My War Memoirs/Chapter 19
XIX
(a) Our Share in the Armistice Negotiations. The Juridical and Political Significance of This
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The negotiations at Geneva had protracted my stay outside Paris two days longer than was desirable. I did not reach Paris until Friday, November 1st, and the early Allied negotiations on the terms of an armistice with Austria-Hungary had begun on the previous afternoon at Versailles. I regarded my absence from the first meeting as a serious matter, since it might possibly result in a real detriment to our national interests, both as regards the formulation of the Armistice terms, and also in respect of our juridical situation as an independent State already recognized by the Allies.
The French Government, who had convened the Conference, had not invited us to the first meeting as it should have done. In addition to having been recognized by the Allies as an Allied Government and nation we had received an express undertaking in our agreements with France and England that we were to participate in all Allied conferences where our interests might be concerned. I therefore proceeded on the morning of November 2nd to the French Foreign Ministry to ascertain how matters stood, and to take immediate steps for vindicating our point of view. I need hardly say that I was dissatisfied with those who had convened the Conference, and I made no secret of my opinion.
I gave Berthelot the first verbal reports on the Geneva negotiations, and I informed him that I would supply the Allied Governments with the written text of the Geneva declaration, as well as a statement of our demand on the subject of the Armistice with Austria. Finally, I emphasized how urgent it was that a representative of Czechoslovakia should at once be summoned to attend all further negotiations on the Armistice with the Central Powers. I added that our absence from these proceedings would make a very unfavourable impression in Bohemia and might produce results which would be unpleasant, both to us and to the Allies.
He proposed to deal with the matter unofficially, to which I agreed, and then returned to the Rue Bonaparte. Shortly afterwards I was invited by telephone to attend the meeting of the Great Powers at eleven o’clock that morning at the residence of Colonel House.
Berthelot’s assistance immediately produced satisfactory results in every respect. Besides the main session of the Inter-Allied Conference (Supreme Military Council), which was held on October 31st and on November 1st, 2nd, and 4th, and which was attended by the chief political and military representatives of the Allied States (among those present were Clemenceau, Pichon, Leygues, Klotz, Lloyd George, Bonar Law, Balfour, Lord Milner, Colonel House, Orlando, Sonnino, Matsui, Hymans, Venizelos, Vesnić, General Foch, General Wilson, General Bliss, and General Robillant), conferences of the four chief Great Powers were held regularly every morning which supplemented the proceedings of the main Conference, and to which a number of military authorities, Prime Ministers and Ministers of Foreign Affairs were co-opted. It was to these proceedings that, as a result of Berthelot’s intervention, I was invited by telephone, as I have mentioned above. At midday on November 4th a special messenger from the French Foreign Ministry came to the Rue Bonaparte with an official invitation from Pichon for me to attend the plenary meeting of the Supreme War Council which was to be held on the same afternoon at Versailles.
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I must confess that I was highly excited when, on the afternoon of November 4th, I took my seat in a motor-car decorated with our flag, and drove through Paris by way of St. Cloud and Sèvres to Versailles. When for the first time I entered the hall at Versailles where all the mighty of this world were assembled—mighty especially at that moment when they were settling the destiny of three Empires in Europe and Asia—and when I took my seat besides Vesnić and Venizelos, I could scarcely believe in the reality of what was happening. Three years previously I had escaped across the frontiers of Bohemia, crawling through the thickets to avoid being seen by the Austrian and Bavarian gendarmes, and staking the whole future on what destiny might bring. Now I was sitting in conference with the representatives of France, Great Britain, United States, Italy, Japan, Serbia, Greece, Belgium, and Portugal, to decide with them as to the fate of the Empires of Wilhelm and Karl, and to sign the terms of their capitulation.
The first meeting on October 31st had been attended only by six States, the four Great Powers (without Japan, which joined the latter meetings), Serbia, and Greece. The proceedings opened with a statement by Marshal Foch on the general situation at the various fronts, in accordance with which the military experts had prepared Armistice conditions to be submitted to the Conference. A discussion on this subject followed immediately, the first topic being the question of an armistice with Austria-Hungary. After certain differences regarding the occupation of Jugoslav areas by the Italian Army, when M. Vesnić expressed his reservation, and acquiesced only after having received an assurance that this arrangement involved no definite commitment with regard to the peace terms, the proposals of the military experts were accepted.
The proceedings continued at the second meeting on November 1st, the subject on this occasion being the Armistice terms for Germany. Belgium also took part in these negotiations. Much of the discussion was concerned with the Allied Note to President Wilson, in which the Allies expressed their two reservations regarding his Fourteen Points, i.e. on the freedom of the seas and on indemnities for areas devastated by the war. There were further differences between Vesnić and the Italian delegates concerning the surrender of the Austrian fleet to the Jugoslavs, and the settlement of this matter was postponed. At the third and fourth meetings, held on November 2nd and 4th respectively, discussions were continued on the Armistice terms for Germany, the final wording of which was then agreed upon. It was also decided that the terms thus settled should be transmitted to President Wilson, and that Marshal Foch should be authorized to negotiate direct with the German plenipotentiaries in the same way. The Armistice with Austria-Hungary, immediately after having been accepted, was forwarded to General Diaz, who received authorization to negotiate direct with the Austro-Hungarian plenipotentiaries.
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The meeting of the Great Powers, which was held on Saturday morning at the residence of Colonel House in the Rue de l’Université, was attended mainly by the military leaders, Foch, Weygand, Sir Henry Wilson, the Italian general, Robillant, and the great European statesmen, Clemenceau, Pichon, Lloyd George, Lord Milner, Orlando, Sonnino, and Matsui. The main subject of discussion comprised the results of the signature of the Armistice with Austria-Hungary as regards the further conduct of the war against Germany. On behalf of the Czechoslovak Government I expressed my agreement with the Austro-Hungarian Armistice terms, and added a detailed statement on the chief demands which we had formulated at Geneva. After a fairly short discussion I secured the consent of the Allies. According to the agreement, on the following day I submitted them in a written form to the French Government, by whom they were transmitted to the Italian Commander-in-Chief.
Marshal Foch presented his proposals for the military arrangements involved by the occupation of the chief points on Austro-Hungarian territory. On the whole, these plans were in accordance with our requirements and our special demands, and could therefore easily be brought within the general scope of these proposals. It should be remembered that at this moment the Conference was not certain whether the German Government would accept the severe Armistice terms which had just been drawn up at Versailles, and from this point of view our participation was important. In his military plan Marshal Foch had taken Bohemia as one of the bases for an offensive against Berlin from the south, and he had asked the Czechoslovak representative to give his consent to this. He explained what measures he wished to adopt for the dispatch of troops across Austrian territory to Bohemia. It was, of course, his intention to use mainly our legionaries in France and Italy for this purpose.
Owing to the change of circumstances only a few of the demands which I submitted on our behalf were fulfilled. Communication to Trieste and also to France by way of Italy (later also by way of Switzerland) was secured for us. The first preparations were also made for the transport of our troops from France and Italy, transport of arms and war material by way of Italy and Austria was guaranteed, and decisions were made for the import of the most necessary food-stuffs. For mainly military reasons (there were also political ones) the capitulation of Austria-Hungary was not followed by any Allied military occupation. On the one hand there was considerable war-weariness among the Allies also, and then they took the views that after the revolution in all parts of the Empire, together with the capitulation of Germany, there was no need for any military occupation. After the Armistice with Germany I discussed the question of the food supply almost exclusively with Mr. Hoover and the American Government. The schemes for economic co-operation and financial help were gradually carried out, at least to a certain extent, during these negotiations.
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The Armistice with Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Turkey formed the agenda at the eighth meeting of the Supreme Military Council between October 31st and November 4th. Full minutes of all these meetings were handed to me for my approval as the representative of Czechoslovakia. The text of the Armistice terms was placed before the Central Powers by Marshal Foch and the other military leaders also on behalf of the provisional Czechoslovak Government.
Of the new States, Czechoslovakia was the only one which participated in the Armistice negotiations. Poland was not admitted, and Rumania, although she had resumed hostilities, was also not invited. The Jugoslavs of Austria-Hungary had not yet been recognized as Allies by Italy and the other Great Powers, so that Serbia alone was represented at the Conference. At the meeting on October 31st M. Vesnić raised the question of the recognition of the Austrian Jugoslavs, but in spite of this the Conference took no steps in the matter.
From the above account it is clear that we were represented at the Conference on the basis of our juridical recognition and the treaties with the Allies which were signed before the collapse of the Empire. In the interests of historical truth I wish to point out that the events within the Empire and the coup d’état at Prague had no influence on this question. This is shown by the examples of the other Austro-Hungarian nationalities, quite apart from the fact that the Allied Governments at that time had no exact information as to the extent of the various upheavals within the Empire, and, from this juridical point of view, did not take them into account. At the meetings themselves not a word was said about the revolutions in Austria-Hungary, and during the discussions concerning the Armistice with Austria the proceedings of the English delegation, for example, were based on the assumption that Vienna might not accept the terms, and that hostilities against Austria would then be continued.
As we shall see, this juridical status of ours was of considerable importance. Our situation was unique and was different from that of the Poles, Rumanians, and Jugoslavs. The Poles were not recognized by the Allies until February 1919, and the recognition of the Jugoslavs as a unified State was granted only during the signature of the Versailles Peace Treaty. Before our departure from Geneva it had been arranged that I was to transmit the results of our proceedings there not only to the Allies, but also to Masaryk and our military leaders. I also promised to keep in direct touch with Prague, and to supply our people there with the earliest possible news of subsequent events, if necessary, also asking them to communicate their instructions. Having therefore settled the matters connected with the Armistice negotiations, I began to deal with the further points of the Geneva agreement.
First of all, on November 4th, I notified the Allies of all the Geneva resolutions, and submitted to them the declarations which had been signed there. While still staying at Geneva I had supplied Masaryk with the first news about the negotiations with the Prague delegates, and on my return to Paris I had sent him a brief telegram concerning the results of the meeting. On the following day, November 4th, I sent a detailed report to Prague about my negotiations in Paris on the subject of the Armistice, and the assistance which was to be granted by the Allies to our people. I also reported to Prague Masaryk’s approval of the Geneva resolutions, and insisted on the urgent need for maintaining order at home and absolute unity with us in Paris as the first condition for any further successful negotiations with the Allies concerning our cause.
(b) The Anniversary of Bílá Hora at the Front. The End of the War
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Having completed these urgent tasks, I was anxious to visit our troops at the front as had been arranged before I left for Geneva. Colonel Philippe had informed me that General Gouraud, with whose army our brigade had been incorporated, was preparing to make use of our troops for attacks in the front line somewhere about October 20th. It was our duty to be with our soldiers at the moment when they were about to engage in hostilities which were deciding the destiny of Europe. Now, after my return from Geneva, my visit had a still more immediate interest; our brigade had taken part in very severe fighting at Vouziers and Terron on the Aisne between October 19th and 25th, and its high military qualities received ample testimony in the army orders of the Supreme Command as follows:
Under the energetic and skilful command of Colonel Philippe the Czechoslovak regiments Nos. 21 and 22 gave proof of the most admirable military qualities in the fighting from October 19th to 25th east of Vouziers. Resolute in attack, stubborn in defence, unwavering in the severe artillery fire, they brilliantly proved themselves equal to the tasks entrusted to them and satisfied their leader in every respect.
Accompanied by Major Fierlinger, who was then my chief military assistant, I started on the morning of Friday, November 8th, from Paris for the front section of General Gouraud’s 4th Army, near Vouziers. At noon we reached a solitary house which formed the headquarters of General Gouraud and his staff. Only a short time before, during the attack on Paris, this house had been occupied by the Kaiser. General Gouraud received us courteously and with a sense of solemnity. The whole front was in movement, the Germans were retreating along the whole line, and the General’s army had scored well-deserved successes.
The General prepared a simple but touching welcome for the Czechoslovak delegates. He invited us to a military lunch at which his staff and a number of our officers were present. During the lunch he spoke about Bílá Hora and our struggle for national independence, our defeat three hundred years ago, and our present victory in which we were participating on three fronts; he said that the servitude to which the nation had been subjected for three hundred years was ended that day by our great success, which would form a bond of friendship between our two nations. Only a short time ago, he said, the Kaiser had stayed in that house and helped to direct the operations which were to bring about the fall of Paris. That day he was welcoming there a Czechoslovak Minister who had come to greet his fellow-countrymen who were fighting to help in the liberation of France and thus also of their own country. It was a manifesto of victory, the terms of which would be handed by Allied Commanders-in-Chief perhaps to-day, perhaps to-morrow, or the day after, to the defeated Kaiser. “Three centuries of your servitude are revenged,” concluded General Gouraud.
I replied to him with emotion as I looked through the windows at the gloom of the devastated fields, and reflected what hecatombs had been sacrificed, and how strange is the logic of events. The anniversary of Bílá Hora!
Shortly afterwards we rode out with a number of officers to see the troops. I came across our regiments a few kilometres behind the main front where they were drawn up in a rectangular formation. In a few words I conveyed to them greetings from Geneva, and informed them of what we had discussed and decided there. I also gave them a short account of the Armistice negotiations at Versailles, and told them that the old regime had already been overthrown in Prague and that we were free. “In accordance with an Allied resolution,” I concluded, “you are going back to your own country to be prepared, if necessary, to continue the military operations there.”
We had hoped that on November 8th we would proclaim the provisional Government at the front, but we already had achieved far more than this: a Government, the overthrow of the old regime at home, the downfall of the Empire and the dynasty, the approaching capitulation of Germany, the prospect of a return at an early date.
We completed the inspection of the brigade, during which General Gouraud decorated a number of our officers and men who had distinguished themselves in the recent fighting.
(c) Co-operation of the Provisional Government with Prague. November 14th, 1918, at Prague
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After the events of October 28th at Prague I considered that our most urgent need was to establish permanent contact and an absolutely unified course of action with our people there. About November 5th and the following days rumours began to reach Paris, mostly from Vienna, that the National Committee was acting in a manner which suggested that it was opposed to us. There can be no doubt that the events in Poland, and partially also those among the Jugoslavs, had some bearing on these rumours which, however, were mainly to be attributed to the last efforts of the Austrophiles. There had been an evident conflict between the Polish Committee in Paris and the Warsaw Government. The Poles in the Allied countries, and to some extent those of Galicia, were unwilling to recognize the regime at Warsaw, to which the Allies had also adopted an attitude of marked reserve. The Jugoslavs were just then in the middle of negotiations about which their opponents were spreading pessimistic reports. Those in Paris were therefore anxiously awaiting the results of the Conference at Geneva between Korošec, Trumbić, and Pašić.
These matters were being followed very carefully by the Allied Governments, who naturally drew from them their own conclusions as to the future development in Central Europe, and formed their judgments about the political conditions of the liberated nations in the immediate future. In view of our proceedings at Geneva, I immediately refuted all reports alleging divergences amongst us. I also thought it necessary to inform Dr. Kramář in Prague about this, and to draw his attention to the danger underlying it. Here I must render a tribute to the absolute loyalty with which our politicians at Prague acted towards us during the critical days of the downfall of Austria, and after the return of our delegates from Geneva.
I was anxious to comply promptly with the demands of our Geneva delegates, and also to make all arrangements in Paris which would help to consolidate our conditions after the change of regime. My first step in this respect was to arrange for the transport of our troops from France and Italy to occupy those areas in which the new State encountered difficulties. For this purpose I had already, on November 9th, asked for the sanction of Prague to enable me to arrange with the French Government for the dispatch of a special French Military Mission to organize our future army. This course was rendered imperative by the interests and future policy of our new State. I immediately obtained sanction from Dr. Kramář for this purpose.
I then supplemented these proceedings by a new military agreement. In the sense of the Allied resolution that Marshal Foch should be Commander-in-Chief of all Allied armies, including those of the Eastern front if there were a continuation of hostilities against Germany, I asked for a formal arrangement between France and our Government, to hold good during the transition period while our State was in course of construction, to the effect that Marshal Foch should remain Commander-in-Chief of our armies on all fronts. On December 17th I submitted the matter to Clemenceau in writing, and on February 14, 1919, I signed a convention with France which was to hold good as long as Marshal Foch remained Commander-in-Chief of all Allied armies.
Finally, I turned my attention to the problem of maintaining the food supply at home with Allied help, and to the preparations for the Peace Conference. The problem of the food supply at this juncture was of vital importance to the new State, since it closely involved the maintenance of order and the protection of large areas from Bolshevism. The French Government and all the Allied representatives who were officially deputed for this purpose granted me, by progressive stages, full authority in these matters, so that little by little, with the help of our troops, I was able to contribute substantially towards the organization of the import of essential food-stuffs via Hamburg and Trieste. In these two ports the Allied Governments established missions which at that critical period rendered valuable services to our people at home.
The Americans in Paris, who were dealing with the provisioning of Czechoslovakia on behalf of the Allied authorities, showed themselves extremely considerate towards us, but in accordance with their instructions they demanded that from what we had or received we should render assistance also to the Germans and Austrians wherever there was a risk of Bolshevism, principally in Vienna. This was entirely in our own interests. I was anxious to show that the orderly elements prevailed amongst us, and I did not want the differences with our neighbours to loom too large at the moment of victory. I therefore made a point of promoting our help to Vienna also by means of food supplies. I further aimed at reducing to a minimum any friction which was likely to arise over our minorities and in connection with Slovakia.
As regards preparations for the Peace Conference, I began to make them at Paris in the early days of December; and in accordance with what I had arranged on this subject with our delegates at Geneva I instructed Prague also to begin preparations. The thoughts of the Allied circles in Paris were concentrated entirely on the Conference as soon as the Armistice had been signed, and if it was not convened until January, the reason was that they were anxious to settle beforehand a number of important matters, notably the details of how the work of the Conference was to be arranged.
At that period my co-operation with Prague was of a very gratifying character. As a result of the enthusiasm after the change of regime, and the unsparing recognition of what had been achieved by our movement abroad, our authority at home was practically unlimited. Prague accordingly complied promptly and readily with our wishes and suggestions. In his letter of November 15th Dr. Kramář paid a tribute to all the work which I had accomplished at Paris since my return from Geneva, and he announced that Prague gladly accepted my proposal concerning the French Military Mission. While agreeing with the course of action proposed towards the Germans in our country, he complained of a number of matters at home which needed adjustment. In particular, he said that there was a constant danger of Bolshevism also in the ranks of the Socialist parties, and that owing to our inadequate military resources we were being driven step by step from the Slovak regions by the Magyars. Karolyi’s proceedings were becoming more and more dangerous to us, and it was essential to take some decisive step as regards the occupation of Slovakia. Conditions in the Teschen district, he said, were also unsatisfactory, owing to the action of the Poles. He concluded by emphasizing that the most important thing was to send our troops home as soon as possible, together with food supplies, and to urge President Masaryk to return to Prague with the least possible delay so as to exert his authority for consolidating our public opinion in social respects.
I continued, therefore, to attend to the settlement of all these difficulties of ours, but almost immediately afterwards it became necessary to engage upon our first diplomatic contest for the territory of the Republic, especially Slovakia. This first struggle was successfully concluded within the following two weeks.
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The events at Prague connected with the convening of the revolutionary National Assembly, with the election of Professor Masaryk as President of the Republic, and with the appointment of a Government, produced an excellent effect in the Allied countries. At a time when chaos prevailed in Austria and Hungary, when no clear agreement had been reached between the Belgrade Government and the Zagreb National Committee, when in Poland there was still an active conflict between two tendencies represented by the Warsaw Government and the Paris National Committee respectively, the progress at Prague was regarded as a happy omen for the beginnings of the new Republic.
The Prague delegates of the National Committee had returned from Geneva on November 5th, and they had been received with the enthusiasm which marked the days inaugurating the new regime. The speech made by Dr. Kramář and the other delegates on their return, as well as the manifestos in the Press and at public meetings, testified eloquently to the great importance which was then attached to the Geneva negotiations, and to the fact that the passive resistance at home had joined forces with the liberation movement abroad.
Immediately after its return the delegation had begun, step by step, to carry out what had been agreed upon at Geneva. The members of the National Committee, who in the meanwhile had brought about the coup d’état at Prague, showed complete agreement with what had been decided at Geneva. It will be remembered that in conformity with the first law passed by the National Committee on October 28th, that body took over the administration of the Czechoslovak territories, and the State form was to be settled by the National Assembly jointly with the National Council in Paris. Before this could be done, the National Committee was held to exercise supreme authority within the State, while for external matters the nation and the new State were represented by the National Council at Paris, which in the meanwhile, by arrangement with the National Committee, had established itself as an interim Government.
In consequence of this, the presiding board of the National Committee, having made the necessary preparations after the return of the delegates from Geneva, convened the revolutionary National Assembly for its inaugural meeting on November 14th in the building hitherto occupied by the Provincial Diet. All the political parties sent their delegates, as previously agreed upon, the number representing each party being proportionate to its numerical strength. The total number of delgates was 249, of which 54 belonged to the Agrarian Party, 49 to the Social Democrats, 40 to the Constitutional Democrats, 28 to the Czech Socialists, 24 to the Catholic Party, 4 to the Centralist Socialist Party, and I to the Moravian Traders’ Party. The Slovaks were represented provisionally by 40 members. The National Committee had laid stress upon the fact that the National Assembly was to exercise legislative power, and to have charge of the Government until the new Constitution had come into force and a definitive Parliament been elected.
Even at the very outset the revolutionary National Assembly, in spite of all difficulties, displayed an activity and an efficiency which showed that it was the product of a judicious convention, and also that each party and organization regarded it as their duty to co-operate in the prompt settlement of the most urgent questions which would enable the country to emerge rapidly from the chaos of revolution. This spirit was admirably manifested at the first meeting on November 14th. The National Assembly was opened by Dr. Kramář with an inaugural address, in which he referred to the victorious conclusion of the struggle. He returned thanks to all who had struggled and suffered, and to the Allied nations. He warmly welcomed the Slovaks from the former territories of Hungary, and towards the Germans who had not yet decided to take their seats in common with the Czechoslovak representatives, he undertook a commitment of national equality. He declared that the bonds were now broken by which the nation had been held to Austria and the dynasty, and that Czechoslovakia was now a free democratic Republic. T. G. Masaryk was then unanimously elected as its President amid unbounded enthusiasm.
Steps were next taken to elect the President of the National Assembly, the deputy chosen being F. Tomášek, who, having taken his vow of allegiance, welcomed the Slovaks, expressed the hope that the Germans would collaborate, and defined the future activity of the Assembly. After the deputies had taken their vows and the Vice-Presidents had been elected, Vice-President Bela, on behalf of the Slovaks, declared that they desired liberty which was neither Magyar nor Slovak, but only Czechoslovak.
The Government was then elected as the result of a joint resolution of all parties. This was done by unanimous vote. Dr. Kramář, who was elected President of the Assembly, while the members of the Government were taking their vows of allegiance, emphasized the historical significance of the day when, for the first time after three hundred years, a legislative National Assembly was again meeting. He also expressed the hope that the Germans would soon realize the necessity of co-operation.
These events were followed with particular attention in the Allied countries. After my return from Geneva I had informed Allied circles what would probably happen in Prague, and now my forecast was being carried out almost in exact detail. I had refuted all rumours of a conflict between us and Prague, and now the reports coming from there clearly demonstrated that we had been right. This was a circumstance which at that difficult period helped to strengthen our position among the Allies.
I attach to these Prague events, in their connection with the Geneva negotiations, a considerable political and historical significance. Here I do not wish to engage in a controversy about the various theories on this subject. I am merely recording the facts, and it will be for the impartial jurist and historian to examine them all and pronounce a detached judgment. The formal and solemn severing of all bonds with the former Empire and dynasty, the proclamation of the Republic, and the election of Masaryk as President, the manifestations in favour of the Allies, our movement abroad, Czechoslovak unity—all these proceedings on the part of the revolutionary National Assembly constitute an historic event directly associated with the Geneva negotiations and the coup d’état at Prague on October 28–30, 1918. Our revolutionary activity abroad had again merged with the policy at home and its opposition to the Habsburg monarchy.
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During those November days when in Germany and Central Europe everything was in a state of ferment, revolution, and chaos, when the Allies were making preparations for the Conference, when enemy territories were being occupied, and when there was a menace of Bolshevism in several countries, we in Paris were living in a state of tension, excitement, expectation, and impatience. The provisioning of Bohemia was not proceeding as rapidly as we should have liked and as we had expected from what the Allies had promised. The transport of our troops was also being continually postponed. I urged Prague to be patient, but I myself was not satisfied.
The dissatisfaction and the alarm amongst us were increased daily by the events which began to develop in Slovakia about November 15th. Károlyi, who had taken charge of the Government in Hungary, realized that it would be possible to make an attempt to preserve the integral character of Hungary only on the basis of certain assumptions. He conscientiously did everything in his power, perhaps somewhat more skilfully than it would have been done by Tisza, Apponyi, Andrássy, or Weckerle. In this respect the Magyars did a serious injustice to this politician and his associates who, amid the welter of revolution, were desperately endeavouring to save for Hungary what at that time nobody else could certainly have saved. With this end in view Károlyi promptly decided upon a policy of racial justice. He contemplated special ministries for the Ruthenians, Slovaks, and Rumanians, he contemplated also administrative reforms on the lines of regional racial autonomy, he had already made practical experiments in this respect, and had announced to the world that future Hungary would for evermore abandon the impossible Chauvinistic policy of former Hungary. This was the programme of his revolutionary National Council, which was publicly proclaimed as early as October 25, 1918.
His second good tactical step consisted of his negotiations with the Allies. Seeing the inevitable advance of the Allied army from the south, and fearing a Serbian invasion of Hungary, he began promptly to negotiate with General Franchet d’Esperey, the Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Allied Army, his purpose being to secure Allied influence for preventing Serbian troops from entering Hungary proper. In this he was successful, as the Allies soon caused the Serbians to withdrawn from the Banat beyond the Danube. Then began the Allied negotiations with Károlyi for the maintenance of order in Hungary.
Thus, between November 7th and the 12th, discussions took place between Károlyi and Franchet d’Esperey, the result of which was the arrangement of a special Armistice signed at Belgrade on November 13th. These proceedings were somewhat irregular, as the Armistice terms for Austria-Hungary had been arranged at Versailles between October 31st and November 4th, and they had been duly signed on the Italian front in the name of the whole Empire on November 3rd. These terms applied in their full extent to Hungary also, and the revolution which had broken out there made no change in this respect. The States which had newly arisen (for example, the new Austria and the new Hungary) had not hitherto existed from the point of view of international law, as they had not been recognized. The negotiations with their authorities had, for the time being, been only of a local character designed for the maintenance of order in the locality concerned and without any political implications. Of the new States, Czechoslovakia was the only one which existed on a basis of international law. Serbia and Rumania had only their old territory, the problems involved by their new areas not having been settled. The juridical situation of Austria, Hungary, and Poland was altogether vague and uncertain.
M. Clemenceau, in granting permission to General Franchet d’Esperey to arrange a special Armistice, assured me by telegram on November 12th that this Armistice was not to affect any political questions. Nevertheless, by Article 17 of the Armistice, it was stipulated that for the time being the whole of Hungarian territory, except Croatia-Slavonia, was to be left under the local administration of the Magyar authorities. This article was then interpreted by the Magyars as an Allied recognition of the integral character of Hungary, and was adduced as an argument against the occupation of Slovakia by our troops and officials. The dispute arising from this was very serious, difficult, and dangerous, both juridically and politically, and it cost us much labour and anxiety. The question of Károlyi’s Armistice, however, gave me an opportunity of settling this point once and for all, and securing an Allied decision which was of far-reaching importance to our territorial questions and also to our internal consolidation.
As I have already mentioned, Károlyi made use of all possible ways and means of saving for Hungary whatever could be saved. Several times he applied to the Allies with proclamations, telegrams, and personal appeals, emphasizing very skilfully that there should be no resolution creating a prejudice with regard to the integral character of Hungary and its administrative unity until the signature of the Peace Treaty. Everybody will understand what it would have meant for the territorial demands of the oppressed races in Hungary if that country had continued to be occupied by the Magyars until the signature of the Trianon Peace Treaty, i.e. August 1920. He also endeavoured to obtain a special Allied permission for Hungary to judge impartially the frontier question, and in this connection he emphasized that Transylvania, Slovakia, and the Ruthenians of Hungary desired to remain with the Magyars. He also broached the question of a possible plebiscite. His intervention with President Wilson in this respect was particularly important, and all these proceedings could not fail to have a considerable influence on the Allies. I had many opportunities of observing this in Paris, and it cost me much labour to counteract the effects of it in good time.
Dr. Kramář had sent me news from Prague about these matters, and had called for prompt help against what the Magyars were doing. The signature of this special Armistice had acted like a bombshell amongst us and also in Slovakia, and it was, moreover, accompanied by serious military movements on the part of the Magyars.
Under the immediate influence of the revolutionary events in our country and in Hungary, a successful attempt was made, on the initiative of Dr. V. Šrobár, to occupy various Slovak local areas with small garrisons of irregular military contingents supported by the Sokols, and also to obtain charge of the public administration. On November 4th Czechoslovak troops, numbering about 1,100 including also gendarmes, occupied Senica, Jablonice, Boleráz, Zohor, and Svatý Jan, while on November 9th this process was extended so as to include Maďarská Ves, Stupava, Děvínská Nová Ves, and other localities. After November 10th the Magyars recovered from their first surprise, and hurriedly prepared two of their divisions, besides mobilizing several levies of recruits. They began a counter-attack upon our garrisons, and everywhere they carried out a policy of terrorism. On November 14th they drove the Czech contingents from Trnava, advancing on Žilina, and before very long the small body of Czech troops had been forced to retire as far as the Moravian-Slovak frontier. Many of our people now began to regard the occupation of Slovakia, and still more its incorporation in the Republic, as problematical. The Prague Diet was very alarmed, but the Government, having no resources for a campaign, or any regular troops which could be sent out for help, was practically powerless.
These events caused the question of incorporating Slovakia in our Republic to assume a juridically controversial aspect, and having had my attention drawn to these matters by Prague, I had to make an attempt to secure from the Allies a settlement on principle before the Peace Conference. As we shall see later, a settlement favourable to us was reached, and no further difficulties arose on this point. A month later an analogous question concerning the German regions of Bohemia had to be considered, and the settlement was again in our favour.
Károlyi, continuing his very skilful tactics, and judging that he was fully covered by his Belgrade Armistice, sent a special note to Prague on November 17, 1918, protesting against the occupation of Slovakia. Dr. Kramář replied to him on the following day, his argument being the one acknowledged by Paris, to the effect that the Czechoslovak State had been recognized by the Allies even before the change of regime, and this recognition applied also to the territories inhabited by the Slovaks. The Magyar Government could not therefore arrange an armistice on behalf of Slovakia, which was an integral part of the Czechoslovak State. Dr. Kramář then informed me of what had happened, and asked for immediate intervention. In this way the struggle for Slovakia was transferred to Paris.
From the second half of November onwards I was daily occupied discussing and negotiating this matter with military circles and politicians. As on previous occasions, I first saw Berthelot, who at once recognized our point of view as being the right one, and I then approached Pichon, Clemenceau, and Marshal Foch, as well as representatives of Great Britain and the United States. I pointed out to them that the Magyar action would inevitably result in a new armed conflict, sooner or later. In the course of these proceedings, it became obvious that there was a definite difference of opinion between the military and the political circles. The politicians regarded General Franchet d’Esperey’s Armistice as a blunder, since it had been arranged in a manner which might prove prejudicial to some of the Allied wishes. After some hesitation it was acknowledged that the blunder must be rectified. I accordingly asked that the exact significance of Franchet d’Esperey’s Armistice should be interpreted, and I also insisted that at the same time the frontiers should be fixed between the Magyars and ourselves so as to be a guarantee against any further surprise action, and also a proof that Slovakia did actually belong to us. I went into this matter on several occasions with Marshal Foch, who agreed to my suggestions, and finally proposed that I should settle a line of demarcation, which he would notify to Budapest, and behind which the Magyars would be compelled to withdraw. I therefore indicated what I regarded as a suitable line for this purpose, and then sent an official report on this dispute to M. Pichon asking him for a definite statement of the Allied point of view, which would then be taken by the Magyars and ourselves as definitive and binding. My report was sent on November 25th, and two days later I received a reply from M. Pichon, which contained the following:
In your letter of November 25th you drew my attention to the conclusions arising from the Armistice negotiated with Count Károlyi on November 13th, and running counter to the Armistice with Austria-Hungary which the Allies signed on November 3rd.
In view of the fact that Count Károlyi wished to draw incorrect conclusions from this document . . . I have the honour to inform you that the Minister of War has just sent precise telegraphic instructions on this matter to the Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Allied Armies.
In confidence I may mention that these instructions provide for the immediate withdrawal of the Magyar troops from the territory occupied by them without authorization.
This successfully concluded the first part of our struggle for Slovakia by which our right to that territory and the juridical ineffectiveness of Károlyi’s Armistice were fully confirmed.
167
Immediately after the change of regime, Dr. Emil Stodola was appointed as our delegate at Budapest, and towards the end of November, at his own request, he was replaced by Dr. Milan Hodža. The first Allied Military Mission, directed by Lieutenant-Colonel Vyx, reached Budapest on November 27th. At the first interview between Dr. Hodža and Lieutenant-Colonel Vyx on November 29th, the latter spoke emphatically against our occupation of Slovakia, which, he said, was contrary to the Belgrade Armistice. He added that our action there would do us great harm at the Peace Conference. Dr. Hodža rightly pointed out that as an Allied State, recognized by the Great Powers even before the collapse of Austria, we were entitled to occupy Slovakia, and he asked Lieutenant-Colonel Vyx, in view of the fact that Paris was duly informed of our attitude in this respect, to obtain direct instructions from Generals Henrys and Franchet d’Esperey. But before any news of the negotiations in Budapest had reached Paris, my intervention there had been effective, with the result that Lieutenant-Colonel Vyx received due instructions from the Ministry of War, these having been originally drawn up by M. Pichon. On December 3rd he transmitted them to Károlyi in a very emphatic communication which reproduced our point of view in its entirety. On the following day Lieutenant-Colonel Vyx notified Dr. Hodža officially of the Paris resolution, and Dr. Hodža transmitted this to the Government at Prague in the following terms:
The Czechoslovak delegate to-day received this communication from Lieutenant-Colonel Vyx:
The Czechoslovak State has been recognized by the Allies. Its troops are recognized as Allied troops. The Czechoslovak State, therefore, is entitled to occupy the Slovak territory in the capacity of a belligerent Power, participating in the fulfilment of the Armistice which stipulates the occupation of the territory of the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy.
The Magyar Government is requested to withdraw its troops from Slovak territory.
From the news which reached me from Prague, it would appear that the first set of instructions supplied to Lieutenant-Colonel Vyx provided for the evacuation of Slovakia, but he did not receive any precise indication of the frontiers to which the Magyars were to conform. As I have mentioned, in the course of my negotiations at the Quai d’Orsay between November 20th and 25th, I had suggested a line of demarcation for Slovakia, consisting of the Carpathians, the River Morava, the Danube as far as the Ipola, from the Ipola to Rimavská Sobota, from Rimavská Sobota in a direct line to the confluence of the River Už with the Bereg, and from there along the course of the Už to the Carpathians. Moreover, I had been informed that these details had been telegraphed to Budapest. Dr. Hodža pointed out to Lieutenant-Colonel Vyx that if the evacuation line was not defined, difficulties would arise, and he therefore asked him to obtain further instructions from Paris immediately. He also at once applied to Prague, urging the authorities there to intervene in Paris, telegraphed to me by way of Salonica, and besides this wrote a letter to me direct. As the result of the telegraphic demand from Prague, I again intervened in the requisite sense, emphasizing the need for sending precise and emphatic instructions to Budapest on the subject of the demarcation line, and also insisting upon the prompt evacuation of Slovakia.
In the meanwhile, Dr. Hodža, fearing the possibility of further complications, reached an agreement on December 6th, 1918, with Dr. V. Bartha, the Magyar Minister of War, for establishing a provisional line of demarcation, to hold good only until fresh instructions arrived from Paris. They then communicated the details of this agreement to Lieutenant-Colonel Vyx, who at once reported the matter to Paris. I myself heard nothing about the Hodža-Bartha arrangement, either from Prague or Budapest, and this circumstance considerably complicated the situation.
My attention had been drawn to this fundamental question at the Quai d’Orsay at my very first negotiations there on the evacuation of Slovakia (after November 20th), and several times towards the end of November and at the beginning of December, when the Prague Government had exchanged telegrams with Károlyi and had sent Tusar to Vienna and Dr. Emil Stodola (later Dr. Hodža) to Budapest. When on November 29th I again discussed these questions with M. Pichon, he reminded me of it in emphatic terms. The American delegation who approached me officially in the matter was equally dissatisfied, and demanded that we should not enter into any negotiations either with Vienna and Budapest or with Berlin.
I drew the attention of Prague to this opinion of the Allies first of all telegraphically, and then in a series of detailed letters between November 27th and 29th. I also informed Prague telegraphically of the American démarche, when it was repeated on December 10th, during the stay of President Masaryk in Paris.
A second matter which was equally unpleasant was the Budapest agreement on a provisional line of demarcation. At the Quai d’Orsay and among the military authorities they were annoyed with us because we had no right whatever to make any arrangements with the Magyars on territorial questions, such a proceeding being possible only if carried out jointly by the Allies. In addition to this, they began to object to the demands of my line of demarcation because Károlyi was claiming that between him and the representatives of the Czechoslovak Government there had been a special agreement about a line of demarcation which was said to correspond approximately to the legitimate demands of both sides.[1] Károlyi argued that it was therefore impossible to expect the Magyars to evacuate the whole territory as far as the line which I had demanded in November and which Paris had then sanctioned. It will be seen that Károlyi was successfully endeavouring to take advantage of the Budapest agreement, in spite of the fact that it was provisional on instructions from Paris.
These topics caused considerable agitation at Prague, as might be supposed during such a period of uncertainty and alarm. The revolutionary National Assembly discussed them on several occasions, and the leading Czechs and Slovaks realized great potential danger in the situation. The Magyar Government had here proceeded very skilfully. Its first move was to try and negotiate with the Slovaks without the Czechs or the Prague Government, indicating that it was willing to make concessions if it negotiated with the Slovak National Council, but not if it had to deal with the Czechs. In this connection I should point out that towards the end of November there were several members of the executive of the Slovak National Council at Budapest besides Dr. Hodža, and Károlyi was endeavouring to bring the discussions on to autonomist lines in the interests of Hungary’s territorial integrity by negotiating only with the Slovaks, without the Czechs and against them. In the National Assembly and in the Press at Prague there were utterances which showed that this development of affairs had caused much concern there. For this reason, on December 1st, the Prague Government issued a statement through the official Press bureau that nobody was authorized to carry on negotiations with the Magyar Government on any subject, and the parliamentary club of Slovak deputies issued a public declaration on the same subject. Dr. Kramář acted according to the demands of the situation. On December 10th he made a statement in the National Assembly to the effect that the occupation of Slovakia did not form a subject of negotiations between the Czechoslovak and Magyar Governments, that nobody had been authorized for this purpose by the Czechoslovak Government, and that Tusar and Hodža, our representatives in Vienna and Budapest respectively, were occupied exclusively with liquidation duties.
I handed this declaration to the authorities in Paris as soon as it reached me, and again asked for the evacuation to be effected as far as the line agreed upon in November. After wearisome and vexatious negotiations at the Quai d’Orsay, I received an assurance that the line of demarcation agreed upon in Paris would be kept to. Accordingly, the Magyar Government was officially notified by Lieutenant-Colonel Vyx to this effect. In acknowledging the receipt of the note, however, the Magyar Government stated that they would not accept the passage relating to the frontiers, as it did not agree with the historical facts of the case, and that they regarded the establishment of this new line as a brutal and arbitrary act. They therefore insisted upon the line of demarcation arranged on December 6th between Dr. Bartha and Dr. Hodža. Nevertheless, the Magyars were compelled to evacuate Slovakia as far as the line arranged by me in Paris.
I have emphasized the details of this interesting struggle because I regard these events as a logical continuation of our revolutionary activity abroad, and also because the settlement of two far-reaching territorial questions was practically reached before the Peace Conference. Thus concluded our first diplomatic incident concerning our controversy with the Magyars about Slovakia.
168
If I here refer to frontier questions and show how we secured the right to occupy nearly all our later State territory long before the decision of the Peace Conference, this will perhaps be the right place for me to add something about the analogous proceedings with regard to our historical areas, especially those with a mixed Czech and German population. The occupation of this territory was also expressly accorded to us on the basis of our war-time recognitions. But I will narrate the course of these events in their due order.
On December 13th Dr. O. Bauer, the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs in Renner’s Government, sent the French Government and the other Allied Governments a protest against the attempt to retain the Sudetic Germans within Czechoslovakia, and he demanded that a plebiscite should at once be arranged. Three days later, in a new note, he demanded that the frontiers between Austria and Czechoslovakia, and between Austria and Jugoslavia, should be settled by a special process of arbitration.
Having been informed of this matter, I at once intervened with the French, English, and Americans, both verbally and in writing. I submitted a memorandum based upon our juridical position as a recognized Allied State with historical frontiers, and I further pointed out that around us, in Germany, Vienna, and Hungary there was a menace of Bolshevism. I also mentioned that, with a view to consolidating our economic affairs rapidly, we were preparing a currency reform, but all our plans were frustrated by the fact that hitherto not even our provisional frontiers had been defined. It was therefore, I said, unconditionally necessary to confirm, at least for the time being, our historical frontiers, since upon this depended the peace and order around us in Central Europe. The step taken by the Austrian Government provided a good opportunity of doing this.
M. Pichon agreed that my argument was right and promised to reply to the Austrian Government in this sense. Then on December 21st M. Berthelot gave me, as an official reply to my communication, the copy of a note which M. Pichon, as a result of our intervention, had handed the Swiss Legation in Paris for transmission to the Government at Vienna. This note is so important, both from a juridical and a political point of view, that I reproduce it here in extenso:
The Swiss Legation kindly handed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs two notes from the Government of German Austria on December 13th and 16th respectively.
The first of these notes protests against the intention of the Allied Powers to embody the Germans from Bohemia and Moravia within the Czechoslovak State. It declares that these Germans desire to separate from the Czechoslovak State, and proposes an immediate plebiscite for the purpose of settling the whole situation. The second note demands that the question concerning the frontiers of German Austria with Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia respectively should be submitted to decision by arbitration.
These demands cannot be accepted by us.
The questions of the frontiers here at issue cannot be settled otherwise than by the Peace Conference, and for this purpose must be investigated by the Allied Governments at a very early date.
The French Government, however, takes the view that the Czechoslovak State, in accordance with the recognition granted to it by the Allied Governments, must have as its frontiers, until the decision of the Peace Conference, the existing frontiers of the historical provinces of Bohemia, Moravia, and Austrian Silesia.
As regards Slovakia, its frontiers must be established thus: The Danube from the present western frontier of Hungary to the river Ipola, thence along the course of the river Ipola to the town of Rimavská Sobota, then in a straight line from west to east as far as the river Už, and thence along the course of the river Už to the frontier of Galicia.
General Franchet d’Esperey called upon the Hungarian Government to withdraw its troops beyond these frontiers. This notification has been complied with. These frontiers have thus, in reality, been already respected.
It was the Americans who caused the greatest difficulty. I discussed affairs with Colonel House and his entourage, comprising Captain Lippman and Major Bonsal. Already at that time the Americans were paying close attention to all arguments which were based upon the historical frontiers of the new States. Those working with Colonel House told me that they feared to create prejudicial results in this matter. If they acknowledged our historical frontiers, what were they to say to the Poles, who were making an analogous claim, but with whose demands it was impossible to comply? They were not opposed to our point of view, but they were unwilling to commit themselves before the Peace Conference, for if they were to give their consent to the occupation of the territories demanded, that would be tantamount to a settlement of the whole question. Finally, however, they too gave their consent when I entered into a definite commitment that the Czechoslovak Government would unconditionally accept the decision of the Peace Conference as final.
It will be readily understood how wide was the scope of these decisions, and it was natural that under such circumstances I felt optimistic about the Teschen question. As early as December 22nd I telegraphically notified Dr. Kramář of this decision, and two days later I sent him a special communication containing the texts of my statements to the Allies as well as of their decisions as to our right to occupy the territory in question. Our Government thereupon carried out the occupation in due course.
169
The transport of our troops from France and Italy was unexpectedly delayed. The first resolutions for their prompt removal were passed at a moment when it was thought that hostilities would have to be continued against Germany from the south. When the Armistice with Germany was concluded, the Supreme French Command had no further interest in the matter and kept putting it off, more particularly as the French themselves had to cope with difficulties of transport, food supply, the occupation of the Rhine area, etc.
From the middle of November I was in continual touch with the French General Staff about these questions. I had first settled a regular transport plan with Colonel Philippe, which I then submitted to General Alby, Chief of the General Staff at the Ministry of War, but neither the General Staff nor Colonel Philippe would allow our regiments to leave France without complete preparation, new equipment, new uniforms, and unless they were reorganized in such a manner as to set a model standard at home. To this I had to agree.
With the Italian regiments the matter was even more troublesome. The first difficulty was due to the fact that at the last moment before the Italian offensive the division had received a new general. On October 21st a telegram suddenly reached me from General Diaz stating that he was obliged, for reasons of organization, to remove General Graziani from the command of our division, and that he proposed General Piccione as his successor. I was not altogether surprised at this, as I knew that there had been disputes between Graziani and the Supreme Command. Nevertheless, I was at first unwilling, for reasons of principle, to agree to this proceeding. By the terms of our agreement with the Italian Government the Supreme Command was not entitled to take stuch a step unless the matter had been first arranged by a preliminary agreement with us. But I knew that our division was about to take part in important operations at the front, and I therefore telegraphed my provisional consent in order that no crisis might arise in the command of our troops, with the possibility of a resulting disaster in the field. I intended to discuss the matter during my visit to Italy, but the development of events made this superfluous.
When the Armistice was signed, and we were to prepare our regiments for departure, this naturally tended to impede the smooth working of our plans, just as it had done in France. In Italy, however, the postponement was caused notably by a fresh decision to prepare a whole corps for us, and from the enormous number of new prisoners who had been captured after the victory at Vittoria Veneta to organize new militia regiments so that it would be possible to return to Bohemia with a fully equipped army comprising units of every kind.
Under these circumstances I decided, after consulting with Prague, to send at least a military mission there at short notice for the purposes of military organization. I appointed as its chief Lieutenant-Colonel O. Husák, whose battalion had distinguished itself in the final stage of the hostilities at Terron. Husák selected a number of our best officers and N.C.O.’s from France, supplemented them by a few Italian officers, and left for Prague towards the end of November. He was received there with enthusiasm, and at once started organizing our home army.
It was not until about Christmas that the transport of our regiments from France and Italy, after my repeated efforts in Paris and Rome, began to make any real progress. The regiments from France were sent to Bohemia and Moravia, while those from Italy occupied Slovakia.
(e) Masaryk’s Return to Prague as President. End of the Revolutionary Movement Abroad
170
On November 20th President Masaryk left New York on his way back to Prague to take up the duties to which the liberated nation had called him. On November 29th he reached England, and spent a few days in London, where he was welcomed as the President of a new State. He took the opportunity of meeting a number of prominent statesmen, such as Mr. Balfour, Mr. Churchill, Lord Milner, Sir Eyre Crowe, Sir William Tyrrell, and others, and then left for Paris, where he arrived on December 7th. Here he visited MM. Poincaré, Clemenceau, Pichon, and Berthelot, as well as various foreign diplomats, such as Colonel House, Mr. Sharp, Trumbić, Vesnić, Venizelos, Take Jonescu, etc. He remained in Paris for a week. On December 8th he visited our troops at Darney, where they were already preparing to return home. This was at the time when on behalf of the Czechoslovak Government I had participated in the official visit of the French Government to Alsace-Lorraine. After our return to Paris we together went through all the necessary preliminaries to the Peace Conference, and agreed upon our whole procedure.
I recall a number of points which struck me during Masaryk’s visit to Paris on this occasion. Thus, he made no secret to me of the anxiety which he felt when he thought of the work awaiting him at home. He agreed that we had successfully overcome the first period of our difficulties, but he emphasized that we were now faced by the second period, involving the work of elaborating the State at home, and in many respects this would be far more difficult. And when I reminded him of the authority and popularity which he enjoyed, and which would make everything possible, he only made a deprecatory gesture with his hand and remarked: “We shall see.”
He also pointed out what I ought to do, and how I should prepare for my return, adding his ideas of what my political future was to be. To this I said nothing: the matter was still new to me, and I had not given any thought to my political future. I had always merely fulfilled my duty, and work which creates, work which challenges, has always been my element. During this time in Paris the President often looked tired and nearly always preoccupied. A sentence has remained fixed in my mind which he uttered on several occasions, and which he repeated to the soldiers at Darney: “We have reached the top, but it is easier to reach the top than to stay there.” I could see why he was anxious, and the reports which we had in Paris at that time about the early difficulties of the Republic did not relieve his anxiety.
On the evening of December 14th, accompanied by M. Clement-Simon, the first French Minister in Prague, President Masaryk left Paris for Prague via Italy. At Padua he stopped to visit the King of Italy and our Italian troops, and then, accompanied by General Piccione, the new commander of our legionaries in Italy, he resumed his journey to Prague, where he arrived on December 21, 1918, almost by the same route as the one by which, four years earlier, on December 18, 1914, he had left Prague on his adventurous pilgrimage around the world. The nation welcomed him with enthusiasm and emotion, with unbounded gratitude and hope. He was referred to as the people’s liberator, and rightly so, for his life’s work marks him out as the last of our great revivalists. He brilliantly completed the task of national revival in the spirit of Komenský, Palacký, and Havlíček.
President Masaryk took up his quarters in the castle at Prague in the same serious mood which he had shown on his arrival in Paris. This can be understood only by those who consider the great scope of his undertakings during the war, and the responsibility both as regards present and future which devolved upon him at that juncture.
By the return of President Masaryk to Prague on December 21, 1918, our liberation movement abroad was, in my opinion, completed. The President returned, for the time being, alone. Our troops from France and England arrived home again slowly in batches during the following months, and helped to maintain order at home, besides providing protection against possible dangers from outside, particularly with regard to the events in Hungary. The Siberian troops had to make further sacrifices to our cause and to that of the Allies. They were unable to return mainly for technical difficulties, but also for political reasons, as the course of events made it imperative for them to remain in Siberia until further notice. In view of the peace negotiations, our Government agreed to this course, and thus our troops in Siberia contributed to our successes at the conference in Paris.
At the moment of victory on the Western front and at home, Štefánik was touring Siberia for the purpose of maintaining order among our volunteer troops, who by now were becoming impatient. Like Štefánik himself, they felt isolated, and were eager to see their homes again. It had long been Štefánik’s plan to return to Slovakia in an aeroplane, but he was unable to carry out his intention until May 4, 1919. This was to be his last journey. By a tragic irony of fate his aeroplane crashed when he was approaching the frontiers of his country, and he was thus not destined to enter Czechoslovakia alive.
After the President’s departure I was unable to leave Paris, although the members of the Government had summoned me to Prague. At this time I was overwhelmed with work arising from the situation in Slovakia, and the approaching Peace Conference also entailed a daily increasing amount of labour. This was the beginning of my new activities for securing peace and the post-war reconstruction of Central Europe. This period was no less exhausting and difficult than had been the war itself.
Thus I did not return home until a whole year later, on September 24, 1919, after four years of toil and struggle abroad, during which there had been no respite and no moments without anxiety.
- ↑ The provisional agreement applied to Slovakia without Bratislava, without the Danube plain, without Košice or its environs, and without the most eastern portion of Slovakia.