Nelson v. O'Neil/Dissent Marshall

by Thurgood Marshall

United States Supreme Court

402 U.S. 622

Nelson  v.  O'Neil

 Argued: March 24, 1971. --- Decided: June 1, 1971

Mr. Justice MARSHALL, dissenting.

This case dramatically illustrates the need for the adoption of new rules regulating the use of joint trials. Here there is no question that Runnels' alleged statement to the police was not admissible under state law against O'Neil. But as my Brother BRENNAN points out and as this Court recognized in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), there is a very real danger that the statement was in fact used against O'Neil.

Those that argue for the use of joint trials contend that joint trials, although often resulting in prejudice to recognized rights of one or more of the codefendants, are justified because of the saving of time, money, and energy that result. But, as this case shows, much of the supposed saving is lost through protracted litigation that results from the impingement or near impingement on a codefendant's rights of confrontation and equal protection.

The American Bar Association's Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Advisory Committee on the Criminal Trial, suggested that if a defendant in a joint trial moves for a severance because the prosecutor intends to introduce an out-of-court statement by his codefendant that is inadmissible against the moving defendant, then the trial court should require the prosecutor) to elect between a joint trial in which the statement is excluded; a joint trial at which the statement is admitted but the portion that refers to the moving defendant is effectively deleted; and severance. I believe that the adoption of such a practice is the only way in which the recurring problems of confrontation and equal protection can be eliminated.

Notes