My War Memoirs/Chapter 12
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One of the characteristic symptoms of the situation in the summer of 1917, and a classical example of the war policy of the Holy See, was the peace note of Pope Benedict XV, issued on August 1, 1917. It aimed at bringing about peace negotiations and thus accelerating the end of the war. This brings it within the scope of the present remarks, apart from the fact that there was a close connection between the war policy of the Vatican and the attempts to preserve the Habsburg Empire.
Here I should like to insert a few words about the general policy and diplomacy of the Vatican during the war.
Pope Pius X died in August 1914, and his successor was elected on September 3rd following. The new Pope, Giacoppo della Chiesa, had been the deputy of Cardinal Rampolla, the State Secretary of Leo XIII and later of Merry del Val, the State Secretary of Pius X. From 1907 onwards he had been the Cardinal of Bologna, and on being elected Pope he received the name of Benedict XV. The war had brought the Catholic Church into a very awkward predicament, not only in a political respect, but also as regards its ecclesiastical, spiritual, and moral mission. In a political respect it was between two fires, and if it had unequivocally taken sides, the consequences would have been very detrimental to its interests. From a spiritual and ecclesiastical point of view, its position was no less difficult. The war had disorganized the contact of the Vatican with the priesthood and its other adherents in both camps, and in consequence of this its followers became more subject to the authority of their respective States. Then, too, the moral disorder which arose everywhere as a result of the war inevitably tended to impair the influence of the Catholic Church. In every country the representatives of Catholicism were compelled to identify themselves with the war aims of that country, and this circumstance helped to undermine the international Catholic solidarity which had hitherto been so strong.
Benedict XV was elected Pope evidently because he had collaborated so long with Popes Leo XIII and Pius X, and with their two prominent State Secretaries, Rampolla and Merry del Val. The political and diplomatic tasks of the Church during the war exhibited such difficulties, as early as September 1914, that great reliance was placed upon the diplomatic and political experience of Giacoppa della Chiesa. Let me at once point out that Benedict XV did not fulfil these expectations. He had been a good official, capable of studying in detail the problems with which he was dealing; he worked hard and was not impervious to new ideas, but he had no skill in politics. He succumbed completely to the influences surrounding him, and he never was able to cope with the situation during the war on the lines of the great political and diplomatic traditions of the Vatican. His war policy was therefore doomed to failure from the outset. When he was elected, it was considered in the Allied countries that his policy would follow the traditions of Leo XIII and Cardinal Rampolla, i.e. he would favour the Entente. This soon proved to be an error, and it became clear that there had been many changes in the Vatican since the time of Leo XIII. Parenthetically I may point out that the Vatican was simply unable to pursue a pro-Allied policy during the war, and it was equally unable to maintain an attitude of neutrality towards the Allies. This was due to the fundamental character of the war between the Central Powers and the Allies, the result of which was that the longer the war went on, the more did the interests of the Catholic Church lean towards the side of the Central Powers.
The war began with an ultimatum of the Habsburgs, the most Catholic of the great Powers in Europe, the traditional pillar of the Catholic Church, deriving support from the Vatican both within and without, and possessing a record of many years of service to the Vatican in international politics in the Balkans, in Germany, against Russia, against Italy, and within its own frontiers, against Liberalism and all progressive tendencies, against Orthodoxy and all schismatic movements. The war began against Orthodox Serbia, which was supported by Orthodox Russia for strengthening its Balkan policy. The camp of the Habsburgs was shared by Germany, which, having long given up the “Kulturkampf,” made use of the Catholic centre for the support of its autocratic policy, and adroitly promoted the Catholic element at home and abroad, especially in Turkey and the Far East. The other side comprised Protestant England, anti-clerical France, and Orthodox Russia, and this alone inevitably proved a determining factor with Conservative Vatican circles at the very outset. Orthodox Russia, before the war, was regarded by Catholic Rome as a bogey penetrating into Central Europe, struggling for influence in the Balkans, and harbouring designs against Constantinople and St. Sofia, while the whole of the Byzantine heritage—which incidentally France and England had assigned to Russia by the agreements on the dismemberment of Turkey in the spring of 1915—was no longer merely a bogey, but an immediate danger hovering above Rome. Anti-clerical pre-war France, which had carried out a breach with Rome, had ruthlessly imparted a lay character to schools, administration, and army, and had no representatives at the Vatican, would, in the opinion of several important Catholics, have expiated this policy by sustaining a defeat. Liberal England, the centre of unrestricted religious research and development, from which Protestant thought was disseminated throughout the world, formed a new danger to the policy of the Vatican. In fact, the Entente contained only two elements—and they were comparatively weak—which provided a counter-argument to these considerations on the part of the Vatican: Catholic Belgium, with its eminent Cardinal Mercier, and the French Catholics, with whom, however, their nationalistic tradition and their Conservatism soon proved too strong for their Catholicism, and resulted in openly expressed dissatisfaction with the attitude of the Vatican. Then the Entente was joined by anti-Vatican Italy which, during the war, never ceased to carry on its old struggle with the Vatican, and in the London Pact inserted an article making it impossible for the Vatican to take any share in the peace negotiations, and thus frustrating one of the chief aims of Vatican policy during the war.
When the United States entered the war and the Russian revolution broke out, the objections of the Vatican to the Quadruple Entente were strengthened by the final arguments which, as a matter of fact, had exerted an influence from the very beginning: Wilson’s democratic ideology and his struggle against the dynastic autocracy of Central Europe, the subversive tendencies of the Russian revolution, and the definite acceptance of the principles involving the self-determination of nations. The latter item, in particular, was intended to bring about the dismemberment of the most Catholic of the great Powers, and the removal of the most Catholic of the dynasties, and the whole affair was entirely alien to the feelings, wishes, aims, and interests of the Vatican. Thus was accentuated the great divergency between the two belligerent parties; one side consisted of democratic France, England, Belgium, Italy, Serbia, joined later by revolutionary Russia, and the democratic United States, all of whom were waging war against the militaristic and dynastic autocracies of Central Europe. Accordingly the Vatican, as an inveterate champion and representative of tradition, of hierarchy, and of all autocratic, dynastic, and aristocratic principles, could not do otherwise than pursue the policy with which it had always been identified, and had always openly acknowledged. For reasons of its spiritual affinity it was antagonistic to those who represented the ideals and principles of modern democracy, involving respect for the individual, the spirit of tolerance in its fullest acceptation, and the interests of progress in political, economic, social, religious, and moral aspects of life.
For these reasons the Vatican could not look with favour upon the prospect of an Allied victory. On the other hand, its purpose would not have been served by an integral victory on the part of Germany and the Pan-German schemes in Central Europe, in Turkey, and the Near East generally. Nor could the Vatican be expected to approve of the presence of Turkey among the Central Powers. But compared with the misgivings which it felt at the thought of an Allied victory, this was a far lesser evil. What would have suited the Vatican best would have been peace on the basis of the status quo with a few minor changes, such as the restoration of a Catholic Poland, the removal of Russian influence from the Balkans, and a few territorial concessions from Vienna to Italy. Such were the ideas in the entourage of Benedict XV, and they may be taken as forming the broad outline of his war-time policy.
It should be added that the diplomatic relations of Vienna and Berlin with the Vatican were better than those of the Entente States. From 1907 onwards the influence of the Central Powers in the organization and diplomatic policy of the Vatican had greatly increased. France, England, the United States, Serbia, and Italy, on the other hand, were entirely without any official representatives at the Vatican. Altogether, the Central Powers paid great attention to the political interests of the Vatican, while the Western States were inclined to regard it far more as a moral or spiritual factor. This was a great mistake on their part. It never was, and never will be, the Vatican’s wish to renounce its political organization and its political influence. In this respect Benedict XV was a typical Pope. He systematically aimed at promoting the Papal authority in international politics. He was anxious to secure a share in the peace negotiations, and protested against Article XV of the London Pact, to which I have referred above. He would also have liked to obtain recognition of the Vatican as a political power through the membership of the League of Nations.
It was therefore a mistake for the States of Western Europe to expect that the attitude of the Vatican would be dictated by the spiritual interests of the Catholic Church. Benedict XV took the point of view that the Papal See could perform its spiritual mission effectively and independently, only if it had sufficient authority and political influence, and for that reason during the war he subordinated its spiritual mission to its political interests.
Such was the struggle which the Vatican itself waged during the war. I think I may say that as far as spiritual matters went the Vatican was on the losing side. By giving precedence to its political interests, it associated itself, although in a hesitant and guarded manner, with those who were the representatives of power and of the materialistic proclivities existing in the pre-war period, as embodied in their method of warfare, in their system of politics and diplomacy, and in their war aims. If the Vatican had been guided by its higher spiritual interests it would have sided with those who proclaimed respect for international agreements and the removal of autocratic tendencies.
Post-war events have shown that the Vatican did not lose by the victory of the Allies. This is a further proof that its policy during the war was an erroneous one, both morally and politically. This explains why the Vatican was so astonished at the defeat of the Central Powers, since until the very last moment it did not believe that such an eventuality was possible. It had assisted the Habsburg Empire right up to its downfall, and after the Peace Treaties were signed the Vatican expressed itself about them with such reservations that some of the Powers thought that the Papal See intended to discredit them.
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All the above statements are confirmed by the actual policy of the Vatican during the war. Scarcely had the war broken out than Pope Pius X defined the first principle of Papal policy thus: As it had not been possible to prevent the war, everything must now be done to accelerate the restoration of peace. Although this seemed to be a purely impartial point of view, the circumstances caused it to be a harmful principle to the Allies only. The principle thus defined by Pius X was somewhat elaborated by Benedict XV, so that in its final form it comprised the following:
1. Impartiality to both sides.
2. The employment of all resources for alleviating the miseries of war, assisting prisoners, emigrants, inhabitants of occupied areas, women, children, etc.
3. Exertion of all efforts to conclude the war and prepare peace negotiations.
As I have pointed out, the first item on this programme was incompatible with the third one, but the most serious objection to the whole scheme was that the Pope had interchanged the word “impartiality” for “neutrality.” A neutral is precluded from adopting an attitude to any action of the belligerents, however outrageous it might be. Impartiality, on the other hand, implies the passing of a moral judgment. In actual fact, Benedict XV assumed an attitude of moral neutrality towards the Catholic world, an attitude which was interpreted as being more or less “benevolent” neutrality towards the Central Powers.
At the same time, the philanthropic activity of the Papal See was carried on in a consistent and effective manner throughout the war, and it met with sincere recognition on all sides.
It was on September 8, 1915, that Benedict XV issued his first manifesto in favour of accelerating the peace negotiations, and he repeated this during the Christmas of the same year. In February 1916 he ordered public prayer for peace at an early date. The Vatican took the view that the less the number of belligerents, the sooner peace would be concluded, and acting on this principle it did everything in its power to prevent Italy from entering the war. The Vatican also endeavoured to induce the United States not to supply the belligerent countries with foodstuffs and munitions. As in actual practice these supplies were being sent only to the Allied countries, this impartiality was again being exercised for the benefit of one side.
In the early months of the war all the friends of the Vatican and the Catholic Church in the Allied countries expected that Benedict XV would express himself on the subject of violated Belgian neutrality, ill-treatment of non-belligerents, and the bombardment of French cathedrals. In this they were disappointed, as the neutrality or impartiality of the Vatican did not permit of any such course.(34)
When, in the summer of 1916, the Central Powers found it advisable to make peace overtures, they took advantage of the Vatican in carrying out their purpose. To-day it can be ascertained how the diplomats of the Central Powers, notably those of Vienna, caused the Vatican to associate itself closely with all their peace efforts. The peace offer which was made by the Central Powers on December 12, 1916, was dispatched by them to the Pope also. The Vatican unreservedly approved of Wilson’s first note, dated December 18th, in which he called upon the two belligerent parties to announce publicly their peace terms.
In December 1916 Benedict summoned up enough courage to express publicly a number of views on the war, which though couched in general terms, were nevertheless sufficiently in the interests of justice. Thus he expressed his regret at the bombardment of open towns, at the removal of the civilian population from their homes, and at the evil effect of submarine warfare.
It was, however, in 1917 that the political and diplomatic activity of the Pope during the war reached its culminating point. The Russian Revolution had brought relief to the Vatican in one way, but in another it had proved a source of considerable alarm. While weakening the political influence of Russia, it threatened the social order by reason of its excesses, and the Vatican was extremely sensitive to both these results. The entry of America into the war caused serious disappointment to Catholic Rome, and the Vatican had exerted its whole influence to try and prevent this critical step. Then in the spring of 1917 came the Socialist peace movement, the progress of which the Vatican followed with great dissatisfaction, as it feared that should the scheme achieve even an apparent success, it would deprive the Pope of credit for a mission which he ought to be carrying out, and would thus tend to strengthen the prestige of international Socialism in general. Thus, from the spring of 1917 onwards, the Vatican was continually considering its active intervention with a view to peace negotiations. In June and July the diplomatic authorities of the Vatican closely investigated the situation on both sides, and on August 1, 1917, Benedict brought out his peace note addressed “To the heads of the belligerent nations.”(35) This may be regarded as his most significant political action during the war. The note was transmitted to the respective States in the middle of August, and published on the 16th of the same month.
In his note Benedict began by referring to the three principles which he had formulated on becoming Pope, and which I have mentioned above. He emphasized that he had no special political purpose, but was prompted entirely by his feeling of duty. He proposed the following principles as being conducive to a lasting peace: (1) material force should be replaced by the moral strength of right; (2) armaments should be reduced to the minimum necessary for preserving public order; (3) armies should be replaced by arbitration bodies; (4) the freedom of the seas should be guaranteed(36); (5) mutual exemption from the payment of indemnities for damage incurred, except in cases where such compensation was agreed upon; (6) mutual evacuation of territories then occupied, i.e. Belgium, with guarantees for its complete political independence of both belligerent parties, evacuation of the occupied areas of France, together with the restoration of the German colonies. (7) The outstanding territorial questions between Austria and Italy, Germany and France, were to be considered in a spirit of reconciliation and with due regard to the desires of the nations involved; (8) the same spirit should be brought to bear upon the territorial aspects of the Armenian and Balkan problems, as well as the question of the former Kingdom of Poland.
Such, then, was to be the basis for establishing the future peace of the nations. Benedict’s note produced a favourable effect chiefly in Vienna, since it was entirely in accordance with the aims and efforts of the authorities there. It was directed towards an early peace, and it said nothing definite as to Austro-Hungarian territory, nor did it refer in any way to the self-determination of nations, nor even to their equitable treatment. Official Berlin was more guarded, especially on account of the Vatican’s unambiguous attitude towards Belgium. The German Press, especially that of the Right, objected to the note, although Vorwärts published an article on August 17, 1917, expressing approval of it.
In the Allied camp the note was immediately repudiated in a very emphatic manner. France was offended by it on account of Alsace-Lorraine, and also because it placed the attackers and the attacked on the same footing. Belgium was dissatisfied that the evacuation of her territories was conditioned by the restoration of the German colonies. Italy regarded the note merely as a manifestation of the peace terms of the Central Powers. As for England and the United States, they were equally opposed to the note, which they considered to be lacking in clearness. They also disliked the manner in which it evaded the most difficult problems, and failed to condemn several acts of violence committed by the Central Powers. Moreover, the compromises which it suggested would in their opinion soon lead to a new war. In all these States the Press was practically unanimous, and not even the leading Catholics ventured to defend the note, but on the contrary, as for example in France, they protested against it.
It was typical of the Vatican policy that Russia, although at that time still an Allied and belligerent State, had been omitted from the note, and it was not sent to the Russian Government. Evidently the peace envisaged by the Vatican would have been very markedly anti-Russian in character.
We in Paris looked upon the rejection of the note as a good sign. Just at the moment when the note appeared, I was making arrangements for my visit to Rome. I was therefore doubly interested in the whole matter. I saw that it promoted the policy of the Habsburg Empire, and I conjectured that, such being the case, I was hardly likely to meet with much success if I got into touch with the Vatican.
The main question which arose in the Allied countries was whether the note had been arranged beforehand with the Governments of the Central Powers. The general impression was that this had been the case. The English and Italian Press at once published reports to this effect, and the French Press copied them. The public in the Allied countries, on the other hand, immediately received an official intimation that the Allied Governments had had no hand in this undertaking. The Vatican defended itself against this serious charge of favouring the Central Powers by pointing out that Benedict would not be capable of such an action, and that no agreement had been made with the Governments of the Central Powers. A letter containing these arguments was sent by Cardinal Gasparri to the Archbishop of Sens and published at Paris in La Croix on October 25th. The Vatican also availed itself of certain ecclesiastical dignitaries for the purpose of counteracting these suggestions. Thus, in England, it was Cardinal Bourne who was entrusted with this task.
To-day it is possible to state that the Vatican had exchanged views with Vienna and Berlin on the subject of its peace overture. Thus, it is an historical fact that at the beginning of August 1917 Mgr. Pacelli, the Papal Nuncio at Munich, transmitted to Dr. Michaelis, the Imperial Chancellor, a document containing almost word for word the concrete peace conditions as formulated in the note which was officially dispatched to the belligerent Governments two weeks later. It is likewise true that the German Government accepted Pacelli’s memorandum as a Papal peace overture, prepared an answer,and passed the whole matter on to Vienna, where, on August 6th, Czernin expressed his approval of the answer given by Michaelis. He urged Berlin, however, to be more explicit in its reply on the subject of Belgium, in order that the Allies might not be able to deduce from it that Germany was contemplating annexation in any form. I do not know when and how Berlin conveyed to Pacelli the answer which it had prepared by agreement with Vienna. It perhaps regarded this step merely as an attempt to test the atmosphere in Berlin. The German reply to the memorandum was, on the whole, favourable, as was also the later official reply to the Papal note of August 1st. It seems evident that the Vatican took this step only in order to be certain how the Pope’s official statement would be received in Berlin. It had no doubt that the note would be favourably received in Vienna, and it did not attach much importance to the opinion of Bulgaria or Turkey. But as far as I know, it did not show similar consideration for Allied opinion, which it sounded only indirectly through various unofficial sources of information.
The discussions between the Central Powers on the subject of the reply to the Papal note were difficult. Vienna had accepted the notewith great satisfaction, and desired to reply unreservedly that it should be regarded as a basis for peace negotiations. It was anxious to induce Berlin to share this point of view, and in the end the German authorities gave Vienna the assurance that their reply would be identical as regards its contents, but that it would be more guarded in form. In particular, Berlin was not satisfied with the wording of the note on the subject of Belgium and the references to the Franco-German frontiers. Turkey very emphatically declined to consider any discussion about Armenia, and Bulgaria wanted the wording to be without prejudice to the possibility of a later annexation of Macedonia.
At length the Central Powers managed to agree upon the wording of their notes. The replies were separate in order that each country could be free to draw up its note in a manner most acceptable to its respective public. The Austrian and German replies were issued on September 19, 1917, and their reception in the Allied countries was extremely unfavourable. It was considered that they were insincere and that they concealed ideas of annexation. This applied particularly to the German note, which evaded any reference to the Belgian question.
The Vatican itself was highly satisfied with the reply from Vienna, but less so with that from Berlin, partly because the Kaiser himself had not answered. Nevertheless, the Vatican felt most hopeful that the replies would form the basis for further conversations.
The action of the Allies was most characteristic. France and England first of all agreed that they would not reply at all. Accordingly, France took no further steps in the matter, while England merely acknowledged the receipt of the note, and after Wilson’s reply Lord Robert Cecil announced in the House of Commons that England associated herself with America in this respect. In Italy, Sonnino made a speech in the Parliament there on October 24th, 1917, rejecting the note and designating it as expressing the wishes of the Central Powers. In this speech Sonnino also, for the first time, publicly stated what many Catholics had hitherto only thought, namely, that the Pope, although considered as the supreme moral authority of the Catholic world, had never made any public statement as to who was guilty in the war and who not.
The Vatican replied to this rather half-heartedly, first of all in a letter from Cardinal Gasparri to the Bishop of Valencia, and then in an article published by the Osservatore Romano, which was a direct answer to Sonnino. Leaving on one side the justified objection to the general form of the note, the Vatican vindicated its avoidance of certain topics in its note of August 1st. The Pope, it was urged, was unwilling and unable to act as a judge or to discuss the question of innocence or guilt in a document, in which his sole purpose was to be an intermediary with a view to bringing about peace negotiations in the interests of all mankind. If he had acted as a judge, he would have defeated the aims of his peace movement at the very outset.
This statement should be carefully noticed. Although the Vatican does not expressly say so, it again draws a distinction between its spiritual mission and its political activity. In its former capacity it evidently associates itself with the duty of being the supreme protector of morality, justice, and right. In its capacity as a political factor, however, it feels itself entitled to act as any other political power would do. This twofold function naturally results in a twofold code of ethics, which forms the most distinguishing feature of the Vatican policy during the war. The conclusion to which this inevitably brings me is, that religious and ecclesiastical matters in general should be excluded from politics. The only possible solution of the problem of the Church in modern democratic States is the return of the Papacy to the spiritual mission which it followed in the early period of Christianity, and a free Church in a free State.
At the same time it would be political blindness not to see that the Papacy, the Catholic Church, and Catholicism as a whole constitute an important international factor, and that they will continue to be a powerful spiritual factor. It was these considerations which prompted me during the war to induce the Vatican to adopt at least a neutral attitude towards our movement, and for the same reason I have always been anxious since the war to keep up a positive policy with the Vatican. This means that I desire to defend the interests of the State resolutely and consistently wherever the policy of the Vatican may be at variance with them, while as regards the spiritual mission of the Vatican, it is my aim to preserve an attitude of tolerance and respect, demanding, of course, the same in return. This is the only possible positive ecclesiastical policy for our State, as for others. It seems to me that the development of the Papacy in the future will involve a gradual loss of political influence and a corresponding increase of moral and spiritual influence.
The King of the Belgians did not send his official reply until January 23, 1918, or six months after the Pope’s note had been issued. This was because the Belgian Government was anxious to ascertain exactly what views the Allies would take, how the Central Powers would reply, and in general what effect would be produced by the action of the Vatican. Moreover, Belgium was in rather a difficult situation in this respect, owing to the Belgian Catholics who at that time constituted the decisive element in Parliament. The Belgian reply was courteous in tone, stating that due note had been taken of the Vatican point of view, which was identical with that of the Belgian Government, as far as Belgium was concerned. It referred also to the Pope’s communication to the Belgian Government, in which he had stated that when speaking on January 22, 1915, about acts of injustice, he had had Belgium in mind as the victim of those acts. On all other questions the Belgian Government announced that it must first arrive at an agreement with its Allies before expressing its point of view. In conclusion, it emphasized the fact that it was not responsible for the infringement of neutrality, and pointed out in a very unambiguous manner that it would not accept any peace which did not offer it full restitution for the injustice which it had sustained, and an assurance that such acts would not be repeated in the future.
The most interesting diplomatic document, however, connected with the Papal note was President Wilson’s reply, which was signed by State Secretary Lansing, and without any undue delay was dispatched on August 27, 1917. It emphasizes the fact that every honourable person must share the desire of the Vatican for an early peace, but that the peace programme formulated in Benedict’s note represents a mere return to the pre-war state of affairs. President Wilson took the view that no just and lasting peace could be attained by this process, the aim of the war then being to remove the regime in Germany which was responsible for the whole disaster. Any negotiations with the autocratic German regime on the basis of the Papal note would mean giving it an opportunity of continuing its former policy. The new peace must be based upon the rights of nations and not upon the rights of Governments. The United States, the reply continued, had no special war aim, but merely desired the peace to be founded upon principles of justice and mutual trust. In conclusion, President Wilson again declared that he was unable to place any confidence in the word of the present rulers of Germany, and that any idea of peace negotiations was out of the question until the necessary commitments could be obtained from the nations of the Central Powers.
This reply was a severe blow to the Papal note. Immediately after it was issued we were able to observe the advantages which we were likely to derive from the Pope’s action. The hopes of the Habsburg Empire had again collapsed, and the principles of democracy and the self-determination of nations had been emphatically enunciated by the most powerful authority in the Allied camp. At a time when the repeated attempts at a premature peace and the uncertainty as to what would happen in Russia were causing us serious concern, we were greatly encouraged by this circumstance.
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In spite of this obvious failure, the Vatican did not give up hope of being able to bring about peace negotiations. The attitude of the Berlin Government on the subject of Belgium induced the Vatican to approach it again through Pacelli, with a view to obtaining a clearer expression of opinion. At the same time Benedict sent a personal letter to Emperor Karl, asking him to use his influence with Berlin to bring about a change of attitude as regards Belgium on the lines of the Papal note of August 1st. In the same letter the Pope urged Karl not to refuse discussions with Italy on the subject of the Trentino. Karl replied by letter on October 4th and promised that he would intervene at Berlin on the subject of Belgium, and declared himself ready to discuss the question of ceding a part of the Trentino in return for compensation in colonies. He concluded by saying that Austria-Hungary was willing to evacuate the Balkan countries under definite guarantees of safety. On October 24th the Pope wrote a letter of thanks for this favourable communication, and expressed himself as being gratified at Karl’s attitude. This letter, however, reached Vienna at the time of the Caporetta victory, and in the meanwhile Kühlmann had replied to Pacelli on the subject of Belgium in less accommodating terms than those of Michaelis’s reply to the Papal note of September 19th. Vienna, having occupied further Italian territory, was no longer disposed to negotiate with defeated Italy on the subject of the Trentino. In a speech delivered at Budapest on October 4, 1917, Czernin threatened that if the Allies did not accept the offers of the Central Powers, as contained in the Papal note and their replies, they would not regard themselves as bound by the proposals in question. The Pope, on the other hand, was well aware that without concessions on the part of Italy, at least in the Trentino question, there was no prospect of any early peace negotiations. The Papal Nuncio at Vienna and Mgr. Pacelli therefore intervened afresh. They applied to the Emperor Karl and the Government at Berlin asking them to assure the Pope that in no case did Vienna intend to retain any of the Italian territory recently occupied. Although Czernin and Karl assented to this, they made it clear that since Vienna had scored a military victory over Italy, no concessions as regards the Trentino could be considered.
This was the final step taken by Benedict in the autumn as a sequel to his peace effort, in which the Vatican counted mainly upon the assistance of Vienna and the German Centre (Erzberger). The Vatican was discouraged by its lack of success in this undertaking, and that is why nothing more was heard from Benedict during the rest of the war.
I will here add a few remarks about the Papal policy during the war, as far as it affected our movement. There can be no doubt that this policy was entirely opposed to our aims and aspirations. As general secretary of the Czechoslovak National Council I was familiar with the political tendencies of the Vatican during the war, and I at once realized the underlying principle of Benedict’s peace note. The action of the National Council had to be arranged in accordance with this. We were not strong enough to undertake a struggle against the Vatican, and such a course would have done us harm among our own people, especially the Slovaks, as well as among the Catholics in the Allied countries. I therefore combatted the policy of the Vatican by showing what the Catholic Church meant to the Habsburg Empire, and how the Vatican was serving the political purposes of the Central Powers. In dealing with Benedict’s peace note our course of action was the same as that adopted against all attempts at a premature peace, which were in the interests of Vienna and Budapest.
As I have explained elsewhere, it was my purpose to win over Catholic circles, just as all others, to the Czechoslovak cause. At the time when the Papal note was issued I was arranging my second visit to Rome, and in connection with this I made the acquaintance of Mgr. Ceretti, one of the most capable of the Vatican diplomats and subsequently the Papal Nuncio in Paris, to whom I was introduced by P. Quirielle. I had several conversations with him about the war, with special reference to Austria-Hungary and ourselves, and he struck me as being very moderate in his views. For the most part he listened to me with detachment, although in a number of matters he expressed his agreement with my opinions.
At that particular time I was finding a manifest sympathy for our movement among several leading French Catholics. Thus M. Trogand, the director of the Catholic periodical Corresponant, was then beginning to show a little favour to us in his paper, and we also received signs of approval from Mgr. Baudrillart, a prominent member of Catholic circles in France, and a man of learning and influence. The opposition to the Papal policy brought the Allied Catholics, especially those in France, closer to us. They regarded the unfavourable attitude of the Vatican to our movement as being equally biassed as it was in their own affairs.
While at Rome during September and October 1917 it was through Loiseau, as on my first visit, that my contact with the Vatican was maintained. On that occasion I was more guarded in my attitude, partly on account of the circumstances connected with the Papal note, partly also because, at a time when there was so much tension in the atmosphere, I did not wish, by my relations with the Vatican, to cause unnecessary offence among Quirinal circles.
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Czernin’s policy, which aimed at taking advantage of every possible opportunity of peace negotiations, seemed, at the end of the summer of 1917, to be making favourable progress on account of the Socialist action at Stockholm, the Papal note, and the course of events in Germany and the Allied States This, however, was only of short duration. In a few months, after the victory at Caporetta and the conclusion of peace with the Bolsheviks, there was a turn of the tide which produced results entirely opposed to the policy of Vienna.
Ever since the outbreak of the Russian revolution Germany had been in a state of internal dissension. Conflicts between political power and military power became more and more acute, and they led to differences between Berlin and Vienna. Bethmann-Hollweg realized that tactically Vienna was in the right, and that a more moderate policy would have been in the interests of the German Empire, but Hindenburg, Ludendorff, and the heads of the German Admiralty refused to give way. These disputes were complicated by an analogous struggle in Parliament. The whole of German policy was oscillating between two diametrically opposite tendencies. There was a moderate section which desired early peace negotiations, in which Germany would be satisfied to compromise, while the military authorities and the nationalistic politicians of the Right aimed at nothing less than a military victory which would enforce heavy peace terms upon their opponents.
The adherents of the former tendency, the most prominent representative of which was Erzberger with his group, started open Parliamentary warfare at the beginning of July 1917 against the military authorities and also against Bethmann-Hollweg, their objection to him being that he went too far in his concessions to the Chauvinists. In the middle of July 1917 Bethmann-Hollweg fell, and nobody in Germany was sorry for him, as he was equally disliked by the Chauvinists. Vienna alone attempted to save him, fearing that his successor might be even more dependent upon the supreme military command.
This proved to be the case, as the tactics of Michaelis soon showed. On July 19th, for the first time, the Reichstag passed a resolution that Germany desired peace, concluded by an agreement between the two belligerent parties. Michaelis, however, had not the courage, in the face of the military authorities and the reactionary parties, to give the Pope any definite assurance on the subject of Belgium when he was preparing his peace note in June and July. Kühlmann was in the same predicament with regard to the German reply to Benedict’s note on September 19, 1917. In this internal struggle Vienna and the Vatican gave all possible assistance to the moderate tendencies, and in fact the whole of Erzberger’s action had been carried out in agreement with them. It did not produce any substantial results, even when Michaelis also had to retire and was replaced on November 1, 1917, by Count Hertling, the Bavarian Prime Minister. Hertling also soon succumbed to the influence of the Supreme Command, and this final victory of the German Chauvinists was rendered decisive by the developments on the battle-fronts and the political events among the Allies.
In October and November 1917 the situation of the Allies was, in every respect, an alarming one. In France the Government of Briand had been replaced on March 14, 1917, by Ribot’s Cabinet, in which the Minister of Foreign Affairs was Ribot himself, and the Minister of War was Painlevé. Ribot’s Government came into power at a juncture when the military and political situations were .daily growing worse. The Russian revolution and its military consequences, the failure of Nivelle’s offensive and the resulting war-weariness and defeatist propaganda in France, difficulties in Parliament, the peace overtures of Sixtus of Bourbon, quarrels with the Socialists on the subject of the Stockholm Conference, difficulties in Greek affairs, and disputes with regard to Italian policy—all this tended to weaken France both within and without.
Painlevé’s Cabinet, which replaced that of Ribot on September 12, 1917, and in which Ribot continued to act as Foreign Minister with Painlevé as Minister of War, was in an even more difficult position. On the Eastern front there was now a continuous record of German successes. The proceedings at the Stockholm Conference, Benedict’s note, and the increasing chaos in Russia were producing an atmosphere of pessimism in France during the autumn of 1917. The Bolshevik revolution and the events which followed it intensified this depression to the utmost.
From the moment when the separate peace between the Central Powers and Russia began to be talked about, there were incessant protests in France against the treachery of the Bolsheviks and Russia in general. What made matters worse was that there were still no visible results from American co-operation at the front, and everything tended to strengthen the movement for concluding the war by negotiation. Caillaux was carrying on propaganda in favour of abandoning the English alliance and arriving at an agreement with Germany for an advantageous peace. The French Parliament was also in a nervous condition on account of disputes with the Socialists. The first crisis of Painlevé’s Government occurred on October 28th, and Ribot, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, was replaced by Barthou. Two weeks later the whole Cabinet fell, and was succeeded in the middle of November by Clemenceau’s Government.
In Italy the situation was even more precarious. The vacillation of the Government, and particularly of Sonnino, on war aims ; the twofold policy towards Germany and Austria respectively ; the action of the Pope, which undoubtedly tended to exert a demoralizing effect on Italian public opinion; and, finally, the propaganda carried on by the Socialist neutralists—all this led to a profound crisis in home policy and lack of resolution at the front. The crisis developed towards the end of October 1917 into the fall of Boselli’s Government, and to a far more serious complication, namely, the reverse at Caporetta in the last week of October. Nor was Orlando’s new Government able to extricate the country from the effects of this disaster for some time to come.
In Russia and on the Eastern front, of course, the conditions were far more critical. The proclamation of the Russian Republic and the arrival of Kerensky’s new Government could not counteract the increasing disruption in the army and in affairs as a whole. The chaos which thus ensued culminated in the Kornilov affair and then in the Bolshevik upheaval. At the beginning of December the new Bolshevik Government itself suggested the question of a military armistice to the Central Powers, and the necessary negotiations actually took place.
In England also these events naturally produced a profound impression. The greatest alarm was caused by the events in Russia and the possible consequences which might arise from them as regards the Far East and India.
The knowledge of these developments was naturally a source of encouragement to the German Supreme Command. As early as the summer of 1917 the German military leaders had decided upon a big offensive on the Italian front in order to reassure Czernin, who was urging the necessity to negotiate for peace without annexation or indemnities. Ever since May 1917 the authorities at Berlin had indicated to him that his fears were exaggerated, and the German victory at Caporetta went far to confirm their opinion. Then, too, the elimination of the Eastern front brought the separate peace with Russia, for which Czernin had made such efforts, and for which he had been willing to make such commitments beforehand. Now it was placed at his disposal unconditionally and without any commitments whatever. Hence the military victory of Germany against Italy and Russia, combined with the events in the Allied countries, denoted the political defeat of Vienna and of Czernin, who were compelled to subordinate their own views to those of the German military leaders. As a matter of fact, Czernin’s ideas as to the outcome of the war were not so far wrong, but it would appear that from this time onwards, although he did not avoid occasional peace moves, he gradually changed his former attitude and began to believe that an Allied victory was impossible. In March and April 1918 he was evidently of the opinion that the existence of the Habsburg Empire was no longer at stake. In accordance with this he modified his policy after the signature of the peace of Brest-Litovsk, and perpetrated a series of irreparable blunders which ultimately landed Austria-Hungary in ruin.
Such was the situation in which new secret overtures for a separate peace with Vienna were launched in the middle of December 1917. This time they emanated from the Allies, the initiative being that of Mr. Lloyd George. There is every indication that he undertook this step with the knowledge and approval of Mr. Balfour. I do not know whether the French Government received previous or timely information on this point, but as far as I have been able to ascertain it would appear that the French were not informed of Mr. Lloyd George’s undertaking until the negotiations had been concluded. As regards Italy, London evidently hoped, after the Caporetta defeat, that the Italians would not be able to maintain so uncompromising an attitude as with the negotiations of Sixtus of Bourbon. The new negotiations began in the early part of November, but the definite proceedings did not take place until the middle of December. There was a meeting between General Smuts and Count Mensdorff at Geneva on December 17, 1917, but they led to nothing, just as those in December 1916 had done. As a result of this repeated failure it was now felt that all such attempts were useless. Thus, although in themselves they were a source of danger to our cause, their consequences hastened the solution for which we had been struggling, and again confirmed the argument with which we had identified ourselves towards the Allies throughout the war.
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On December 5th Count Skrzynski, the Legation Counsellor attached to the Austro-Hungarian Legation at Berne, informed Czernin confidentially that Prince Djenal Tussum and Parodi, who was in the confidence of Sir Horace Rumbold, the English Minister, had indicated to him the desire of the British Government for its representative to meet the Austro-Hungarian delegate for exchanging views on peace questions affecting only those two countries. On November 11th Czernin expressed his agreement with this on principle, but with certain reservations, which showed that his opinion of the general situation had changed since the previous April. He was willing to accept any communication which the British Government might make to him, and Count Mensdorff-Pouilly could at any time proceed to Switzerland for this purpose. On December 1, 1917, Sir Horace Rumbold sent Parodi a letter, in which he repeated the former communication, and asked for the date when the delegate from Vienna would arrive. After long negotiations, during which the Austrians expressed their desire that the British Government should send somebody of the same standing as Count Mensdorff, who was the oldest and most important Austro-Hungarian diplomat, it was agreed that the British delegate was to be General Smuts, and that the meeting was to take place on December 18th at Geneva in the villa of the Austro-Hungarian Consul Montlong. General Smuts arrived at the stipulated time and he was accompanied by Philip Kerr, Lloyd George’s secretary.
In his conversations, General Smuts showed a very strong anti-German attitude, but it would appear that he was far more indulgent towards the Habsburg Empire. His projected scheme with regard to Austria-Hungary involved something similar to the British Empire with the self-governing dominions, and at the conclusion of his interview with Mensdorff he repudiated the idea of dismemberment of Austria-Hungary.
Mensdorff’s final suggestion was that General Smuts should meet Czernin himself, as the latter would best be able to decide whether Austria-Hungary could influence the Germans against the programme of German militarism. In accordance with the instructions which Czernin had given him, he endeavoured to prepare a way for direct contact between German and British diplomacy. When, however, General Smuts emphatically declined to have any dealings with the Germans, he did not insist, but again, acting on Czernin’s instructions, intimated that it was useless to try and bring about a separate peace without Berlin.
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This was Czernin’s last peace overture. He undertook it in the conviction that every opportunity should be taken to end the war speedily and to save the monarchy. From the very beginning of his term of office as Foreign Minister at the end of 1916, Czernin was convinced that the war should be ended as speedily as possible, evidently regarding this as the only way of saving Austria-Hungary. It seems to me that of the Austro-Hungarian politicians during the war Czernin proved to be, relatively speaking, the best. It cannot be denied that he showed capacity as a politician and negotiator, with quite a good knowledge of the problems with which he was dealing. He knew that defeat would mean the end of Austria-Hungary, whose excessive dependence upon Germany he deplored. He rightly judged that this would prove one of the main difficulties to Austria-Hungary, both as regards Germany and also the Allies. In his capacity as Minister at Bucharest he realized in good time that Rumania would enter the war, and his reports on these matters were accurate, although the authorities at Vienna and Budapest attached no importance to them. He was quick to realize that the only possibility of successful negotiation with the Allies was to be moderate in his demands, and his policy was carried out in accordance with this idea. In all disputes with Germany he opposed the German Supreme Command, and in this, too, he was right. I do not think that he could have saved the Habsburg Empire, even if Vienna had paid more heed to him, but he would have been a more dangerous opponent to us. In my opinion, once the war had started, it was not humanly possible to save Austria-Hungary at all.
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Though all attempts at a premature peace ended in failure, there was always the possibility that they might succeed, and this, of course, had to be reckoned with. Nevertheless, I was a firm believer in our final victory. Considerations derived from the philosophy of history led me to feel sure that the peace moves in 1917 and the spring of 1918 would fail of their purpose. I regarded victory in our national struggle as being extremely probable because the military, political, and moral forces which had been let loose by a war between five European Great Powers, by the entry of America into the war, and by the outbreak of the Russian revolution had acquired such an impetus that the intervention of no personal will, however strong, could avert the destructive effects which they would ultimately have upon the Habsburg Empire. The opposition of the greater part of the nations within her borders to her rule was an elemental one, and her existence was increasingly threatened as the ideas associated with democracy and racial self-determination became more and more the driving forces of the contest. Then, too, I considered that this war, the greatest in history, must inevitably produce some vast and decisive results, or, if untenable compromises were made, their outcome would be internal upheavals after the war was over. For these reasons I felt convinced that Austria-Hungary could not survive, and that our cause would consequently be victorious.
In all the anxiety which I felt during these efforts to bring about a separate peace, when we were struggling against the intrigues of the Austrophiles, against the endeavours of reactionaries, against alarmists and opportunists, or against the scruples of persons who were conscientious enough, but who had an imperfect conception of the points at issue, the ideas which I have outlined above formed a great encouragement and hope to me, and they were confirmed by my daily experience during the war, as well as by the general course of the war and its results. It was my belief that the truth would prevail, but I did not expect it to prevail unaided. Accordingly, the struggle against all arguments in favour of a separate peace formed the basis of our work in 1917. I was aware that we could not reckon upon any sentimentality towards the oppressed nations on the part of Allied politicians if there was any serious question of peace with Vienna. In so terrible a war there was far too great a tendency to protect immediate interests, whether real or only apparent, and regardless of public declarations or promises. As I have said, I do not reproach the Allied politicians for this. The question was not merely a moral one. It involved a proper understanding of what any particular policy would lead to, as far as the Allied States were concerned, and specially an understanding of our argument that, in the end, it would be better for the Allies and Europe in general if the Habsburg Empire were to disappear.
Any compromise with Vienna in the summer of 1917 would have been an unmitigated disaster to us. By that time we had a political and military movement organized on a large scale, and as its leaders we had committed hundreds of thousands of our people and their families to a life-and-death struggle.