On the Vital Principle/Book 2/Prelude to Chapter 2
As the purport of this chapter is to determine the essential or characteristic properties of the Vital Principle in order to attain to a solid definition, it commences, very appropriately, with a short disquisition upon that form, and a protest against any deviation from its real purport; and thus the argument of the foregoing chapter is continued. The opening paragraph is necessarily obscure, from the nature of its topic, but it may be practically at least elucidated, by reference to similar topics in the other works. It is observed by Aristotle[1], that the antecedent is, absolutely speaking, more apprehensible than the sequence, as a point e.g. is than a line, a line than a surface, and a surface than a solid; so too an unit is more apprehensible than a number (for the unit is the origin of all number), as a single letter is than a syllable. But sometimes, on the other hand, the reverse of this happens—for as it is the solid, especially, which falls under the senses, so the surface is more apprehensible than the line, and the line than the point; as the multitude (οἱ πολλοὶ) are already conversant with them, while the sequences are to be acquired only by attention, or some peculiar mental faculty. Thus, to speak generally, it is best to gather knowledge concerning sequences through their antecedents; for this is by far the most scientific mode of conducting an inquiry. In fine, whatever falls under the senses seems, from being familiar to us, to be more apprehensible than principles or causes, which are more or less abstractions; as, the falling of a stone seems to be more apprehensible than the principle of Gravitation. But as the knowledge of any subject may be also acquired through the study of its accidents, that is, its essential properties, so it is suggested that the knowledge of Vital Principle may be arrived at through the study of its faculties.
- ↑ 1 Topica, VI. 4, 5.