On the Road to Insurrection/Letter to the Comrades
Letter to the Comrades
October 16–17, 1917.
COMRADES,—
The period we are now passing through is so critical, events succeed one another with such incredible rapidity, that the writer whose fate it is to be placed somewhat out of the full current of history, runs a constant risk of being behind the times or of appearing to be badly informed, especially if his writings are not published immediately. Nevertheless, I find myself compelled to address this letter to the Bolsheviks (though perhaps it will not be printed); for the hesitations, against which I consider it my duty to set myself with the utmost energy, are a crying scandal, and may have the most disastrous effect on the party, on the progress of the international proletariat and on the revolution. It is possible that I am too late: in any case, I intend to mention the information at my disposal and the times of its receipt.
It was only on the morning of Monday, October 16, that I was able to see a comrade who had been present the evening before, at Petrograd, at a most important Bolshevik meeting and who gave me detailed information about the debates. The question discussed was that of the insurrection, which was also the subject of comment of the whole press on Sunday. The assembly included representatives of all the principal branches of Bolshevik activity in the capital. And only a negligible minority—two comrades to be exact—was against the insurrection. The reasons put forward by these comrades are so weak, show such disorder, such timidity, such a forgetting of the fundamental principals of Bolshevism and of revolutionary proletarian internationalism, that one asks oneself how such shameful hesitations can be explained. Nevertheless, the fact exists, and since a revolutionary party should have no tolerance of hesitation on so serious a matter, and this pair of comrades against our principles might cause some disturbance in our midst, it is necessary to examine their arguments, reveal the nature of their hesitations and show how infamous they are. That is what I am going to try to do in the following lines.
"We have not a majority amongst the people, and consequently the insurrection cannot be successful."
Those who are capable of speaking thus, either consciously trifle with truth or are incurable formalists who, being fully determined to take no account of the actual situation, in the highest degree a revolutionary one, desire stubbornly to have a guarantee that in the whole country the Bolshevik party has exactly half the votes plus one. Never throughout history has a revolutionary party had such a guarantee, and it is absolutely impossible that it should have. To bring forward objections of this kind is to jeer at your audience and to conceal your flight from reality.
The revolution affords incontrovertible evidence that the majority of the people, after the events of July, began to rally to the Bolsheviks. This was shown even before the Kornilov insurrection, by the elections at Petrograd on August 20, when the percentage of votes obtained by the Bolsheviks in the town itself (excluding the suburbs) rose from 20 per cent. to 33 per cent., and later, in September, by the municipal elections in the Moscow municipal districts, where the total percentage of the votes for the Bolsheviks increased from 11 per cent. to 49½ per cent. (a Moscow comrade whom I saw recently told me that the exact figure was 51 per cent.). It was also shown by the elections for the soviets. It was shown again by the fact that, in spite of their central council being entirely devoted to Avxentiev, the peasant soviets declared themselves by a majority to be against the coalition.[1] Now to be against the coalition, is in reality to follow the Bolsheviks. Further, communications which reach us from the front bear clearer and clearer witness that in spite of the slanders and attacks directed against the Bolsheviks by the Socialist Revolutionary or Menshevik leaders, officers, deputies, &c., the mass of the troops is coming over more and more strongly to their side.
Finally, what shows more clearly than any words, that the people are rallying to the Bolsheviks, is the peasant insurrection which is the most important fact to-day. For, whatever lies are told by the bourgeois press and its pathetic attendants, the perpetual procrastinators of the Novaia Zizn and others who shout "pogrom" and "anarchy," the insurrection is a fact. The movement of peasants in the province of Tambov has been an insurrection both in the physical and political sense of the word, an insurrection which has had splendid political results, the first of which has been the agreement to hand the land over to the peasants. Terrified by the insurrection, the whole Socialist Revolutionary clique, up to and including the Dielo Naroda, now proclaims the necessity of giving the land to the peasants. Here, attested by facts, is the justification and the success of Bolshevism. The insurrection was necessary to teach conduct to the Bonapartistes and their lackeys of the Pre-parliament.
The result is a fact. Now whatever happens, a fact is a solid thing. And this factual argument in favour of the insurrection is stronger than all the bad reasons with which our pessimist politicians conceal their inquietude and their fear.
If the agrarian insurrection was not an event of national political importance, the socialist revolutionary minions of the Pre-parliament would not proclaim that it was necessary to give the land to the peasants.
The Rabotchi Pont has already drawn attention to another excellent political and revolutionary result of the peasant insurrection. This is the arrivals of barley at the railway stations in the province of Tambov. Here again, my fanatical friends, is an argument which shows you that insurrection is the only way to save the country from famine and disaster. While the Social-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, who are betraying the country, are grumbling, threatening, writing resolutions and promising to feed the starving by calling together the Constituent Assembly, the people themselves set to work and settled the food question in the Bolshevik way, by insurrection against the great landowners, the capitalists and the monopolists.
And the magnificent results of this solution (the only real one) of the food question have been admitted by the bourgeois press itself, by the Roushaia Volia, among others, which published a communique stating that the stations in the Tambov province are literally blocked by cereals—since the rising of the peasants.
To doubt that the majority of the people are now with the Bolsheviks and following them towards the future, is to hesitate disgracefully and to reject in fact all the principles of proletarian revolutionism; it is to abjure Bolshevism.
"We are not strong enough to take control, but neither are the bourgeoisie strong enough to overrun the Constituent Assembly."
The first part of this reasoning is only a paraphrase of the previous argument, which argument gains nothing in force or persuasive powers because of the expression of confusion and fear of the bourgeoisie, by pessimism about the workers and optimism about the bourgeoisie. If Cadets and Cossacks affirm that they will fight to the end against the Bolsheviks, no one dreams of doubting their word for a moment; but if, in hundreds of meetings, workmen and soldiers express absolute confidence in the Bolsheviks and repeat that they are ready to fight to secure power for the soviets, people think it their duty to point out that voting and fighting are quite different things.
It is obvious that by reasoning thus, the insurrection is condemned beforehand. But it is difficult to see how this one-sided pessimism differs from open adoption of the bourgeois platform.
Consider the facts. Recall the countless declarations of the Bolsheviks, completely "forgotten" by these pessimists of ours. We are not weary of repeating that the soviets of workmen's and peasants' representatives are a force, are the vanguard of the revolution and that they can seize power. Thousands of times we have reproached the Mensheviks and Social-Revolutionaries for their incessant output of sonorous phrases about "the plenipotentiary organs of democracy"; and for their fear of the soviets seizing power.
What did the Kornilov insurrection show? That the soviets are indeed a force.
And yet, after this impressive demonstration, we shall repudiate Bolshevism, deny our own principles, and say that we are not strong enough (though the soviets of both capitals and the majority of the provincial soviets are Bolshevik)! Are not such procrastinations shameful? In a word, our pessimists, without daring to say so, do nothing less than reject the resolution: "All Power to the Soviets!"
How can it be proved that the bourgeoisie is not strong enough to overturn the Constituent Assembly?
If the bourgeoisie is not strong enough to break up the soviets, it is sufficiently strong to overturn the Constituent Assembly, for there is no one to prevent it. To believe the promises of Kerensky, and his friends, to believe the resolutions of the Pre-parliament lackeys; is this an attitude worthy of a member of the proletarian party, of a revolutionary?
The bourgeoisie is not only strong enough to overturn the Constituent Assembly if the present government continues, but it can bring about the same result indirectly by handing over Petrograd to the Germans, by opening the front, by an increase of lock-outs and by interfering with the arrivals of grain. It has already done all these things to some extent. Hence it is strong enough to do them completely, if the workers and the soldiers do not overturn it.
"The soviets must be a pistol held to the head of the government, to force it to call together the Constituent Assembly and to disclaim the attempts at Kornilov."
This is what one of our two deplorable pessimists dared to say!
And he had to say it, for to disclaim the insurrection is to disclaim the resolution: "All Power to the Soviets!"
Certainly, resolutions are not sacred. But why did no one raise the question of modifying the resolution: "All Power to the Soviets" (as I myself did after the events of July)? Why be afraid openly to ask that it be revised considering that since September the party has been examining the question of the insurrection, which henceforth is alone capable of giving complete power to the soviets?
To this, our deplorable pessimists can give absolutely no answer. To renounce the insurrection is to renounce the giving of power to the soviets: As far as realising the hopes and dreams of the people is concerned, it is throwing ourselves on the magnanimity of the bourgeoisie, who "promised" to call together the Constituent Assembly.
Is it really so difficult to understand that, if power comes into the hands of the soviets, the Constituent Assembly and its success are safe? The Bolsheviks have repeated this until it has become monotonous, and no one has ever tried to contest their statement. This "combined form" is agreed on by everyone; but now to extol, under the name of "combined form," the abandonment of the handing of power to the soviets; to extol this abandonment secretly without daring openly to repudiate our resolution; what can be said of this? Is there a parliamentary expression to describe such an attitude?
An unloaded pistol! This was the answer rightly made to our pessimist. If this is right, it is ranging oneself at once with the Libers and the Dans, who have thousands of times proclaimed that the soviets were a pistol, and thousands of times have deceived the people; for, under their control, the soviets were absolutely nothing at all.
But if we want a bullet in the pistol, this is equivalent to preparing the technique of the insurrection, for the bullet must be found and the pistol loaded: besides, one bullet will not be enough.
We must either frankly adopt the Liber-Dan platform and frankly renounce the resolution: "All Power to the Soviets," or we must adopt straight-out insurrection. There is no middle course.
"… The bourgeoisie, in spite of Rodzianko's desire, cannot deliver Petrograd to the Germans, for it is not the bourgeois, but our heroic sailors who do the fighting. …"
This argument, too, is charged with that "optimism" about the bourgeoisie which is shown only too clearly at every moment by those who have only pessimism for the strength and revolutionary capacity of the proletariat.
It is the heroic sailors who do the fighting, but this did not prevent two admirals from running away before the capture of Essex Island.
This is a fact! Facts are facts. They prove that admirals, just as much as Kornilov, are capable of being traitors. The general staff has not changed, the corps of officers is Kornilovian: this, too, is an irrefutable fact.
If the Kornilovians (directed by Kerensky who is a Kornilovian himself) want to give up Petrograd, they have two, even three ways of doing so.
First of all, they could, through treason among the highest officers, open the Northern sector of the land front.
Secondly, they could arrange with the German and the English imperialists for the freedom of action of the whole German Fleet, which is stronger than ours, and which will be directed against us. Besides the "vanished" admirals have been able to give our plans to the Germans.
Thirdly, by a lock-out and by interfering with the arrival of barley, they could reduce our troops to despair and to complete helplessness.
None of these possibilities should be left out of account. Facts have proved that the bourgeois cossack party in Russia has already knocked at three doors and tried to open them.
What then? Why then, it is our duty not to wait till the bourgeoisie will throttle the revolution.
We must not despise Rodzianko's intentions, for experience has tested him. Rodzianko is a man of action. It is incontestable that capital is on his side. Now capital is an enormous force so long as the proletariat has not possession of power. For decades Rodzianko has shown unbounded devotion to the political ends of capital.
To hesitate, then, on the question of insurrection, to hesitate to recognise that insurrection is the only way of saving the revolution, is to hand oneself entirely to the bourgeoisie, to sink into that cowardly state of confidence which characterises revolutionary socialism, Menshevism and the apathy of the "moujik," and against which the Bolsheviks have directed their most violent attacks.
Either let us fold our arms and, uttering professions of "faith" in the Constituent Assembly, wait till Rodzianko and his henchman betray Petrograd and the whole revolution—or let us decide on insurrection. There is no middle course.
But even the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, if that is all, does not alter the situation; for no constitution, no vote by an assembly, even the most sovereign body, would be able to conquer famine and Wilhelm. The convocation of the Constituent Assembly and its efficacy depend on the seizure of power by the soviets: this is an ancient Bolshevik truism, which events are confirming more and more ruthlessly and irrevocably.
"… We are getting stronger every day, we can form a powerful opposition in the Constituent Assembly; why risk everything on one throw? …"
This is the logic of a Philistine, who has read that the Constituent Assembly was to be called together, and who trusts implicitly in the ability of legal and constitutional methods to resolve the situation.
Unfortunately, the question of famine can no longer be solved, nor can that of the surrender of Petrograd, by waiting for the Constituent Assembly. This is what is forgotten by the simpletons, those who have lost their heads and those who have given way to their fears.
Hunger does not wait. The peasant insurrection did not wait. War does not wait. The vanished admirals did not wait.
Or perhaps because we, the Bolsheviks, proclaim our faith in the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, hunger will kindly consent to wait? Would the vanished admirals agree to wait? Would the Maklakovs and Rodziankos agree to give up the lock-out, stop interfering with grain arrivals, and cease their secret negotiations with English and German imperialists?
This, in fact, is what seems to stand out from the point of view of the champions of "constitutional illusions" and of Parliamentary feeble-mindedness. These people do not wish to see and cannot see anything of real life: for them the only realities are the paper announcing the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, and the elections.
And these sightless ones are still astonished that a starving people, a soldiery betrayed by their generals and their admirals, can be indifferent to the election! O wise men!
"… If the Kornilovians begin again, we will show them what we are made of. But as for beginning ourselves; what's the good of running the risk of failure? …"
This is in the highest degree convincing and revolutionary. History does not repeat itself, but if we turn our back on it, and, considering the first Kornilov insurrection, say to ourselves: "Aha! if only the Kornilovians begin again": What wonderful revolutionary strategy this is! Exactly like "go where you are pushed!"
Perhaps, we say, the Kornilovians will once more choose a bad time to begin. Isn't this a powerful "argument"? What a serious foundation for proletarian tactics?
Just suppose that the Kornilovians may have learnt something?Suppose that they wait for famine riots, the breaking of the front, the surrender of Petrograd, and only begin at that time? What then?
It is suggested that we base the tactics of the proletarian party on the chance of the eventual repetition by the Kornilovians of their old mistakes!
Let us forget what the Bolsheviks have shown hundreds of times, what has been proved by six months of revolution; let us forget that there is not and cannot be any other solution than the dictatorship of the Kornilovians or of the proletariat; let us forget this, deny it all, and wait. Wait for what? Wait for a miracle; wait for the development of events, which happened so uncontrollably and stormily from April 20 to August 29, to take place suddenly (owing to the prolongation of war and increase of famine) at the peaceful, calm, legal sitting of the Constituent Assembly and the carrying out of its legal decisions.
Here we have real "Marxist" tactics! Wait, ye starving, Kerensky has promised to call the Constituent Assembly together!
"… There is nothing in the international situation, considered as a whole, which obliges us to take immediate action; rather we would damage the cause of the socialist revolution in the West, if we get ourselves shot. …"
This argument is really wonderful: Schiedemann and Renaudel themselves would not be able more cleverly to exploit the sympathy of the workers who wish for the success of the international socialist revolution.
Just consider: under the most difficult conditions, with only Liebknecht (and he still in prison), with no papers, no freedom of meeting, no soviets, in spite of the unchangeable hostility of all classes of the population, even including the better-off peasants, to the idea of internationalism, in spite of the superior organisation of the upper, middle and lower class imperialist bourgeoisie, the Germans, that is the international revolutionary Germans, workers disguised as sailors, have been able to organise an insurrection in the Fleet.
And we, who have dozens of papers, freedom of meeting, a majority in the soviets; we, international proletarians, who, compared to our comrades all over the world, are in an exceptionally favourable position, we would refuse to support, by our own insurrection, the German revolutionaries. We would reason like the Schiedemanns and the Renaudels, would say: "It is better not to attempt a rising, for if we get shot, the world will lose reasonable, model internationalists, incomparable in fact!"
Let us show our wisdom. Pass a motion of sympathy for the German insurgents and keep down insurrection in Russia. This will be reasonable, well-thought-out internationalism. And how rapidly will internationalism flourish in the world if this wise counsel triumphs everywhere?
The war has worn out and tortured the workers of every country. In Italy, in Germany and in Austria, revolutionary explosions are becoming more and more frequent.
We alone, with our soviets of workers and soldiers' deputies, let us alone wait! … Let us betray the interests of the German internationalists as we are betraying the Russian peasants who, by their rebellion against the great landowners, are calling upon us to arise, too, against the Kerensky government.
Let the clouds of the imperialist conspiracy of plutocrats of all countries roll up to overwhelm the Russian revolution; we shall quietly wait till capital has crushed us with its billions. Instead of making an attack upon the conspirators and breaking their ranks with the victory of the soviets of workers' and soldiers' deputies, let us wait for the Constituent Assembly which, it if is called conscientiously by Kerensky and Rodzianko, will triumph by means of the permission to vote of all the international plotters. Why should we doubt the good faith of Kerensky and Rodzianko?
"… But we have 'everybody' against us! We are isolated. The Central Executive Committee, the Menshevik-internationalists, and also the Novaia Zizn have issued and will issue proclamations against us!"
A splendid argument indeed! It is precisely by this isolation that we have won the sympathies of the people. It is by it that we have won the soviets, without which the insurrection could not have been either sure or speedy. Now, let us profit by the fact that we have won the soviets, by also passing, ourselves, into the ranks of hesitation. What a magnificent fate for Bolshevism!
The whole policy of the Liber-Dans and the Tchernovs, as well as that of the S.R.'s and left-wing Mensheviks has been composed of nothing but hesitations. The masses are moving towards the Left. These two facts: the movement of about 40 per cent. of the Mensheviks and the S.R.'s into the Left camp, and the peasant rebellion, are in an obvious and undubitable connection.
But it is precisely the nature of this connection which reveals the abysmal apathy of those who are now bewailing the fact that the Central Executive Committee, rotten as it is to the core, or the Left wing S.R.'s and other perpetual hesitators have pronounced themselves against us. If we are to have a real political comparison we must view these hesitations of the petit-bourgeois leaders—Martinov, Kamkov,[2] Soukhanov,[3] and others, in relation to the peasant rebellion.
On whose side are we? With the handful of irresolute leaders at Petrograd who have only indirectly expressed the evolution of the masses towards the Left, and who, at each move Leftwards went shamefully lamenting and wavering and apologising to the Liber-Dans, Avxentievs and consorts—or are we with the masses who have themselves moved to the Left?
It is in this way, and only in this way, that the question must be faced.
As the Martovs, Kamkovs and Soukhanovs have betrayed the peasant rebellion, it is proposed that we, revolutionary internationalists, should follow their example. That is, in short, the essence of the policy of those who are advising us to imitate the left-wing S.R.'s and the Menshevik-internationalists.
We have always said that the best way to help hesitators is to stop hesitating ourselves. These brave petit-bourgeoise Left-wingers hesitated to pronounce for the coalition! We brought them in behind us in the end because we did not hesitate ourselves. And events justified our action.
By their hesitating doubts and fears these gentlemen were losing the revolution. We alone saved it. And now shall we become feeble when hunger is knocking at the gates of that Petrograd which Rodzianko and company are preparing to surrender?
"… But we have not even a solid contact with the railwaymen and post-office workers. Their official representatives are the Planson.[4] Now, is it possible to win without the railways and the post on our side?"
Always the same refrain! The Liber-Dans one moment, and the Planson the next: But have the masses displayed the slightest confidence in these people? Have we not kept on pointing out that these leaders are betraying the masses? Have not the masses detached themselves from these chiefs and come over to us, in the Moscow elections as well as in the soviet elections? Or is it by any chance that the rank and file of railwaymen and post-office workers are not suffering from the famine? Are they not on strike against the Kerensky government? And, before February 28 did we have a contact with these Trade Unions? This was the question which a comrade asked the "pessimist." The latter replied alleging that it was impossible to compare the two revolutions. But this answer only reinforces the position of the questioner. For the Bolsheviks have spoken thousands of times (and not so that it should be forgotten just before the decisive moment) of the long preparation of the proletarian revolution against the bourgeoisie. The main feature of the political and economic life of post-office and railway Trades Unions has been precisely the separation of the proletarian elements of the rank and file away from the petit-bourgeois and the bourgeois upper strata. The important fact is not that we should get "contact" in advance with these two Trade Unions; it is that only the victory of the proletarian and peasant revolution can give satisfaction to the rank and file of the railwaymen and post-office workers.
"… At Petrograd we have two or three days' bread supply. Can we give bread to the insurgents?"
This is one of the innumerable remarks of the sceptics (who may always "doubt," for they cannot be refuted in any other way than by experience). It is one of those remarks by which blame is laid on the innocent.
As a matter of fact it is Rodzianko and company, as a matter of fact it is the bourgeoisie, who are preparing the famine and speculating upon the stifling of the revolution by famine. There is not and there cannot be another means of escaping the famine than by the insurrection of the peasants against the great landowners in the country, and the victory of the workers over the capitalists in the towns and cities.
Otherwise, it is impossible to take the cereals from the rich, to transport them despite the sabotage of the rich, to break the resistance of the corrupt officials and of the profiteers, and to establish a rigorous control. This much is proved by the history of the organisations and of the food policy of the "Democratic" regime, which never wearied of complaining about the sabotage of the capitalists; to which it only opposed tears and supplications.
There is no force in the world, save that of the victorious proletarian revolution, which is capable of passing to revolutionary action, instead of being restricted to weeping and prayers. And the more the proletarian revolution is postponed, the more prolonged are the hesitations of those who are in perplexity and disarray—the more this revolution will exact great sacrifices; the more difficult will it be to organise the marketing and distribution of bread.
Slackening down in the revolution means death—this is the answer to those who, in face of growing disorganisation and the increasing famine, have the mournful courage to dissuade the workers from rising in revolt: (that is to say, to advise them to wait and to put their trust once more in the bourgeoisie).
"… The situation on the front no longer involves danger. Even if the soldiers conclude an armistice on their own initiative there will be no great harm done. …"
But the soldiers will not conclude an armistice. To conclude an armistice State power is necessary, and it is impossible to obtain this without insurrection. The soldiers will run away—that is all. This much is indicated by all reports coming from the front. It is impossible to wait without running the risk of helping Rodzianko to come to an understanding with Kaiser Wilhelm and without contributing to the complete disorganisation of the army. For if the soldiers are reduced to despair (and they are not far from it) they will run away in a body and abandon everything.
"… But if we seize power and do not obtain either an armistice or democratic peace, perhaps the soldiers will not consent to a revolutionary war. What could we do then?"
This is an argument that recalls the proverb: that an idiot can ask ten times more questions than can be answered by the concerted wisdom of ten wise men.
We have never denied the difficulties which proletarian power will be up against during the imperialist war. Nevertheless we have given our sanction to the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasants. Can we possibly renounce our principles now that the moment of action has arrived?
We have always said that the dictatorship of the proletariat in any one country creates immense changes in the international situation, in its economy, in the situation and state of mind of the army—shall we then "forget" all this now and allow ourselves to be frightened by the difficulties of the revolution?
"… The masses, according to general opinion, have no ardent desire to fight. Amongst the signs which justify pessimism we must also place the growing circulation of the ultra-reactionary Press. …"
All things appear naturally yellow to those who are afraid of the bourgeoisie. In the first place they substitute for the Marxian criterion an intellectual-impressionist criterion. They replace the political estimation of the development of the class struggle and of the general march of events on an international scale, with subjective impressions on the state of mind of the masses; but they forget that the firm line of the Party, its unshakable decision, is also a factor in forming this state of mind; especially at the decisive moment of the revolution. It is sometimes very convenient for responsible leaders to forget that, by their vacillation and their propensity to burn what they worshipped yesterday, they are themselves creating hesitations in certain sections of the masses.
In the second place—and this is most important at the present moment—people without character forget to add, when mentioning the state of mind of the masses, that, "according to general opinion," this state of mind is concentrated and anxious.
That, "according to general opinion," the workers would rise as one man on the appeal and for the defence of the soviets.
That, "according to general opinion," the state of mind of the masses is only confined to despair and that the growth of anarchy is nothing but the result of this state of mind.
That, "according to general opinion," there exists amongst the class-conscious workers a marked aversion to going out into the streets only for demonstrations, for a partial struggle—because the feeling is in the air that a general battle is approaching and not a partial struggle; because the futility of strikes, demonstrations and isolated pressure has been understood and recognised by all.
And so on.
If we approach the study of the state of mind of the masses from the point of view of the whole development of the class struggle and the political struggle, as well as of the whole course of events during these six months of revolution, we shall clearly see how people terrified by the bourgeoisie have false perspectives. The present point of view is not that of April 20–21, of June 9, of July 3, for then there existed a spontaneous effervescence that we, as a Party, did not take advantage of (April 20); or that we restrained and transformed into a peaceful demonstration (June 9 and July 3). For we knew quite well at that time, that the soviets were not yet on our side; that the peasants still believed in the Liber-Dan-Tchernov method and not in the Bolshevik method (insurrection); that, moreover, we could not have had the majority of the people with us; and that, consequently, insurrection would have been premature.
At that time the idea of the final decisive battle had not seized the mind of the majority of thinking workers; not a single party committee even considered the question. As for the partly-conscious masses, they had not yet been thrown back on their own resources, they had not yet the courage of despair. They were seized with a spontaneous effervescence, with the simple hope that an "intervention," or even simply a demonstration, would suffice to "influence" the Kerenskys and the bourgeoisie.
Now, for an insurrection something entirely different is required. What is necessary is, on the one hand, the deliberate, firm, and unshakable decision of men who have decided to fight to the very end; and, on the other hand, the silent despair of the masses who feel that henceforth half-measures will not bring salvation, that it is impossible to "influence" the government, that the starving will "sweep all away, will break down everything, even anarchically," if the Bolsheviks do not know how to lead them in the decisive struggle.
Now, it is precisely to this concentrated state of mind of thinking men, and to this almost desperate hatred of the masses against the capitalists and factory-owners who are closing down their factories—it is to this state of mind that the development of the revolution has led the workers and peasants.
This fact also explains the "success" of the blackguards of the ultra-reactionary press who are serving up to the people a counterfeit of Bolshevism. The monarchists are rejoicing as they see the approach of the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie; but it has always been thus in all revolutions—this is absolutely inevitable. And if we allow ourselves to be frightened by this fact, we must give up, not only the hope of insurrection, but also the proletarian revolution itself. For, in capitalist society, this revolution cannot develop without calling forth the wicked joy of the monarchist clique who hope to have good fishing in troubled waters.
Intelligent workers know perfectly well that the monarchists are working hand in glove with the bourgeoisie, and that the decisive victory of the proletariat (which the petit-bourgeois do not believe in which the capitalists fear; which some avowed revolutionaries wish for, in the hope that the Bolsheviks will not be able to keep power)—this victory, they know, will definitely annihilate the monarchists. And they know that the Bolsheviks will maintain power and will be able to use it for the greatest good of war-weary and war-shattered humanity.
In fact, is there a man in possession of his mental faculties who can doubt that the Rodziankos and the Souvarines[5] are acting in connivance, sharing rôles with one another?
Have not the facts proved that Rodzianko is leading Kerensky by the nose and that the "National Printing Press of the Russian Republic" (don't smile!) is printing, at the expense of the Princess, ultra-reactionary speeches made by monarchists in the Imperial Duma? Has not his fact been revealed even by the flunkeys of Dielo Naroda? Has not the journal of the great Tsarist landowners, the Novoie Vremia itself supported at all elections the candidature of the Cadets?
Did we not read yesterday that industrial commercial capital (non-party, of course!) has subsidised the Cadets to the extent of a mere 300,000 roubles?
Considered from the class point of view and not from the sentimental point of view, the whole of the ultra-reactionary press is only a branch of the firm of "Riabouchinsky, Miliukov & Co." Capital buys up the Miliukovs, &c., on the one hand, and on the other the ultra-reactionaries.
There is no other method than by the victory of the working class to put an end to the scandalous poisoning of the public mind by the reactionary press.
And why should we be astonished if the war-weary and war-shattered people are eagerly absorbing reactionary poison? Is it possible that, in capitalist society on the verge of bankruptcy, despair should not be spread abroad amongst the oppressed masses? And cannot the despair of the masses, amongst whom unthinking elements are numerous, find a form of expression in the steady consumption of all kinds of poison?
The position of those who, in speaking of the state of mind of the masses, invest these latter with their own weakness is untenable. The masses are divided into conscious elements awaiting their time and unthinking elements ready to fall into despair; but the masses of the oppressed and starving are not hesitant and weak.
"… Moreover, a Marxist party should not reduce the question of insurrection to the level of a military plot…"
Marxism is an extremely profound and complex doctrine. Consequently it is not astonishing to meet constantly, amongst those who are breaking away from Marxism, with quotations from Marx which seem to confirm their arguments—especially if these quotations are made in bad faith.
A military plot is pure Blanquism, if it is not organised by the party of a determined class; if the organisers of it have not justly estimated the correct moment in general and the international situation in particular; if they have not on their side the sympathy (proved by deeds) of the majority of the people; if the course of the revolution has not destroyed the illusions and the hopes of the petty bourgeoisie in the possibility and the efficacy of the method of conciliation; if the organisers of the "plot" have not conquered the majority of the organs of revolutionary struggle recognised as "plenipotentiary" organs, or occupying, like the soviets, an important place in the life of the nation; if in the army (when the thing happens in war-time) there is not a determined hostility against a government prolonging an unjust war against the will of the people; if the slogans of insurrection (such as "All Power to the Soviets," "The Land to the Peasants," "Immediate Democratic Peace to all Belligerent Nations," "Annulment of Secret Treaties and Secret Diplomacy," &c.)—if these slogans have not acquired the widest diffusion and the greatest popularity; if the advanced workers are not convinced of the desperate situation of the masses and assured of the support of the country workers (a support proved by an important peasant movement or by a widespread insurrection against the landlords and the government which is defending them); finally, if the economic situation seriously allows hope in a favourable solution of the crisis by peaceful methods and the parliamentary way. …
I think that is enough, is it not?
In my pamphlet "Will the Bolsheviks Maintain Power?" (which I hope will appear any time now) I have made a quotation from Marx which has a real connection with the question of insurrection, and fixing the rules of insurrection considered as an "art."
I am willing to bet that if the croakers who are now shouting against the military plot were invited to explain the difference between the "art" of armed insurrection and a military plot to be condemned from every point of view, they would only be able to repeat what has been said above, or else they would disgrace themselves and call down upon themselves the general scorn of the workers. Just try it and see, "Marxists of failure"!
Do sing us a little song against the "military plot"!
POSTSCRIPT
The preceding lines were already written when I received, on Tuesday evening at eight o'clock, the Petersburg Sunday papers, amongst which was the Novaia Zizn, in which I read Bazarov's article. M. Bazarov states that "in the town a manuscript sheet is being circulated in which two noted Bolsheviks pronounce themselves against armed action."
If this be true, I beg the comrades whom this letter cannot reach before Wednesday to have it printed as quickly as possible.
It was not intended for publication; it was only a discussion with the party members with whom I am in correspondence. But if the heroes of the Novaia Zizn (who voted for the Bolsheviks on the day before yesterday, and for the mensheviks yesterday, and who have almost succeeded in bringing the two together in the famous Unity Congress)—if these heroes, who do not belong to our party, and whom we have chided time after time for their contemptible weakness, if such individuals receive a manuscript from the members of our party who are agitating against the insurrection—we cannot possibly remain silent. We must ourselves agitate for the revolt. Let the anonymous writers be definitely revealed and punished, if only by the mockery of all conscious workers, for their shameful hesitations. I have at my disposal only an hour before sending this letter to Petrograd, and that is why I shall indicate in a few words only one of the "arguments " of the mournful heroes of Novaia Zizn. M. Bazarov is trying to reply to the argument of comrade Riazanov who has said, quite truly, that "the insurrection is being prepared by those who are creating despair and indifference amongst the masses."
The mournful hero of a sad cause replies:—
"Have despair and indifference ever conquered?"
O contemptible idiots of the Novaia Zizn! Do they know of any cases in the history of insurrection when the oppressed masses have won in a fight to the death without being reduced to despair by long sufferings and acute crises of every kind?
When have the masses not been disgusted and made indifferent by the servility of pre-parliaments, by tramping about on the Square of the Revolution, and the manœuvres of the Liber-Dans reducing the soviets, organs of power, to the rôle of talk-shops?
Or is it indeed a fact that the imbeciles of the Novaia Zizn have by any chance discovered indifference amongst the masses on the question of the Daily Bread, on the continuance of the war, and the return of the land to the peasants?
FINIS
- ↑ Not at the democratic conference, but later, for instance, the soviet of peasant deputies at Petrograd on October 2.
- ↑ Leader of the Left S.R.'s.
- ↑ Internationalist Social Democrat, of the Novaia Zizn.
- ↑ Populist and defensist. The Central executive committee of the railwaymen comprised 18 S.R.'s, 6 Mensheviks, 4 Social Democrats, 1 Cadet, &c., and only 2 Bolsheviks out of 40 members. But it had to remain neutral in the events of October because of the attitude of the rank and file of railwaymen.
- ↑ Monarchist, editor of the Novoie Vremia.