legislated for the things of time had enough to do. Let not the same body, or at least let not exactly the same body, legislate for the things of eternity. Let some manifest difference be made between the national court when it takes in hand the concerns of man's temporal existence, and the national court when it takes in hand the concerns of his life everlasting.
This appeal was favourably responded to. It was decided that the ministers of religion should not be incorporated with Parliament, but that another plan should be adopted—that a new supreme national council should be established for deliberation on sacred affairs. And now, what happened? This happened. The one Scottish Parliament became, under the agitation of the Reformers, two Scottish Parliaments. And our General Assembly of the present day, however much it may have altered its character, is the second and junior of these Scottish Houses of Parliament. Surely our ministers will not complain that we have assigned to the body in which they rejoice an ignoble parentage!
This additional House of Parliament—which the General Assembly originally was, and which it still is in a constitutional point of view—was established on principles quite as liberal as those of its elder sister. The only difference was, that the clergy exercised a considerable influence on its proceedings, as was to be expected when we consider the special purpose for which it had been set on foot—namely, the separate treatment of ecclesiastical affairs. The administration of these affairs was already in the hands of the clergy; it would have been strange indeed had their opinions not been taken in regard to their legislation. Accordingly, the clerical order was largely represented in the General Assembly. But the various congregations were also largely represented. The nobles, too, had their place, and the sovereign was the visible head of the court, as he (or she) still is in the person of the Lord High Commissioner. In short, every historical circumstance connected with its early formation proves that the General Assembly of our church was nothing more and nothing less than what we have called it—an extra House of Parliament, a second supreme National Assembly, organised for the treatment of ecclesiastical topics. We shall see by-and-by that it would be more correct and philosophical to say that this
