Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court/Opinion of the Court

[p356] PER CURIAM.

Petitioners were convicted of various state crimes and sentenced to fixed terms of imprisonment. They were then committed to the Patuxent Institution in lieu of sentence, for an indeterminate period, pursuant to the Maryland Defective Delinquency Law, Md. Ann. Code., Art. 31B. They sought federal habeas corpus, challenging on constitutional grounds the criteria and procedures that led to their commitment, and the conditions of their confinement. They contend, inter alia, that the statutory standard for commitment is impermissibly vague, that they are entitled to put the government to the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that at the compulsory psychiatric examination prescribed by the statute they were entitled to have the assistance of counsel and to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination, and that they are being denied a constitutional right to treatment. The District Court denied relief sub nom. Sas v. Maryland, 295 F. Supp. 389 (Md. 1969), and the Court of Appeals affirmed sub nom. Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F. 2d 1153 (CA4 1971).^[1] We granted certiorari, 404 U.S. 999 [p357] (1971), to consider whether, and to what extent, the constitutional guarantees involved by petitioners apply to this kind of commitment process. After briefing and oral argument, it now appears that this case does not present these issues in a manner that warrants the exercise of the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court.

1. Of the four petitioners, one has been unconditionally released from confinement, and the other three are subject to criminal sentences that have not yet expired, and that would bar their release from custody even if their claims were to prevail.^[2] This fact, while not necessarily dispositive of all the claims presented by these petitioners, casts those claims in a different light, not contemplated by our original grant of the writ.^[3] Cf. McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, ante, p. 245.

2. Under our decisions in Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966), Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972), and Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), petitioners' challenge to the Maryland Defective Delinquency Law should be considered in relation to the [p358] criteria, procedures, and treatment that the State of Maryland makes available to other persons, not "defective delinquents," committed for compulsory psychiatric treatment. We are informed that the statutes governing civil commitment in Maryland are presently undergoing substantial revision, designed to provide greater substantive and procedural safeguards to committed persons. Accordingly, it seems a particularly inopportune time for this Court to consider a comprehensive challenge to the Defective Delinquency Law.

In these circumstances, the writ of certiorari is therefore dismissed as improvidently granted.

It is so ordered.

Notes

1. Petitioner Murel was originally committed as a defective delinquent in 1962, and Creswell in 1958; their separate petitions for federal habeas corpus were denied without hearing in 1963. On appeal, the Court of Appeals consolidated these and other similar cases, and remanded all of them for a hearing, sub nom. Sas v. Maryland, 334 F. 2d 506 (CA4 1964). The hearing was deferred, by agreement of the parties, pending the outcome of related litigation in the state courts, which culminated in the decision in Director v. Daniels, 243 Md. 16, 221 A. 2d 397, cert. denied sub nom. Avey v. Boslow, 385 U.S. 940 (1966). The federal habeas hearing was then held in the consolidated cases, which by this time also included that of petitioners Hayes and Avey, who had been committed after the Court of Appeals' remand order. The petitions were again denied, 295 F. Supp. 389 (Md. 1969), and the Court of Appeals affirmed, 436 F. 2d 1153 (CA4 1971).
2. At the start of this litigation nine years ago both Murel and Creswell were subject to confinement that was wholly attributable to the Defective Delinquency Law, their sentences having expired. This is no longer the case because Murel was recently released, and Creswell was convicted and sentenced on new charges. We therefore do not reach their claims.
3. We do not suggest that these claims are moot, or that a case or controversy is lacking, or that habeas corpus is inappropriate to test the special incidents, if any, of these defective-delinquency confinements. See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963); North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 248 (1971).