On the Vital Principle/Book 1/Prelude to Chapter 5
The argument against the opinion of Xenocrates that the Vital Principle is "a number with self-motion" is continued, and Aristotle, having already objected to it as number, proceeds here, after a brief allusion to what had been advanced, to object to it as being motive. If the Vital Principle be some kind of body, then however attenuated its parts, there must be two bodies in one; if it be a number, then as the unit is a point, unless that number be innate and peculiar, every kind of body must have Vital Principle, and this cannot be admitted. With respect to its motion, it had been shewn that the unit, being homogeneous, that is without parts, cannot be so acted upon as to move; if it be motor and moved, it must, as entity, have some distinction, and then it is no longer to be regarded as an unit. The resemblance between this theory and that of Democritus is again alluded to, as the same objection is applicable to both; for it matters not whether the motor be a monad, or point, or corpuscle in motion, since their motion is the cause of motion in other things; thus, both systems maintain a blind force, and ignore the influences of sensibility and will. It will probably be said that the topic has been too long dwelt upon, but it should be recollected what an important part was assigned by the Pythagoreans[1] to number, which they derived from the monad or unit, and regarded as the origin, the matter, and the essential properties of beings, and as constitutive of the heavens. It has already been said how, as numbers were the first entities in nature, they perceived resemblances to beings and qualities in them rather than in the elements fire, &c.; and hence made one combination to be justice, another mind, and so on.
- ↑ Metaphys. I. 4, 5.