National Union of Marine Cooks and Stewards v. Arnold/Dissent Black

by Hugo Black

United States Supreme Court

348 U.S. 37

National Union of Marine Cooks and Stewards  v.  Arnold

 Argued: Oct. 15, 1954. --- Decided: Nov 22, 1954

Mr. Justice BLACK, with whom Mr. Justice DOUGLAS concurs, dissenting.

In Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 17 S.Ct. 841, 42 L.Ed. 215, decided in 1897, this Court held that due process of law was denied by a trial court which had refused to permit a defendant to try his case on the merits merely because the defendant had disobeyed the court's order to pay into the court's registry money which was the subject matter of the controversy. This Court said that such a denial of all right to defend would convert the court into an instrument of wrong and oppression. The appeal here was dismissed by the Washington Supreme Court on the single ground that petitioner has disobeyed a court order to turn over certain bonds which were not even the subject matter of this lawsuit. I think the Hovey v. Elliott doctrine applies with equal force to this dismissal. True this Court has said that a state is not constitutionally required to provide a system of appellate court review. But since Washington has done so, proceedings in its supreme court are merely the final step in the judicial process in trying cases and therefore cannot be conducted so as to deny that 'due process' which the Fourteenth Amendment requires. Cole v. State of Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201-202, 68 S.Ct. 514, 517, 92 L.Ed. 644, and cases there cited. And Washington also must abide by the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection command in deciding who can and who cannot appeal. Cochran v. State of Kansas, 316 U.S. 255, 62 S.Ct. 1068, 86 L.Ed. 1453.

State legislatures have broad power to forbid varied types of conduct and to provide for punishment by courts. But the power to punish for violation of admittedly valid statutes is not unlimited. State punishments must not obliterate clearly granted federal rights. See, e.g., Hill v. State of Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 543, 65 S.Ct. 1373, 1375, 89 L.Ed. 1782. I suppose no one would contend that a defendant convicted of such conventional crimes as larceny or embezzlement could be punished by compelling him to give up his religious faith. The right of a person to be heard in his own defense stands on an equally firm constitutional base. In McVeigh v. United States, 11 Wall. 259, 267, 20 L.Ed. 80, this Court said that to deny an 'alien enemy' a right to defend himself 'would be a blot upon our jurisprudence and civilization.' It was there said that a constitutional right to defend is inseparable from a liability of be sued. And I can see no reason why the same principle is not equally applicable in each court where rights are passed upon. The appeal here was but a continuation of petitioner's defense which began in the trial court. But petitioner was denied any opportunity to defend itself in the appellate court because it had disobeyed a court order. By whatever other name it may be called, the dismissal was punishment. I do not think the Washington legislature could provide this kind of punishment for disobedience of a court order or for any other crime, and certainly the state court's power to do so is no greater than that of the state's legislature. Hovey v. Elliott, supra, 167 U.S. at pages 417-418, 17 S.Ct. at page 844, 42 L.Ed. 215.

In summary, petitioner having been haled into court as a defendant has been denied an opportunity to defend itself in a court that had power finally to decide whether petitioner should pay money to plaintiffs who sued. The purpose was punishment for an offense having no relation at all to the merits of the plaintiff's claim or to the petitioner's defense. From the beginning, due process and equal protection have meant that every defendant must be permitted to defend himself in any court where his antagonist can appear and prosecute. This right of defense belongs to all-good or bad, one who has violated laws the same as one who has not. I would reverse this case.

Notes