could attempt to induce companies to come back into compliance with agreement terms or recommend that the FCC revoke a carrier's authorization.[1] Team Telecom officials, however, claimed they do not know what the FCC would deem a sufficient reason for revocation, and none were familiar with the FCC ever revoking an authorization on the basis of national security concerns.[2] Team Telecom officials, however, stressed that site visits were still a helpful tool in that they, at a minimum, signaled to the foreign carriers that Team Telecom was watching from an oversight perspective.[3]
As with the review process, in addition to limited statutory authority,[4] resources have been a major contributing factor to Team Telecom's haphazard oversight.[5] As described above, DHS has only two employees dedicated to Team Telecom—both reviewing applications and monitoring security agreement compliance.[6] DOJ historically had one attorney doing the same.[7] Although it has attempted to increase resources, DOJ currently employs only two attorneys dedicated to compliance monitoring efforts.[8] Those attorneys, along with their supervisor, are responsible for monitoring compliance with more than 100 security agreements.[9]
C. Nearly a Year after the Subcommittee's Investigation Began, the Administration Took Steps to Formalize Team Telecom
Nearly a year after the Subcommittee launched its investigation and extensively engaged with members of Team Telecom, the administration took steps to address systemic issues regarding Team Telecom. On April 4, 2020, the President issued Executive Order 13913, formalizing Team Telecom as the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States
- ↑ Id.; Email from the Dep't of Homeland Sec. to the Subcommittee (June 4, 2020) (on file with the Subcommittee).
- ↑ Briefing with the Dep't of Homeland Sec. (Feb. 7, 2020); Briefing with the Dep't of Justice (Aug. 1, 2019).
- ↑ Briefing with the Dep't of Homeland Sec. (Feb. 7, 2020); Briefing with the Dep't of Justice (Aug. 1, 2019).
- ↑ Team Telecom officials noted that the lack of statutory authority left it with limited enforcement mechanisms. For example, unlike CFIUS, Team Telecom had no subpoena authority or means to protect classified information. See Email from the Dep't of Justice to the Subcommittee (June 3, 2020) (on file with the Subcommittee).
- ↑ See id.
- ↑ Briefing with the Dep't of Homeland Sec. (Feb. 7, 2020). Again, this represents only employees in DHS's Office of Policy, which is the DHS representative to Team Telecom. It does not include employees from other DHS offices, such as the Office of General Counsel, who assist on Team Telecom matters. See Email from Dep't of Homeland Sec. to the Subcommittee (June 4, 2020) (on file with the Subcommittee).
- ↑ Briefing with the Dep't of Justice (Apr. 3, 2020).
- ↑ Id.
- ↑ Id.
46
