Noonan v. Bradley/Dissent Clifford

by Nathan Clifford

United States Supreme Court

76 U.S. 394

Noonan  v.  Bradley

Mr. Justice CLIFFORD, with whom concurred SWAYNE and DAVIS, JJ., dissenting.

I dissent from the opinion and judgment of the court in this case upon two grounds, which I will proceed to state without entering at all into the argument to support the respective propositions—

1. Because I think that the alleged disability to sue should have been pleaded in abatement and not in bar. Undoubtedly a different rule of pleading prevailed at common law, but there are three reported decisions of this court in which it is held that such a plea in a case like the present must be in abatement, and in view of our complicated system of jurisprudence I am not inclined to overrule those cases. They have been regarded as authorities for many years, and I am of the opinion that the rule which they establish is the better one as a rule of pleading in the Federal courts than the rule which prevailed at common law. ^[1]

2. I am also of the opinion that the decree in the former suit is conclusive as to the rights of the parties, and that it constitutes a complete answer to the defence in the present suit. ^[2]

Notes

1. Childress v. Emory, 8 Wheaton, 642; Kane v. Paul, 14 Peters, 33; Ventress v. Smith, 10 Id. 161.
2. Noonan v. Lee, 2 Black, 499.