- render the domestic communications infrastructure otherwise vulnerable to exploitation, manipulation, attack, sabotage, or covert monitoring, (4) engage in economic espionage activities against corporations that depend on the security and reliability of the U.S. communications infrastructure to engage in lawful business activities, or (5) otherwise engage in activities with potential national security implications; and
- U.S. Legal Process: Whether the Executive Branch will be able to continue to conduct its statutorily authorized law enforcement and national security missions, which may include issuance of legal process for the production of information or provision of technical assistance.[1]
If no immediate concerns were identified, Team Telecom informed the FCC that it had no comment on or objections to the application.[2] As noted above, the FCC did not conduct further review of the issues—the foreign carrier's application was streamlined and deemed approved within 14 days.[3]
If Team Telecom determined that the applicant's foreign ownership or proposed services raised potential concerns, it recommended that the application be removed from the FCC's streamlining process.[4] Team Telecom also requested that the FCC defer any action on the application until Team Telecom's review was complete.[5] Team Telecom then engaged the foreign carrier applicant to learn more about its business and proposed services. Information solicited from the applicant typically included:
- Descriptions of the regulated and unregulated services provided by the applicant, including the technical specifications for providing such services;
- ↑ Executive Branch Recommendation re CTA, supra note 56, at 14–15; Executive Branch Recommendation re China Mobile USA, supra note 56, at 6-7. According to Team Telecom, these factors were developed "based on input from agencies with expertise in national security and law enforcement matters, as well as past experiences evaluating applications referred by the Commission and monitoring the effectiveness of mitigation measures." Executive Branch Recommendation re CTA, supra note 56, at 15.
- ↑ Briefing with the Dep't of Justice (Aug. 1, 2019); FCC Proposed Executive Branch Review Reform, supra note 154, at ¶8; Kathleen Collins, Assistant Bureau Chief, International Bureau, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Remarks for Panel Discussion at the 2d National Forum on CFIUS (July 21, 2015).
- ↑ See 47 C.F.R. § 63.12(a)–(b); FCC Proposed Executive Branch Review Reform, supra note 154, at ¶8; Kathleen Collins, Assistant Bureau Chief, International Bureau, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Remarks for Panel Discussion at the 2d National Forum on CFIUS (July 21, 2015).
- ↑ Briefing with the Dep't of Justice (Aug. 1, 2019); Kathleen Collins, Assistant Bureau Chief, International Bureau, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Remarks for Panel Discussion at the 2d National Forum on CFIUS (July 21, 2015).
- ↑ Briefing with the Dep't of Justice (Aug. 1, 2019); Kathleen Collins, Assistant Bureau Chief, International Bureau, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Remarks for Panel Discussion at the 2d National Forum on CFIUS (July 21, 2015).
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