterwards be heard to say that in adjudicating upon his title the board erred, or that the land department in determining the boundaries of his claim erred, in order that he may claim outside of the survey and patent other lands which he considers covered by his grant. He cannot repudiate a jurisdiction to which he has appealed; and the estoppel extends to parties claiming under him. Boyle v. Hinds, 2 Sawy. 527; Cassidy v. Carr, 48 Cal. 339.

In determining claims under Mexican grants the board of land commissioners was required by the act under which it was created to be governed by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the law of nations, the laws, usages, and customs of the government from which the claim was derived, the principles of equity and the decisions of the supreme court of the United States, so far as they were applicable. And in U.S. v. Fossatt, 21 How. 445, 449, this court, if considering what was involved in the inquiry into the validity of a claim to land under that act, said: 'It is obvious that the answer to this question must depend, in a great measure, upon the state and condition of the evidence. It may present questions of the genuineness and authenticity of the title, and whether the evidence is forged or fraudulent; or it may involve an inquiry into the authority of the officer to make a grant, or whether he was in the exercise of the faculties of his office when it was made; or it may disclose questions of the capacity of the grantee to take, or whether the claim has been abandoned or is a subsisting title, or has been forfeited for a breach of conditions. Questions of each kind here mentioned have been considered by the court in cases arising under this law. But, in addition to these questions upon the vitality of the title, there may arise questions of extent, quantity, location, boundary, and legal operation, that are equally essential in determining the validity of the claim In affirming a claim to land under a Spanish or Mexican grant, to be valid within the law of nations, the stipulations of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and the usage of those governments, we imply something more than that certain papers are genuine, legal, and translative of property. We affirm that the ownership and possession of land of definite boundaries rightfully attach to the grantee.' Trust relations respecting the property between the patentee and others may be enforced equally with such relations between him and others respecting any other property, but until the patent is set aside or modified by proceedings taken at the instance of the government, all the questions necessarily involved in the determination of a claim to land under a Spanish or Mexican grant, and in establishing its boundaries, are concluded by it in all courts and proceedings, except as against parties claiming by superior title, such as would enable them to resist successfully any action of the government in disposing of the property. The confirmation takes effect, by relation, as of the date of the first proceeding commenced before the land commissioners; and an adjudication that at that date it was valid, is also an adjudication that it was valid at the date it was made. And the patent which follows the confirmation and approved survey, and is a matter of record, is itself evidence of the regularity of preliminary proceedings. As was said in Beard v. Federy, 3 Wall. 478, 492, 'by it the government declares that the claim asserted was valid under the laws of Mexico; that it was entitled to recognition and protection by the stipulations of the treaty, and might have been located under the former government, and is correctly located now, so as to embrace the premises as they are surveyed and e scribed. As against the government this record, so long as it remains unvacated, is conclusive. And it is equally conclusive against parties claiming under the government by title subsequent. It is in this effect of the patent as a record of the government that its security and protection chiefly lie.'

It remains to consider two other positions taken by the appellants: First, that the sale to Poli of the ex-mission of San Buenaventura was illegal and void, and hence that no title passed to the patentee on its confirmation;second, the want of any allegation in the complaint, or any evidence in the proofs, that the plaintiffs were in possession of the premises when this suit was commenced. In support of the first position the appellants cite U.S. v. Workman, 1 Wall. 745. In that case it was held that the departmental assembly of California had no power to authorize the governor to alienate any public lands of the department, and that its own power was restricted to that conferred by the laws of colonization, which was simply to approve or disapprove of the grants made by the governor under those laws. But it does not follow that there were not exceptional circumstances with reference to the sale to Poli, which authorized the governor to make it. We are bound to suppose that such was the case, in the absence of any evidence to the coutrary, from the fact that the validity of his claim under it was confirmed by the board of land commissioners, by the district court of the United States, and by this court on appeal. The question of its validity was thereby forever closed, except as against those who might be able to show a prior and better title to the premises. The defendants show no title whatever; but, on the contrary, the grant under which they assert title has been, by the adjudication of the board of land commissioners, and by the survey and patent, confined to other land. Second, as to the want of any allegation in the complaint of possession by the plaintiffs, or any evidence of that fact in the proofs, it is sufficient to say that, by section 738 of the Code of Civil Procedure of California, a plaintiff asserting title to lands, though out of possession, may maintain an action to determine an adverse claim, estate, or interest in the premises. People v. Center, 66 Cal. 551, 5 Pac. Rep. 263, and 6 Pac. Rep. 481. A statute of Nebraska, authorizing a similar suit by a plaintiff out of possession, was before this court for consideration in Holland v. Challen, 110 U.S. 15, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 495, and the jurisdiction of a court of equity to grant the relief prayed in such case was sustained. See, also, Reynolds v. Bank, 112 U.S. 405, 411, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 213; Chapman v. Brewer, 114 U.S. 158, 170, 171, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 799; U.S. v. Wilson, 118 U.S. 86, 89, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 991; Frost v. Spitley, 121 U.S. 552, 557, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1129. We see no error in the decree of the court below, and it is accordingly affirmed.

Notes